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A FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION: THE EVOLUTION OF
KOREAN CIVIL SOCIETY 1972-1987
Sukhee Lee, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University, 2002
This dissertation seeks to explain the evolutionary process of Korean civil
society throughout the 1970s and 1980s as a foundation for democratization. I argue
that the changing character of civil society in the mid-1980s was a necessary
condition for democratic transition in 1987. Thus, this study focuses on how an
ineffective civil society became sufficiently effective to be a deciding factor in
Korea’s democratic transition, and seeks to define what factors led to the change. In
the process of development of civil society, several factors, such as political culture,
economic development, political opportunity structure, and the external environment,
affected the character of civil society.
Most factors had an initial obstructive effect on the character o f democratic
civil society, and thus it remained divided, isolated, and ineffective during the 1970s
and early 1980s. This ineffective character began to shift to an active, united,
assertive, and effective character from the mid-1980s by the favorable and
simultaneous influence of those factors. Moreover, the middle class who had been
passive in supporting democratic civil society and its struggles with the authoritarian
regime began to support and participate actively in the democratic movement after the
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general election in 1985. Due to these changes, democratic civil society began to
attain counter-hegemony against the regime and forced it to make concessions in
1987.
This study demonstrates several findings. First, the changing character of
democratic civil society was a foundation for the democratic transition. Second, the
crucial condition for changing the character of civil society was that those internal
and external elements should affect the character, both favorably and simultaneously.
Third, along with the influence of domestic and international elements, the active
support of the middle class was essential to the success of civil society in the mid1980s.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I. Statement of the Research Problem
In the spring of 1987, Seoul and other major cities in South Korea were filled with
demonstrators who called out “Democratization!” Business people, workers, religious
organizations, and ordinary citizens joined students-led demonstrations on the streets to
demand an end of the authoritarian regime and a fair direct election for president. After
weeks of escalating tension and confrontations between firebomb wielding protesters and
riot police armed with tear gas, the Chun Doo-Hwan regime yielded to the people’s
demands for democratization. Roh Tae-Woo, a presidential nominee of the ruling
Democratic Justice Party, announced democratic programs, including a direct presidential
election and the release of political prisoners, on 29 June 1987, and thus it became a
turning point of Korean democratization. Thus, as many scholars mentioned, the
democratic transition of South Korea was a result of efforts of thousands of individuals
and civil society organizations that fought and suffered over many years.1
Although there are many studies that focus on the role of civil society in the
Korean democratic transition, most studies have stressed only the role of civil society and

1Bret L. Billet, “The History and Role of Student Activism in the Republic of Korea: the politics
of contestation and conflict resolution in fledgling democracy,” Asian Profile (Hong Kong) 20, no. I
(1992): 23-34; Lee Kang-Ro, “Democratization and the Social Movements in South Korea: The Dynamics
of the Bureaucratic Mobilization Regime,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1990); Lee, S.
H. “Transitional Politics of Korea, 1987-1992: Activation of Civil Society,” Pacific Affairs 66, no. 3 (fall
1993): 351-67; Joe Foweraker, Making Democracy in Spain: Grassroots Struggle in the South, 1955-1975
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), vii-viii.

1
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its interactions with the authoritarian regime in the last stage of the democratic transition
process. However, pro-democracy civil society in South Korea had not been strong
enough to force the authoritarian regime to move toward the democratic transition
process, and had not had the capability to challenge the authoritarian regime until the
mid-1980s. In fact, most groups and organizations of civil society in the 1960s and
1970s did not have autonomy from state, and were divided in terms of ideologies,
strategies, and organizations. Therefore, it is significant to find out how this divided,
isolated, and inconsequential civil society of the 1970s and early 1980s changed to an
autonomous and strong social force that could pressure the regime to accept people’s
demands for democratization in 1987. However, in spite of the importance of the long
term evolutionary process of civil society, previous studies have not emphasized the
long-term evolutionary process of civil society and the relationship between the character
of civil society and democratic transition. Because of those limitations, it has been
difficult to understand the whole process of the democratic transition.
Thus, this study argues that the change of civil society through the 1970s and
1980s and its impact on the institutional political arena significantly influenced the
Korean democratic transition. Many important social and political factors, such as
socioeconomic development, the political elites’ role, and a split within the ruling
coalition, influenced the democratic transition. However, more importantly, the changing
character of civil society throughout the 1970s and 1980s was a decisive element of the
Korean democratic transition. That is, the civil society that attained autonomy and
counter-hegemony through the political struggle in the 1970s and 1980s led the regime to

2
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consider negotiations with the opposition party for a constitutional revision in the mid1980s, and finally forced the regime to accept democratic transition in 1987.
This study also attempts to find the main reason of failure and success of the
democratic movement from the changing character of civil society throughout the 1970s
and 1980s. Namely, democratic civil society of the 1970s had many limitations in
struggling with the authoritarian regime because of internal and external difficulties.
Thus, the democratic movement could not be influential and failed to attain counterhegemony against the authoritarian regime.2 However, civil society in the mid-1980s
rapidly grew and expanded by the influence of several internal and external elements and
became a strong political and social force that could challenge the authoritarian regime.
This well-organized and strategically and ideologically united civil society came to have
the capacity to challenge the regime directly and influenced the negotiation process for
the democratic transition of 1987. Therefore, the main research questions of this study
are: how did divided, isolated, and inconsequential civil society of the 1970s change to an
united, assertive, and influential civil society in the mid-1980s? What were the major
elements that influenced the changing character of Korean civil society? How did those
elements affect changing the character of democratic civil society throughout the 1970s
and 1980s? And, how was the democratic transition process in the mid-1980s influenced
by the civil society organizations that were empowered and politically active?
In order to answer these questions, this study will examine several internal and
external factors, such as political culture, economic development, political opportunity
structure, and external environments, which could possibly affect the character of civil

3
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society through the 1970s and 1980s. Those internal and external factors not only
respectively affected changing the character of civil society, but also reciprocally
influenced each other. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the dynamic relationship
among these factors and their influences on the character of civil society. In addition,
because these internal and external factors were closely related to policies and reactions
of the regime toward civil society, interactions between civil society and the regime
should be carefully examined to understand the process of changing the character of civil
society.
Therefore, the main purposes of this study are: 1) examining internal and external
factors that influenced changing a character of Korean civil society throughout the 1970s
and 1980s, 2) analyzing how and when those internal and external factors favorably or
unfavorably influenced the changing a character of civil society, 3) understanding how
civil society organizations attained autonomy and counter-hegemony against the
authoritarian regime through the 1970s and 1980s, and 4) examining the impact of the
civil society, which attained counter-hegemony and autonomy, on the democratic
transition process of 1987.
Since this study covers a long-term evolution process of Korean civil society, the
civil society approach is not enough to explain the whole process of the growing and
changing civil society. Because the civil society approach excessively emphasizes the
role of civil society in the democratic transition rather than its evolutionary process, it is
difficult to examine the long-term evolutionary process of Korean civil society and the

1 Yun Sung-Yi, “Sahoiundongui kwanjumesu bon Hankook Kwonuijuuicheje Byundong” (The
Change of Korean Authoritarianism in the Perspective of the Social Change: focused on the political
opportunity structure), Korean Political Science Review 32, no. 4 (1998): 120-22.

4
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change of its character that had many intervention variables.3 Therefore, synthesizing
pre-existing democratic theories and approaches is very useful to elucidate what the civil
society approach has difficulties in explaining the long-term evolutionary process of
Korean civil society and its influence on democratic transition.
Through examining research questions, this study will reach several conclusions.
First, the divided, isolated, and inconsequential democratic civil society of the 1970s and
early 1980s not only changed to active, united, and assertive civil society, but also it was
supported from the middle class in the mid-1980s. This changed democratic civil society
played a decisive role in the democratic transition of 1987. Second, the waning of the
traditional Confucian political culture strongly influenced the change of civil society and
the democratic struggle in the mid-1980s. In addition, the change of the political culture
affected not only the attitude of the middle class toward the authoritarian regime but also
the basic relationship between civil society and the state. Therefore, development of
political culture was a necessary condition for changing character of civil society.
Third, in the Korean case, economic development had directly influenced the
changing character of civil society as well as indirectly influenced the change by
affecting other internal and external elements, such as political culture and the political
opportunity structure. However, economic development itself is insufficient to explain
the changing character of civil society and attaining counter-hegemony against the
regime. For instance, successful economic development had been favor to the
authoritarian regime rather than civil society until the mid-1980s. Therefore, economic

3 More importantly, civil society approach often dismissed the character of civil society. That is,
certain types of civil society may distort democratic order, and civil society groups and organizations may
contain many uncivil and undemocratic elements. He Baogang, The Democratic Implications o f Civil
Society in China (London: Macmillan, 1997).

5
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development cannot be a sufficient condition, but it is certainly a necessary condition for
changing character of civil society.
Fourth, by the expansion of the political opportunity structure, democratic civil
society was able to revitalize and establish strategically and ideologically united
nationwide organizations for influential struggles with the authoritarian regime.
Moreover, there was a significant change in the character of civil society due to the
expansion of the political opportunity structure. That is, after the political opportunity
structure was expanded, democratic civil society became more active, united, and
assertive and thus could challenge the hegemony of the authoritarian regime. Therefore,
the expansion of the political opportunity structure was another important necessary
condition for changing a character of civil society in South Korea. Fifth, although
external elements were not as important as other internal elements, they could reinforce
the changing character of civil society. In this respect, external elements were also
important and necessary condition for changing the character of civil society.
Finally, despite the fact that each of several factors affected the change of civil
society in South Korea, they could not be a sufficient condition for changing the
character of civil society. In the mid-1980s, simultaneous and favorable influence of
those internal and external factors made the democratic movement more influential, and
thus democratic civil society played a decisive role in the democratic transition of 1987.
Therefore, it is very important that those four internal and external elements affected civil
society at the same time and in the same space in understanding the changing character of
civil society. That is, each o f four elements is a necessary condition for changing the

6
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character of civil society, but it can be a sufficient condition for changing a character of
civil society when they combine at same time and in the same space.

2. Themes of Post-War Governance of South Korea
1) The Military in Politics
For nearly three decades without interruption, the military authoritarian regime
had ruled the country with iron-clad control over its political institutions as well as civil
society in general.4 Under the pretense of protecting the nation from communist forces in
the North and securing national prosperity, military leaders prohibited all types of
organizations as well as individual citizens from engaging in any activities that
challenged their repressive rule.5 As the most important group of the ruling coalition, the
influence of the military directly and indirectly reached every sector of the society. For
example, after the inauguration of the Yushin regime in 1972, the role of the military
became even more significant as a part of the ruling coalition.6
Since the Yushin authoritarian rule, the military of South Korea had consisted of
the regular career group and the political group. President Park intentionally divided the
military and carefully controlled the balance of those two groups. Thus, the internal
division within the military was not serious enough to break down the authoritarian rule.
This internal conflict within the military began to appear more clearly after Park’s death
in 1979, and it developed into an internal power struggle in the transitional process.
Through an internal coup in December 1979, the new military force, a politically oriented
4 Yang Byung-Ki, “Hankookui Goonbujungchie kwanhan Yongu” (The Study on the Military
Politics of South Korea), Korean Political Science Review 27, no. 2 (1993): 178-79.
5 Choi Jang-Jip, Hankook Minjuui Jogunkwa Junmang (Conditions and Prospects of Korean
Democracy), (Seoul: Nanam, 1996); Bruce Cumings, Korea "s Place in the Sun, (New York: Norton, 1997).

7
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military group, came to control not only the military but also the institutional political
arena. Since the new military force took power in 1980, it occupied strategically
important positions in the military, and controlled not only the military but also the
institutional political arena.7 Through these processes, the military had maintained its
political position as one of the most important state institutions, and it continued as such
until the democratic transition of 1987.

2) The Weakness of Democratic Institutions
Traditionally, democratic institutions of South Korea had been weak and used by
authoritarian regimes. Especially, after the military coup in 1961, the domination of the
government over other institutions, such as the court, the National Assembly, and
political party, became stronger. Thus, the National Assembly, political parties, and the
courts had been forced to serve as institutional instruments that merely approved and
supported the policies formulated in the executive branch, controlled by the authoritarian
regime, until the democratic transition in 1987.8 Because of the tight control of the
authoritarian regime over the institutional political arena during the 1970s and early
1980s, those institutions could not attain any autonomy from the regime.9

6 Robert E. Bedeski, The Transformation o f South Korea: Reform and Reconstruction in the Sixth
Republic under Roh Tae Woo, 1987-1992 (London and New York; Routledge, 1994), 23.
7 According to Nordlinger, the military o f South Korea belongs to the “type o f rulers” among
Nordlinger’s category of the military political system. He defined the “type of rulers” as a military regime
that pursues political, economic, and social change through the regime dominance by the direct military
rule. Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, 1977), 22-7.
* Shin Doh C, Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea (Cambridge; Cambridge
University Press, 1999), xxii.
Yun Sang-Chul, 80nyundae Hankookui Minjuhwaiheanggwajung (The Process of Korean
Democratization in 1980s), (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1997), 62.
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Particularly, opposition parties did not play active roles in the democratic
movement during the 1970s and early 1980s, and thus some autonomous social groups
and organizations of civil society played roles of the opposition party. In this respect, the
weakness of the opposition parties caused civil society to grow rapidly and lead the
democratic movement Although there were several opportunities for the opposition
party to attain autonomy from the authoritarian regime and become actively involved in
the democratic movement the opposition party did not take advantage of those
opportunities. The dominant role of the regime over political parties began to change
after the general election of 198S. After the emergence of the strong opposition party as
an outcome of the general election, the opposition party was able to struggle actively
against the authoritarianism inside and outside of the institutional political arena through
establishing a grand coalition with civil society.
During the authoritarian ruling, one distinctive characteristic of the institutional
political arena was that there had not been a close relationship between political parties
and civil society until the general election campaign began in early 1985 because of
differences of ideologies and strategies. After the strong opposition party emerged as an
important actor through the election of 1985, the attitude of civil society toward the
opposition party began to change, and they were willing to establish a coalition with the
opposition party. Through the grand coalition with civil society, the opposition party
could force the authoritarian regime more aggressively to make concessions for
democratization.

9
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3) Economic Development
The economy of South Korea has been rapidly and successfully developing for
the last three decades. Since authoritarian governments had concentrated all efforts on
economic development, their efforts for economic development were successful. The
authoritarian regime elaborated the idea of modernization into a form of ideology that
may be called “developmentalism.”10 Developmentalism here is not meant as a specific
model of economic development as in the context of Latin America, but a set of ideas and
beliefs in a broader sense.11 Through economic development, authoritarian regimes had
justified their authoritarian rule. In order to achieve rapid and successful economic
development, every economic policy had been set and implemented by the government,
and the regime had to suppress labor movements and other social movements that
criticized the suppression of workers and the regime’s economic policy. Thus, the
people’s satisfaction and support toward the economic performance of the regime caused
democratic civil society to be isolated from ordinary people.
In this viewpoint, successful economic development functioned as an element that
reinforced the political foundation of the authoritarian regime. However, the
government-led economic policy inevitably brought economic inefficiency and resulted
in a structurally unbalanced economy.12 Because of the regime’s emphasis on the exportoriented economic policy, economy had come to be dependent on large conglomerates,

10 Bruce Cumings, The Korean Crisis and the End o f “Late" Development (London: New Left
Review, 1998); Im Hyug-Baeg, “The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea,” World
Politics 39, no. 2 (January 1987): 231-57; Muller N. Edward, American Sociological Review S3, no. 1
(February 1988): 50-68.
11 Developmentalism has been characterized by the researchers on Latin America as a model of
economic growth achieved through import-substituting industrialization focused on heavy industry, high
reliance on foreign capital, and state direction of economy.
12 Lim Hyun-ChuL “Chamyoboda Anjunge Chijung” (Concerns more for a Comfortable Life than
for Participation), Wolgan Chosun (April 1985): 90.

10
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and collusion between politics and business (Jungkyimguchak) took place. Due to the
unbalanced economy, conflict between the state and the bourgeoisie, and external
influences, the economy came to face a crisis in 1978. Furthermore, this economic crisis
made the society unstable and caused the ruling coalition to split in dealing with the
economic and political crisis. Eventually, this political instability caused the collapse of
the Yushin regime.
In the 1980s, the structural problem of the economy was not solved, but became
even more serious. The regime was getting less autonomous from conglomerates.
Moreover, from the early 1980s, the relationship between the state and the bourgeoisie
was getting worse because the regime did not responded well toward the capitalists’
demands. Since then, not only capitalists but also ordinary people did begin to express
their dissatisfaction toward the authoritarian regime and criticize economic policies. This
conflictive relationship between the state and the bourgeoisie advantageously affected the
democratic transition. In this regard, economic development had affected the
authoritarian regime, both positively and negatively. The successful economic
development favorably affected the authoritarian rule through drawing more support from
the public. On the other hand, rapid and successful economic development caused the
authoritarian regime to lose its legitimacy and to split the ruling coalition. Furthermore,
it facilitated creation of the middle class who were critical of the regime, and
encouragingly affected the growth of pro-democracy of civil society.
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4) Active but Inconsequential Civil Society
Since its independence, Korean civil society had been isolated, divided, and
inconsequential because of a repressive policy and institutional and financial control of
the authoritarian regime until the mid-1980s. Thus, civil society could not have
autonomy from the state and had to be satisfied with its survival. After the early 1970s,
several politically conscious groups of civil society transformed to pro-democracy groups
and actively struggled for democratization with the authoritarian regime as a reaction to
the regime’s suppression.13 During the Yushin regime, the democratic movement of civil
society had focused on the restoration of the democratic constitution. However,
democratic civil society faced fundamental limitations in its democratic struggle because
of harsh suppression and internal divisions. Thus, civil society could not have the
capacity to overthrow an authoritarian regime. More importantly, pro-democracy civil
society failed to obtain popular support because of its radical ideologies and the political
propaganda of the authoritarian regime.
Right after President Park’s death, civil society had a great opportunity to vitalize
and could actively engage in the transitional politics. However, democratic civil society
failed to take advantage of the opportunity and thus another authoritarian regime was
established in 1980. The new regime suppressed civil society more harshly than in the
previous regimes. In spite of the harsh suppression, unlike civil society of the 1970s,
democratic civil society in the 1980s continued to develop its ideologies and strategies
and tried to establish coalitions among themselves and with the opposition party.
Eventually, democratic civil society came to be revitalized by the expansion of the

13 Yun Sang-Chul, SOnyimdae Hankookui Minjuhwaiheartggwajung (The Process of Korean
Democratization in 1980s), 75.
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political opportunity structure in late 1983 and began to actively struggle to attain
counter-hegemony against the authoritarian regime.14
Furthermore, with the changing a perception of the authoritarian regime and the
participation of the middle class in the democratic movement, democratic civil society
began to penetrate deeply to the society in the mid-1980s. These changes contributed to
moving public discourse from the authoritarian regime to civil society.15 Democratic
civil society established a grand coalition with the public sector and the opposition party
for influential democratic struggles and grew as a strong political and social force that the
regime could not control over. This changed civil society strongly pressured the
authoritarian regime to move toward democratic transition in the mid-1980s, and the
regime had to accept democratic demands in 1987. Therefore, the political struggle of
civil society in spring of 1987 was a culmination of tensions that had been building up
between the authoritarian regime and civil society, which had grown larger and stronger,
with heightened interest in broader political participation.16

S) Traditional Political Culture
As a traditional political culture, Confucianism has been a powerful organizing
principle in South Korea. It provided political, social, ethical and even aesthetic norms
for over five hundred years. It also provided a hierarchical concept of the cosmos and
society, while fusing upward social mobility based on merit and an authoritarian social

14Yun Sung-Yi, “Sahoiundongui Kwanjumesu bon Hankook Kwonuijuuicheje Byundong” (The
Change of Korean Authoritarianism in the Perspective of the Social Movement): 117-19.
13Tun-Jen Cheng and Lawrence B. Krause, “Democracy and Development: with special attention
to Korea"Journal o f Northeast Asian Studies 10, no. 2 (1991): 58.
16 Hagen Koo, “Strong State and Contentious Society,” in State and Society in Contemporary
Korea, ed. Hagen Koo (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 247.
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order.17 Its stress on education has undoubtedly benefited Korean social and economic
development, but it is also true that the principles of traditional Confucianism have not
been conducive to democracy. That is, because of the hierarchical and authoritarian
character of the Confucianism, it had been difficult for people to express dissatisfaction
toward the state and to challenge the authority of the state.18 This traditional political
culture made establishment of authoritarian rule easier and the democratic movement of
social sectors more difficult.19
However, this traditional political culture began to change through the process of
modernization albeit there were still Confucian characteristics not only in the society but
also in people’s thoughts and behaviors. Through the modernization and influence of
Western culture, more people came to believe in the superiority of Western values and
methods. The Western way was embraced completely as a cure for all of South Korea’s
ill, an effective technical formula for economic growth and national security, and a new
basis for building a good society, that is, an American-style mass-consumer society and a
popularly based democracy. Liberal democracy and market capitalism became new state
ideologies, a presidential regime was instituted, and societal actors became increasingly
versatile in using the modem political rhetoric of liberty and equality.20 Thus, the
traditional Confucian political culture became for Korean people something to be
criticized, delegitimized, and dismantled.
Several factors influenced the development of the political culture. Among them,
the influence of Western liberal culture, socioeconomic development, and the spread of
17 Robert E. Bedeski, The Transformation o f South Korea: Reform and Reconstruction in the Sixth
Republic under Roh Tae Woo. 1987-1992,96.
'* Han Sung-Joo, “The Korean Experiment,” Journal o f Democracy (spring 1991): 93.
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Christianity significantly influenced the change of the political culture.21 This changed
political culture through three decades strongly affected not only the relationship between
civil society and the state but also the relationship between the state and people. In
addition, the change of the political culture directly and indirectly influenced not only the
character of civil society but also the Korean democratic transition.

6) External Environments
Since the independence of South Korea, the external environment had been
favorable to authoritarian regimes. After the end of the Korean War, every government
used the issue of national security to legitimize itself. The crude anticommunist ideology
or mentality that emerged from the war reduced Korea’s capacity to develop new
democratic values and ideals. The inevitable outcome was that, for decades, the
authoritarian values of law and order remained unchallenged as the ruling ideology
underpinning the dictatorship. During the 1970s and 1980s, authoritarian regimes
justified their suppression on democratic civil society and opposition leaders with the
national security issue. In this respect, the ideological polarization and military hostility
between North and South Korea may have helped to delay democratization. In addition,
the U.S. support negatively affected democratic transition. The U.S. government had
supported every authoritarian regime since the independence in 1945 for its strategic
national interests. The U.S. even permitted and supported the use of the military to
suppress the democratic movement. This favorite attitude of the U.S. toward
19 Larry Diamond and Kim Byung-Kook, eds.. Consolidating Democracy in South Korea
(London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 9
20 Larry Diamond and Kim Byung-Kook, eds.. Consolidating Democracy in South Korea, 62-3.
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authoritarian regimes began to change from the mid-1980s, and the U.S. directly and
indirectly supported civil society and democratization.
Besides the confrontation between South and North Korea and a change of the
U.S. policy, the Asian Games in 1986 and the Olympic Games in 1988 functioned as
positive elements in the democratic transition of 1987.22 As a host country, the
government could not openly suppress the democratic movement and had to show
improvement of human rights conditions to the world. In addition, the successful
democratic transition in the Philippines greatly influenced not only the character of civil
society but also the democratic movement. For example, the successful democratic
transition in the Philippines provided confidence that the Korean civil society could
successfully achieve democratization. Therefore, external factors certainly contributed to
not only the regime’s strategy for dealing with political crisis but also changing a
character of civil society.

3. Literature Review
1) Literature Review of Democratic Transition
There are many diverse theories and approaches to explain the democratic
transition of the authoritarian regime. According to Dankwart Rustow, those theories of
democratization can be divided into two major groups: functionalist theories and genetic

21 Robert E. Bedeski, The Transformation o f South Korea: Reform and Reconstruction in the Sixth
Republic under Roh Tae Woo, 1987-1992,98-101.
22 Shin Doh C., Mass Politics and Culture in Democratking Korea, 3; Chu Yun-Ham, Fu Hu, and
Moon Chung-In, “South Korea and Taiwan: The International Context,” in Consolidating the Third Wave
Democracies, eds. Larry Diamond, Marc F. Planner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).
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theories.23 Functionalist theories assume that outcomes of transition result from
functional preconditions. On the other hand, genetic theories emphasize open-ended
causal relationships, and consider the transition not as an inevitable process but as one
dependent on how and when it originates and on the outlooks, strategies, and behavior o f
different actors. Thus, genetic theories pay less attention to structurally determined
preconditions and prerequisites for democracy, and more to the strategies available to the
actors involved in the democratic transition and to the specific political arrangements by
which democracy emerges as a solution to contending political actors.
Modernization theory, one of socioeconomic functionalist theories, argues that
higher levels of literacy, education, and urbanization are usually associated with high
levels of economic development, and in turn provides civil understandings and supports
necessary to democratic institutions and practices.24 According to functionalist theorists
like Scott C. Flanagan, the major cause of democratic transition is a functional
dissynchronization between an authoritarian political system and the requirements of the
society. That is, if an authoritarian regime doesn’t fulfill the requirements or needs of the
society, aroused by socioeconomic changes, the authoritarian regime comes to face its
23 Dankwart Rustow, “Transition to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative
Politics 2, no 3 (1970): 337-63.
24 Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases o f Politics (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1981), chapter2 and 14; Philips Cutright, “National Political Development:
Measurement and Analysis," American Sociological Review 28 (April 1963): 253-64; Deane E. Neubauer,
“Some Conditions of Democracy,” American Political Science Review 61 (December 1967): 1002-9; Larry
Diamond, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Juan Linz, “Building and Sustaining Democratic Government in
Developing Countries: Some Tentative Findings,” World Affairs 150, no. I (1987): 5-19; Larry Diamond,
"Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered,” American behavioral Scientist 35,4/5 (1992):
450-99; Larry Diamond, “Introduction: Civil Society and Struggle for Democracy,” in The Democratic
Revolution: Strugglesfo r Freedom and Pluralism in the Developing World, ed. Larry Diamond (London:
Freedom House, 1992); Larry Diamond, “The Globalization of Democracy: Trends, Types, Causes, and
Prospects,” in Global Transformation and the Third World, eds. Robert O. Slater, Bany M. Shutz, and
Steven R. Dorr (Boulder Lynne Rienner, 1993); Larry Diamond, Introduction: Political Culture and
Democracy," in Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries, ed. Larry Diamond (Boulder
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crisis, followed by an emergence of democratic institutions which fulfill the new
requirements.25 However, these functionalist theories are criticized because they do not
distinguish a correlation and causation of independent and dependent variables. For
example, Dankwart Rustow contends that economic prosperity may be the functional
requisite for the maintenance of democracy, but it does not bring the democracy into
existence.26 Robert Dahl also points out that evidence simply does not sustain the
hypothesis that a high level of socioeconomic development is either a necessary or a
sufficient condition for competitive politics nor the converse hypothesis in which
competitive politics is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for a high level of
socioeconomic development.27
In addition, cultural functionalism assumes that there is a direct congruence
between dominant social values and the mode of political domination.28 For example,
East Asian authoritarianism is explained by hierarchical Confucian political culture and
Latin American authoritarianism is explained by Libero-Latin authoritarian, patrimonial.
Catholic, stratified political culture. Almond and Verba identified a so-called “civic
culture” as the one most conducive to democracy. The civic culture is characterized by a
high degree of mutual trust among its members, willingness to compromise and to
tolerate conflicting interests and beliefs. On the other hand, O’Donnell’s theory of the

Lynne Rienner, 1993); Samuel Huntington, The Third World Wave: Democratization in the late Twentieth
Century.
25 Scott C. Flanagan, “Models and Methods of Analysis," in Crisis, Choice and Change:
Historical Studies o f Political Development, eds. Gabriel Almond, Scott C Flanagan, and Robert J. Munt
(Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1973), 46-57.
26 Dankwart Rustow, “Transition to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” 337-63.
27 Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1971).
28 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1963);
Harry Eckstein, “A Theory of Stable Democracy,” in Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study o f
Norway (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).
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bureaucratic authoritarianism demonstrates that some types of authoritarian regimes are
more likely to emerge with a certain level of economic development. Especially, this
theory criticizes Almond’s political cultural theory, as a so-called “civic culture” might
be the outcome rather than the preconditions of democracy. Moreover, Albert O.
Hirschman points out that consensus on basic values and political procedures can often
be shown as a the product of democracy rather than its cause or precondition.29 That is, it
seems uncertain that the change of political culture brings about either institutional
change or democracy.
Therefore, functional theories have difficulties in explaining the specific process
of the democratic transition in Third World countries because the functional theories that
have been developed based on Western experiences tend to ignore unique political and
social conditions of Third World countries. According to these functional theories,
certain socioeconomic preconditions can automatically bring democracy. However, in
reality, democratization has not occurred in many Third World countries in spite of
socioeconomic development In this regard, these functional democratic theories have a
serious limitation in explaining why those Third World countries, which attained
socioeconomic development, did not achieve democratic transition. The main reason of
this is the functional theories mainly ignore the political and social uniqueness of the
Third World countries and other important factors, such as political struggle of civil
society and political leaders’ role in explaining the democratic transition process.

29 Albert O. Hirschman, A Biasfo r Hope: Essays on Development and Latin America (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 30.
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On the other hand, genetic theorists argue that the genesis of democracy should be
studied separately from the functional requisites for its maintenance.30 The genetic
theories emphasize causation more than correlation. For example, genetic theories focus
more on the political actors’ choice and decision than structural preconditions or
determination. According to Laurence Whitehead, the path of democratic transition is
decided ultimately by relevant political actors although structural variables, such as
economic performance, class structure and international systems, do constrain and affect
the course of democratic transition in the Third World countries.31 According to these
theories, there are diverse paths to democratic transition - and non-transition - depending
on the strategies and choices of the relevant actors.
In genetic theories, there are various models of democratization, such as the
“Transition from Above” model,32 the “Projection of Hegemonic Bourgeoisie” model,33
the “Opening through Election” model,34 the “Invisible Transition” model,35 and the
“Standoff’ model.36 In addition, the “contingent choice” model emphasizes the political
actors’ strategic choice more than structural preconditions or determination in the process

30 Dankwart Rustow, ‘Transition to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” 346.
31 Laurence Whitehead, “International Aspect of Democratization," in Transitionsfrom
Authoritarian Rule. eds. O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1986), 38
32 Donald Share and Scott Mainwaring, “Transitions through Transition: Democratization in Brazil
and Spain,” in Political Liberalization in Brazil: Dynamics, Dilemmas, and Future Prospects, ed. Wayne
A. Selcher (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 17S; Philippe Schmitter, “Liberation by Golpe:
Prospective Thoughts on the Demise of Authoritarian Rule in Portugal,” Armed Forces and Society 2, no. 1
(1975); Nicos Poulantzas, The Crisis o f the Dictatorship: Portugal Greece, Spain (London: New Left
Books, 1976).
33 Peter Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance o f Multinational, State and Local Capital in
Brazil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 267.
34 Im Hyug-Baeg, “Politics of Transition: Democratic Transition from Authoritarian Rule in South
Korea,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1989).
33 Manuel Antonio Garreton, “Political Processes in an Authoritarian Regime: The Dynamics of
Institutionalization and Opposition in Chile, 1973-1980,” in Military Rule in Chile: Dictatorship and
Opposition J. eds. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1986).
36 Dankwart Rustow, “Transition to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” 337-63.
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of democratic transition has noticed. According to this model, democratization is
characterized by a high degree of uncertainty. Consequently, the dynamics of
democratization necessarily revolve around strategic interactions between actors with
uncertain power resources. Contingency implies that political outcomes in the process of
democratization depends less on objective conditions than subjective rules surrounding
strategic choices made by the elite.37 Thus, the right decisions by elites, both from
authoritarian regimes and the opposition force, are crucial to the outcomes of
democratization.38 In addition, Frances Hagopian argues that democratic institutions
arising out of “pacted” transitions tend to have greater chances of survival. Elitists in
nature, such pacts usually restrict the scope of direct mass participation during the
transition stage and so lessen the fears of authoritarian elites and their incentives to
reverse the transition process. These political pacts usually affect the rule-making aspect
of democracy rather than a broader socioeconomic democratization.39
Besides the functionalist and genetic theories of democratization, many scholars
who study democratization have recently focused on a role of civil society in the
democratic transition process. According to this civil society paradigm, the political
struggle of civil society with an authoritarian regime is a main source of democratization,
and thus the role of civil society is very important, not only in the process of democratic
transition, but also in democratic consolidation.40 Thus, civil society has been considered

17Terry Lynn Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America.” Comparative Politics 23
(1990): 6.
}1 Baohui Zhang, “Corporatism, Totalitarianism, and Transitions to Democracy,” Comparative
Political Studies (April 1994): 110.
19 Frances Hagopian, “Democracy by Undemocratic Means?: Elites, Political Pacts, and Regime
Transition in Brazil," Comparative Politics 23, no 2 (July 1990): 147-70.
40 Leonardo Avriter, “Introduction: The Meaning and Employment of Civil Society in Latin
America,” Constellation 4 (1997): 88-93; David L. Blaney and Mustapha K. Pasha, “Civil Society and
Democracy in the Third World: Ambiguities and Historical Possibilities," Studies Comparative
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as a very important variable in the analysis of the actual processes of democratization and
future possibilities in the Third World countries.41 For example, in Southern Europe and
Latin America, civil society was resurrected as soon as the first step toward political
liberalization had been made, and the subsequent massive democratic struggle of civil
society broke down authoritarian rule.42 In Eastern Europe, independent and well
organized civil society, after liberalization, played a decisive role as a necessary
condition for democratic transition.43 In Africa, political struggles of civil society have
played a decisive role in the struggle for democratization, and it is highly unlikely that a
viable democracy can survive without a civil society.44 Also, in Asia, the growth of civil
society has played a crucial role in the democratic transition because the impetus of the
political progress primarily came from the conflict and compromise between the
increasingly organized civil society and the ruling party.45
Although existing literatures of civil society and democratization focus on the role
of civil society in the democratic transition process, not many literatures focus on how

International Development 28 (1993): 3-23; Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, “Secondary Associations and
Democratic Governance,” Politics and Society 20 (1993): 393-472; Larry Diamond, “Introduction: Civil
Society and the Struggle for Democracy," in The Democratic Revolution: Struggles for Freedom and
Democracy in Developing World, ed. Larry Diamond (New York: Freedom House, 1992).
Larry Diamond, “Toward Democratic Consolidation,” in The Global Resurgence o f Democracy,
eds. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Planner (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
19%), 227-40.
42 Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schminer. Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule: Tentative
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 48-56.
43 Michael H. Bernhard, “Civil Society and Democratic Transition in East Central Europe,”
Political Science Quarterly 108, no 2 (1993): 326.
44 Robert Fanon, Democracy and Civil Society in Africa, Mediterranean Quarterly 2, no. 4
(1991): 83-93; Dwayne Woods, “Civil Society and in Europe and Africa: Limiting State Power through a
Public Sphere,” African Studies Review 35 no. 2 (1992): 77-100.
45 Thomas B. Gold, “Resurgence of Civil Society in China,” Journal o f Democracy 1, no. 1
(1990); David Strand, “Protest in Beijing: Civil Society and Pacific Sphere in Beijing,” Problems o f
Communism 39, no. 3 (1990); Ahn Chung-Si, “Economic Development and Democratization in Korea: An
Examination on Economic Change and Empowerment of Civil Society,” Korea and World Affairs 15
(1991); Gordon White and Jude A. Howell, In search o f Civil Society: Market Reform and Social Change
in Contemporary China (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); David M. Jones, “Democratization,
Civil Society, and Illiberal Middle Class Culture in Pacific Asia,” Comparative Politics 30, no. 2 (1998).

22

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

civil society emerges and attains counter-hegemony against the authoritarian regime, and
how weak organizations and groups of civil society under authoritarian rule develop into
a strong and united civil society. Thus, it has been difficult to understand the whole
process of democratization by the political struggle of civil society and long-term
interactions between civil society and the state. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the
nature and the evolution process of civil society, especially the changing character of
civil society and its influence on democratic transition.
Many social, political, economic, and cultural factors, such as economic
development, political culture, and political opportunity structure, can influence changing
a character of civil society. In particular, the political opportunity structure is a very
important necessary condition for changing character of civil society. Generally, the
political opportunity structure is defined as dimensions of the political environment that
provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their
expectations for success or failure.46 O’Donnell and Schmitter assert that normal science
methodology is not appropriate to study rapidly changing situations like liberalization
and democratization.47 Thus, the concept of the political opportunity structure can help
to explain how civil society attains counter-hegemony and forces the authoritarian regime
to concede for democratic transition.
The political opportunity structure can also be altered by several factors, such as
repression of the state, elite fragmentation, existence of supportive forces outside of the
social movement organizations, and the power configuration in the institutional political
arena. First, when the level of state repression increases, activities of civil society will be
46 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 85.
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constrained, and vice versa. Second, elite fragmentation certainly opens space for the
opposition force. Third, the existence of supportive force outside of civil society
organizations is also an important factor that can change the character of civil society.
Fourth, the emergence of strong opposition parties and their alliances with civil society
place meaningful pressure on the authoritarian regime and facilitated democratic
transition. The relationship between civil society and the political opportunity structure
is reciprocal. That is, the strengthened civil society can transform the political
opportunity structure in their favor.48
In addition to the nature of civil society and its character change, strategies of
civil society for influential struggle with an authoritarian regime are also important.
Particularly, in expaining and analyzing strategies of civil society, a “war of position”
and a “war of maneuver,” introduced by Antonio Gramsci, are very useful concepts to
analyze interactions between civil society and an authoritarian regime. According to
Antonio Gramsci, the “war of maneuver” is a direct challenge against the state, such as
violent demonstrations, electoral revolutions, workers’ revolutions and so on. Through
strong collective efforts, civil society can challenge and overthrow the ruling bloc.
However, Gramsci argues that the “war of movement” or “war of maneuver” cannot be
effective against hegemonic states, such as those in Western Europe because civil society,
under bourgeois hegemony, is much more fully developed and takes manifold forms. A
“war of movement” might conceivably enable a revolutionary vanguard to seize control
of the state, but because of the resistance of civil society, such an exploit would, in the

47 O’Donnell and Schmitter, “Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies,” 4.
48 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development o f Black Insurgency 1930-1970
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 146.
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long run, be doomed to failure.49 A premature attack on the state by a “war of
movement” would only reveal the weakness of the opposition, and lead to a re-imposition
of bourgeois dominance as the institutions of civil society reasserted control.
By articulating the concept of a “war of position,” on the other hand, Gramsci
tries to put forward a fundamentally new theory of revolution. This is a more
fundamental strategy than a “war of movement” The purpose of this strategy is to make
people (workers and peasants) gradually have political consciousness, and make them
realize that they are exploited by the ruling bloc. This strategy includes education, use of
mass media, role of political entrepreneurs, spreading propaganda, and so on. Such a
revolution would be an extended campaign for hegemonic influence among the
population at large. As a strategy for political change, the “war of position” resolves an
imbalance between the powers and needs of the proletariat, as well as eliminating the
radical conjunction of violent means and ethical ends that has plagued classical
Marxism.50
Particularly, in considering the capacity of civil society in struggling with an
authoritarian regime, its nature is very significant Some scholars, like Benjamin R.
Barber, assert that it is difficult to expect an active role of civil society in the
democratization without a strong democratic civil society.51 That is, most civil society
organizations and groups in the Third World countries were not well organized and were
divided by their goals, ideologies, and strategies. Because of the weakness and split of

49 Robert W. Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method,” in
Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations, ed. Stephen Gill (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993), 53.
Walter M. Adamson, Hegemony and Revolution: A Study o f Antonio Gramsci’s Political and
Cultural Theory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 236-37.
51 Benjamin R. Barber, A Placefo r Us: how to make society civil and democracy strong (New
York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 38-68.
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civil society, its democratic movements have been inconsequential, and they have been
easily suppressed by authoritarian regimes. However, this passive, isolated, and divided
civil society slowly develops to a united political and social force in terms of
organizations, ideologies, and strategies, and challenges authoritarian regime to attain
counter-hegemony. This change of character is a very important element in attaining
counter-hegemony and forcing the authoritarian regime to move toward the
democratization process. In spite of the importance of examining the character of civil
society, however, previous studies of democratization and civil society have not focused
on the evolution process and changing a character of civil society. As a consequence, it
has been difficult to understand the long-term evolution process of civil society and its
influence on the democratic transition process.

2) Literature Review of Korean Democratization
The successful democratic transition of South Korea still remains largely
unexplored using most theories and methods of comparative inquiry. Unlike its
counterparts in Southern Europe and Latin America, South Korea has received little
attention in the large body o f theoretical and empirical literature that is concerned with
the world's current wave o f democratization.52 Those studies that have been done have
taken the perspective of a mixed set of approaches, such as elite-oriented theory,
modernization theory, and civil society approach. Some previous studies that were
conducted based on elite-oriented theories emphasized the social and political elites’
52 Richard Gunther, Nikiforos Diamondouros & Hans-Jurgen Puhle, eds.. The Politics o f
Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1995), 1-32; Juan J Linz and Alfred Stephan, Problems o f Democratic Transition and
Consolidation: Southern Europe. South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: The Johns
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roles and decisions in the process of democratic transition. Those studies tried to explain
the Korean democratic transition as an outcome of the elites’ disposition, calculation, and
interactions between ruling elites and the opposition challegers. Thus, the most important
factor facilitating the democratic transition of South Korea was the ruling elites’ decision
to accept democratic demands and opposition party members’ entrepreneurship. For
example, Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Young-Sam, who had been major opposition leaders
since the 1970s, used both the regular political arena and the streets to force the Chun
Doo-Hwan regime to move toward the democratic transition process in 1987.53 If
organized political parties had not been working in both arenas, the massive
demonstrations could have resulted in a temporary regime breakdown, with no transition
to a democracy.
Thus, some scholars, like Edward Friedman, emphasize that democratic transition
requires bargaining and rule setting by political leaders who are working within the
institutional political arena.54 The negotiations can be prompted by street
demonstrations, but the rule-setting process requires politicians and a bargaining game.
That is, the political leaders’ roles taken in the institutional political arena was a decisive
factor in the democratic transition of South Korea.55 On the other hand, scholars, like
Ahn C. S., point out that the Korean democratization is a perfect example of
Huntington’s term “transplacement,” Donald Share’s “transition through transaction,”

Hopkins University Press, 1996); Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyn Huber Stephens & John D. Stephens,
Capitalist Development and Democracy (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1992).
33 Shin Doh C. Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea, 1-2.
MEdward Friedman, The Politics o f Democratization: Generalizing East Asian Experience (CO.
Boulder. Westview Press, 1994).
33 Some scholars like Im Hyug-Baeg argue that the democratic transition was a result of the split
of the ruling coalition into hard-liners and soft-liners. Im Hyug-Baeg, “Democratic Transition in Korea: A
Strategic-Choice Analysis,” a paper presented at the Conference o f the Korean Political Science
Association, Seoul, Korea, 1991.
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Karl and Schmitter’s ‘"transition by pact,” and Przeworski’s “democracy with guarantee.”
In these terms, the government made a concession and opposition groups accepted it as a
compromise to avoid mutual catastrophe.56 However, because the elite-oriented theories
mainly focus on the political leaders’ role in the process of the democratic transition, they
have ignored what influenced the elites’ decisions and behavors in the democratic
transition process. Moreover, many studies, conducted on the basis of elite-oriented
theories, have stressed the political actors’ decisions and interactions with the opposition
forces at the moment of the democratic transition. For example, Moon Chung-In and
Kim Yong-Chul focused on how and why the political leaders on the both ruling and
opposition side reached an agreement for the democratic transition, and what the role of
political leaders in the democratic transition process of South Korea was.57
Like this, many scholars provide insufficient focus outside of the institutional
political arena, such as the political struggle of pro-democracy civil society. That is, they
dismiss the point (or at least pay it no heed) that the democratic transition involves long
complicated and uncertain interactions between the authoritarian regime and pro
democracy civil society. Particularly, in the case of South Korea, the long-term
democratic struggle by civil society was a significant factor that changed ruling and
opposition elites’ attitudes and behaviors. Because of the emphasis on one sector of the

56 Ahn, C. S. “Democratization and Political Reform in Korea: Development, Culture, Leadership,
and Institutional Change.” in Korea in the Global Wave o f Democratization, eds. Shin, D. C., Zoh, M. H.,
& Chey, M (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1994), 161-78; Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave:
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Donald Share, “Transition to Democracy and Transition
through Transaction,” Comparative Political Studies 19 (1987); Karl and Schmitter, “Modes of Transition
in Latin America, Southern, Eastern Europe,” International Social Science Journal 138, (1991); Adam
Przeworski, “Games of Transition,” in Issues in Democratic Consolidation, eds. Scott Mainwaring,
Guillermo O’Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992).
57 Moon Chung-In & Kim Yong-Chul, “A Circle of Paradox: Development, Politics and
Democracy in South Korea,” in Democracy and Development: Theory and Practice, ed. Leftwich Adrian
(Cambridge, MA: Polity Press), 1996.
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society and covering a short period of the democratization process, most elite-oriented
studies can explain only a part of the long democratic transition process.
There are also studies that examine the Korean democratic transition based on the
modernization thesis that emphasizes a correlation between socioeconomic development
and democratization.58 Those studies basically argue that the successful socioeconomic
development was the main causal variable in the Korean democratic transition of 1987.
Haggard and Kaufman call this mode of democratic transition “the authoritarian
withdrawal in good times.”59 Socioeconomic development, such as a certain level of percapita income, education and urbanization, resulted in the formation of a relatively strong
middle class, who came to have democratic values and attitudes, caused the regime to
accept democratization. For example, Hahm Chai-Bong is such an author.60 According
to him, Korean democratization was a result of a “crisis of success” rather than a “crisis
of failure.”
Pak Se-Jin also characterizes the democratization of South Korea as an outcome
of a “crisis of success.” According to him, the kind of Korean democratization can
neither be characterized as the “East Asian” model nor as liberal democracy in the
“Anglo-American” style.61 The “crisis of success” brought a crisis of legitimacy, and the
authoritarian regime adopted liberalization policies to overcome the legitimacy problem.
The result of liberalization was that both the opposition party and civil society
organizations took up the struggle for democratization against the authoritarian regime.
51 Martin Seymour Lipset, “Some Social Requisites o f Democracy: Economic Development and
Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (1959), 69-105.
59 Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, Political Economy o f Democratic Transition
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
40 Hahm Chai-Bong, “Democratic Reform in Korea Promise of Democracy,” Korea Focus 5, no. 5
(Sept-Oct. 1997): 38-49.
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However, Pak’s study does not explain a causal relationship between the successful
economic development and civil society’s attainment of counter-hegemony against the
authoritarian regime. Therefore, it has a limitation in explaining the whole development
process of civil society as one variable to explain Korean democratic transition.
Han Sung-Joo emphasizes the role of the middle class in the process of the
democratic transition as an outcome of socioeconomic development. According to him,
there were several socioeconomic factors that influenced the democratic transition of
South Korea, including 1) democratic socialization among a highly literate populace; 2)
the growth of the middle class whose members are becoming increasingly confident with
economic achievement and political rights; 3) the high cost of repression resulting from a
rapidly growing democratic movement; 4) the national desire to be accepted and
recognized by the outside world as a modem democratric nation; 5) a status that is
becoming increasingly important in continued economic expansion; and 6) the particular
externality of South Korea as a nation closely allied with the United States for its acute
security needs.62
However, most studies that applied the modernization thesis do not explain why
the democratic transition of South Korea took place when it did. Another weakness is
that many studies tend to overstress the role of the middle class who had not been
significant until the transitional moment of the mid-1980s. For example, David Steinberg
argues that urbanization, one of the consequences of economic development, was an

61 Pak Se-jin, “Two Forces of Democratization in Korea,” Journal o f Contemporary Asia 28, no. 1
(1998): 45-73.
62 Han Sung-Joo, “South Korea: politics in transition,” in Democracy in Developing Countries,
eds. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, 3, (London: Adamantine Press, 1988), 267303.
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important cause of the Korean democratic transition.63 As urbanization increased, the
relative freedom of the population to express its voting preferences was far less restricted,
and the authoritarian regime lost control over social groups. As another consequence of
urbanization, Steinberg points out the growth of the middle class. The status of the
middle class in South Korea essentially conveys three messages: 1) hope in a society in
which the lives of children will be better than those of the parents; 2) a conservatism that
has been evident in voting patterns, which indicates that this group wants to protect these
gains; and 3) a sense of participation in the political process. Thus, Steinberg concludes
that urbanization and pluralism, based on successful economic development, were very
significant conditions of the democratic transition of South Korea.
Despite the fact that many studies have emphasized the growth of the middle class
and its role in the democratic transition, those studies failed to clearly explain how the
middle class suddenly turned its back on the authoritarian regime and participated in the
democratic movement in the mid-1980s. The democratic struggle of civil society,
including the middle class, in the mid-1980s was not a direct consequence of economic
development. Even though the socioeconomic development influenced the changing
character of civil society and provided social and economic resources to civil society, it
did not directly cause civil society to struggle more actively and aggressively with the
authoritarian regime. For example, the middle class, after the mid-1980s, began to be
politically and morally motivated rather than economically, and actively participated in

a David I. Steinberg, “The Republic of (Corea: Pluraiizing Politics,” in Politics in Developing
Countries: Comparing Experience with Democracy, eds. Diamond, Larry Linz Juan J. Lipset Seymour
Martin (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995); David I. Steinberg, “Continuing Democratic
Reform: The Unfinished Symphony,” 203-4.
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the democratic movement.64 Therefore, the main proposition of the modernization thesis
about the relationship between economic development and the growth of civil socety
partially fit in the Korean case. Finally, although many studies try to explain the
democratic transition with the modernization thesis, most studies have been devoted to
descriptions of the institutional and procedural aspects of the democratic transition.65
On the other hand, studies of the Korean democratization that have used the civil
society approach emphasized the role of several civil society groups or organizations in
the last stage of the democratic transition process. According to the civil society
approach, the pressure of civil society was a major cause of the regimes’ ultimate
compliance with the people’s demands for democratization.66 Thus, those studies argue
that an empowered and politically active civil society threatened the authoritarian regime,
and forced it to follow the process of democratic transition in I987.67 Scholars, such as
Sung Kyung-Ryung, point out that the acceptance of democratization by the authoritarian
regime was a result of the tremendous popular resistance organized by civil society
organizations, such as student activists, labor activists, religious communities, and the
middle class.68 However, it is difficult to find literature that deals with those significant
groups and organizations of civil society from the beginning of their movements. In
other words, most studies have focused on any one or a few groups and organizations,

64 Mar In-Sub, “Capitalist Development and Democratization in South Korea: The Socioeconomic
Structure and Political Process,” (Ph.D. diss.. North Western University, 1991).
63 Shin Doh C. Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea, xxiii.
66 Alfred Stepan, Democratizing Brazil: Problems o f Transition and Consolidation (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1989), xi.
67 Larry Diamond, “Toward Democratic Consolidation,” 228; Gordon White, “Democratization
and Development II: Two Countries’ Cases,” Democratization 2, (199S).
61 Sung Kyung-Ryung, “Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation in South Korea: Great
Achievements and Remaining Problems,” 87-109.
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and examined the democratic struggles of those limited groups and organizations in the
democratic transition process.
For example, Bret L. Billet focuses on the role of student activism among various
pro-democracy groups and organizations of civil society in the 1980s.69 According to
him, student activism during the “June Rebellion” in 1987 served to bring other elements
of civil society, such as the opposition party leaders, and the middle class, into the
political contest with the Chun regime. Despite the fact that students had been the most
active group of civil society, there were other important groups of civil society, such as
religious communities, the Jaeya forces and labor organizations that greatly contributed
to Korean democratic transition. In this regard, the Billet’s study tends to ignore the
evolution process of the student movement and other important democratic groups and
organizations. Therefore, without examining the long-term evolutionary process of the
student group and the relationship with other democratic groups and organizations, it is
difficult to understand the whole process of the democratic transition.
Lee S. H. also examines the contributions of civil society in the democratic
transition period.70 However, like Billet, he also focuses on certain groups, namely
militant industrial workers, reform-minded white-collar workers, and intellectuals.
According to Lee, these three groups were the main actors of civil society that forced the
authoritarian regime to move toward the democratic transition. However, unlike other
studies, he stresses that counter-activities and responses of the regime toward the
democratic struggle of civil society are other important factors in the democratic
transition. Namely, he points out that the liberalization policy and weakening of the
69 Bret L. Billet, “The History and Role of Student Activism in the Republic of Korea: the politics
of contestation and conflict resolution in fledgling democracy,” 23-34.

33

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

state’s capacity to deal with the political crisis influenced a character of civil society.
However, his study dismisses not only the evolution process of civil society but also the
change of its character through the 1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, Lee seems to
overstress workers’ role in the democratic transition process. Compared with other
groups, such as students, religious communities, and the Jaeya force, the working class in
the 1970s and early 1980s was passive and poorly organized.71 Because of the internal
and external restrictions, workers’ influence on the democratic transition was weaker than
that of other major groups. In this respect, previous studies of Korean democratization
are limited in applying the civil society approach.
In this regard, Lee Kang-Ro’s study on democratization and the social movement
of South Korea takes a new direction based on the civil society approach.72 He
demonstrates the crucial role of democratic civil society in pushing an authoritarian
regime toward democratic transition. Moreover, he examines the interactions between
key democratic groups of civil society and the authoritarian regime. In order to illustrate
the interactions, he examines the goals, ideologies, organizational forms, and coalition
activities of democratic groups and organizations of civil society. However, he did not
present a systematic analysis of structural changes that were responsible for the
resurrection of civil society under the authoritarian regime. As a consequence, Lee could
not explain why the authoritarian regime implemented the decompression policy in late
1983, which provided space for revitalization and active struggles. In addition, like other
previous studies that applied the civil society approach, Lee dismisses the evolution
70 Lee S. H., “Transitional Politics of Korea, 1987-1992: Activation of Civil Society,” 351-67.
71 Kim Byung-Kook and Lim Hyun-Chin, “Labor Against Itself: Structural Dilemmas o f State
Monism,” 111-37
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process o f democratic civil society through the 1970s and 1980s, focusing only on the
transitional period. In spite of these weaknesses, however, his study is very valuable in
examining the roles and activities of civil society in the Korean democratic transition.
In addition, Kim Sun-Hyuk recently criticizes previous studies that apply the
elite-oriented paradigm in the Korean democratization case, and demonstrates the
appropriateness of the civil society paradigm over other theories in explaining the
democratization of South Korea.73 Although Kim effectively explains the role of civil
society in the process of Korean democratic transition, he does not explain which factors
caused a weak, isolated, and divided civil society in the 1970s and early 1980s to change
to a strong and united civil society in the mid-80s. That is, Kim’s study does not explain
how Korean civil society evolved and eventually attained counter-hegemony against the
regime. Thus, most previous studies that applied the civil society paradigm in explaining
the Korean democratic transition process are incomplete.
In another approach, Chu, Yun-Ham, Hu Fu, and Moon Chung-In emphasize the
impact of external factors in the Korean democratic transition.74 Although these authors
recognize the importance of domestic factors, such as economic development and the
transformation of civil society, they point out that external influences were more
important. According to them, two significant external factors influenced the democratic
transition of South Korea in 1987. One was a decrease in the threat from North Korea,
and the other was the U.S. pressure. Their study emphasizes that the Korean democratic

72 Lee Kang-Ro, “Democratization and the Social Movements in South Korea: The Dynamics of
the Bureaucratic Mobilization Regime,” (Ph.D. diss.. University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1990).
73 Kim Sun-Hyuk, The Politics o f Democratization: The Role o f Civil Society (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000).
4 Yun-Ham Chu, Fu Hu, and Chung-In Moon. “South Korea and Taiwan: The International
Context,” in Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, eds. Larry Diamond, Marc F. Planner, Yun-han
Chu, and Hung-mao Tien (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).

35

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

transition was not an isolated incident driven only by domestic dynamics. That is,
without the external influences, such as the U.S. influence, democratic transition would
not be possible. However, their emphasis on external factors is overstressed. Rather, it is
more appropriate to say that those external factors reinforced the domestic factors.
On the other hand, Mar In-Sub applies the relative class power model for
explaining Korean democratic transition.75 He stresses the centrality of the alliance of the
working class with the middle class and other groups for the democratic breakthrough in
June 1987. Mar demonstrates the tension between capitalists and the state, the relative
deprivation of the middle class, and the exploitation and oppression of the working class,
all of which appeared in the course of capitalist development led by the bureaucraticauthoritarian state. Consequently, various social classes that were dissatisfied with the
regime began to struggle for democratization. However, those in opposition to the
regime did not automatically establish solidarity for the democratic struggles.76 For
example, the opposition party did not link to the working class to establish a coalition
against the regime until early 1987 because of internal conflicts in ideologies and
strategies. In addition, he overstated the roles of the middle class and working class in
the democratic transition process because he focuses on the last stage of the whole
process of democratization. Therefore, his emphasis on the coalition between the middle

75 Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Everlyne Stephens and John Stephens, Capitalist Development and
Democracy (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1992); Mar In-Sub, “Capitalist Development and
Democratization in South Korea: The Socioeconomic Structure and Political Process,” (Ph.D. diss.. North
Western University, 1991).
76 Sung Kyung-Ryung, “Hankook Jungchiminjuhwaui Sahoijuk Giwon: Sahoiungdongjuk
Jupgeun” (The Social Root of the Political Democratization: social movement approach), in The New
paradigm o f Korean Politics and Society, Kyungnam University Far East Institute (Seoul: Nanam, 1993),
85-132; Park Hyun-Chae, Kim Keum-Soo, Jang-Eul-Byung, Jung Yun-Hyung, and Lee Hae-Chan, “6wol
tujaenggwa minjuhwaui jinro (The June Struggle and the Road to Democratization), in Junhwan (The
Change), (Seoul: Sageul, 1987), 101-167; Choi Jang-Jip, Cho Young-Rae, and Choi Je-Hyun, “Kookminui
Himeun Widaehaetda (People’s Power was Great), Wolgan Chosun 8, (1987): 178-92.
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class and working class for the democratic struggle generalizes the relative class power
model too much in the case of Korea.
Those various perspectives of studies on Korean democratization have several
serious weaknesses. First, previous studies have focused too much on elite-oriented
theories and modernization theory in explaining the democratic transition. Consequently,
they tend to ignore social factors that influence the elites’ role and decisions. Therefore,
analyzing democratic struggles outside of the institutional political arena is limited, or
incomplete. Second, most studies have focused on only a part of the whole process o f the
democratic transition. In particular, those studies that applied the civil society approach
have mostly ignored the evolution process or changing character of civil society because
of focusing on the short period of transition. Third, many scholars who apply the civil
society approach tend to focus on particular groups or segments of civil society and their
struggles with the authoritarian regime. Because of that, most dismiss the dynamic
relationships among various groups and how they established a united front for influential
democratic struggles. Thus, existing studies are limited in their ability to understand how
civil society became autonomous and had an offensive character in the mid-1980s, a
necessary condition for the democratic transition process in 1987.

4. The Concept of Civil Society and Democratic Civil Society
Civil society has been interpreted and conceptualized by many scholars based on
various perspectives.77 Nevertheless, civil society has been generally understood and

77 For example, John Locke as well as Scottish Enlightenment philosophers, such as two Adams,
Smith and Ferguson, contributed to its early popularity as a notion of what linked the state and individual,
just as Hegel and Marx gave it a radical turn that allowed it to become both a reflection and a critique o f
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interpreted by two perspectives, liberal and Marxist-inspired approaches. According to
the liberal perspective, civil society refers to that sphere of voluntary associations and
informal networks in which individuals and groups engage in activities of public
consequence for their liberty and interests.78 It is distinguished from the public activities
of government because it is voluntary and from the private activities of markets because
it seeks common ground and public good. In addition, the liberal perspective has
considered the state as necessary evil for protecting the rights and freedom of individuals
and groups, and it has seen civil society as the good.79 Although ensuring that people
treat each other fairly required a minimal state, liberals worried that the state would revert
to the absolutist ways of monarchy in new forms.80 Therefore, state power should be
limited and civil society, which has a right to resist state power, plays a role in limiting
state power. Thus, the liberal perspective sees civil society as an independent guarantor
of formal democracy or as providing a space for defensive resistance under authoritarian
rule. In this regard, civil society provides a foundation for maintaining democracy and
for playing a role in protecting individual rights and freedom.81 The liberal perspective
sees autonomy as a necessary condition for civil society to establish and maintain
democracy.82 According to Thomas Paine, the state should not intervene in civil society.

bourgeois society. In addition, Tocqueville helped to introduce the idea into American political discourse,
where it has exercised an important if somewhat paradoxical influence ever since.
n Philippe C. Schmitter, “Civil Society in East and West,” 240.
79Thomas Paine, “Common Sense,” in Thomas Paine: Political Writings, ed. B. Kucklick (New
York: Cambridge UP, 1989), 3.
10John Keane, “Despotism and Democracy: The Origins and Development of the Distinction
between Civil Society and the State 1750-1850,” in Civil Society and the State, ed. John Keane (New York:
Verso, 1988).
11 J. Cohen, “Discourse Ethics and Civil Society,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 14 (1988):
325.
c Lawrence E. Cahoone, Civil Society: The Conservative Meaning o f Liberal Politics (Malden,
MA: Blackwell, 2002), 225-26.
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Thus, civil society contributes not only to democratic transition but also to democratic
consolidation.*3
Tocqueville’s influence on the study of civil society and democracy was to draw
attention to the significance of the independent eye of society as a check against the
centralization o f power in democratic society.84 Echoes of Tocqueville’s writings on
civil society’s organizational density and its significance for democracy resonate in
works on “political development” in the so-called modernization theory tradition. In an
influential article by Seymour Martin Lipset, “intermediary organizations and
institutions” are identified as “social requisites for democracy.”85 Moreover, Robert
Putnam is concerned with the correlation between the effectiveness of public institutions
and the success of democratic government, and with the degree to which a society
approximates the ideal of a civil community.86 In short, according to the liberal
perspective, the proliferation of autonomous organizations serves to deepen civil society,
which, in turn, guards against state despotism and strengthens democratic processes and
institutions.
In contrast with theorists in the liberal and Tocquevillean tradition, who take
political regimes as their point of departure, Marxist-inspired political scientists situate
civil society within a broader social formation. According to Marxist-inspired theorists,
civil society and democratization appear not as essentially self-organizing and selflimiting spheres and processes, but rather as discrete phenomena within a contingent
13 Alvin W. Goulder, The Two Marxism (New York: The Seabury Press, 1980), 371; Robert D.
Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modem Italy (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1993), 107.
MAlexix de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Vintage, 1954).
15 Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and
Political Legitimacy,” 69-105.
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historical context which is characterized by capitalist production relations, bourgeois
state apparatuses, and social class conflict. Marx linked civil society to the emergence of
a post-feudal mode of production and to the development of distinct institutional spheres,
such as state and economy. Marx saw democratization as the dissolution of civil society,
like the realm of economic interests, labor, private property, and class distinctions.87
Some neo-Marxists, associated with Antonio Gramsci, afford the state a higher
degree of autonomy, and thus a more prominent role in creating the conditions within
which civil society may survive or thrive. Alan Wolfe believes that the experience of
Western capitalism changed the conception of civil society. It occupies the space
between the market and the state, embodying neither the self-interest o f the one nor the
coercive authority of the other.** Unlike Marx who identified civil society as the material
relations of individuals, Gramsci focused on ideological and cultural relations.89 The
Gramscian perspective emphasizes the importance of the role of dense civil society in
complementing and reinforcing the coercive state under capitalism.90 Additionally,
Gramsci's concept of the relationship between the state and existing institutions is less
abstract and more dynamic and interactive.91 Gramsci argued that “the ensemble of
organisms, which is commonly called private,” such as political parties,92 civic

16 Robert Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Y. Nanetti, Masking Democracy Work: Civic
Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University press, 1993), 87.
17 Karl Marx, “The German Ideology,” in Writing o f the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society,
eds. Trans. Lloyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Guddat (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 13.
“ Alan Wolfe, Whose Keeper?: Social science and Moral Obligation (Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press, 1989), 16.
19 Norberto Bobbio, “Gramsci and the Concept of Civil Society,” in Civil Society and the State, ed.
Keane (London: Verso Press, 1988), 83.
90 Perry Anderson, “The Antinomies o f Antonio Gramsci,” New Left Review 100 (November
1976-January 1977): 5-80.
91 Marcia Landy, Film, Politics, and Gramsci (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994),
24.
92 Antonio Gramsci, “The Intellectuals,” in Selectionsfrom the Prison Notebook, eds. Quintin
Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 12.
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associations, and religious institutions, helps to maintain the power o f the bourgeois state
by facilitating rule through consensus, or to use his term, “hegemony.” In the Gramscian
perspective, the concept of hegemony is very important; it is defined as “the spontaneous
consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on
social life by the dominant fundamental group.”93 Recently, some scholars, such as
Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens try to link growth of counter-hegemonic
pressures in subordinate classes to democratization.94 Those theorists stress that the role
of civil society in democratic transition ultimately depends on its autonomy from
dominant class interests.
As shown above, the concept of civil society is interpreted and understood
differently by different scholars. Especially, the discourse of civil society has been
revived during the recent wave o f democratization from authoritarian and totalitarian
rule.95 Particularly, since the early 1970s, the focus of study in democratization has
shifted toward the developing of civil society. However, in spite o f its widespread use,
the concept of civil society, like other political terms, remains ambiguous and confusing.
Many scholars have presented such different concepts of civil society that it becomes a
formidable task to establish a universal definition.96 Most literatures generally agree on

93 Antonio Gramsci, “The Intellectuals,” 12; Joseph Femia, Gramsci's Political Thought:
Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary Process (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 24-6.
Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, and Evelyne Stephens, Capitalist Development and
Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 45-51.
John Keane, “Remembering in Dead: Civil Society and the state from Hobbes to Marx and
Beyond,” in Democracy and Civil Society (New York: Verso, 1988); John Keane, “Despotism and
Democracy: The Origins and Development of the Distinction between Civil Society and the State 17501850,” in Civil Society and the State, ed. John Keane (New York: Verso, 1988); Jean Cohen and Andrew
Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992).
96 For example, Tocqueville emphasized the role of civil society in sustaining democracy, and
provided an early formulation for the argument that a pluralist and self-organizing civil society independent
of the state is an indispensable condition o f democracy. In addition, Antonio Gramsci emphasizes the
importance of the role of dense civil society in complementing and reinforcing the coercive state under
capitalism. Recently, Jeff Haynes defines civil society as “encompassing the collectivities of non-state
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several elements that constitute civil society, despite the ambiguity and diversity of the
concept of civil society.
First, individual units of civil society must be able to determine their collective
interests independently of the state.97 Thus, civil society can freely criticize the state and
demand collective interests. Civil Society is considerably limited under state
corporatism, where the authoritarian state organizes, sponsors, funds, subsidizes,
monitors, subordinates, mobilizes, and controls corporatist groups, with a view to co
optation, incorporation, repression, and domination. Thus, the first priority of civil
society under an authoritarian regime is to attain autonomy from the state, and such
autonomy becomes a foundation of civil society movements against the regime. In
addition, civil society should be differentiated from political society, mainly the political
party. Although civil society and political society may be intimately interconnected
through multi-level channels, there are fundamental differences. For example, civil
society doesn’t seek political power whereas the ultimate goal o f the political party is to
take political power.98 Instead, civil society seeks to engage and to influence the state for
collective interests.
Second, civil society has an organized form. It may be planned or spontaneous,
short or long duration, formally or informally organized.99 Civil society exists as forms
of associations, groups, movements, organizations, and institutions. Moreover,
individuals should voluntarily organize or join organizations of civil society, and express
organizations, interest groups and associations, such as trade unions, professional associations, further and
higher education students, religious bodies, and media-which collectively help maintain a check on the
power and totalizing tendency of the state.” Stepan defines civil society as an arena where numerous social
movements and civic organizations strive to constitute themselves into an ensemble of arrangements to
express themselves and advance their interests.
97 Edward Shils, “The Virture of Civil Society,” Government and Opposition 26, no. I (1991): 3.
n Philippe C. Schmitter, “Civil Society East and West,” 240.
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their needs and interests. In this respect, civil society is the self-organization of society,
the constituent parts of which voluntarily engage in public activity.100 However, under
authoritarian regimes, this organizational form of civil society was often threatened by
repression. Thus, it is difficult for civil society groups and organizations to maintain an
institutional form.
Third, associations, groups, movements, organizations, and institutions of civil
society share a certain set of norms and rules, such as pluralism and self-governance.101
Thus, they accept the notion that different groups and organizations of civil society
represent different interests. In the relationship with the state, a civil society that is
legally guaranteed legitimates the state.102 However, if the state itself is lawless and does
not respect the self-governance and autonomy of civil society, then civil society doesn't
consent to the legitimacy of the existing order. Instead, civil society attempts to revoke
and change the norms and rule themselves, either by crafting informed arrangements
invisible to the authorities or by replacing the existing state-society relations with new
ones. In this regard, civil society is potentially a highly subversive space, a space where
new structure and norms may take hold to challenge the existing state order.103
Therefore, civil society is a place where the state and the opposition force struggle for
hegemony of a society.
Based on these elements and for the purpose of this study, civil society is defined
as self-organized groups, associations, and institutions in society that have or seek

99 Kim Sun-Hyuk, The Politics o f Democratization in Korea: The Role o f Civil Society, 12.
100 Marcia A. Weigle and Jim Butterfield, “Civil Society in Reforming Communist Regimes: The
Logic of Emergence,” Comparative Politics, (October 1992): 3.
101 Edward Shils, “The Virture of Civil Society,” 4.
102John Keane, Democracy and Civil Society (New York: Verso, 1988), 14; Larry Diamond,
“Toward Democratic Consolidation,” 5.
103 Robert Fatton, “Democracy and Civil Society in Africa," 86.
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relative autonomy from the state, and voluntarily engage in public activity to pursue
individual, group or national interests within the context of a legally defined state-society
relationship.104
However, these various associations, groups, organizations, and institutions of
civil society cannot be monolithic and homogeneous with respect to their activities and
characteristics. That is, not every group and organization of civil society contributes to a
democratic transition because each has different characters and goals, and there may be
an unbalanced relationship with the state. Some civil society groups and organizations
are controlled or co-opted by the regime, and therefore the capacity to struggle against an
authoritarian regime, are not concerned with democratization, and may even support an
authoritarian regime. Thus, only certain groups or organizations of civil society are
involved in a democratic movement and contribute to democratization.105
Benjamin Barber notes that democratic civil society should be more narrowly and
explicitly defined than the general concepts of civil society.106 In studying
democratization and civil society, the broad concept of civil society should be divided
into democratic civil society that is actively involved in political development or
democratic movement and non-democratic civil society which is not concerned with
political development or don’t participate in democratic movements. In accordance with
104 Marcia A. Weigle and Jim Butterfield, “Civil Society in Reforming Communist Regimes: The
Logic of Emergence,” 3; Larry Diamond, “Toward Democratic Consolidation,” in The Global Resurgence
o f Democracy, 4; Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and Southern Cone (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1988), 3-4; Thomas B. Gold, “The Resurgence of Civil Society in China,”
Journal o f Democracy 1, no. 1 (1990): 20; Andrew Arato, “Civil Society against the State: Poland, 19801981,” Telos 47 (1981): 23; Gordon White, “Prospects for Civil Society in China: A Case Study of
Xiaoshan City,” Australian Journal o f Chinese Affairs 29 (1993): 65; Edward Shils, “The Virture of Civil
Society,” Government and Opposition 26, no. 1 (1991), 4; John Keane, Democracy and Civil Society (New
York: Verso, 1988), 14.
105 Kim Sun-Hyuk, The Politics ofDemocrattation: The Role o f Civil Society, 20.
106 Benjamin R. Barber, A Placefo r Us: How to Make Society Civil and Democracy Strong (New
York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 57.
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political and social conditions of each country, democratic groups of civil society that
play a crucial role in the democratic transition process can be different. Moreover, the
influence o f each democratic group or organization of civil society on the institutional
political arena might be also different. For example, in the democratic transition of the
Philippines, the role of the church was important, and it strongly influenced democratic
transition in 1986.107 On the other hand, students were one of the most powerful civil
society groups in the democratic transition process of South Korea. Therefore, the
concept of civil society should be narrowed down, and democratic civil society that
actually participated in the democratic movement should be focused in studying on the
relationship between civil society and democratization.
There are several characteristics of democratic civil society. First, it is more
likely to compromise in its relations with the state: it follows the rule of law and
authority. Second, democratic civil society tries to improve the stability, predictability,
and govemability of a democratic regime. In addition, democratic civil society tries to
facilitate stability, bargaining, and the growth of cooperative networks. Third,
democratic civil society uses internal democratic processes of decision-making and
leadership selection. Thus, it respects democratic values and practices, such as
constitutionalism, representation, transparency, accountability, and rotation of elected
leaders. Fourth, organizations of democratic civil society compete with each other, and
the competition helps to ensure accountability and representativeness by giving members
the ability to join other organizations.

107 Eva-Lotta Elisabet Hedman, “In the Name of Civil Society: Contesting Free Elections in the
Post-Colonia! Philippines,” (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1998).
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In addition, democratic civil society plays several important roles in a society.108
One important role is to provide a basis for limiting state power in order to control the
state by society. In addition, democratic civil society works to undermine the legitimacy
o f an authoritarian regime and force the regime to negotiate with the opposition in the
democratic transition process. Second, active democratic civil society can stimulate
political participation, increase political efficacy and skills of democratic citizens, and
promote an appreciation of the obligation as well as the rights of democratic citizenship.
Particularly, under authoritarian rule, democratic civil society has often played the role of
an opposition party, suppressed by the regime, and it has negotiated with the regime in
the democratic transition process. Third, democratic civil society develops democratic
values and principles, such as tolerance, moderation, willingness to compromise, and a
respect for opposing viewpoints. In addition, democratic civil society contributes to the
development of political culture through educating people and struggling with the
authoritarian regime.109
Fourth, democratic civil society supplements the role of the political party. That
is, democratic civil society plays a role of integrating, articulating, and representing
public interests. In addition, democratic civil society recruits and trains new political
leaders. Through being active within groups and organizations of civil society, leaders of
civil society learn not only technical and administrative skills but also normative
standards of public accountability and transparency.110

IM Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, The Global Resurgence o f Democracy, 230-31.
1WMaria Rosa deMartini and Sofia de Pinedo, “Women and Civic Life in Argentina,” Journal o f
Democracy 3 (July 1992): 13&46.
110 Dette Pascuai, “Organizing People Power in the Philippines,” Journal o f Democracy I (winter
1990): 102-9.
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However, pro-democracy civil society in Third World countries is different from
the ideal. The democratic civil society in Third World countries, especially authoritarian
countries, has a clear intention to struggle for democratization. In the Korean case,
several social groups transformed to pro-democracy groups, which had a common goal
and strong aspirations for democratization, right after the installation of the Yushin
regime, and struggled with authoritarian regimes. Although each group or organization
of democratic civil society had different goals, they agreed that the transition to
democracy was a necessary and sufficient condition for achieving their individual goals.
These natures of democratic civil society are clearly different from those of nondemocratic civil society.
Because of this struggling nature, in addition, democratic civil society under
authoritarian regimes has undemocratic features, such as using violence and
undemocratic ideologies. In addition, members of democratic civil society in the Third
World countries have a more democratic and critical perception of the regime as
compared with members of conservative and government-controlled civil society.
Democratic groups and organizations in civil society, such as students, workers, and
religious leaders and organizations, have more chances to meet democratic values and
principles than do other groups and organizations because of democratic education or
active involvement through social and political activities. In addition, those democratic
groups and organizations of civil society are more autonomous from the state than are
groups and organizations of civil society, controlled by an authoritarian regime. This
autonomy from the state makes democratic groups and organizations of civil society
ready to sacrifice and actively struggle with the authoritarian regime. In addition, under
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an authoritarian regime, democratic civil society is not well institutionalized due to the
harsh suppression, and it usually disintegrates after democratic transition occurs.
In these respects, unlike the ideal type of democratic society, roles and characters
of democratic civil society under an authoritarian regime are different. Thus, under the
authoritarian regime, democratic civil society can be defined as groups and organizations
that are independent from the state in their activities, have a clear intention to struggle
with the authoritarian regime for democratization, and directly and indirectly participate
in the democratic movement.

5. Key Variables
In order to examine the evolution of democratic civil society and the change of its
character, this study will examine influence of several internal and external elements that
can possibly affect the character of Korean civil society during the 1970s and 1980s.
Those factors not only respectively affect the character of civil society, but also
reciprocally influence each other. Because of the complicated relationships, it is
necessary to examine dynamic relationships among these variables and their influences
on the character of civil society. Those factors are political culture, economic
development, political opportunity structure, and external environments.
First, political culture is an important element because it constrains not only
people’s thoughts and behaviors but also affects the relationship between the state and
civil society.111 As Almond and Verba point out, civil society cannot play its active roles

1,1 In this study, political culture is defined as “a people’s predominate beliefs, attitudes, values,
sentiments, and evaluation about the political system of a country and the role of the self in that
system.”Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: political attitudes and democracy in five
nations, an analytic study (Boston: Little Brown, 1965).
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in “parochial” and “subject” political culture. On the contrary, in the “participant”
political culture, civil society can be involved more actively in the decision-making
process.112 Moreover, development of political culture significantly affects the character
of civil society and its democratic movement As seen in Eastern Europe, Latin America,
and Asia, the development of political culture plays an important role in determining the
character of civil society.113
The development of political culture affects the character of civil society several
ways. First the change of political culture influences the character of civil society by
affecting the relationship between the state and civil society.114 When traditional political
culture, like Confucianism, dominates a society, civil society is more likely to have a
passive stance toward to the state. Thus, it is difficult for the public to participate
actively in democratic civil society. Due to this passive and isolated character, civil
society is limited in struggling with and challenging the state. On the other hand, through
development of the political culture, civil society can develop favorable political and
social environments for its activities, such as struggling to attain counter-hegemony
against the authoritarian regime.
Second, the change of political culture strongly influences the public opinion and
behaviors.115 Along with development of political culture, people come to have political

112Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture.
111Giuseppe di Palma, “Legitimation from the Top to Civil Society: Politico-Cultural Change in
Eastern Europe,” World Politics 44, no. I (October 1991): 49-80; James L. Gibson, Raymond M. Ouch,
Kent L. Tedin, “Democratic Values and the Transformation of the Soviet Union,” The Journal o f Politics
54, no. 2 (May 1992): 329-71.
114 Ronald Inglehart, “The Renaissance of Political Culture,” The American Political Science
Review 82, no. 4 (December 1988): 1203-30.
"} James L. Gibson, “Political and Economic Markets: Changes in the Connections Between
Attitudes Toward Political Democracy and a Market Economy Within the Mass Culture of Russia and
Ukraine,” The Journal o f Politics 58, no. 4 (November 1996): 954-84.
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consciousness and become critical of authoritarian rule.116 The influence of political
culture on the middle class is especially crucial in changing the character of civil society.
Generally, the middle class in developing countries with traditional political culture is
more interested in economic prosperity and political stability than in political
development However, the change of political culture stimulates the middle class to be
interested in political development and they become more critical o f the authoritarian
regime. It may also lead them to participate more actively in the democratic movement
of civil society without fear of suppression. This active participation of the middle class
can make civil society have a more united and aggressive character, and help civil society
struggle actively with the authoritarian regime. In this respect, the change of political
culture is an important element that can affect changing a character of civil society.
Although the political culture is not a sufficient for the change of civil society, it is a
certainly necessary condition.
In the Korean case, the waning of the traditional Confucian political culture and
the spread of the Western democratic civic culture have gradually influenced civil society
and its democratic movement throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Through the change of
political culture during the 1970s and 1980s, more groups and organizations in civil
society became more actively involved in the democratic movement. For example, the
middle class, influenced by the spread of democratic civic culture, began to change its
perceptions and values, and became more interested in political development than in their
economic prosperity from the early 1980s. The change of perceptions and active
116For instance, Almond and Verba conclude that stable democracy requires certain cultural
characteristics widely shared among the people. These cultural traits include: a sense of political
competence, feeling of obligation to participate in politics through such activities as elections and party
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participation of the middle class decisively helped civil society to attain counter
hegemony against the authoritarian regime in the mid-1980s.
In the Korean case, the traditional political culture has been changed particularly
by two socioeconomic phenomena. One was successful economic development, and the
other one was broad and deep penetration of Christianity. As many modernization
theorists point out, economic development provided more opportunities for education,
civil understandings, and supports of democratic institutions and practices.117 In this
respect, successful economic development contributed to providing an important
condition for changing political culture in South Korea. In addition, the rapid spread of
Christianity during the 1970s and 1980s played an important role in changing the
traditional Confucian political culture. Along with the spread of Christianity, more
people could contact with and practiced democratic values and principles, such as respect
for human rights and political equality, through religious organizations and rituals. This
in turn caused the Korean society’s vertical structure to change to a horizontal structure.
With the changed political culture, influenced by economic development and the spread
of Christianity, more people became involved in democratic organizations of civil
society, and this caused civil society to be more united and assertive, as evidenced by
massive striving for autonomy and counter-hegemony. Therefore, the change of political
culture was a necessary condition for changing the character of civil society.

events, trust in and willingness to cooperate with others and other institutions, and so on. Gabriel A.
Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture, 337-69.
117Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases o f Politics, chapter 2 and 14; Larry
Diamond, “Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered,” 450-99; Larry Diamond, “The
Globalization of Democracy: Trends, Types, Causes, and Prospects,” in Global Transformation and the
Third World, eds. Robert O. Slater, Barry M. Shutz, and Steven R. Dorr (Boulder Lynne Rienner, 1993);
Paul R. Abramson, Ronald Inglehart, “Education, Security, and Postmaterialism: A Comment on Duch and
Taylor’s "Postmaterialism and the Economic Condition" (in Exchange),” American Journal o f Political
Science 38, no. 3 (August 1994): 797-814.
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Second, economic development is another important variable that can influence
the character of civil society. Economic development not only directly influences the
character of civil society, but also indirectly affects the character of civil society by
influencing other variables, such as political culture and political opportunity structure.
Major proponents of the modernization theory argue that economic development
significantly enhances the growth of democratic civil society. For instance, economic
development pluralizes and empowers civil society by encouraging the spread of
information and knowledge and by increasing the capacity and density of independent
organizations. Economic development also makes it possible to facilitate creation of
more associations and organizations and to establish more complex and broader social
networks in a society.118 With economic development, civil society gains more social
and economic resources for influential democratic struggles under harsh repression.
Therefore, economic development is an important element that provides a foundation for
changing the character of civil society.
Moreover, economic development provides a strong motive for the middle class,
whose role is crucial in the democratic movement, to change their attitudes and behaviors
toward authoritarian regime.119 As many modernization theorists point out, one of the
most important contributions of economic development is to facilitate creation of the
middle class and to reinforce its power in society regardless of the intention of the
regime. As a result, civil society can secure broader support from them to struggle
actively and effectively against the authoritarian rule. On the other hand, economic

111 Seymour Martin Lipset, “The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited: 1993 Presidential
Address,” American Sociological Review 59, no. 1 (February 1994): 1-22.
119 Samuel P. Huntington, “How Countries Democratize,” Political Science Quarterly 106, no. 4
(winter 1991 - winter 1992): 579-616.
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development also affects civil society by influencing other elements, such as political
opportunity structure and political culture. For example, through the economic
development, an educational opportunity is expanded, and society is more urbanized.
This socioeconomic development favorably affects the development of political culture,
and expands space where civil society can become involved in the political process.
Through these processes, the character of civil society gradually changes. Economic
development can also change strategies or policies of the regime in dealing with the
resistance o f democratic civil society. This change of strategies or policies toward civil
society may expand or narrow the political opportunity structure.
Economic development also influences the relationship between the regime and
civil society, both favorably and unfavorably. As an unfavorable influence, the
authoritarian regime can attain legitimacy through successful economic performance.
Under this situation, it is difficult for civil society to draw popular support to challenge
the hegemony of the regime. In addition, it can be also difficult for civil society to be
assertive and united with respect to the authoritarian regime. On the contrary, successful
economic development can cause a crisis of legitimacy to the regime. As mentioned
before, economic development facilitates creation o f the middle class who is critical of
the authoritarian regime and provides a strong motive for them to support civil society.
As a result, the authoritarian regime faces a challenge from civil society that the middle
class actively supports. In this case, economic development stimulates civil society to
vitalize and challenge the hegemony of the regime. Therefore, economic development is
a necessary, if insufficient condition for changing the character of civil society.
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In the Korean case, successful economic development decisively influenced the
character of civil society by affecting the political opportunity structure in early 1980s.
The Chun regime, which based its confidence on successful economic performance,
implemented a decompression policy toward the opposition force to solve its legitimacy
problem. Unlike planners’ intention, the decompression policy caused the political
opportunity structure to expand and revitalize democratic civil society. Democratic
groups and organizations of civil society began to re-organize and establish a coalition
among social groups and organizations and with the opposition party. In this regard, the
expansion of the political opportunity structure, strongly affected by successful economic
development, favorably affected changing the character of civil society.
In addition, economic development indirectly influenced the character of civil
society by affecting the development of political culture. Along with successful
economic development, political culture gradually changed from the traditional
Confucian culture to a “civic culture.” This change of political culture led the middle
class to have a more critical perception of the authoritarian regime and finally join in the
democratic movement led by democratic civil society. The active participation of the
middle class in the democratic movement decisively influenced the character of civil
society and became a foundation of attaining counter-hegemony. The successful
economic development also provided economic and social resources to civil society, and
thus democratic groups and organizations of civil society could more effectively resist
against the harsh suppression. For instance, due to successful economic development,
more pro-democracy organizations could be established, and their democratic struggles
could be more influential based on economic resources and social networks that
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economic development provided. In this respect, economic development was a very
important element that affects the character of civil society.
Third, the political opportunity structure greatly affects the character of civil
society.120 The political opportunity structure is defined as dimensions of the political
environment that provides incentives for people to undertake collective action by
affecting their expectations for success or failure.121 In many cases of democratization
cases in the Eastern European and Asian countries, the character o f civil society has been
altered by a political opportunity structure. Although the economy develops and political
culture changes, it is difficult for civil society to be active, united, and influential under
harsh suppression. On the other hand, when the political opportunity structure is opened
or expanded, civil society comes to have more chances to actively challenge the
regime.122 In addition, because the political opportunity structure usually changes
suddenly, it becomes possible to explain why and how the active struggle of civil society
with a regime occurs at a certain point and why the character of civil society dramatically
changes from defensive to assertive. Therefore, the creation or expansion of political
opportunity structure acts as a catalyst in changing the character of civil society.
Although political opportunity structure plays a crucial role in changing the
character o f civil society, it is impossible for civil society to have the capacity to force
authoritarian regimes toward a democratic transition process with expansion of the
political opportunity structure by itself. In order for civil society to attain the capacity,
other factors, such as economic development, political culture, and external
120 Dingxin Zhao, “State-Society Relations and the Discourses and Activities of the 1989 Beijing
Student Movement,” American Journal o f Sociology 105, no. 6 (May 2000): 1592-1632.
121 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements. Collective Action and Politics, 85.
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environments, should support the change of political opportunity structure. For example.
Although the political opportunity structure is opened or expanded, if pro-democracy
civil society is not ready to change its character, the influence of the political opportunity
structure will be diminished by suppression. Therefore, the political opportunity
structure cannot be a sufficient condition for changing the character o f civil society.
The creation or expansion o f the political opportunity structure influences the
character of civil society in several ways. For instance, the political opportunity structure
provides more space for civil society to revitalize and struggle actively with the
authoritarian regime. In addition, the political opportunity structure makes it possible to
draw popular supports more easily.123 With expansion of the political opportunity
structure, the middle class can join civil society organizations and participate in the
democratic movement without fear of repression. As seen in many cases of democratic
transition, popular support, especially by the middle class, is crucial to the political
struggle of civil society. In this sense, the active participation of the middle class with its
broad support to civil society strongly influences the character of civil society.
Especially, when the expansion of the political opportunity structure combines with other
variables, such as economic development, development of political culture, and external
influence, the impact of political opportunity structure on the character of civil society is
even stronger.
In the Korean case, the political opportunity structure decisively affected the
changing a character of civil society and the democratic movement in the mid-1980s.

122John A. Booth, Patricia Bayer Richard, “Repression, Participation and Democratic Norms in
Urban Central America,” American Journal o f Political Science 40, no. 4 (Nov. 1996): 120S-32.
123 Doug McAdam, The Political Process and the Development o f Black Insurgency (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1982), 23-35.
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The expansion of the political opportunity structure in South Korea took place during the
regime’s implementation of the decompression policy in late 1983. After the
authoritarian regime implemented the decompression policy, democratic civil society
rapidly revitalized and began to build coalitions with the opposition party. Since then,
pro-democracy civil society began to directly challenge the regime and to struggle to
attain counter-hegemony. This change of civil society’s character greatly contributed to
the attainment of counter-hegemony and to the democratic transition in 1987.
Additionally, the expansion of the political opportunity structure led to the
emergence of a strong opposition party in 1985, which in turn led civil society to have a
more active, united, and assertive character in the struggle with the regime. Although the
opposition party failed to gain a majority, it did win enough seats to struggle with the
ruling party in the National Assembly. Furthermore, the emergence of a strong
opposition party by expansion of the political opportunity structure favorably affected
changing the character of civil society. As a result, civil society became able to struggle
more effectively with the regime through establishing a coalition with that opposition
party. In this respect, the expansion of the political opportunity structure of 1983 became
a turning point in changing a character of civil society from inconsequential to influential.
Fourth, external environments, such as support from the U.S. government and
successful democratic transitions in other countries, can also influence the character of
civil society.124 Although external environments are not as important as domestic factors,
they play an important role in changing the character of civil society. In the Korean case,
the external environments affected the character of civil society, both favorably and

124 Yun-Ham Chu, Fu Hu, and Chung-In Moon. “South Korea and Taiwan: The International
Context”
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unfavorably. As an unfavorable influence, the U.S. defeat in the Vietnam War strongly
restricted the democratic movement in the mid-1970s. On the contrary, when the
external environment is favorable to civil society, civil society is more likely to be active,
assertive, and influential. When the Carter administration pursued a strong human rights
policy in the late 1970s, many civil society organizations were emboldened to struggle
with the regime over human rights in spite of the threat of suppression.
In addition, successful democratic transition in other countries, especially by the
active political struggle of civil society, positively affects the character of civil society.
In the Korean case, the successful democratic transition in the Philippines strongly
influenced civil society and the democratic movement. The success of the democratic
transition based on vigorous social action encouraged democratic civil society struggle
more actively with the authoritarian regime. Furthermore, it made Korean civil society
have confidence that its democratic movement could also succeed in South Korea as it
did in the Philippines. Additionally, the indirect support of the U.S. government to the
democratic movement of civil society constrained possible options of the authoritarian
government to deal with its political crisis. These external influences strongly
encouraged civil society to use aggressive strategies and ideologies in struggling with the
authoritarian regime. In this regard, external environments play an important role in
changing the character of civil society.

6. Hypotheses
Hypothesis I: The changing character of civil society throughout the 1970s and 1980s
was a necessary condition for the successful Korean democratic transition in 1987. Civil
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society, which had been divided, isolated, and inconsequential during the 1970s and early
1980s. gradually transformed to active, united, and assertive by the mid-1980s. This
change of character decisively affected civil society to have the capacity to force the
authoritarian regime toward democratic transition. Especially, simultaneous and
favorable influence of internal and external elements on the character of civil society in
the mid-1980s was decisive for democratic civil society to have the capacity to attain
counter-hegemony against the regime.

Hypothesis II: The political culture had influenced the character of civil society, both
favorably and unfavorably during the 1970s and 1980s. The traditional Confucian
political culture which emphasized hierarchical order of society obstructively affected the
democratic movement of civil society and public participation in the movement. On the
contrary, since the early 1980s, development of political culture, influenced by
socioeconomic development, had favorably affected civil society. Therefore, the
development of political culture was a necessary condition for changing the character of
civil society.

Hypoothesis III: Successful economic development influenced the character of civil
society, both negatively and positively. Successful economic development during the
1970s and early 1980s had unfavorably affected the character of civil society through
providing legitimacy to the regime. On the other hand, the economic development
sponsored the middle class to evaluate the authoritarian regime critically and supported
democratic civil society. Furthermore, the decompression policy in late 1983 was a result
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of the regime's confidence of the successful economic performance, and it expanded the
political opportunity structure. Therefore, the economic development of the mid-1980s
was a necessary condition for changing the divided, isolated, and inconsequential
character to active, united, and assertive character.

Hypothesis IV: The expansion of the political opportunity structure in late 1983 and the
emergence of the strong opposition party in the genemal election of 1985 influenced
changing a character of civil society. After the Chun regime implemented a
decompression policy toward civil society in late 1983, the political opportunity structure
became favorable to civil society and its struggle with the regime. In addition, the
emrgence of the strong pposition party in the general election of 1985 was another
outcome of expansion of the political opportunity structure. By the expansion of the
political opportunity structure and emergence of the strong opposition party, character of
democratic civil society changed to active, assertive, and united, and civil society could
struggle more effctively with the regime. Therefore, the expansion of political
opportunity structure is a necessary condition of changing character of civil society.

7. Research Methodology
This study of the evolution of civil society and its impact on the democratic
transition of South Korea is a case study. The great advantage of case studies is that by
focusing on a single case, that case can be intensively examined even when the research
resources at the investigator’s disposal are relatively limited. The scientific status of the
case study method is somewhat ambiguous, because science is a generalizing activity.
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Indirectly, however, case studies can make an important contribution to the establishment
of general propositions and thus to theory-building in political science.125 By interpreting
the history of Korean democratization, this study will seek to confirm the hypothesis that
the evolution of civil society, especially the change of civil society’s character, strongly
influenced the democratic transition. This study will try to examine internal and external
elements and their explicit and implicit influences on civil society and the regime. Not
only specific policies and strategies of the authoritarian regimes toward civil society but
also the reactions of democratic civil society under authoritartian regimes have not been
fully disclosed. Thus, it is necessary to examine and then interpret important actions and
reactions of both the regime and civil society.
In addition, this study will prove hypotheses - related to the nature of civil society
and democratization - by examining differences between Korean civil society of the
1970s and that of 1980s. Finally, this study will seek to demonstrate that the evolution of
civil society was a necessary condition that eventually forced the Chun regime to comply
the democratic transition in 1987. Thus, the results of this study will be used in other
studies of democratization as a hypothesis. Although this study cannot make a general
law-like proposition based on a single case, this study can provide hypothesis well worth
examining in future research.
There are several reasons to choose South Korea as a case study. First, South
Korea achieved a successful democratic transition and entered the democratic
consolidation process. In some countries of the Third World, it is not clear whether they

125 Joe R. Feagin, Anthony M. Orum and Gideon Sjoberg, eds., A Casefo r Case Study (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 1-26; Isadore Newman and Carolyn R. Benz, QualitativeQuantitative Research Methodology (Carbondaie and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press,
1998).
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have really made the transition from an authoritarian system to a democratic system. In
this sense, South Korea is a good example because most scholars agree that it already
passed through the transition period and is currently in the consolidation process.126
Second, the role of civil society was indispensable to the democratic transition process of
South Korea. Therefore, the Korean case is useful for suggesting that civil society
gamers attention in the study o f the democratic transition. Third, there are many
competing theories and interpretations of the Korean democratic transition. Most studies
have tended to focus on describing the process of the Korean transition without
systematically applying a particular democratic theory or model. Fourth, although
democratic transition occurred in 1987, South Korea has a long history of the democratic
movement. Thus, the Korean case is useful in examining the long-term evolution process
of civil society. As such, South Korea is a worthwhile as a case study of the democratic
transition that character of civil society and its influence greatly contributed.
This study will use primary and secondary sources to examine the evolution
process of Korean civil society and its interactions with the authoritarian regime. First, in
the analysis of major political and social forces, such as the regime, political parties, and
civil society organizations, this study will use political platforms, public statements,
handbills, newsletters, and magazines of the ruling and opposition parties and democratic
groups and organizations of civil society. Because many civil society organizations
disappeared after the transition in 1987 or were suppressed by the authoritarian regime, it
is difficult to get information about those organizations and their activities. Moreover,
126 Frank Gibney, Korea's Quiet Revolution: From Garrison State to Democracy (New York:
Walker and Company, 1992); International Forum fo r Democratic Studies, Democracy in East Asia:
Conference Report (Washington D.C.: International Forum for Democratic Studies, 1996); New York
Times, “Winning Ways in South Korea,” 28 December 1992. Christopher Sigur, Korea's New Challenges
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because publications of those groups and organizations in civil society were tightly
censored, it is very difficult to get information about their specific demands. Thus, this
study will also use interviews to collect hidden and lost information about organizations
of civil society that no longer exist, to obtain more historical facts, and to try to discern
the political intentions of both the regime and civil society. Interviews will also provide
more specific information of interactions between civil society and the regime and
conflicts within civil society. In order to examine political and social groups and
organizations in spheres of civil society and institutional political arena, this study will
use politicians’ and journalists’ reminiscences and interview information because most
strategies and ideologies of civil society organizations and of the authoritarian regime
were not openly expressed. In addition to these first and second references, this study
will use newspapers and magazines to collect information about important events in the
democratization process through the 1970s and 1980s.
Through those first, second sources, and interview information, this study will
build two databases: one on organizational profiles, and the other on events. The
organizational profiles database will be composed of those pro-democracy organizations
of civil society, which were established or actively involved in the democratic movement
from 1972 to 1987. These organizations of civil society are divided into four general
categories: students, religious communities, the Jaeya force, and labor organizations.
Because this database will focus on ideologies and strategies of pro-democracy
organizations of civil society, it will be very useful to examine not only the ideological
orientation but also the changing character of civil society. Also, this database will

and Kim Young Sam (New York: Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, 1993): Wall Street
Journal, “Democracy Wins One,” 22 December, A 12.
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provide an idea about the evolving political environment through the time-series analysis,
and it will be useful to examine the evolution of democratic civil society through
comparing strategies and ideologies of civil society organizations in the 1970s and 1980s.
The events database (type of event) will be composed of important democratic
struggles of civil society and of responses by the authoritarian regime, between the years
1972 and 1987. This database will describe important events of civil society and the
authoritarian regime between 1972 and 1987: demonstrations, terrorist acts, public
statements, and prayer meetings, and responses from the authoritarian regime. By using
these two databases, this study can confirm not only changing strategies and ideologies of
civil society organizations, but also changing responses of the regime toward civil
society. In addition, this study can confirm the expansion of civil society and
transforming hegemony through analyzing the scale of the democratic movement and
size of participants in protests and demonstrations. Moreover, this study will analyze the
process of attaining counter-hegemony of civil society against the regime by looking at
the relationship between the degree of suppression and the frequency and intensity of
democratic struggles of civil society. Through event analysis and time-series analysis of
these two databases, this study will examine the evolution process of civil society and its
influence on the democratic transition.
Second, in order to examine the change of the middle class in its perception of
and behavior toward the authoritarian regime, this study will use survey data. In
addition, this study will use various socioeconomic data, which were published by the
government and private institutions, to analyze the influence of social and economic
development on the changing character of civil society.
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In order to collect data and thereby understand political and social situations of
the democratic transition period, a field research will be necessary. Field research can
provide opportunities to meet with and interview people who were deeply involved in the
process of democratic transition. Particularly, because much printed information about
civil society organizations is limited or else has disappeared, a field research is
indispensable in getting this information. The field research concentrated on getting
unofficial publications about civil society groups and organizations and interviews with
people who were actually deeply involved in the democratic movement of civil society
and who were part of the decision-making process.

8. Organization of Dissertation
This study will be composed of seven chapters. The first chapter is an
introduction of this study. I have presented research questions, literature review, key
variables, hypotheses, the methodology, and organization of this study. In the second
chapter, I will provide a survey of post-war Korean history, culminating in the transition
of 1987. The third chapter will cover the Yushin authoritarian period (1972-1979). Not
only the background and nature of the Yushin regime, including the ruling ideologies, but
also the nature of civil society and its struggles with the Yushin regime will be examined.
In addition, interactions between the regime and democratic civil society, such as
students, the Jaeya force, the religious communities, and labor organizations, will be
examined. I will also examine why and how several autonomous civil society groups
transformed to pro-democracy groups in the early 1970s and struggled with the
authoritarian regime. Furthermore, conflicts within civil society groups and

65

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

organizations will be also examined. Through examining interactions between civil
society and the Yushin regime, I will focus on what kinds of restrictions hindered the
democratic movement of civil society. I will also examine not only which political and
social factors influenced pro-democracy civil society and its democratic movement but
also which internal and external factors affected the collapse of the Yushin regime.
In Chapter Four (1979-1983), I will focus on the resurrection of civil society and
its democratic struggles in the new political environment, from Park’s death in 1979 to
the implementation of a decompression policy toward democratic civil society and the
opposition party in late 1983. The changed political and social conditions after Park’s
death and their impacts on the character of civil society and the relationship between civil
society and the regime will be analyzed. Especially, I will examine the “Kwangju
Democratic Movement” of 1980 and its long-term impact on the democratic movement
of civil society. I will also examine why the great chance for the democratic transition in
1980 was aborted in the perspective of character of civil society.
Chapter Five (1983-1985) will focus on the decompression policy of the regime
toward civil society and its influence on the character of civil society. I will demonstrate
that successful economic development provided not only a concrete political foundation
for the regime but also an opportunity for civil society to revitalize and work more
actively against the regime. In addition, I will examine what made the regime implement
a decompression policy and how the political opportunity structure expanded by the
decompression policy decisively affected civil society and its democratic movement.
Moreover, I will examine change of the middle class and the establishment process of
coalitions among various democratic groups and organizations. Finally, I will examine
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how changed character o f civil society and the critical middle class affected the general
election of 1985.
In Chapter Six (1985-1987), I will examine outcomes of the general election in
1985 and how it influenced the character of civil society and the democratic movement in
the mid-1980s. I will also examine what kinds of political and social factors influenced
the outcomes of the general election, and analyze how outcomes of the election affected
character of civil society. In particular, I will examine and analyze how civil society
organizations, revitalized by the decompression policy and the outcome of the general
election, established a grand coalition with the opposition party, and forced the
authoritarian regime to accept the actual democratic transition in 1987. Also to be
examined will be the political and social factors that contributed to attaining counterhegemony of civil society against the authoritarian regime in the middle of the 1980s.
In addition, I will focus on major strategies of the coalition of democratic civil
society, the opposition party, and the middle class, for attaining counter-hegemony
against the regime. I will also examine how civil society influenced negotiations for
constitutional revision between 1986 and 1987. In addition, not only ideological and
strategic conflicts among various civil society organizations and groups but also dynamic
relationships between civil society organizations and the opposition party during the
process of democratic transition will be examined. In addition, this chapter will
demonstrate that the active participation of the middle class in the democratic movement
was a very important factor that influenced changing a character of civil society. Finally,
I will examine how civil society that attained counter-hegemony played a decisive role in
the democratic transition in 1987.

67

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chapter Seven will conclude this study. This chapter will conclude that the
changing character of civil society through the 1970s and 1980s significantly affected the
democratic transition in 1987. I will emphasize that various internal and external
elements significantly influenced the character o f civil society and this change of
character was an important in attaining counter-hegemony against the regime. In
particular, the simultaneous and favorable influence of those factors on civil society was
essential to democratic transition in 1987.
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CHAPTER II

BRIEF HISTORY O F THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN SOUTH KOREA

On 29 June 1987, Roh Tae-Woo, a presidential candidate of the ruling
Democratic Justice Party, publicly announced the democratization program after a long
period of violent confrontations between the authoritarian regime and the opposition
force. The “June 29 Declaration” was the democratic breakthrough in the contemporary
history of South Korea. In the “June 29 Declaration,” a direct presidential election,
revision of the Constitution, release of political prisoners and other democratic measures
were included. Until Roh’s declaration, there had been many individual and
organizational sacrifices and violent confrontations between the authoritarian regime and
democratic civil society.
The democratic movement of civil society that began from the early 1970s had
been inconsequential, and barely influenced the political institutional arena until the mid1980s. Because of suppression and internal conflicts, civil society had been divided, and
its democratic movement did not reach the point that civil society could challenge the
authoritarian regime. However, after the mid-1980s, democratic groups and
organizations of civil society, gradually supported by the opposition party and the middle
class, began to attain counter-hegemony against the Chun regime, and force the regime to
move toward the democratic transition process. Especially, in June 1987, the nationwide
democratic movement of civil society paralyzed the society, and put the regime in
political crisis. Under the crisis, the regime did not have many options for solving the
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political crisis. After long and violent confrontations between the regime and democratic
civil society, the Chun regime had to accept the democratic demands of civil society
through Roh’s declaration on June 29.
However, the democratic movement of civil society did not suddenly appear in
the middle of the 1980s. In the early 1970s, pro-democracy groups and organizations of
civil society, mainly focusing on the restoration of the democratic constitution, began to
organize and develop into anti-authoritarian groups and organizations throughout the
1970s and 1980s. In this evolutionary process, democratic civil society had faced many
internal and external restrictions, such as ideological and strategic conflicts and harsh
repression. Nevertheless, democratic civil society had survived, and grew into a strong
social force that could challenge the authoritarian regime.
Since the civilian government, based on a democratic constitution, was
established in July 1948, the government and its people had difficulties in exercising
democratic principles because of the traditional Confucian political culture and Japanese
colonial rule for a long period. Furthermore, because of the division of the Korean
peninsula, the influence of the military in domestic politics was getting stronger.
Moreover, the Korean War from 19S0 to 1953 increased the political status of the
military, and national security became the most important policy of the regime. These
internal and external factors impeded political development, and encouraged President
Rhee Syng-Man to abuse power. By the late 1950s, President Rhee had made the
political system practically his own by controlling political parties and civil society.
Because of the autocratic characteristics of the regime, the hallmarks o f the First
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Republic (1948-1960) were President Rhee's arbitrary executive power and the
opposition movement against his tyranny.
However, the Rhee regime had not eliminated the anti-govemment civil society
and its activities. Beginning in early April 1960, university and high school students
began to protest against Rhee’s dictatorship. This set off major student demonstrations,
followed by repression and violence. Students, exposed to and influenced by Western
political ideas, strongly criticized the regime because of their dissatisfaction with 1) the
lawless and corrupt Rhee regime, 2) the society ruled by violence, 3) the corrupt society,
4) economic depression, and 5) the arrogance of the privileged class. Criticism of the
dictatorship reached a peak on April 19,1960, when student group protested on streets
throughout the country against Rhee’s dictatorship. After this huge demonstration on
April 19, President Rhee finally announced he would step down from the presidency.
The Second Republic (August 1960-May 1961) was established after the National
Assembly election of July 29,1960. In the election, the Democratic Party, which had
been the opposition party under the First Republic, became a majority party in the
National Assembly. However, the Democrats disintegrated into factions, and Chang
Myon became the Prime Minister on August 19,1960 by a narrow margin. Because of
the experience of dictatorship and political corruption in the presidential system, the
Second Republic adopted a cabinet system led by the Prime Minister. However, the
Chang Myon government disappointed the Korean people when it imposed anti
democratic measures. Unlike people’s expectation, political and social instability during
the Second Republic was more serious than that of the First Republic. Although more
democratic than the First Republic in the institutional aspect, the Second Republic lost its
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control over political, social, and economic sectors because of the weak
institutionalization of governance and intense political struggles among many political
parties.
In this unstable situation, the military, with its emphasis on political and social
stability for the sake of national security, began to have a critical view of the Chang
Myon regime. In addition, the military leaders felt threatened by North Korea and thus
began to seek political change through direct intervention in politics. Furthermore, many
young military officers were strongly dissatisfied with their promotions. Eventually, the
military, led by Major Gen. Park Chung-Hee, carried out a military coup on May 16,
1961. Once the coup had toppled the civilian government, they took over the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of the state and organized a Military Revolutionary
Committee, consisting of five generals. In addition, martial law was proclaimed and
remained in force until late 1963. Although some politicians, like President Yun Bo-Sun
and Prime Minister Chang Myon, attempted to resist the coup of young military officers,
it did not succeed. On May 18, the thirteen-member cabinet held its last meeting and
resigned. The Second Republic was formally declared dead.
After the successful coup, military leaders gave two-reasons to justify their
intervention. The junta claimed that military intervention was inevitable because of
political instability and ineffective economic policy. After three years of direct military
control, Park publicly announced that he would retire from active duty, and play an
effective role in the future civilian government. He resigned from active military service
on August 30 and promptly joined the Democratic Republican Party (DRP), established
mainly by retired military officers and former opposition politicians. Park Chung-Hee
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became a presidential candidate of the ruling DRP and won the election held on October
IS, 1963. In addition, his party gained a majority of seats in the November 1963 general
election. Through these two elections, President Park created a political foundation for
ruling the country, and the Third Republic was established.
Although the Third Republic was established by the military coup, the regime had
a democratic constitution, and its power was exercised by democratic procedures in the
period from 1963 to 1971. The Park regime defined the national goals to be economic
development and national security. The Park regime succeeded in achieving economic
development and national security. Nevertheless, from the beginning o f the Park regime,
the opposition party took issue with the regime’s legitimacy. Moreover, in the
presidential election of 1971, Park barely won over Kim Dae-Jung, the candidate of the
major opposition party. President Park understood that his narrow margin in the election
was a result of ineffectively dealing with the opposition force and of the problem of
legitimacy. Thus, President Park needed to do something to overcome the legitimacy
problem in order to maintain his political position.
Based on the existing constitution, the Park regime had political and legal limits
in defending itself from the anti-government movement of the opposition force. Thus,
President Park decided to change the political system so he could more easily deal with
threats and challenges of the opposition force. To do this, President Park needed a new
political and legal foundation to effectively suppress anti-regime the democratic
movement of the opposition without legal and political restrictions. The first step was the
inauguration of the Yushin-revitalizing reform-Constitution in 1972. Park stated the new
constitution was necessary to eliminate the conditions fostering disorder and inefficiency
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and to develop the free democratic institutions best suited for Korea.127 The Yushin
Constitution, adopted indirect presidential election, allowed the President an indefinite
number of six-year terms. After Park was indirectly elected as the president, the regime
suppressed not only the opposition party but also democratic civil society through
powerful presidential emergency decrees and state power apparatuses.128
After the inauguration of the Yushin regime in 1972, democratic civil society, led
mainly by students, the Jaeya force,129 workers, and religious communities, began to
struggle with the Yushin regime for restoration of the democratic constitution. Because
of harsh repression, however, the struggle for the democratic transition did not succeed
during the 1970s. More importantly, democratic civil society was not well organized and
did not have unified strategies and ideologies for their struggle. In spite of these internal
and external difficulties, however, democratic civil society continued to struggle with the
regime during the 1970s.
The collapse of the Yushin regime began with the economic crisis in late 1978
when the underlying difficulties became manifest and the economy began to falter. The
economic crisis of 1978, caused the unbalanced investment and unstable international
economic environment, brought the political crisis of 1979. Workers and the white-collar
middle class, who had traditionally supported the Yushin regime, began to defect and
criticize the economic policies of the regime. This anti-govemment struggle developed
127Dong-A Daily, 18 October 1972, 1.
I2t Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, Politics in Developing Countries:
Comparing Experiences with Democracy (Boulder Lynne Rienner, 1990), 273.
'* Jaeya means extra-institutional opposition force. The term, Jaeya is a somewhat ambiguous
concept because dissident students, workers, urban poor, and farmers are not included in this category,
although they are outside of the institutional political arena. In this respect, the Jaeya can be defined as a
broad category of opposition notables with middle class origins, who have been involved in anti-regime
political activities working outside the officially sanctioned political space. Yun Sang-ChuL 80nyundae
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into the democratic movement The confrontation between democratic civil society and
the regime reached the point at which the regime might use the military to suppress the
democratic movement by the end of 1979. Along with the violent confrontation between
the regime and civil society, a politically important event took place in the institutional
political arena. The ruling party and government ousted Kim Young-Sam, one of the
opposition party leaders with influence in the democratic force of civil society, from the
National Assembly. This political incident provoked an uprising in Busan and Masan.
Although the democratic struggle of civil society was not sufficient to break down the
regime, it was enough to make political and social conditions unstable as well as provoke
a political crisis for the regime in 1979.
In this crisis, the ruling coalition was divided into hardline and moderate factions
based on their strategies for dealing with the political crisis. The moderate faction aimed
to solve the political crisis through compromise with the opposition force, whereas the
hardliners wanted to suppress democratic civil society by use of the military. However,
because the President himself and the hardliners of the ruling coalition controlled the
decision making process of the regime, the opinion of the moderate faction could not be
accepted. Internal conflict within the ruling coalition grew to the point where Kim JaeKyu, one of the moderate faction, decided to assassinate President Park. For Kim, this
was the only way to solve the political crisis peacefully. Thus, Kim Jae-Kyu, the Chief
of Korean Intelligence Agency (KCIA), assassinated President Park on 26 October 1979.
With Park’s death, the authoritarian Yushin regime collapsed, and South Korea faced a
new political situation in the 1980s.

Hankaokui Minjuhwaehanggwajung (The Process o f Democratic Transition of South Korea in the 1980s),
75-6.
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Park’s sudden death not only caused political and social instability, but also
provided an opportunity for democratization. In the politically and socially unstable
situation, democratic civil society became actively involved in transitional politics.
Many new democratic organizations were established and struggled to attain autonomy
from the state. At the same time, they began to force not only the opposition party but
also the ruling party to reach an agreement for the transition to democracy. On the other
hand, in the institutional political arena, the DRP and the opposition New Democratic
Party (NDP) began to negotiate the process of democratic transition right after Park’s
death. Moreover, the acting president Choi Kyu-Ha, Prime Minister under the Park
regime, agreed and supported negotiations for a democratic transition.
However, negotiations for the democratic transition could not reach an agreement
because neither the DRP nor the NDP had complete autonomy from civil society or
hardliners in the military. That is, under the politically unstable situation, the real power
was in the military because it was the only state institution that was well-organized to use
physical force. After the intra-military coup in December 12, 1979, the new military
force, led by Chun Doo-Hwan, emerged as a real political actor in transitional politics.130
Under the influence of the new military force, the Choi government was gradually
reduced to a puppet regime controlled by the military hardliners. The new military force
started to suppress democratic civil society, especially students and workers. Thus, the
democratic movement of civil society, that had just begun to vitalize and get actively
involved in transitional politics, began to shrink, and the initiative of the transitional
process went back to the government. The plan of the new military force for taking

130Choc Po-Sik, “Je 5 Gongwhakook junya: 12. 12Pyun” (The Eve of the Fifth republic: The 12.
12 Phase), Wolgan Chosun, (May 1996): 497-631.
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power did not stop here; it sought an excuse to intervene directly in politics. As an
excuse of direct military intervention, the new military force chose the democratic
uprising in Kwangju, and harshly suppressed the “Kwangju uprising” in May 1980,
through the expansion of martial law. The new military force tried to justify their direct
intervention in politics in order to eliminate political and social disorder in Kwangju. As
a result of the suppression, the best opportunity for democratization since the early 1970s
was aborted, and the Korean people had to wait a long time for democratization to occur.
Furthermore, the new military force's plan for taking power continued after the
“Kwangju Uprising.” The new military force gradually occupied important
governmental and military positions, and pressured president Choi to step down from the
presidency. President Choi resigned on 16 August 1980, and Chun Doo-Hwan, a retired
Army General, was elected a president by the Electoral College (National Unification
Conference) in August and was inaugurated on 1 September 1980. On October 22, a
referendum for revision of the Constitution was held, and it passed with 91.6 percent
approval, with 95.5 percent voter turnout. On October 27, Chun dissolved the National
Assembly and all political parties and instead installed the Legistative Council for
National Security (LCNS). After the LCNS passed various laws for suppressing not only
civil society but also the opposition party, Chun lifted martial law. However, the
repressive policy toward the opposition force was even harsher than that of the Yushin
regime. However, democratic civil society, such as students and the Jaeya force in the
early 1980s, continued to develop ideologies and strategies and waited for the right time
when they could attain counter-hegemony against the military authoritarian regime.
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On the other hand, the Chun regime concentrated its resources and efforts on
economic development and political and social stability through a repressive policy on
economic, political, and social sectors. Consequently, the Chun regime did accomplish
successful economic development and political and social stability. The regime, thus,
succeeded in facilitating creation of a “new middle class” who supported the Chun
regime.131 Nevertheless, the Chun regime could not avoid the fundamental problem of its
legitimacy. The regime needed to solve the legitimacy problem for effective and stable
governing in the future. Thus, the Chun regime implemented a decompression policy to
expand the political foundation and overcome the legitimacy problem in late 1983.132
Unlike planners of the decompression policy, however, the decompression policy
provided a great opportunity for democratic civil society to revitalize and effectively
struggle with the authoritarian regime. In addition, democratic civil society responded to
the decompression policy by strengthening ties with the opposition party. Diverse and
heterogeneous pro-democracy groups consolidated into a centralized nationwide
organization in order to establish a unified direction and to coordinate among diverse
social movement organizations. When the Chun regime recognized the unexpected
outcome of the decompression policy, they tried to regain the control over civil society
and the opposition party by returning to a repressive policy.
However, it was too late for the regime to serve the initiative on the political
situation. The public dissatisfaction with the authoritarian regime clearly appeared in the
general election of 1985. The opposition New Korean Democratic Party, established just
before the election, got more than one-third of the National Assembly seats and was able
131 Dong-A Ubosa, Dong-A Yongam (Dong-A Year Book 1984), 527.
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to play a significant role in the democratic movement In addition, the NKDP’s success
in the general election of 1985 was also very meaningful to democratic civil society.
Democratic civil society perceived the result of the election as turning the people’s
support away from the authoritarian regime. Based on this perception, democratic civil
society could struggle more actively and aggressively with the Chun regime, and thus
develop into a political and social force that could challenge the hegemony of the state.
In addition, the successful outcome o f the election made the NKDP struggle more
offensively with the regime in the institutional political arena.
On the other hand, democratic civil society that recognized that public supports
had begun to move toward the opposition force began to strongly pressure the ruling and
opposition party to negotiate for the constitutional revision. In a response to pressure
from civil society and the opposition party, the Chun regime implemented an even
harsher repressive policy than before. However, in spite of suppression, democratic civil
society continually forced the ruling party and regime to negotiate with the opposition
party for the constitutional revision. Because of continuing refusal by the ruling party
and the government to revise the constitution, however, the NKDP gave up the strategy
of compromise and adopted a maximalist strategy, such as democratization through the
“street politics,” in 1986. This shift o f NKDP’s strategy was welcomed by democratic
civil society, and the uncomfortable relationship between civil society organizations and
the NKDP was healed. The new cooperative climate developed into the formation of a
united front between the opposition party and democratic civil society.

132 Yun Sang-Chul, I980snyundae Hankookui Minjuhwaehaenggwajung (The Process of
Democratic Transition in the 1980s), 91-110.
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This coalition of the opposition party and democratic civil society was a great
success. Although student groups were the most active participants among various
groups o f democratic civil society, the participation of industrial workers, farmers, and
low-paid service workers broadened the popular base of the democratic movement.
Especially, the United Minjung (masses) Movement for Democracy and Unification
(UMMDU), established in March 1983, played a key role in organizing mass rallies in
the mid-1980s. A distinctive characteristic of the popular mobilizations in this period
was that it indicated the multi-class, multi-sectoral nature of the democratic movement.
The initial reaction of the Chun regime to the democratic movement of civil
society and the opposition party after the general election was to crack down on the
petition drives by mobilizing thousands of police. However, this repression could not
stop the democratic struggles of civil society, revitalized after the decompression policy
by active participation of the middle class. The enormous pressure from below finally
succeeded in forcing the Chun regime to open the dialogue for the constitutional revision
on 30 April 1986. However, the negotiation between the ruling and opposition party
faced difficulties from the beginning because both parties could not act independently of
hardliners in the ruling coalition and civil society.
During the negotiation, democratic civil society continually pressed the Chun
regime to revise the authoritarian constitution. In spite of this pressure, the negotiation
between the DJP and NKDP was not successful. Thus, democratic civil society that was
disappointed by the negotiation process began to strongly criticize both parties and to
struggle directly with the Chun regime. Many ordinary people, especially the middle
class, came to distrust the intentions of the Chun regime for the constitutional revision,
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and they began to express their dissatisfaction toward the regime. Furthermore, various
democratic organizations began to unite under nationwide umbrella organizations, and
the coalition between those organizations and the opposition party was more
consolidated. Under the situation, the Chun regime began to lose control over civil
society and its democratic movement, and the social instability began to grow.
On 13 April 1987, President Chun announced a suspension of the negotiation for
the constitutional revision until after the 1988 Summer Olympic Games. He claimed that
consensus among opposition parties was not possible and that time was running out
before the elections. Instead, the government offered to the NKDP, which strongly
wanted a return to direct presidential elections, a parliamentary system as a compromise.
Lee Min-Woo, president of the NKDP, replied that his party would consider the proposal
of the government if the ruling party adopted seven major political reforms.133 Kim
Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung, who were de facto leaders of the NKDP, rejected this
initiative. They strongly criticized the attempt to compromise, broke away, and formed
their own Reunification Democratic Party on 8 April 1987.134 Through this process, the
opposition party was split, and the opposition raised doubts over their ability to handle
power responsibly.
Right after Chun’s announcement of suspending negotiations, democratic civil
society and the opposition party began to protest strongly against the Chun’s decision.135
This protest developed into a violent confrontation between the regime and the opposition
force. A couple of incidents occurred during this confrontation. One was that a
1331) adoption of local self-governing system, 2) guarantee of freedom of press, 3) guarantee of
association and basic rights, 4) neutrality o f government officials, 5) guarantee of more than two party
system, 6) fair election laws for congressmen, and 7) release and restatement of political prisoners.
134Joongang Daily, 8 April 1987.
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university student's death (Park Chong-Chul) by the police torture was disclosed by a
religious organization and the other was that another university student (Yi Han-Yol) was
killed during the demonstrations. These two tragic incidents emotionally and politically
affected not only democratic civil society but also the middle class. These incidents
motivated radical and moderate groups and organizations of civil society to unite and
struggle more actively and effectively. In addition, these incidents strongly induced
active participation of the middle class, who had traditionally supported the authoritarian
regime or had been quiet. The middle class clearly began to change their attitude and
behavior toward the authoritarian regime. Furthermore, they even began to participate in
the democratic movement. Based on the influence of those two incidents and active
struggle with the regime, democratic civil society began to attain counter-hegemony
against the authoritarian regime. In spring of 1987, the Chun regime lost control over the
democratic movement of the opposition coalition established by united civil society
organizations and the opposition party, and it faced a serious political crisis.
On 10 June 1987, two important rallies changed the future of Korean politics.136
One was that the ruling DJP held its party convention to nominate Roh Tae-Woo, who
was a president of the ruling party, as its next presidential candidate. The other important
rally was a nationwide demonstration, led by the National Coalition for Democratic
Constitution (NCDC),137 to denounce the cover-up o f the torture and murder o f Park
Chong-Chul and the scheme to maintain the current constitution. Under this
135 Hankook Daily, 27 June 27 1987.
136John Kie-Chiang Oh, Korean Politics: The Questfo r Democratization and Economic
Development (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999), 91.
137 The National Coalition for Democratic Constitution (NCDC), which consisted of religious and
intellectual dissenters, was established on 27 May 1987. The founding statements of the NCDC
emphasized human rights and the restoration of formal procedural democracy such as a direct presidential
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circumstance, the Chun regime had only two options for solving this national political
crisis. One option was harsher suppression toward civil society and the opposition party
through use of the military. The other was a negotiation with the opposition party that
civil society strongly supported and adoption of the demands of the opposition force.
Eventually, on 29 June 1987, Roh Tae-Woo, the presidential candidate of the
ruling DJP, announced a democratization program with the President Chun's consent
The declaration on June 29 constituted a foundamental agreement for the Korean
democratic transition. The eight points of the declaration were: 1) constitutional revision
for the directly elected presidential system, 2) revision of presidential election law,
including the end of restrictions on campaigning, 3) restoration of political rights of Kim
Dae Jung and release of political prisoners, 4) full respect for basic human rights, 5)
freedom of the press, 6) local government autonomy and self-regulation for educational
institutions, 7) provisions for hill political activities, and 8) elimination of crime and
corruption. By adopting the main demands of the opposition force, Roh seized the
initiative in the approaching election. He turned mass opposition to his candidacy into a
new legitimacy and began to isolate the radical students from the Catholic church and the
support of the middle class. After the June 29 declaration. South Korea entered into the
democratic transition process, and the ruling and opposition party negotiated a schedule
for the constitutional revision and a presidential election.

election. The formation of the NCDC meant the establishment of moderate leadership in the opposition
coalition.
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CHAPTER in

THE SHIFT TO THE YUSHIN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME AND CIVIL
SOCIETY (1972-1979)

1. The Inauguration of the Yusbin Regime
The formal democratic political system was broken by the installation of the
Yushirt (Revitalization) Constitution in 1972, and shifted to an outright authoritarian
political system. The Yushin regime had many similar characteristics to typical
bureaucratic authoritarian regimes.138 The popular sector was politically and
economically excluded under the Yushin regime. In the political area, competitive
elections were abolished, any kind of strike was virtually prohibited, the labor union
organizations were severely restricted, and human rights were violated arbitrarily. In the
economic area, the primary concern of the economic policy was not the improvement of
the standard of living of the lower classes but rapid and quantitative growth of the
economy.
In spite of these common characteristics, the background of inaugurating the
Yushin regime was quite different from those of Latin American countries. First, there
was no economic crisis before the inauguration of the Yushin Constitution. The
economic growth rate was at 5.8% in 1972, although it declined from the rate of 9.4% in
1971, unemployment rate lowered to 4.5% in 1972 from 7.4% in 1965, and the export

131 Im Hyug-Baeg, “The Rise o f Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea,” 239-40.
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growth rate of 52.1% was much higher than the rate of 22.6% in 1971.139 Second, the so
called “deepening” of the productive structure didn’t precede the inauguration of the
Yushin Constitution. Many Latin American countries, such as Venezuela, changed their
political system to an authoritarian system to suppress workers’ demands and protect the
bourgeoisie class from an unstable economic condition.140 However, in South Korea,
there was no active labor movement, and thus there was no particular reason for the
regime to change the political system to suppress the labor movement. Third, before the
inauguration of the Yushin regime, the political struggle by democratic civil society was
not serious enough to threaten the ruling coalition. For example, the number of people
involved in political struggle was higher in 1971 than before, but declining by 1972. In
addition, most civil society organizations did not have autonomy and were divided
because they had been financially supported or institutionally controlled by the regime.141
Then, why did an outright authoritarian regime emerge in South Korea under
different circumstances from those presupposed by Guillermo O’Donnell’s bureaucratic
authoritarian model? Since Park Chung-Hee took power in 1961, the regime had
concentrated on an economic development policy to broaden the popular support, and the
effort had been successful. As a result, the regime could draw public support, and the
ruling coalition had no problem in dealing with workers in the process of promoting labor

139 Economic Planning Board, Major Statistics o f the Korean Economy (Seoul: Economic
Planning Board, 1980).
140 Anibal Romero, “Venezuela: Democracy Hangs On" Journal of Democracy 7, no 7 (October
1996): 33-6.
141 Simone Chambers called this kind of civil society a “bad civil society," and this bad civil
society develops when groups fail to live up to the ideals of democratic citizenship: when groups advocate
hate, organize around xenophobia, and generally contribute to an atmosphere of distrust, and suspicion
between social actors. In extreme cases, where, for example, violence is suspected, the state can step in and
censure the group. Simone Chambers, “A Critical Theory of Civil Society,” in Alternative Conceptions o f
Civil Society, eds. Simone Chambers and Will Kymlicka (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University
Press, 2002), 100-5.

85

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

intensive exports because the market conditions had kept wages low even without state
intervention. However, this economic condition began to change from the late 1960s.142
When the unlimited supply of labor ended, the regime faced a new situation that the
exhaustion of the labor surplus pressured wages up. In this situation, the regime needed
suppress the wage increase through the inauguration of the Yushin regime in 1972.
However, this economic factor is not enough to explain the transformation of the
regime. Although the shortage of labor naturally tends to enhance wages, if there is no
one organized to represent workers’ interests, there is no incentive for the ruling coalition
to change the regime from formal democracy to authoritarianism. What happened in
1971 was that a new political coalition was established around the labor issue. The
outcome of two elections in 1971 showed that formal democratic institutions couldn’t
provide the new coalition with a formidable instrument to assert their interests.143 Under
this circumstance, the ruling coalition closed democratic institutions in order to continue
the economic system based on an export-oriented economic policy because the existing
balance of force heavily relied on the ruling coalition.
In addition, there was a purely political and personal reason.144 In the presidential
election of 1971, the margin between President Park and Kim Dae-Jung, a opposition

142 At the end of 1960s, the Korean economy faced the first major problem in export-led
industrialization. The major cause of this economic problem was foreign debt The interest gap between
domestic and foreign loans and a corporate tax structure which made interest payments on business
borrowings tax deductible drove a large number of firms, which had overextended themselves through
foreign borrowing in the middle of 1960s, to the brink of bankruptcy. The government had to take over 30
“ill managed” companies in 1969, together with the burden of paying back their foreign debts. Woo JungEn, Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1991), 106-17.
143 In the general election on 25 May 1971, the opposition party achieved good results by winning
69 of the 204 seats. The DRP no longer enjoyed a two-thirds majority as before (1967:73.7%), but they
still held a majority of 113 seats (55.4%). Juergen Kleiner, Korea: A Century o f Change (New Jersey:
World Scientific, 2001), 149-50.
144John Lie, “Democratization and Its Discontents: Origins of the Present Crisis in South Korea,”
Monthly Review 42, no. 9 (February 1991): 40-1.
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presidential candidate, was very close. The difference between these two persons in the
election was less than 1,000,000. Presdent Park, seriously challenged in the election,
needed political, social and cultural restructuring to hold concrete political power.
However, there was a limitation in the current formal democratic political system because
it restricted presidential power. This political environment provided President Park a
strong motive to change the political system to authoritarianism. In this regard, the
Yushin inauguration was the ruling elites’ preemptive strike against the possible
emergence of the alternative opposition force.

2. Political, Ideological, and Economic Restructuring
1) Political Restructuring
The major goals of the political restructuring were to depoliticize all institutional
political arenas, including party politics, and to consolidate Park’s political power. The
Park regime replaced party politics with bureaucratic politics. Bureaucrats were assigned
to implement what Chalmers Johnson calls “plan rational” economic policies rather than
“market rational” ones. In order to implement the “plan rational” economic
developmental projects, Park insulated and immunized economic bureacrats from the
influence of party politics as well as from the special interests of big business.145 In
addition, under the Yushin Constitution, the President was empowered not only to
dissolve the National Assembly but also to appoint one-third of the congressmen, who
formed a bargaining body called “Y uchunghoeThrough the power to appoint one-third

143Chalmers Johnson argues the developmental states like Japan and South Korea pursue a “plan
rational” strategy rather than market rational strategy. According to Johnson, the evaluative standard of
plan rationality is effectiveness while that of market rationality is efficiency. Chalmers Johnson, A/777 and
the Japanese Miracle (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982), 21.
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of the congressmen, Park could put the National Assembly under his control. So, the
legislative power of the ruling party was emasculated so that it became a rubber stamp of
the executive branch.146
Park carefully applied a strategy o f “divide and rule,” and thus important state
institutions, such as the military, had not taken a firm and fixed place in politics.
Furthermore, he didn’t allow any internal division within not only the military-asinstitution but also other state institutions. At the same time, Park provided economic
and political incentives to the ruling coalition to obtain their loyalty. These economic
and political incentives made the relationship between President Park and the ruling
coalition groups more solid.147 Through a combination of economic and political
incentives and of harsh suppression. President Park sucessfully maintained his power.

2) Ideological Restructuring
President Park tried to justify the inauguration of the Yushin regime as promoting
the unification of the country, coping with the volatile international situation, and
carrying out rapid socio-economic development Particularly, the economic development
policy that had been emphasized since the military coup in 1961 was crucial for the
regime to justify authoritarian rule.148 He also tried to justify the authoritarian regime
with the national security ideology. His argument was that all national resources and
146 Stephan Haggard and Moon Chung-In, “The State, Politics, and Economic Development in
Postwar South Korea," in State and Society in Contemporary Korea, ed. Hagen Koo, 76.
147 Yang Byung-Ki, “Hankookui Gunbu Jungchie kwanhan Yongu" (The Study on the Political
Military), Korean Political Science Review 27, no. 2 (1993): 183-84.
148 According to President Park’s speech, President Park said “We will have to do various things
well in order to live well. We will need to do politics well, do economic construction well, strengthen
national defense, do diplomacy well, and develop culture and art Yet I believe that the basic way to
achieve all of them and the fundamental solution to the difficulties and evils that have existed for a long
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energies should be effectively and efficiently managed by the centralized state until the
threat from Communist North Korea vanished. Thus, he defined the Yushin regime as a
transitional one to cope with an emergency. Because of this transitional nature of the
ruling ideology, the regime was vulnerable to pressure from the opposition force when
the causal factors that brought the regime into existence disappeared, were satisfied or
were accomplished.
Nevertheless, the ideology of national security couldn't provide a sufficient
rationale for the abolition of liberal democratic institutions and procedures. Thus,
President Park had to rely more heavily on economic development as a rationale for the
inauguration of the Yushin regime. Park argued that superior economic performance was
essential to triumph over Communist North Korea in any peace time confrontation. In
order to achieve this goal, the country’s energy and resources should be organized with
maximum efficiency, the kind of efficiency that could only be achieved through
concentrating all the power in the state.

3) Economic Restructuring
The regime that lost legitimacy in the conversion of a formal democracy into
outright authoritarianism tried to recover the loss of legitimacy by promising a better
economic life to people. Thus, over-ambitious economic goals were presented to the
people as a rationale for keeping the authoritarian regime, i.e., the achievement of
national grandeur and the upgrading of the nation’s economic, political, and military

time in our society is to build our economy rapidly and establish a self-sustaining economy.” Park ChungHee’s speech on April 29, 1967.
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status in the international system.149 So, the economic policy became politically
propagandized and severely politicized to compensate for the loss of political legitimacy.
In order to achieve this economic goal, the Park regime launched a new phase of
industrialization based on heavy and chemical industries in 1973. The import
substitution industry was not enough to achieve this goal, and thus the regime needed an
export-oriended economic policy.
In addition, the change of economic policy was aimed at the attainment of a
political imperative in response to the changing world market. Since the beginning of the
1970s, developed countries began to strengthen their protectionist barriers, especially on
labor intensive consumer non-durable goods from NICs. In addition, the push into the
HCI was motivated by the need to upgrade the capability of military self-reliance in the
face of the U.S. troop withdrawal announced in the Nixon Dotrine in 1970.IS° Because of
this combination of constraints and new opportunities, the regime shifted the emphasis
from exports of labor intensive, consumer non-durable goods to labor intensive assembly
works of heavy industries.151
In order to concentrate the export oriented economic policy, the state encouraged
the formation of big business groups.152 This policy concentrated on exports in the
largest export firms, and put the small firms under the networks of big trading firms as
149 For example. President Park promised the people that he could attain the economic goal of
SI,000 per capita income and 10 billion dollars in exports by 1980. Federation of Korean Industries (FKI),
Chunkyungryun 20nyunsa (The Twenty Years History of the FKI), (Seoul: FKI, 1983), 267-68.
The Nixon Doctrine stressed self-defense among the U.S. allies. The Nixon administration
made a partial withdrawal of U.S. military troops from South Korea in 1971 and announced that they would
withdraw U.S. troops within five years. President Park, a former General, felt a crisis of national security
and determined to promote key defense-related industries.
131 Stephan Heggard and Moon Jung-In, “The South Korean State in the International Economy:
Liberal, Dependent, or Mercantile?” in The Antinomies o f Interdependence: National Welfare and the
International Division o f Labor, John Gerard Ruggie (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 173.
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subcontractors. Therefore, the HCI drive increased the power of the bourgeoisie class
and, as a consequence, identified the state more closely with conglomerates and made the
regime more vulnerable to populist and leftist critique.153 The result of nurturing the
capitalist class ultimately increased the power of the bourgeoisie class in the national
economy, and caused the state to be a hostage of the bourgeoisie class in the crisis
period.154

3. The Nature of the Yushin Regime and Its Coalition
1) Nature o f the Yushin Regime
A unique characteristic of the Yushin regime was harsh suppression of civil
society and opposition parties. The Yushin regime controlled most civil society groups
and organizations through institutional and financial restrictions, and suppressed civil
society that transformed to pro-democracy civil society in early 1970s because the regime
was afraid of expansion of democratic civil society and its democratic movement. The
regime also controlled opposition parties and their political activities by supporting a
cooperative leadership and prohibiting political activities of key opposition politicians.

>sz For example. General Trading Companies were built generally as the overseas marketing arms
of the Chaebol to realize maximum efficiency in penetrating oversea markets. Hagen Koo, State and
Society in Contemporary Korea (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993), 79.
153 According to Peter Evans, the state’s performance for foreign loans over foreign direct
investment had a political motivation because the state’s discretionary power over the allocation of foreign
loans provided an additional leverage over local bourgeoisie. Peter Evans, “Transnational Linkages and the
Economic Role of the State: An Analysis of Developing and Industrialized in the Post-World War II
Period,” in Bringing the State Back In, eds. Evans, Reuschemeyer, and Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985).
134Chung Jae-Yong and Richard J. R. Kirkby, The Political Economy o f Development and
Environment in Korea (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 117.
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Thus, while the ruling coalition came to have a solid political foundation, the role of civil
society and opposition parties continued to shrink.155
Under the outright authoritarian regime, functions of the institutional political
arena had been structurally restricted, and the institutional political arena, such as
political parties, National Assembly, and courts, had been used to obtain justification of
the policy-making process. Neither the ruling nor opposition parties represented the
public interest In addition, they did not have a close relationship with civil society, and
provided only legal justification for the regime. The National Assembly, completely
controlled by the ruling party, could not be a place for discussing political and social
issues for the public interest. Instead, it was used to legalize state power as a part of the
state institutions. The Yushin regime also controlled the judiciary branch with the
president’s appointment power and restriction of judges’ roles. Through harsh
suppression and legal and institutional restrictions, the regime could control not only the
institutional political arena but also most groups and organizations of civil society.

2) The Ruling Coalition of the Yushin Regime
(1) Military
When the direct rule of the military junta that started with the military coup in
1961 ended in 1963, the military withdrew from politics, and only military-tumedcivilians could participate in national politics. After taking power, Park didn’t allow the
military to be directly involved in politics and used the military to resolve internal
ISSThe Yushin Constitution, which legalized repressive measures of the state power apparatuses,
banned every anti-government political activism, and any criticism of the Yushin Constitution. The Yushin
Constitution provided a legal foundation of harsh punishing up to the death penalty. Geir Helgesen,

92

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

political problems as little as possible. Although the military was not directly involved in
politics, however, its potential power gradually increased after the installation of the
Yushin regime.
In addition, the military strongly influenced the ruling ideology of the Yushin
regime. Just as Abrahamsson points out the common orientation of the military in the
Third World, the military of South Korea also considered political and social order to be
very important.156 Especially, the confrontation with North Korea made the military
consider social order and political stability to be even more important. This ideological
orientation of the military provided basic directions to the political and economic policies
of the Yushin regime. In this respect, the military was a strong supporter of the Yushin
regime as well as providing ideological and human resources to the Yushin regime.157
After the inauguration of the Yushin regime. Park’s policy toward the military was
more careful because a personalized dictatorship required tighter control over the military
since it remained the only contender for power. In order to control the military
effectively, Park strengthened the power of the security community, such as the Defense
Security Command of Army, within the military since the regime needed to enforce more
discipline and surveillance on regular army groups that didn’t commit themselves to the

Democracy and Authority in Korea: The Cultural Dimension in Korean Politics (New York: S t Martin
Press, 1998), 70.
156 Bengt Abrahamsson, “Elements of Military Conservatism: Traditional and Modem,” in On
Military Ideology, ed. M. Janowitz (Belgium: Rotterdam University Press, 1971), 68. In fact the main
reason of the military coup in 1961 was political and social instability. The young military officers, led by
Gen. Park Chung Hee, were worried about the political and social instability under the situation of the
divided nation. Thus, in order to stabilize political and social order, the military intervened in politics, and
directly ruled for three years.
157 During the Yushin period, key cabinet members, related to the national security and political
affairs, and national security, came from the military, and those ministers rotated important posts. The
main reason of this was that those who came from the military were people who President Park could trust.
In addition. President Park used those appointments as an incentive for loyalty to his regime. The
Institution of the Army History, Hankaokgungwa Kookkabaljun (Korean Army and State Development),
(Seoul: Hwarangdae Yongusil, 1992), 112.
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repressive regime. The major role of the Defense Security Command of Army was to
prevent prominent officers in regular military organizations from emerging as contenders
to Park or from forming a civil-military alliance against the regime.
Park’s discriminatory policy of favoring political officers over regular career
officers was harmful to the internal unity of the military and created latent splits in the
late Yushin regime. Although not explicitly exposed, suspicion, dissension, distrust,
feuds and even hostility had existed between these two groups within the military during
Park’s reign. However, this conflict did not threaten or challenge Park’s political
power.158 The emergence of internal division within the military generated different
strategic stances on how to maintain authoritarianism. The career professional officer
group was neutral in the struggle between an authoritarian regime and democratic
opposition forces because the continuing military confrontation with North Korea
eliminated the possibility of dismantling the military. On the other hand, the security
community group, composed of hardline supporters, was directly responsible for the
suppression of anti-authoritarian dissidents and had no skill other than surveillance,
intimidation, interrogation, torture, etc. Therefore, they had a vital interest in
perpetuating the authoritarian regime as long as possible. In spite of this internal split,
Park had carefully maintained a balance of power between those two groups, and thus no
individual or group within the military could oppose Park’s dictatorial hold on power. As
a result of Park’s careful policy and a close relationship with Park, the military had

ISS According to former Army Gen. Lee So- Dong, this internal conflict within the military did not
affect the control of President Park over the military. It was an internal struggle for taking a leadership in
the military. There was no question about the loyalty of these two groups to President Park. That is, the
career professional officers had relative deprivation in their promotion and the relationship with President
Park. This internal element caused the split of the military.
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remained as an importat part of the ruling coalition and supported the regime until its
collapse in 1979.

(2) Bourgeoisie
The Korean state has become strong and autonomous through the implementation
o f industrialization projects since the early 1960s. With the economy devastated by the
war, the state came to dominate the economic and financial sectors through receiving and
allocating foreign aid. Through this process, economic elites came to owe their
socioeconomic status to the good graces of the regime in power.159 However, although
the state has been strong and independent, the state has been always pressured from the
private interests. It is paradoxical that increased penetration of the state into civil society
increases the likelihood that societal interests will attempt to invade and divide the

. 160
state.
The prelude of the Yushin installation in the economic sector appeared in the
“Presidential Emergency Measure for Economic Stability and Growth” on 3 August
1972.161 It was a fatal blow to private financiers in the curb loan market while the
industrial bourgeoisie benefited the most. Small and medium business was in a relatively
disadvantaged position. The fact that big business, individually through private channels

159Choi Jang-Jip, “Political Cleavages in South Korea,” 22.
Dietrich Reuschemeyer and Peter Evans, Bringing the State Back In, 69.
161 The main components of the August 3 Measure were: 1) to freeze repayment of all private curb
market loans for 3 years of grace period, 2) to repay the loans equitably over a 5-year period at an interest
rate far below the market rate, and 3) to replace 30% of the short term high interest loans of firms with
long-term low interest loans from the central bank which were to be repaid over 5 years after a 3-year grace
period. Chosun Daily, 3 August 1972: Jung Yong-Duck, “Regulatory Policy in Korea: An Evaluation of
the Presidential Emergency Decree for Economic Stability and Growth o f August 3, 1972,” Korean Social
Science Journal 13, (1986-1987): 44-77.
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and collectively through a business association (Federation of Korean Industries: FKI),162
lobbied hard before the announcement of the Measure tells of the need for collective
action on the part of the bourgeoisie even under an authoritarian regime that nurtured
domestic capitalists. The case of the “August 3 Measure” showed that the Korean
bourgeoisie in the 1970s had already attained high degree of class cohesiveness and was
capable of making collective action to promote their common interests in spite of state
intervention.
By organizing the business association, large conglomerates could formulate a
collective strategy to influence the state and society. In fact, under the authoritarian
regime, to organize economic associations was more influential than to organize political
parties to realize and to defend collective interests of a class because party politics was
generally displaced and frozen by the regime. Besides organizations and associations of
the large conglomerate, the bourgeoisie class increased its influences on the state through
informal connections with high ranking bureaucrats. Moreover, the bourgeoisie class
tried to influence public opinion by the various mechanisms, such as newspaper
companies and broadcasting stations, and recruited prominent public opinion leaders in
the non-economic sector of the political, military, academic, and cultural circles.163 After

162 The Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) was established by 13 CEOs on 16 August 1961.
When it was established, its name was the Association of Korean Businessmen. In its first general
assembly, Lee Byung-Chul, CEO of the Samsung Group, was elected as the first president In 1960s, this
organization suggested an export-led economic development strategy and inducement of foreign capital. In
addition, this organization concentrated its effort on enhancing status of the economic community after the
“May 16 Revolution.” On August 1968, the name of the association was changed to the Federation of
Korean Industries (FKI) and affiliated SO industry level associations under its umbrella. In the 1970s, the
FKI dedicated export promotion, and supported the growth of the heavy and chemical industries as core
national industries. FKI, Chunkyungryun 20nyunsa (The 20-years History of Federation of Korean
Industries), (Seoul: FKI, 1983).
163 For example, the Samsung Group established the Joongang Daily and Dong-A Broad Casting
System to advocate interests of the bourgeoisie class and influence public opinion.
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the regime pursued the HCI projects, every individual capitalist competed with each other
to be chosen by the state as the investor and manager of specific HCI projects.
By the end of the Yushin regime, the bourgeoisie attained more strengths in the
relationship with the state and society through collective actions. The
“Chunkyungyuchak (close ties between an economic class and political elites)” didn’t
strengthen the consolidation of the authoritarian regime because the ties lessened the
degree of freedom of the authoritarian state, making the state increasingly reliant on
repression at the time of crisis. The close ties between bourgeoisie and the state created
disenchantment among medium and small industrialists, and also created cracks in the
authoritarian ruling coalition in the late 1970s. Nevertheless, the bourgeoisie class served
as an economic foundation of the Yushin regime. That is, the successful economic
performance of the bourgeoisie class was very important for the regime to obtain its
legitimacy. As compensation for being a foundation of economic development, the
bourgeoisie class could be supported economically and politically by the regime.164 In
this respect, the regime and the bourgeoisie class had a reciprocally dependent
relationship, and the bourgeoisie class had been an important ruling coalition group.

(3) Bureaucrats
Along with the military and bourgeoisie, bureaucrats had also played a very
important role as a part of the ruling coalition during the Yushin period. Particularly,
bureaucrats played a significant role in the regime’s implementation of economic and

164 The bourgeoisie class, especially the chaebol, was offered subsidized interest rates (negative in
real terms), preferential credit allocation, tax incentives and exemptions, and license to operate in the
lucrative domestic market where they enjoyed a quasi-monopolistic positioning. Chung Jae-Yong and
Richard J. R. Kirkby, The Political Economy o f Development and Environment in Korea, 63.
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social policies. In the authoritarian political system, bureaucrats could expand their
power in the name of technical rationality and accomplishment.165 During the Yushin
regime, bureaucrats sought their political and economic interests through serving
President, and thus could remained as a pillar of the ruling coalition groups.
Another reason why bureaucrats became powerful during the Yushin regime was
that many retired military officers who had a close relation with President Park were
recruited for important positions in the bureaucracy. Thus, bureaucrats could maintain a
close relationship with the military, a powerful group within the ruling coalition, and
could continuously expand their power. Additionally, bureaucrats played the role of
mediator between the state and the bourgeoisie class during the Yushin period. Through
the bureaucrats’ mediation, conflicts between the regime and bourgeoisie could be
solved, and thus this bureaucrats’ mediation role enabled them to grow as one pillar of
the regime’s ruling coalition.
More importantly, Park’s emphasis on the role of bureaucracy in socioeconomic
policies changed the balance among ruling coalition groups. Park’s favor and emphasis
gradually moved from the military to bureaucrats. He needed professional bureaucrats,
who did not have political ambition, to set and implement economic policies of the
regime. In addition, the regime believed that the bureaucracy could effectively control
the Jaebul with complicated regulatory measures, and supported the bureaucracy.166
Through special favors to bureaucrats, Park could maintain a stronger and more effective
authoritarian regime than had any previous regimes. With the increasing importance of
165 Kim Ho-Jin, Hankook Jungchichejeron (The Theory of Korean Political System), (Seoul:
Barkyoungsa, 1990), 371.
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bureaucrats, the power o f the military within the ruling coalition gradually decreased
albeit the military remained an important ruling coalition group. The reason was that
President Park gave autonomy to bureaucrats for the effective implementation of policies,
while he didn’t allow the military to have any autonomous power.167

3) Institutional Political Arena
In the 1970s, one unique characteristic of the institutional political arena was its
lack of autonomy. The internal and external environment made it difficult for the
political institutional arena to be independent from the state. For example, because o f the
international political situation of the Cold War and confrontation with North Korea,
liberals and leftists in the society found it difficult to express their voices, and there was
not much space for political struggle by the opposition force. Along with civil society,
therefore, tight control of the ruling coalition and external political environment caused
the institutional political arena to be weak and passive. This weak institutional political
arena made the regime easily justify and propagandize political and economic policies.168
The opposition and ruling parties did not politically represent civil society
because of weak connection with civil society and the tight control of the regime.
Although party politics genuinely has a function of articulating and integrating demands
and interests of civil society, the party politics ignored public interests and demands.169

166 Meredith Woo-Cumings, “Miracle as Prologue: The State and the Reform of the Corporate
Sector in Korea, in Rethinking the East Asia Miracle, eds. Joseph E. Stiglitz and Shahid Yusuf, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2001), 361.
167 Kim Young-Myung, Hankook Hyundai Jungchisa (The History of Korean Modem Politics),
(Seoul: Eulyumunhwasa, 1992), 344.
161Yu Jae-II, “Hankook Jungchisahoiui Gujohyungsunggoa Byunhwa” (The Structure and Change
of Korean Political Society), A New Tendency o f Korean Political Society (Seoul: Nanam, 1993), 186.
169Choi Han-Soo, Hyundaejungdangron (The Theory of Modem Political Party), (Seoul:
Eulyumunhwasa, 1993), 195-218.
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Rather, the institutional political arena played a negative role in representing civil society
that was not well enough organized to pressure the political parties. Under this
circumstance, political parties could not have a close relationship with civil society, and
therefore could not represent the civil society.
Another characteristic of the institutional political arena was an unfair
competition rule and undemocratic behaviors, and procedures. The party politics in
South Korea had never had other types of party systems except for the “dominant-party
democracy,” which Lucian Pye once mentioned.170 Because the Korean party politics
had been formed by the ruling party and the major semi-loyal opposition party, fair
competition among political parties and the appearance of new parties, which would
genuinely represented interests of civil society, could not be expected. Especially, the
election laws had not been fair or just, and had always been twisted by the ruling and
opposition party for attaining majority seats in the National Assembly and interests of the
major opposition party to prevent other social forces from the institutional political arena.
During the Yushin period, the ruling DRP had remained the majority party
through advantageous election laws and the influence of state intelligence agencies. On
the other hand, the major opposition NDP had been weak and divided in spite of efforts
to integrate anti-government opposition forces. More importantly, the regime controlled
the NDP through controlling its leadership, and thus it was difficult for it to criticize the
regime or become actively involved in the anti-govemment struggle.171 In this sense, the

170 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995), 41-3.
171 Juergen Kleiner, Korea: A Century o f Change, 159.
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Korean party system was 1.5 party system because there was no fair competition between
the ruling and opposition party.172
The DRP, in spite of its political status as the ruling party, could not be in the
center of political power. Rather, it was just one part of the state power because
President Park privatized the ruling party through recruiting retired military officers and
using bureaucrats. On the other hand, the NDP didn't have any power resource except
for party organizations. The first priority of the NDP was to take power and the issue of
democratization was a secondary matter. The NDP also had a conservative character,
especially in terms of ideology.173 The NDP was much more conservative than the
mainstream of the dissident movement.174 Because of this conservative orientation, the
NDP didn't show any difference from the DRP, especially in dealing with issues of anti
communism, pro-American policy, and unification policy. The NDP also supported the
position that extreme liberals and radicals of the society should be excluded from the
institutional political arena. This conservative character of the NDP made it difficult for
the NDP to establish a coalition with democratic civil society.
The imbalance of power between the ruling and opposition party was also
reflected in the National Assembly. The National Assembly, firmly controlled by the
ruling party, was used as a political instrument to provide legitimacy to the authoritarian
regime. Thus, it was not easy for the opposition party to criticize and struggle with the

172 Yu Jae-IL, “Hankook Jungchisahoiui Gujohyungsunggoa Byunhwa" (The Structure and Change
of Korean Political Society), 198.
173 According to A. Lowell, political party can be divided into three (liberal, reform, and
conservative party) in the ideological aspect. Based on his classification of political party, Korean
opposition party of the Yushin period belonged to conservative political party. It did satisfy status quo, and
it was not optimistic about reform. Yun Jung-Suk, “Bosuwa Jinbo Hankookjuk Sanghwoang”
(Conservatism and Progressivism: the Korean Situation), Ju n g kyu n g Moonhwa (Politics, Economy and
Culture), (October 1985): 82-91.
174 Choi Jang-Jip, “Political Cleavages in South Korea,” 35.
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regime in the National Assembly. For example, there were many procedural and
institutional restrictions on the opposition party’s ability to struggle with the authoritarian
regime in the National Assembly. In most cases, the opposition party had to be satisfied
with issuing public statements.175

4. The Crisis and Collapse of the Yushin Regime
1) Economic Crisis
When the regime began to pursue the HCI economic policy in the early Yushin
period, it enjoyed autonomy from the social classes. However, as the state became
deeply involved in planning, constructing infrastructure, financing, and regulating
workers, and thereby legitimizing the policy of the HCI projects, the autonomy of the
regime in adjusting economic policy in the face of a volatile international economic
environment had gradually decreased.176 The large investment on HCI projects satisfied
only one of economic factions, the large conglomerates. As a result, high industrial
concentration and monopolization were created, and the welfare of the whole society
became dependent on the capacity for the capital accumulation of the bourgeoisie. In
addition, the HCI drive changed the financial structure of the domestic economy. The
share of investment in expenditure on gross national product rose from 26% in 1976 to an
unprecedented 37% in 1978.177 The over-investment was caused by the requirements for

175 For example, the NDP publicly announced that the Yushin regime should stop repression
toward school, and return to democratic political system. Dong-A Daily, 4 April 1975.
176 Hagen Koo and Kim Eun-Moe, “The Developmental State and Capital Accumulation in South
Korea,” in States and Development in the Asian Pacific Rim, eds. Richard P. Appelbaum and Jeffrey
Henderson (Newbury Park: Sage, 1992), 135.
177 Paul W. Kuznets, “The Dramatic Reversal of 1979-1980: Contemporary Economic
Development in Korea,” Journal o f Northeast Asian Studies 1, no. 3 (1982): 75.
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expansion in the heavy and chemical industries. Between 1977-1979, for example, 80%
of investment went to the heavy industry sector.
Table 3-1
Incremental Capital Output Ratios (1955-1980)
(ICOR: Gross Investment/Output Change)
1955-60
1257
Gross Investment
Change in GDP
425
2.96
ICOR
Source: World Bank, Korea, 47

1960-65

1965-70

1970-75

1975-80

1657
1038
1.60

4993
2459
2.03

10607
3637
2.92

21266
4390
4.84

There were several serious problems in over-investment in the HCI project. First,
the growth of exports and export competitiveness in the world market declined as a result
of focusing on the HCI projects. Second, the over-investment on the HCI project caused
a high rate of inflation, and the domestic economy began to be de-stablized.178 This high
inflation led people to become dissatisfied with the economic performance of the regime,
and their support began to move toward the opposition force. Third, the HCI drive
created acute labor shortages in the skilled labor market. While non-agricultural
employment rose 8% in 1977 and 10% in 1978, employment in skilled occupational
categories increased 26% and 17% respectively.179 This unbalanced labor market forced
many light manufacturing industries to close, and made the unemployment rate high.
These problems structurally caused the regime to face an economic crisis in late 1978.
The over-ambitious HCI drive narrowed the regime’s support base in the longer
perspective. The middle class and other conservative social groups and organizations

171Tony Michell, “What Happens to Economic Growth When Neo-Classical Policy Replaces
Keynesian? The Case of South Korea,” Institute o f Development Studies Bulletin 13, no. I (1982): 60-7.
179 Paul W. Kuznets, “The (Dramatic Reversal of 1979-1980: Contemporary Economic
Development in Korea,” Journal o f Northeast Asian Studies I, no. 3 (1982): 77.
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that had traditionaly supported the Yushin regime began to turn their backs on the regime
and supported the opposition force.180 Thus, the formerly dormant middle class began to
express economic discontent with the authoritarian regime. This dissatisfaction of the
middle class was evidently expressed in the general election of 1978. The outcome of the
election showed that the regime already lost its power base. Nevertheless, this
dissatisfaction of the middle class had never become a threat to the authoritarian regime
because the number was small and there was no certain organization to lead them to join
the anti-government movement. However, this breaking down of the solid supporting
base directly caused the regime to face a political crisis in 1979.

2) Political Crisis
The economic crisis destabilized the authoritarian equilibrium. Before the crisis,
the Yushin regime could defend itself against incessant challenges from the opposition
force with its huge repressive state apparatuses and with the material resources coming
from an unprecedented economic boom. When the economic crisis started in 1978,
however, the regime’s choices in responding to the crisis had already been narrowed
because of the structural dependence on capital created by the HCI drive. The choice of
the regime was limited to transferring the costs to the politically weak social groups.
Thus, it inevitably generated a mass defection of the social forces which had previously
supported, or at least acquiesced to the authoritarian regime.
In spite of this economic problem, the crisis, which originated in the structural
economic condition, needed new political situations in order to be developed into a

l>0 Stephan Haggard and Moon Chung-In, “The State, Politics, and Economic Development in
Postwar South Korea,” 81.
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political crisis leading to the eventual collapse of the Yushin regime. The new political
situations were the election of 1978 and the ensuing confrontation between the regime
and the opposition force. The general election, held on 12 December 1978, at first drew
little attention because it was meaningless in deciding the locus of power in the Yushin
period. As expected, 68 candidates of the ruling DRP and 61 candidates of the
opposition NDP were elected by direct popular votes. The outcome itself didn't give the
regime any trouble in controlling the legislative body because the regime could maintain
a solid majority by adding the one third (77 seats) of the National Assembly seats,
appointed by the president.

ittt

Nevertheless, the outcome of the election was a disaster to

the regime because the NDP gained more popular votes than the ruling party: 32.8% vs.
31.7%. It gave a tremendous symbolic victory to the opposition party and democratic
civil society.
Afrer the election, the NDP began to struggle for the restoration of democratic
politics based on the fact that they gained more popular votes in the election. The NDP
claimed that the result of the election showed people’s lack of confidence in the Park
regime, so they demanded the release of political prisoners and revision of the Yushin
Constitution. In addition, democratic civil society began to establish nationwide
organizations for influential struggle with the regime and began to criticize the
inauguration of the 9th President. For example, the National Coalition for Democracy182
issued a public statement in which they criticized the repression policy toward democratic

1,1 C. I. Eugene Kim, “Significance of Korea’s 10* National Assembly Election,” Asian Survey
19, no. 5 (1979): 523-32.
112The National Coalition for Democracy (Minjujuui Kookmin Yonhap) was established by social
movement activists and Jaeya leaders, such as the former President Yun Bo-Sun and Ham Suk-Hun, on
July 5, 1978. This organization focused to struggle for peaceful democratization through cooperation with
other social, political, and religious organizations. In addition, it emphasized to coordinate the individual
movements and 12 affiliated organizations at the national level. Joongang Daily, 2 March 1979.
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civil society and demanded improving human rights conditions, abolition of emergency
decrees, and release of every political prisoner. In a response to these demands, the
regime released opposition political leader Kim Dae-Jung and 106 other dissidents,
hoping thereby to ease the tensions with the opposition force.183
Especially, the successful outcome in the general election caused an internal
power struggle within the NDP to intensify. In May 1979, Kim Young-Sam regained the
leadership of the NDP by defeating Lee Chul-Seung who had been accomodating to the
Park regime. Kim Young-Sam’s victory signified the emergence of a disloyal opposition
in South Korean politics.184 After winning the internal power struggle, Kim Young-Sam
pledged to fight the Park regime both inside and outside the National Assembly.
“Outside” the National Assembly clearly meant that he would cooperate more closely
with democratic civil society such as the National Coalition for Democracy and the
National Coalition for Democracy and Reunification. In addition, the Jaeya force, as the
extra-institutional opposition force, realized the importance of the political party as a
bridge that connected civil society and the regime.185 It increased efforts to change the
semi-opposition NDP to a genuine autonomous opposition party that could be a leading
political institution to replace the authoritarian regime.
Faced with intensified opposition forces, the ruling coalition began to split in
dealing with political opponents and workers’ protests. The internal division didn’t reach
the point of breaking down the ruling coalition, but was a matter of personal differences
in the solution of the political crisis. For example, hardliners, represented by the Head of
,K Washington Post, Saturday, 23 December 1978, A 1.
IS4 Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown o f Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 27-38.
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Presidential Bodyguards, Cha Ji-Chul, argued for harsher suppression to crack down on
any kind of anti-regime opposition. On the other hand, softliners like the Chief of KCIA,
Kim Jae-Kyu, took a more pragmatic stance toward the opposition and advocated
dialogue rather than confrontation.186 However, the voice of the softliners had to be
silenced because Park actively supported the hardline strategy, and thus suppression of
democratic civil society and the opposition party was carried out.
Starting with the brutal suppression of the striking workers and their supporters in
the YH incident,187 the regime ousted the intransigent NDP leader, Kim Young-Sam, not
only from the party president post, but also from the National Assembly membership
using judicial maneuvering and rubber-stamp national assemblymen.188 The ousting of
Kim Young-Sam from the National Assembly generated widespread anti-regime political
repercussions from the popular masses and international public opinion.189 For instance,
in Kim’s hometown, a full-scale anti-government uprising erupted and spread to the

lt5 The Jaeya force, extra-institutional opposition forces, can be defined as a broad category of
opposition notables with middle class origins, who have been involved in anti-regime political activities
working outside the officially sanctioned political space.
116Cho Gap-Je, Yugo (Mishap), (Seoul: Hanghilsa, 1987), 95. The Korean Central Intelligence
Agency (KCIA) was established in June 1961 with Kim Jong-Pil as its head. The KCIA was granted
powers that went far beyond those of American CIA and included domestic as well as international
surveillance, besides the right to investigate other intelligence agencies. Within three years, the KCIA had
established an extensive network o f agents in South Korea and abroad. Eventually, the KCIA came to
symbolize the sophisticated and systematic repression of the Park era. Carter J. Eckert, Lee Ki-Baik, Lee
Young-Ick, Michael Robinson and Edward W. Wagner, Korea. Old and New: A History (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1990), 361.
1(7 On 7 August 1979, the owner of Y.H. Industrial Co. shut down his factory and dismissed all
workers, approximately 350 poorly paid young women, and fled to the US. The factory had originally
produced w ip and later ski suits but had gotten into trouble. The female workers anted their jobs back and
demonstrated for that goal. Juergen Kleiner, Korea: A Century o f Change, 165.
Robert E. Bedeski, The Transformation o f South Korea: Reform and Reconstruction in the Six
Republic Under Roh Tae-Woo, 1987-1992,25.
,w Park Hyun-Chae, “79nyun Bumasataeui Yoksajuk Baekyunggwa Uiui” (The Historical
Background of Puma Incident and Its Meaning), in HankookMinjokminjungundonguongu (The Study of
Korea National Minjung Movement), eds. Baek Nak-Chung and Jung Chang-Ryul (Seoul: Dure, 1989),
178.
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entire city. The so called “Buma Hangjaeng” (Uprising in Busan-Masan)190 was the first
democratic movement that the masses and the middle class participated in since the
Student Revolution on April 19,1960. The student demonstrators’ shouts o f “abolition
of the Yushin regime and dictatorship” spread to the city, and citizens of Busan city
participated in student demonstrations. Despite the fact that the regime ordered
universities to close, the demonstration didn’t stop, and students of other universities
joined the demonstration. Eventually, the regime invoked the Garrison Decree, and
suppressed demonstrators by using the military.191 This Busan-Masan Uprising
influenced democratic movements in other areas. For example, about 5,000 students of
Seoul National University issued a resolution demanding withdrawal of martial law and
abolition of theYushin regime.192
In addition, the U.S. government recalled Ambassador William Gleysteen as a
protest against Kim’s removal from the National Assembly. When President Carter
visited South Korea, he and Senator Kennedy met Kim Young-Sam as a sign of U.S.
support for him.193 In that meeting, Kim told them that the U.S. government faced a time
when it would have to decide to stop supporting authoritarian regimes that ignored
people’s passion for democratization.194

190 The direct cause o f the Busan-Masan Uprising lay in the expulsion of Kim Young-Sam from
the National Assembly but more fundamentally, the uprising reflected ordinary citizens’ anger toward an
authoritarian regime that didn’t respect democratic rules and that arbitrarily suppressed political opponents.
Kim Sun-Hyuk, The Politics o f Democratization in Korea: The Role o f Civil Society, 63.
191 Nam Koon-Woo, South Korean Politics: The Search fo r Political Consensus and Stability
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989), 169.
192 Institute o f Gladness and Hope, Amheksokui hwoibul (A Torch of Darkness: Testimony of
Democratic Movement in the 1970s and 1980s), vol. 3, (Seoul: Catholic Publisher, 1997), 207.
193 In spite of the State-Visit, President Carter met opposition politicians and leaders of democratic
civil society as many as possible after the short meeting with President Park. In the meeting with
opposition leaders, he expressed his support to the democratic movement o f civil society implicitly. Lee
Sang-Woo, “70nyundae Hankookui Minjuhwawa Mikookui Apryuk” (Democratization of South Korea and
Pressure of the United States in the 1970s), Sindong-A, (1990): 202.
194 Washington Post, Wednesday, 10 October 1979, A24.
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More importantly, the “Busan-Masan Uprising” and the ensuing turmoil across
the country generated a split within the ruling coalition in dealing with the political crisis.
In spite of the split, Park himself and Cha Ji-Chul supported the continuation of a
hardline policy toward democratic civil society. On the other hand, Kim Jae-Kyu,
Director of the KCIA, argued that the hardline approach had only exacerbated public
discontent with the government, and that a more flexible stance would have defused the
situation. Kim realized that resolution of the political crisis through a compromise with
the opposition force was impossible because Park himself was the staunchest protagonist
of the hardline policy. Thus, he believed that the only way to avoid national disaster in a
violent confrontation between the regime and democratic civil society was to assassinate
Park and to restore democracy.195 Kim eventually killed Park and Cha Ji-Chul at a secret
KCIA compound near the Blue House on 26 October 1979. This was the tragic demise
of Park’s 18-year-old authoritarian regime. However, this collapse of the Park regime
without removing diehard protagonists of the authoritarian regime didn’t immediately
bring democracy; in fact, it complicated transitional politics.

5. Democratic Civil Society and the Opposition Party
The transformation of civil society in early 1970s was closely related to the
installation of the Yushin Constitution. Along with the installation of the Yushin
Constitution, the regime began to suppress civil society and established cooperative
relationships with most civil society groups and organizations through political,
economic, and ideological restructuring. As a result, those state-controlled civil society
organizations could not strongly criticize the installation of the Yushin regime. The
1,5 Nam Koon-Woo, South Korean Politics: The Search fo r Political Consensus and Stability, 173.
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Yushin regime also effectively controlled opposition parties through institutional and
financial supports. Under these circumstances, several confrontational social groups,
such as students, workers, the Jaeya force, and religious communities, transformed to
alternative social forces in the struggle for the restoration of a democratic constitution.
Leaders of those civil society groups strongly believed that they were the only groups
who could mobilize their members to struggle for a restoration of democratic
constitution. Those democratic groups that had autonomy and a clear goal of
democratization began to struggle against authoritarian rule from the early 1970s.
The suppression by the regime focused on destroying those democratic groups
and organizations and isolating them from the public. Under continuing threats and
suppression, those democratic groups continued to establish organizations, and to
struggle for restoration of a democratic constitution. For example, on 27 November
1974, leaders of the religious communities and the Jaeya force, such as Yun Bo-Sun, Kim
Young-Sam, Ham Se-Ung, and Kang Won-Yong, established the National Congress for
the Restoration of Democracy to struggle for democratization with the regime through
peaceful methods.196
The democratic movement was also represented by two other organizations in late
Yushin regime. One was the National Coalition for Democracy (Minjujuui kookmin
yonhap), and the other one was the National Coalition for Democracy and National
Reunification (NCRD). The National Coalition for Democracy, established by social
movement activists and Jaeya leaders on 5 July 1978, pursued peaceful democratization
by cooperating with other social, political, and religious organizations, and by
concentrating its efforts on coordinating individual movements and organizations at the
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national level.197 The NCRD, established by leaders of the Jaeya force in January 1979,
struggled for abolition of the Yushin Constitution and building liberal democracy. Its
strategy was to build a coalition with 13 other Jaeya organizations, including the Korean
Council of Human Rights Movement of the KNCC and the National Conference for
Restoration of Democracy, and to support students and workers' democratic movements
against the Yushin regime. Participants in the NCRD included religious organizations,
(e.g., the National Catholic Priests’ Corps for the Realization of Justice, NCPCRJ),
intellectual organizations (e.g., the Korean Council for Human Rights Movement), and
writers’ organizations (e.g., the Council of Writers for Practicing Freedom).198
The transformed democratic civil society in the early 1970s had several
characteristics that were different from conservative co-opted organizations of civil
society. Whereas the more conservative civil society groups and organizations were
controlled by the institutional and financial support of the regime, democratic groups and
organizations of civil society were independent from the regime.199 For example,
because of a unique social and political status of the religious communities, it could
either avoid harsh suppresson by the regime or were ready to endure the suppression.200

1,6 Dong-A Daily, 28 November 1974.
197Joongang Daily, 7 July 1978.
>9>The Korean Council for Human Right Movement, established by 32 religious leaders and
journalists on 29 December 1977, focused to struggle for improvement of human rights. This organization
mainly used public statements and comments about certain policies or reactions of the regime as a strategy
for struggle. Dong-A Daily, 30 December 1977. Pak Tae-Kyun, “Hankook Minjujuui JudoSeryuk” (The
Leading Force of South Korean Democratization?), in Hankook Minjujuuiui HyunjaejukKkwaje: Jedo,
Kaehyuk mit Sahoe Undong (Current Tasks for South Korean Democracy: Institutions, Reforms, and Social
Movements), ed. Korea Council o f Academic Groups (Seoul: Changjakgwa bipyungsa, 1993), 169.
m Those newly transformed civil society groups in the early 1970s recognized the state support
took their autonomy away, and didn’t need financial aid from the state because they were not well
organized institutionally. For example, students didn’t need much money because they could use circle
rooms as their offices, and lived in campus. In addition, they could manage political struggles with other
students’ financial supports albeit it was not enough money.
200 According to Park Eun-Sook, a former student movement activists and currently social worker
of the Heungsadan, in the 1970s student movement activists who truly believed their movement could
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Thus, pro-democracy civil society could criticize the regime more freely and actively
despite harsh suppression. Another characteristic was a diversity of ideologies and
strategies within the groups and organizations. This diversity made the regime nervous
because diverse demands of civil society made the regime difficult to deal with various
demands of civil society. On the other hand, this diversity made various democratic
groups and organizations difficult to unite in fighting against the regime, and thus caused
the democratic movement to be ineffetive during the Yushin period.201
From the beginning of the Yushin regime, those democratic civil society had clear
and firm goals in its movement, such as a restoration of democratic constitution,
improvement of human rights condition, liberalization of schools, improvement of
working conditions, and economic justice. Because of these diverse goals, it was initially
difficult for democratic civil society to struggle effectively with authoritarian regime.
However, from the mid-1970s, those democratic organizations began to recognize that
they could not achieve their individual goals without breaking down the authoritarian
regime that suppressed them.202

change political system, and struggled for restoration of democratic constitution. In addition, in order to
achieve their goal, they were ready to be suffered by the authoritarian regime. There was a tendency that
student movement activists were proud o f the experience of torturing and imprisonment by the state power
apparatuses. Park Eun-Sook, interviewed by author, Seoul, 13, 14, and IS September 1999.
201 According to Lee Tae-Bok, Ham Se-Ung and Park Eun-Sook, workers were more interested in
economic issues, such as wage and working environment, student movement concentrated on school
liberalization in the early Yushin regime, and the religious communities struggled for improvement f
human rights with the regime. Because o f diversity of goal, it was difficult for democratic groups and
organizations to unite for influential struggles with the regime. However, those democratic groups and
organizations realized that the fundamental problem started from the installation of the Yushin regime and
they struggled for abolition o f the Yushin regime from the middle of the 1970s. Lee Tae-Bok, interviewed
by author, Seoul, 21 October 1999. Lee Tae-Bok was a labor movement activist in the 1970s and 1980s,
and he is currently a president o f the Nodong Sinmoon Inc. (The Labor Newspaper). Ham Se-Ung,
interviewed by author, Seoul, 12 October 1999. Ham Se-Ung is a Catholic priest, and he had been actively
involved in the democratic movement in the 1970s and 1980s. Because of active involvement, he had been
arrested many times by the regime.
202 From the mid-1970s, it was easy to find political slogans or demands in the democratic
movement of most democratic organizations. For example, on March 31, about 500 students gathered in
Korea University, and discussed about the Yushin Constitution. They demanded withdrawal o f the Yushin
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In addition, democratic civil society of the 1970s had an institutional weakness.
Because of harsh suppression, it was very difficult for democratic organiations to develop
institutional organizations, and thus they were easily destroyed by the state power
aparatuses.203 Instead, to survive from the suppression was the first priority of those
groups and organizations. Related to the repressive policy, democratic civil society often
used violence as a means of struggle with the regime. Especially, students and workers
often used violence, such as street demonstration involving the throwing stones, firebottles and violent confrontations with the police, in their struggle with the regime.204
During the Yushin period, democratic groups and organizations adopted a parallel
strategy of the Gramscian term “war of movement” as a main strategy for struggle with
the regime. That is, violent demonstrations and protests were believed to be more
influential in expressing their demands and dissatisfaction because the police and other
state power apparatuses completely blockaded democratic movements o f civil society.
Then, what made the democratic movement of civil society inconsequential
during the Yushin regime? First and foremost was a repressive policy o f the Yushin
regime toward democratic civil society. The regime didn’t allow democratic civil society

Constitution, and warned that the regime should not use confrontation with North Korea in politics. DongA Daily, 3 1 March 197S. On 1 March 1976,20 Protestant ministers. Catholic Priests, and about 700
believers gathered to play for current Korean political situation in Myungdong Catholic church, and
demanded stepping down President Park from the presidency. Myungdon Catholic Church. Hankook
Catholic Inkwon undongsa (The History of Human Right Movement of Korean Catholic), (Seoul:
Myungdong Catholic church, 1984), 350-53. At the same day, former president Yun Bo-Sun publicly
announced that democracy was impossible under the Park regime, and said that the Park regime was more
authoritative than the previous Lee regime. He also said that South Korea could not won over North Korea,
and there was no way except for democracy in order to win the confrontation with North Korea. Institute
of Gladness and Hope, Amheksokui hwoibul (A Torch of Darkness: Testimony of Democratic Movement in
the 1970s and 1980s), vol. 2,469.
203 According to the interview with Chun Yong-Ho, student movement activists continuously
changed names of organizations, or established new organizations to avoid suppression by the regime.
According to his personal experience, he established six organizations for a day. Chun Yong-Ho,
interviewed by author, Kwangju, 4 September 1999.
204 Hagen Koo, “Strong State and Contentious Society," 237-40.
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to criticize and challenge the regime. The Emergency Decree was the most effective
means for suppressing the opposition forces. For example, as Table 3-2 shows, the
regime declared 16 Emergency decrees and martial laws whenever special measure was
necessary.
Table 3-2
Emergency Measures and Martial Law under the Park Regime

May 16,1961:
June 3,1964:
Aug. 26, 1965:
Oct. 15,1971:
Dec. 6,1971:
Oct. 17, 1972:
Jan. 8,1974:
Jan. 4,1974:
April 3,1974:
Aug. 23,1974:
Dec. 31, 1974:
April 8, 1975:
May 13, 1975:
May 13, 1975:
Oct. 18, 1979:
Oct. 20,1979:

Declaration of Martial law, nationwide
Declaration of Martial law in Seoul
Declaration of garrison decree in Seoul
Declaration of garrison decree in Seoul
Declaration of state of national emergency
Declaration of Martial law, nationwide
Declaration of Emergence Measure(EM) 1 and 2
Declaration of EM 3
Declaration of EM 4
Declaration of EM 5 (removal of the EM 1 and 4
Declaration of EM 6 (removal of the EM 3)
Declaration of EM 7 (closure of Korea University)
Declaration of EM 8 (removal of the EM 7)
Declaration of EM 9 (included points of the EM’s 1,
4 and 7)
Declaration of Martial law in Pusan
Garrison decree in Masan and Changwon

Source: Dong-A Daily, 24 January 1981,9; Kim Ho-Jin, Hankook
Jungchichejeron (The Theory of Korean Political Sytem), (Seoul:
Bakyoungsa, 1993), 265-66.
The second reason could be found in the diversity of ideologies and strategies
within the democratic civil society. Each group or organization of civil society had
different goals, strategies, and ideologies. Because of this diversity, they during the
Yushin period had to face internal conflicts, and these conflicts led their democratic
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movement inconsequential.205 The third reason was that the lack of public support,
especially from the middle class, was a serious obstacle to the influential struggle of
democratic civil society. There were several political, cultural, and economic reasons for
this. First, the middle class didn’t have a clear identity as an important constituency of
civil society. Moreover, most of them didn’t have political consciousness or critical
perception of an authoritarian regime.206 They considered that participants in the
democratic movement and democratic civil society had totally different ideologies from
theirs. Thus, they were reluctant to join democratic organizations of civil society and
participate in the democratic movement during the 1970s. The democratic movement
without popular support had a limitation in struggling with the regime.
Second, the economic consideration was also an important reason why the middle
class didn’t actively support and participate in democratic groups and organizations and
their democratic movement During the 1970s, most people were much more interested
in their economic prosperity than in political development and didn’t want to slow down
rapid economic development by uncertain political change.207 Thus, they were critical of
violent and radical protests o f democratic civil society. Particularly, they were critical of

305 According to Park Eun-Sook, a former student movement activist, the internal conflict made
democratic groups and organizations difficult to concentrate the democratic movement during the Yushin
period. During the Yushin regime, student movement activists had to face internal conflicts about
approaches for effective struggle with the regime. Park Eun-Sook, interviewed by author, Seoul, 13,14,
and IS September 1999.
According to John Kie-chiang Oh’s work, a large majority of Koreans began, from about the
mid-1970s toward the end of the Park regime, to identify themselves probably for the first time as members
of the middle class. John Kie-chiang Oh, Korean Politics: The Questfo r Democratization and Economic
Development, 66.
207The 1971 survey asked the respondents the following: With regard to modernization, which do
you find more important, economic aspects such as better income and economic stability or political
aspects such as greater freedom and political stability? 54% of409 citizens and 55% of 10S legislators
considered economic aspects more important, while 37 % of citizens and 39% of legislators chose political
aspects. Lee Young-Ho, “Economic Growth vs. Political Development: The Issue Relative Emphasis in
Modernization,” Korea Journal 12, no. 5 (1972): 5-11.
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students and labor movements with leftist ideologies and violent strategies.20* Third, the
middle class were afraid of joining democratic organizations and their democratic
movement because of possible suppression by the regime. Fourth, the middle class who
had been used to the traditional Confucian political culture was more familiar with
authoritarianism than with democracy. They, more consevative than democratic groups,
preferred strong leadership more than compromise or negotiation.
For these reasons, the democratic movement had been inconsequential and easily
suppressed by the regime. Nevertheless, the political struggle by democratic civil society
continued, and its character slowly changed. At the beginning of the Yushin regime,
restoration of a democratic constitution and guarantees o f liberal democratic values, such
as a protection of political freedom and equality, the end o f dictatorial rule, and political
corruption, were the ultimate goals of the democratic movement. However, in the late
Yushin regime, democratic civil society struggled for complete abolition of the
authoritarian regime and democratization. However, democratic civil society was not
mature enough to develop united strategies and ideologies for an influential revolutionary
democratic movement. In terms of a strategy, students and labor movement activists
preferred violent means whereas the Jaeya force and religious communities relied on non
violent strategies such as peaceful demonstrations, public statements, and prayer
meetings.209 In this sense, ideological and strategic difference was a serious obstacle to
the establishment of a coalition among the various democratic groups and organizations
and with the opposition party.
** Kim Jin-OKyun and Cho Hee-Yen, “Bundankwa Sahoesanghwange dehayo” (The Relationship
between divided nation and social situation), Bundansidaewa Hankooksahoe (The Age of Divided Nation
and Korean Society), (Seoul: Kachi, 198S), 422.

116

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1) The Democratic Movement of Civil Society
Some scholars, like Nam Koon-Woo, argued that major causes of the downfall of
the Yushin regime in 1979 were the growth of democratic civil society and its political
struggle.210 However, this argument is not appropriate because the democratic struggle of
democratic civil society was not strong enough to overthrow the regime despite the fact
that they actively struggle for democratization. Although pro-democracy groups and
organizations actively struggled for democratization, their movement had been
inconsequential during the Yushin period because o f lack of public support, internal
division, and suppression by the regime. Nevertheless, the democratic movement o f civil
society in the late 1970s was strong enough to destabilize the political situation and
divide the ruling coalition in dealing with the political crisis. Especially, along with the
change of the leadership in the opposition party, the protest for human rights and the
autonomization of schools developed into a political movement that demanded the
abolition of the Yushin Constitution and the restoration of a democratic constitution.211
Consequently, the ruling coalition was divided into hardliners and moderates in dealing
with the political crisis, and this internal conflict within the ruling coalition led to the
collapse of the regime.

209 According to Park Eun-Sook and Lee Tae-Bok, during the Yushin period, students and workers
didn’t have other strategies for struggle against the repressive regime except using violence to express their
demands and dissatisfaction toward the Yushin regime.
210 Nam Koon-Woo, South Korean Politics: The Search fo r Political Consensus and Stability,
131-203.
211 During the Yushin period, there were several changes of leadership in the opposition party
(New Democratic Party), and the character of the party was changed according to the leadership. For
example, when Lee Chul-Seung controlled the party, the opposition party was more likely to cooperate
with the regime. On the other hand, when Kim Young-Sam took control of the party, the party came to
have more combative and critical characteristics.
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(1) The Opposition Party
Under the Yushin regime, the major goal of the NDP was to survive as a political
institution. Because the bureaucrats and repressive state apparatuses monopolized state
functions, the opposition party accepted the role of what Linz calls “semi-opposition
party,” i.e., “those groups that are not dominant or represented in the governing group but
that are willing to participate in power without fundamentally challenging the regime.”212
Under an authoritarian regime, the role of the opposition party belongs to “loyal
opposition,” and the Korean case was no exception until the mid-1970s.
However, when the Jaeya force and student movement activists pressured the
NDP to change a role of the party from a legal semi-opposition to a genuine autonomous
opposition party, a dissident group emerged within the NDP. After Kim Young-Sam
took over the leadership in late 1974, the NDP began to attack the lack of legitimacy of
the Yushin regime and demanded restoration of a democratic political system. This
change of the leadership in the NDP created a short standoff between the regime and the
opposition forces, mainly the NDP, the Jeaya force, and student movemnt activists.
Eventually, President Park responded by taking the issue to a national referendum on the
Yushin Constitution on 12 February 1975. However, the result of the referendum could
be easily anticipated since the public discussion about the referendum was prohibited,
and boycot of the referendum was strongly discouraged.213 In this respect, the hegemony
of the regime was established through the election.
In this situation, an unfavorable event to not only the opposition party but also
civil society took place. The United States was defeated in the Vietnam War, and fear of
212 Juan Linz, “Opposition to and under an Authoritarian regime: Spain,” in Regimes and
Opposition, ed. Robert Dahl (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 191.

US
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domino-like communist expansion spread in East Asia. The U.S. defeat calmed the
voices o f the new leading opposition faction, led by Kim Young-Sam, and strengthened
the position o f the compromising faction, led by Lee Chul-Seung. Thus, an external
event unfavorably affected the development of the opposition party and caused another
internal power struggle within the NDP. After the intense internal power struggle, the
loyal semi-opposition regained control with the help of the state apparatuses’
manipulation through a violent party convention on 11 September 1976.214 Since then,
the NDP had remained a calm, docile and submissive semi-loyal opposition party until
1979.
In addition, the NDP had been originated within the anti-Communist landed class
and covered a broad spectrum, from conservative to centralist. It was not the
“nomenclature for a class.”215 Thus, the NDP was unclear as to whose interests they
represented. Being divided by factional allegiances, the party became vulnerable to
manipulation by the regime. This lack of organizational cohesion and ideological
commitment, weakness in coalescing interests and formulating policies, and strong
personalism of leadership were the main characteristics of the NDP in the Yushin period.
Because of these weaknesses, the center of the democratic movement moved to
democratic civil society, such as the Jaeya force, students, religious dissidents, and
workers, and made it virtually impossible for the democratic movement to formulate a
unified and coherent strategy against the authoritarian regime.

2,3 Dong-A Daily, 13 February 1975.
214 Dong-A Daily, 12 September 1976.
2,5
Eugene Kim and Kihl Yong-Whan, Party Politics and Elections in Korea (Stiver Spring,
Maryland: The Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1976), 14.
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(2)

Labor Movements

When organized collectively with well-defined common interests and a collective
identity, the labor movement can be more threatening politically to authoritarian regimes
than any civil society groups such as students, church related organizations, and
neighborhood associations. Collective action by workers can directly disrupt the whole
national economy through work stoppage.216 This is why the Yushin regime began with
a repressive policy toward the labor movement.217 For instance, the enactment of the
“Law Concerning Special Measure for Safeguarding National Security” in December
1971 forbade the right of collective action in the public sector. Amendments to the labor
laws in 1973 permitted the state to intervene in labor disputes and did not allow any
national union or industry level unions to control company or floor unions.218
Nevertheless, even the harshest authoritarian regime could not completely
eliminate labor organizations. Instead, they allowed workers' organizations that were
heavy-handedly controlled. As Samuel Valenzuela mentioned, the Yushin regime had
two strategies, the “corporatist strategy” and the “market strategy.”219 The corporatist
strategy is employed when the state directly involves itself in the creation of vertically

216 Samuel Valenzuela, “Labor Movements in Transition to Democracy: A Framework for
Analysis,” Comparative Politics 21 (July 1989): 448.
217 According to Lee Tae-Bok, from the late 60s, the economic situation was getting worse, and
thus workers' dissatisfaction toward the regime gradually reached an uncontrollable situation. Thus, the
Yushin regime, emphasized economic development, needed to stabilize a labor movement, and thus
implemented the harsh repressive policy toward the labor movement. In addition, the regime was worried
about possible establishment o f a coalition between workers and students in the anti-government
movement Because of these reasons, the Yushin regime focused to suppress the labor movement along
with suppression on the student movement
218 Korean National Council of Churches (KNCC), 1970nyundae Nodong Hyunjanggwa Jeungun
(The Witness to Working Place in the 1970s), (Seoul: Poolppit 1984), 224-32.
219 Samuel J. Valenzuela, “Labor Movements in Transition to Democracy: A Framework for
Analysis.”
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structured and state-sanctioned labor organizations for the regulation of labor conflicts.220
The state is involved not only in screening leaders but also in controlling the collective
bargaining process. Unions were designed to collaborate with employers and the state
and to promote social peace. On the other hand, a market strategy aims at reducing the
functions o f labor organizations to a minimum by discouraging rank and file membership
and by decentralizing collective bargaining to such a degree that workers can not develop
concerted labor actions.221 By employing the market strategy, the state tries to minimize
the economic impact of union activities by decentralizing collective bargaining and by
incapacitating strike efforts through the use of strike breakers, lockouts, and prohibitions
on work stoppages in the key strategic areas of industry.222
The Yushin regime adopted a combination of these two strategies. The regime
adopted the corporatist strategy of labor control by involving itself in organizations of
national-level and industry-level union federations run by leaders who supported the
Yushin regime. The Labor-Management Council at the factory level and the Factory
Saemaul Undong (factory new community movement)223 were state-initiated and directed
organizations designed to transform industrial relations based on class conflict into
relations based on capital-labor cooperation so as to be harmonious, hierarchical and
patrimonial. Besides these strategies, the regime mobilized the mass media to accuse

220 Philippe C. Schmitter, “Still The Century of Corporatism?” Review o f Politics 36 (1974): 85131.
221 Samuel Valenzuela and Jeffrey Goodwin, Labor Movements under Authoritarian Regimes
(Cambridge, MA: Center for European Studies Monographs on Europe, 1983), 5 and 7.
Samuel Valenzuela, “Labor Movements in Transition to Democracy: A Framework for
Analysis,” 450.
223 The Saemaul Undong introduced in 1971 was a comprehensive rural community development
program with its main focus being the improvement of rural life. However, it is argued that the Saemaul
ideology was used to dismantle traditional values, seen as barriers to rural modernization. As such, it
constituted a hegemonic project aimed at mobilizing society behind the state. The Factory Saemaul
Undong also had a same goal for controlling labor organizations and their labor movement
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labor movement activists of being supported and controlled by the North Korean
Communist party.224
Throughout the Yushin period, the labor movement could not be influential
because of harsh suppression and internal division. Moreover, the labor movement had
to focus mostly on economic issues, such as improvement of working conditions and
wages because of workers’ lack of political consciousness. According to Lee Tae-Bok, a
former labor movement activist, economic issues, such as wages, working environment
and economic justice, were much more important to workers in the 1970s.223 More
importantly, the labor movement did not receive strong support from other democratic
groups or from ordinary people because of its radical character and different social
background. However, in spite of these difficulties, the labor movement of “democratic
unions” and external-institutional movement organizations survived because of a very
important change in the late Yushin period: the main target of the labor movement shifted
from their employers to the regime. Thus, the labor movement showed promise that it
could develop into a political movement. Additionally, from the late part of the decade, a
coalition between workers and other democratic groups began to appear in spite of harsh
suppression and their internal tensions. These changes within the labor movement
influenced the democratic movement of the 1980s.
Labor unions during the Yushin regime can be divided into three kinds: official
(Oyong) unions, “democratic” unions, and extra-institutional unions. First, during the

m Hagen Koo, “The State, Minjung, and Working Class in South Korea,” State and Society in
Contemporary Korea (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 136.
225 Lee Tae-Bok, interviewed by author, Seoul, 21 October 1999.
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1970s, so called Oyong unions (collusive company dominated unions)226 were organized
with the support of the state apparatus, especially the KCIA. This organizing official
unions was a result of regime’s suppression and an attempt to organize state corporatist
labor unions. The Oyong unions were composed of the FKTU {Nochong) at the national
confederation level, 17 industry level union federations and numerous company level and
plant level unions.227 Besides this FKTU, the National Agricultural Cooperatives
Federation (NACF, Nonghyup) was also a pro-regime union, recreated in 1961 by the
military government. These pro-government labor unions were readily manipulated by
the KCIA, and remained “unfailingly loyal” to the Yushin regime.228 The leaders of
these Oyong unions abandoned the collective bargaining power of the unions and instead
acted as intermediaries between the state and workers and between employers and
workers, discouraged strikes, and adhered to collaborative capital-labor relations.
Another important role for these official unions was to support the authoritarian
regime. For instance, the FKTU publicly announced its support when the Yushin regime
was inaugurated in 1972.229 Furthermore, the FKTU supported a series of amendments to
labor codes in 1973 and 1974 which denied the system of industry level union federation,
expanded the public sectors in which the organization was not permitted, and allowed the
226 Oyong union means unions that are closely tied with employers and the authoritarian regime.
Generally, their leadership and finance were supported by the regime. Therefore, those Oyong unions
didn’t have autonomy from the state.
227 The regime made it illegal to organize independent national union confederation except the
FKTU and dissolved other radical union confederations in 1963. KNCC, I970nyundae Nodong
Hyunjanggwa JeungunJJhe Witness to Working Place in the 1970s), (Seoul: Poolppit, 1984), S6-7.
George E. Ogle, South Korea: Dissent within the Economic Miracle (London: Zea Books,
1990), 159.
229 Because of the support to the Yushin regime, the FKTU was blamed by various civil society
groups and organizations. For example, on 5 January 1994, 19 Catholic and Protestant organizations stated
that Federation of Korean Trade Unions (Hankook Nochong) should be dissolved because it didn’t reflect
workers’ demands. According to them, the FKTU, controlled by the regime, was not a civil society
organization. Institute of Gladness and Hope, Amheksokui hwoibul: 7, 80nyundae Jeungunkwa Minjuhwa
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increase o f regulation by state agencies. Thus, the FKTU, supported and controlled by
the regime, could not represent workers’ real interests, and were used to control labor
movements.230
Second, the harsh repressive policy and the creation of official unions could not
prevent the emergence of a new group of unions, so called “Democratic Unions,” within
the legal structure of labor organizations.231 The democratic union focused its efforts on
overcoming the obstruction of the regime through the grassroots level struggle and
representing workers’ real interests.232 Democratic unions resisted repressive
interference from capitalists and the state as they struggled for the economic interests of
union members. Especially, they implemented intra-union democracy and sought to
overcome the limitations of isolated individual company-level unions by encouraging
solidarity among members of different democratic unions. For example, when a worker,
Min Jong-Jin, was killed by gas suffocation in 1977,200 workers from Seoul and Inchon
gathered in solidarity with Min’s colleagues to protest the miserable working conditions
and the repressive labor policy of the regime.233 Futhermore, they tried to induce

undong (A Torch of Darkness: Testimony of Democratic Movement in the 1970s and 1980s), (Seoul:
Catholic Publisher, 1996), 486.
230 Choi Jang-Jip, “A Corporatist Control of the Labor Unions in South Korea,” Korean Social
Science Journal 11 (1984): 37.
231 The “Democratic unions,” established as a name of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions
in the late 1980s, traces its roots to the nascent workers’ struggles ignited by the self-immolation of a
garment worker Chun Tae-il on 13 November 1970. The tenacious struggles of female workers in exportoriented light industries laid the foundation of the modem labor movement As light industries gave way to
heavy industries as the focal point of the export economy in the 1980s, the early militancy inspired the
awakening of the regimented workforce in large-scale industries which became the hotbed of the Great
Workers' Struggle of 1987. The explosion not only galvanized the uniformed workers of industrial
complexes and the neck-tie corps of office buildings, but shook the entire society. Choi Jang-Jip, “A
Corporatist Control of the Labor Unions in South Korea,” 33.
232 According to Choi Jang-Jip, about 20 to 30% of all labor unions were autonomous union in the
late 1970s. Choi Jang-Jip, “A Corporatist Control of the Labor Unions in South Korea,”38.
233 Korean National Council of Churches (KNCC), I970nyundae Nodong Hyunjanggwa Jeungun
(The Witness to Working Place in the 1970s), 586-89.
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intellectuals and religious organizations to participate in the labor movement, so as to
establish a coalition among workers, intellectuals and religious activists.
In spite of these efforts, however, the democratic labor movement remained at the
level of economic struggle.234 Because of this, most labor movement activists did not
have much knowledge of the socio-political structure which constrained the labor
movement outside the economic arena. Thus, they didn’t attack the dependent economic
structure and repressive authoritarian regime, the bases of labor repression. As a
consequence, the democratic unions failed to develop into a strong social force that could
challenge the authoritarian regime. Democratic unions also failed to establish solidarity
among themselves or to establish a national level confederation and industry level
federations as alternatives to the state-controlled Oyong unions such as the FKTU. For
example, because of ideoloical and social differences, other democratic groups and
organizations, such as the Jaeya force, were reluctant to cooperate with labor unions in
resisting the authoritarian regime.
Nevertheless, the democratic movement succeeded in changing the main target of
workers’ struggles from capitalists to the authoritarian regime. This happened when
labor movement activists realized that the major obstruction to the labor movement was
not capitalist but the regime. As a response to this change, the regime suppressed
workers more harshly and tried to justify its suppression as necessary for national
security.235 Because of this suppression, democratic unions became more violent and
radicalized. However, it was impossible for them to directly challenge the regime that
234 Chung Dae-Yong, “Jaeya Minjunodongundongeui Jungaegwajunggwa Hyunhwang” (The
Development and the Present Status of Democratic Labor Union Movements of the Jaeya), in Korea
Christian Industrial Development Institute, ed. Hankook Nodongundongeui Inyum (The Idea of Korean
Labor Movement), (Seoul: Jungamsa, 1988), 177-78.
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monopolized the physical force. What democratic unions could do against the regime
was to struggle for economic interests sporadically. As a result of the emergence of
democratic unions, capitalists came to support the regime more firmly.236
The third kind of labor movement was an “Extra-Institutional Labor Movement.”
Some dissident workers resorted to extra-institutional or extra-legal means of protest
against the repressive regime. Dissident workers, former student activists and
intellectuals who were denied access to existing legal and institutional labor
organizations tried to organize politically motivated protests. This worker’s movement
was very often allied with radical student organizations and dissident intellectuals. This
group of the labor movement was more active in establishing a coalition with other
democratic groups and organizations, and its leaders were interested more in political
issues than economic issues. The main goals of these external-institutional labor
organizations were to break up the state sanctions toward the labor movement, and to
develop the labor movement into a political struggle for democratization. Only in this
way would it be possible to realize the workers’ interests.
In addition, the extra-institutional labor movement had a unique character,
different from that of other democratic civil society groups and organizations. This
radical labor movement group was critical of church-led labor movements. For them,
religious organizations helped workers not from the standpoint of a class struggle under
capitalist society but out o f a sense of moral responsibility for their oppressed working
neighbors. In this sense, this radical labor movement group viewed social conflicts as a

235 Hong Seung-Sang, interviewed by author, Seoul, 19 August 1999.
236 Lee Tae-Wook, “Hankookui Sanuphwakoajungesuui KywgjeminjuhwcT (Economic
Democratization in the Process o f Korean Industrialization), Donga Yongu IS, (Seoul: Sogang University,
1988): 178.
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class struggle, and the solution for this social conflict should be a workers’ revolution.
Thus, the government considered them as an enemy of social and political stability, and
thus harshly suppressed them.237
Because of harsh suppression and internal divisions within the labor group,
workers’ collective activities were spontaneous, sporadic, and strictly limited to
economic issues throughout the Yushin period. In particular, workers failed to establish
their position as a serious social force within the opposition force as well as within the
political system at large.238 Union organizations became polarized into either Oyong
unions or democratic independent unions. Both “Qyo/tg” and “Democratic” unions were
decentralized because the repressive policy toward the labor movement was
unprecedentedly harsh. The combination of these internal and external circumstances
surrounding the labor movement made not only the labor movement but also the
democratic movement inconsequential.

(3) Student Movements
Students have been considered as the “conscience” of South Korean politics for a
long time. Their political consciousness came from the successful experience of the
student movement in the early 1960s. Since then, students had led protests against
diplomatic normalization with Japan, rigged elections in 1967, and the revision of the
Constitution allowing Park a third term in 1969. Through these actions, the student group

237 According to Hong Seung-Sang, the regime considered those labor movement activists as a
revolutionary group that attempted to overthrow the state. Based on this judgement of the labor movement
activists, the state harshly suppressed and tried to destroy its related organizations o f civil society. Hong
Seung-Sang, interviewed by author, Seoul, 19 August 1999.
23 Choi Jang-Jip, “A Corporatist Control of the Labor Unions in South Korea,” 180.
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came to be known as the “only conscious force of the society.”239 In addition, the student
movement was not integrated to the ideological hegemony of the state. Thus, President
Park, who early recognized the importance of controlling the student movement so as to
maintain the Yushin regime, harshly suppressed them.
In fact, students first broke the masses’ silence under the Yushin repression. On 2
October 1973, students of Seoul National University held a rally demanding the
establishment of liberal democracy.240 However, this initial efflorescence of the antiYushin struggle subsided as a result of another round of government crackdowns,
symbolized above all by the Emergency Decree no. 9, promulgated in May 1975, which
banned any criticism of the Yushin Constitution. Student demonstrations spread to
almost all campuses, and they received widespread support from intellectuals, church
human rights groups, and opposition party leaders, thus igniting the democratic
movement in other sectors of the society.241 For example, the National Coalition for
Democratization organized the “One Million Signature Campaign for the Revision of the
Yushin Constitution” in December 1973.242 The Park regime reacted to the signature

239 Yun Sang-Chul, SOnyundae Hankookui Minjuhwaihaenggwajung (The Process of Korean
Democratization in the 1980s), 77.
240 Dong-A Daily, 3 October 1973; Harry Magdoff, “Are there lessons to be learned?” Monthly
Review 42, no. 9 (February 1991): 42. In addition, about 300 students of Seoul National University
demonstrated against the authoritarian regime, and demanded the restoration of democracy on October 5.
Dong-A Daily, 9 October 1973. Before October, there were students’ several demonstrations, but those
demonstrations were not planed, and students’ dissatisfaction was accidentally erupted. For example,
students gathered in each university campus, and celebrated the “4.19 Student Revolution” on April 19,
1973. After the celebration, they protested against the Yushin regime, and demanded restoration of a
democratic constitution and withdrawal of the dictatorial regime. Dong-A Daily, 19 April 1973.
241 For example, on S November 1973, about 300 students of Kyungbook University in Daegu
City distributed anti-government handbills, and demonstrated against the regime for restoration of the
democratic government. Dong-A Daily, 8 November 1973. In addition, on November 14, about 70
students o f Korea University gathered in campus, and demanded release of arrested students,
autonomization of university, and exercise o f liberal democracy. Dong-A Daily, 14 November 1973.
242 Thirty leaders of church, academic circle, and the press group started the signature campaign on
4 December 1973, and surprisingly gathered 0.3 million signatures in days despite severe interference from
the authorities. Christian Institute for the Study of Justice and Development, I970nyundae
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campaign with Emergency Decree no. 1 on 8 January 1974 which “banned any activity to
deny, oppose, distort or slander the Constitution.”243
In spite of the Emergency Decree, student demonstrations did not end completely.
In the spring of 1974, a group among student activists established a national student
organization, the National Democratic Youth Student Alliance (Minchunghakryun).244
The Minchunghakryun was significant because it was a national coordinating
organization of individual college level democratic movement and tried to build a
coalition with other democratic groups of civil society. In addition, this organization
raised labor issues in connecting with democratization for the first time since the
installation of the Yushin 245 The regime responded to the establishment of the
Minchunghakryun with a new Emergency Decree no. 4, imposed to quell a specific
student organization, on 3 April 1974.246 After the regime lifted Emergency Decrees no.
1 and 4 on August 23, student demonstrations flared up again, provoking the onset of the
democratic movement among the press, intellectuals, and the opposition party.247 For a
short period, student protests contributed to a standoff between the regime and the
opposition force, and forced the regime to hold a national referendum for the Yushin
Minjoowhaundonggwa Kidoegvo (Democratization Movements and the Church in the 1970s), (Seoul:
CISJD, 1983), 130-37.
243 Dong-A Daily, 25 October 1974.
244 The National Democratic Youth Student Alliance (Minchunghakryun), established by student
movement activists on 27 March 1974, struggled for the restoration of democratic institutions, denying
Yushin constitution and military dictatorship. Dong-A Daily, 28 March 1974.
245 KNCC, I970nyundae Minjooundong: Kidoggyoinkwonundongeul JoongsimetroJJhe
Democratization Movements in the 1970s: with Special Reference to Christian Human Rights Movement),
(Seoul: The Committee for Human Rights, KNCC, 1987), 3SS-S7.
246 Chosun Daily and Dong-A Daily, 3 April 1974. For example, the KCIA announced that the
"uncovering" of the "National League for Democratic Youth and Students (Junkook MinJu CheongNyeon
HakSainj> ChongYeon Maing)” fabricated organization of student leaders, religious and scholars.
' 47 On 7 October 1974, the opposition NDP proposed to establish a “committee for the
Constitutional Revision” in the National Assembly. On October 24, journalists of Dong-A Daily started the
“Movement for Practicing Free Press” with “declaration of practicing free press.” On November 17,
dissident literary men established “the Council of Literary men for Realizing Freedom. In addition, a group
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Constitution on 12 February 197S and to release most political prisoners on February
15.24*
After the referendum, the regime pursued an even harsher repressive policy
toward not only the student movement but also political, social, and, economic struggle
of other democratic groups and organizations. For example, President Park promulgated
the Emergency Decree no. 7 for the sole purpose of closing Korea University campus on
April 8, 1975.249 However, the news of the collapse of Vietnam on 30 April 1975,
aroused a new security concern among people against Communist North Korea, and gave
the regime a new rationale for suppressing internal dissidents for the sake of national
security. This disadvantageous external environment remarkably weakened the student
movement. Thus, in the latter half of 1975, there were no massive student
demonstrations except a few incidents such as distributing political handbills and small
size demonstrations.250 For example, as Table 3-3 shows, the number of student political
prisoners was 27 in 1976 and 90 in 1977, which were quite small compared with 165 in
1973 and 246 in 1974.
Table 3-3
Number of Political Prisoners (1971-1980)

Students
Workers &
Farmers

1971
43
69

1972
1
7

1973
165
49

1974
246
5

1975
126
5

1976
27
1

1977
90
7

1978
230
58

1979
267
41

1980
468
230

of dissident leaders made the “Declaration of People” and established the “National Conference for the
Restoration of Democracy” on November 27.
24S In the referendum, 79.84% people of the eligible voters voted, and the regime gained 73%.
Institute o f Gladness and Hope, Amheuksokui hwoibul: 7, SOnyundae Minjuwha Undonguijeungun, (A
Torch of Darkness: Testimony of Democratic Movement in the 1970s and 1980s), vol. 1, S09.
249 Chosun Daily, 9 April 1975.
230 Lee Hae-Chan, “ KusAmchejewa Hakdaengundong” (Yushin Regime and Student Mmovement),
in Yushin Chejewa MinjuhwaundongJThe Yushin Regime and Democratization Movements), ed. Han
Seung-Hun (Seoul: Samminsa, 1984).
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Table 3-3—continued
1971

1972
1

1973
3

1974
12

1975
4

1976
22

1977
11

1978 1979 1980
Clergymen
7
4
22
Religious
Activists
1
5
1
8
35
8
Journalists
14
& Literary
13
1
6
3
2
20
20
33
men
Teachers
1
2
12
1
8
2
5
21
31
10
Politicians
12
5
6
5
1
14
3
14
40
White Color
4
Workers
3
2
24
14
Bisinessmen
1
11
1
3
2
1
19
16
4
Marginals
1
1
8
2
1
1
4
25
Civil
Servants
2
12
Others and
Unclassified 25
3
2
67
23
3
3
752
39
234
71
Total
156
331
160
120
347 1239 930
Source: KNCC, 1970nyundae Minjoohwaundong: Kidoggyoinkwonundungeul
Joongsimetro (The democratization movements in the 1970s: with special reference to
Christian human rights movement), (Seoul: The Committee for Human Rights, KNCC,
1987), 2066-67.
In the late 1970s, student movement activists developed new strategies for the
democratic movement One was the so-called “Hyungjang Joortbiron (Strategy of
Preparation at Workplaces).” This strategy was based on realization mere confrontation
with the authoritarian state apparatus on the street would inevitably result in mass defeat.
Therefore, the proper strategy of the student movement was to realize that the true
transforming force would be workers not students. The necessary task of the student
movement was to go into workplaces to educate workers and thus raise their classconsciousness in order to prepare for struggle at the moment of crisis. In this sense,
student movement activists realized a necessity of a parallel strategy of the Gramscian
term “war of position” for an influential democratic movement.
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Another strategy was the so-called “Strategy of Political Struggle,” which
criticized the Hyunjang Joonbiron on the grounds that it neglected the role of political
struggle, thereby avoiding the necessary and imminent confrontation with the
authoritarian regime. Preparation at the work place, according to this radical strategy,
was secondary to political struggle.251 Since the late 1970s, many student movement
activists in the “Preparationist group” infiltrated factories disguised as workers to raise
workers’ political consciousness. Other students, who insisted on the priority of political
struggle, consistently tried to organize student demonstrations on the street as well as on
campus. However, without the joining of the middle class, urban marginals and workers,
the democratic movement of a student group could not be influential. It was not until late
1979 that the student movement succeeded in gathering their support and thus becoming
a popular movement capable of threatening the regime, as was shown in the mass
uprising in Busan and Masan.
Unless linked with other democratic groups and organizations, the student
movement had not been influential albeit student movement activists actively
struggled.252 To make things worse in the 1970s, the student movement neither achieved
inter-university solidarity among individual campus level organizations nor developed
joint strategies. Internal division within the student movement was another important
limitation, and it continued in the 1980s. Thus, as Figure 3-1 illustrates, the active
251 Lee Jong-Oh, “80nyundae Nodongundongroneui Jungaewa Jungeeui Ihaereul wuihayu” (For
the Understanding of the Development of Labor Movement Strategies in the 1980s), Hankook
Nodongundongeui //ryum_(Ideology of Korean Labor Movements), (Seoul: Jungamsa, 1988), 230-31.
252 Bret L. Billet, “The History and Role of Student Activism in the Republic of Korea: the politics
o f contestation and conflict resolution in fledgling democracy,” 23-34. According to Park Eun-Sook and
Chun Yong-Ho, major obstacles for the active struggle with the Yushin regime were harsh suppression of
the state power apparatuses and internal split Particularly, student movement activists were divided by
ideologies and strategies, and they had to concentrate on internal power struggles for taking leadership of
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student movement and suppression by the regime had repeated throughout the Yushin
regime.253 However, in spite of these internal conflicts and external suppression, the
student group was the most intransigent opposition force to the Yushin regime.
Figure 3-1
Tendency of Students-Involved Events, 1972-1979
15 H

Number

Quarter

(4)

41234123*123*123*1234123112341234
72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79

Religious Communities

Under the Yushin regime, only religious communities could provide sanctuary for
the opposition forces.254 In the beginning of the Yushin regime, democratic groups and
organizations had to concentrate on their survival under harsh suppression. Thus, the
religious communities remained the only sanctuary tolerated by the regime and could
thus provide shelter for the democratic force of civil society. At the same time, the
religious communities were actively involved in the democratic movement. For example,
the student movement In most cases, hardliners won the internal struggle, and led student movemenL
Thus, student movement became radical and violent.
253 For example, the number of the student demonstrations sharply increased in the 4* quarter of
1972, the 1“ and 4lh quarter of 1974, the 4* quarter of 1976,3"* quarter of 1978, and the 3rd quarter of 1979.
In contrast the student movement during the rest of the Yushin period was relatively dormant because of
harsh suppression.
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the religious communities were leading groups, which initiated the “One Million
Signature Campaign for the Revision of the Yushin Constitution” in 1973-1974.255
However, this active role could not continue because the Yushin regime began to
pressure the religious communities to disconnect from other democratic groups and
organizations. This policy of the Yushin regime caused the religious communities to
become more actively involved in the democratic movement of the 1970s. For example,
the arrest of Bishop Chi Hak-Soon strongly influenced the Catholic Church to get
involved in the democratic movement. Since this incident, the religious communities and
related organizations became a crucial component of the democratic movement.256
Since the labor issue became politicized under the Yushin regime, the church
became increasingly concerned with labor issues both for political and missionary
reasons.257 Since the late 1960s, many organizations of the religious communities
became increasingly critical of the capitalist notion of economic growth as a means to
resolve poverty, marginalization, and other social problems. Along with this change of
attitude, the Protestant church became polarized so that the progressive wing took an
assertive and active role in opposing the regime's political and economic policies while

214 Hagen Goo, “The State, Minjung, and the Working Class in South Korea,” 139.
255 Christian Institute for the Study of Justice and Development (CISJD), 1970nyundae
Minjoowhaundonggwa Kidoggyo (Democratization Movements and the Church in the 1970s), (Seoul:
CISJD, 1983), 130-37.
256 The active political struggle of the religious communities started when the Yushin regime
arrested Bishop Chi as a charge of leading the Minchunghakryun incident in 1974. In this regard, the
suppression of the state on the religious communities was a significant reason for the active involvement of
the religious communities in the democratic movement
257 Chun Tae-II’ death in 1970 became a turning point and strongly influenced the religious
communities. After this incident the religious communities with other civil society groups and
organizations came to involve in social and political movements. Choi Jang-Jip, “Political Cleavages in
South Korea,” in State and Society in Contemporary Korea, ed. Hagen Koo (London and Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1999), 33-4.
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the majority of churches remained “conservative, fundamentalist and anti-intellectual.”258
The progressive churches challenged the fundamentalist, dogmatic theology that was
introduced by American missionaries, and they adopted their own missionary principle
for the masses, i.e., so called “Minjung (mass popular) theology.”259 The Minjung
theology, influenced by Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Harvey Cox, and Jurgen Moltman as well
as by Latin American liberation theology, aimed to fit theological principles to the reality
o f Korean culture, society, and politics.260 Rather than individual salvation, the Minjung
theology emphasized salvation of the people who were politically oppressed,
economically exploited and deprived, and socially and culturally alienated and
marginalized from the main power structure of the society.261
In the early Yushin period, on the other hand, the Korean Catholic Church’s main
hierarchy retained a conservative position on the participation of the church in the
popular movement. Only Catholic lay organizations such as the JOC,262 expressed a deep
concern for social issues at the grassroots level. However, encouraged by the conclusion

251 Suh, David Kwang-Sun, “Forty Years o f Korean Protestant Churches: 1945-1985,” Korea and
World Affairs 9, no. 4 (1987): 813.
259 Harry Magdoff, “Are there lessons to be learned?,” Monthly Review 42, no. 9 (February 1991):
42-43. Minjung is defined in terms of several overlapping meanings. First, in the context of capitalist
production relations in the contradiction between capital and labor, the minjung is made up of workers,
peasants, the lower middle class, and the urban poor. Second, at the political level, the minjung consists of
those who are made peripheral to, or alienated from, the political process because of direct and indirect
restrictions placed on political participation by the authoritarian regime. Third, the mityung is made up of
the dependent and subordinated relationship to the United States. Last, while the minjung exists
objectively, as outlined above, the actual social composition of the minjung, at the level o f praxis, is
constituted by a collective historical consciousness can be traced back to the experiences of the minjung
during the great “Tonghak Revolution” at the end o f the nineteenth century. Thus, the minjung is not a
fixed or limited sociopolitical entity, but embodies a dynamic, liberating subjectivity that arises from a
history o f oppression.
260 According to Suh, David Kwang-Sun, while liberation theology has been developed in the
socio-economic situation of Latin American context, Minjung theology has been developed in the socio
political situation of 1970 Korea. Suh, David Kwang-Sun, “Forty Years o f Korean Protestant Churches:
1945-1985,” 815.
Suh, David Kwang-Sun, “Forty Years o f Korean Protestant Churches: 1945-1985,” 816.
262 The Jeunnes Ouvriers Chretiens (Ganochung, JOC), established by religious labor movement
activists in 1958, concentrated its efforts on supporting the labor movement.
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of the Second Vatican Council (1965), the Korean Catholic Church paid more attention to
the promotion of justice, welfare o f popular classes, and democratization of the political
system.263 Although South Korea is not considered as a Catholic nation, as Huntington
mentioned, the South Korean case is an important case in dealing with religious changes.
As his interesting expression, the choice between an authoritarian and a democratic
political system is a conflict between a dictator and Cardinal.264
The imposition of the authoritarian Yushin system changed the church-state
relationship in the 1970s. That is, some leaders of both Protestant and Catholic churches
began to criticize the authoritarian regime and participate in the democratic movement.
For example, the “Easter Morning Service on Namsan” on 22 April 1973 was the first
public anti-regime demonstration organized by a leading clergy, Rev. Park Hyung-Kyu.
Because of the meeting, Rev. Park was arrested for the charge of organizing subversion
of government.265 In addition, Bishop Chi Hak-Soon was arrested on 6 July 1974 on the
charge of instigating a civil war and providing financial assistance to students involved in
the Minchunghakryn incident.266 Those arrests of dissident clergy stimulated anti-regime
antipathy even within politically conservative church factions. As a result, an individual
clergy's struggle with the Yushin regime developed into a collective struggle of church
organizations.

263 According to the interview with Catholic priest Kim Seung-Hoon, after the Second Vatican
Council, young clergy demanded that church should express a voice of suppressed, and should represent
the poor. According to him, this was the most important mission of the church. Based on these beliefs,
many Catholic clergy came to be involved in democratic civil society and its democratic movement.
264 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the late Twentieth Century, 76.
265 KNCC, I970nyundae Minjoohwaundong: Kidoggyoinkwonundongeul Joongsimetro (The
Democratization Movements in the 1970s: with Special Reference to Christian Human Rights Movement),
254-74.
266 Dong-A Daily, 7 July 1974.
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The “Declaration of Korean Christians” of 1973 was the first historical statement
for democratization by the Korean Protestant Church. In the declaration, the church
defined the Yushin regime as an “absolute dictatorship” that was “created by satanic
groups for their domination and interests” and characterized the inauguration of the
Yushin regime as “the rebellion against the people.”267 Furthermore, the church vowed to
reject all laws, decrees, policies, and procedures made after 27 October 1972, and tried to
form solidarity with world Christian movement.268
In the democratic movement of the religious communities, the National Council
of Churches in Korea (NCCK), focused mainly on human rights, has been the main
coordinator of six national anti-regime Protestant church denominations.269 For example,
the NCCK met the issue a human rights declaration in 24 November 1973. In the
declaration, the NCCK said that human rights and people's sovereign power in South
Korea were infringed upon by the authoritarian regime and asserted that church leaders
had to struggle for improvement of human rights condition. Other national organizations
involved in the anti-government movement were the KSCF (Korean Student Christian
Federation),270 EYC (Ecumenical Youth Council)271 and the UIM (Urban Industrial

267 Dong-A Daily, IS June 1973.
26t KNCC, 1970nyundae Minjoohwaundong: Kidoggyoinkwonundongeul Joongsimetro, 250-53.
269 The six religious bodies that had participated in the NCCK were Korean Christian
Prebysterians, Korean Jesus Prebysterians, Korean Methodists, Korean Salvation Army, Korean Anglican
Church, and Korean Gospel church.
270 The Korea Student Christian Federation (KSCF, Hankook Kidok Haksaeng Chongyonmaeng)
was established by Protestant student movement activists, such as Oh Je-Sik and Na Sang-Ki, on 25 April
1948. The KSCF, strongly influenced by the liberation theology, focused its efforts on struggling for
democratization. This organization often participated in demonstrations with other social movement
organizations and supported other democratic organizations.
271 The Korean Ecumenical Youth Council (EYC, Hankook Kidok Chongyun Hyupuihoe) was
established by youth members of 6 Protestant organizations (about 750,000) on 6 March 1973. The EYC
struggled for realization of social justice, improvement of human rights, and democratization. In addition,
the EYC that had a close relationship with Jaeya groups and other student organizations supported the
democratic movement. This organization was destroyed by the regime on 25 September 1976.
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Mission).272 The KSCF especially focused its activity on grassroots organizing, such as
the forming of base communities among the urban poor, while the UIM focused on
organizing autonomous unions through educating young female workers.273
In the Catholic Church, after the arrest of Bishop Chi, Catholic priests organized
the NCPCRJ to support and struggle effectively with the authoritarian regime on 24
September 1974.274 The Catholic priests’ body sometimes contradicted the upper echelon
of the Catholic Church hierarchy, such as the National Conference of Korean Bishops,
that tried to avoid deep involvement in secular politics. Instead, the conservative bishops
tried to put the young liberal priests’ organization under the control of the official church
hierarchy by recognizing the Committee for Justice and Peace, established on 10
December 1975.275 The priests’ organization formally accepted the decision of the
Bishops Conference, but didn’t stop organizing public rallies and prayer meetings in
protest against the Yushin regime. In addition to protesting human rights violations,
young Catholic Christians and priests organized grassroots movements for farmers and
272 The Urban Industrial Mission (Dosi Sanup Sunkyohwi, UIM), established by religious leaders,
such as Cho Seng-Juk, Cho Hwa-Soon, Ahn Kyung-Soo, Chung Jin-Dong, and Cho Ji-Song on 4 February
19S7, concentrated its efforts on struggle for improving human rights conditions and continuously
demanded social and economic justice. It also demanded release of arrested workers, and punishment of
people who suppress workers.
273 This organization contributed a great deal in organizing democratic unions in Wonpoong
Textile Co., Bando Trading Co., Dongil Textile Co., Control Data Co. They helped worker's struggles in
Samwon Textile, Yurim Chemical, Dongnam Electric, Taekwang Industry, Simdo Texile, and Yurim
Trading. It organized the struggle for Eight Hours working day in Confectionery, Lotte Confectionery, and
Bangrim Textile. Chung Jae-Yong and Richard J. R. Kirkby, The Political Economy o f Development and
Environment in Korea, 64-5.
274The National Catholic Priest’s Corps for the Realization of Justice (Catholic Priests’
Associationfor Justice) was established by some Catholic priests who are interested in social movement,
such as Lee Seung-Hoon, Moon Kyu-Hyun, and Ham Se-Ung, on 23 September 1974. The NCPCRJ
attempted to effectively fight against the authoritarian regime after the attest of Bishop Chi. In addition, the
NCPCRJ played the role of the national organization of the anti-regime Catholics and consistently
defended human rights and opposed the state’s social, political and economic policies. Dong-A Daily, 24
September 1974.
275 The Committee for Justice and Peace was especially interested in human right movement, and
contributed to realization of social justice, development of social justice and improvement of peace. This
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workers. The JOC and Catholic Fanners Association (Kanong)276 tried to organize
grassroots movements for workers and fanners, respectively.
In spite o f the active role of the progressive faction of Korean churches, the
majority of Korean churches either remained silent to the abuse of Yushin
authoritarianism or openly supported the regime. For example, conservative Protestant
ministers started the “Morning Prayer Meeting for the President” on 1 May 1968 and
continued the meetings after the Yushin inauguration by changing the name to the
“Morning Prayer Meeting for the State.” In addition, in November 1974, the Daehan
Kidokyo Yenhaphwoi (DCC) publicly announced that the NCCK could not represent all
Protestant churches because it integrated only 6 branches of the church, and expressed
that the participation of Protestant churches in anti-government demonstration was not
right.277 Especially, conservative church leaders opposed the political participation of
churches, and instead supported the government stance on religion, i.e., the separation of
church and state based on the theological position of non-interference by the church in
matters of the secular state.278 On the other hand, in the Catholic Church, the antigovernment movement, led by liberal clergy, was constrained by the uncooperative
bishops in the upper hierarchy of the Catholic Church.

organization mainly supported social and political movement for democratization and improvement of
human rights through issuing public statements.
The Catholic Peasant Association (KCFM, Kanong), established on 17 October 1966, played
an important role in organizing peasant grassroots movements. The KCFM concentrated its efforts on
struggle for improvement of peasants' conditions, overcoming social contradiction. In addition, it tried to
involve in political struggle against the authoritarian regime, and snuggled for urban and rural community.
The Kanong tried to organize grassroots movements for fanners.
Dong-A Daily, 27 November 1974.
271 NCCK, I970nyundae Minjoohwaundong: Kidoggyo Inkwonundongeul JoongsimetroJThe
Democratization Movements in the 1970s: with Special Reference to Christian Human Rights Movement),
502-8.
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In spite of the repressive policy and internal division within the church, Catholic
and Protestant churches played a significant role in supporting other democratic groups
and organizations and their democratic movement, and sometimes became directly
involved in the democratic movement during the Yushin regime. Because of the unique
status of the church in a society, they could criticize the authoritarian regime more easily
than other democratic groups and organizations.279 However, under harsh suppression, it
was difficult for the religious communities to establish firm solidarity with other
democratic civil society such as students, workers, and the Jaeya force. Thus, the
religious communities had to be satisfied with indirect supports to the democratic
movement of civil society, such as holding prayer meetings and issuing public statements
to criticize the authoritarian regime.280

(5) The Jaeya Force
Under the situation in which the NDP was a semi-loyal opposition party, a group
called the Jaeya force emerged outside the formal institutional political arena.281 The
term, Jaeya is somewhat ambiguous because dissident students, workers, urban poors,
and farmers are not included, although they are outside of the institutional political arena.
The Jaeya force can be defined as a broad category of opposition notables with middle
779 For example, under harsh suppression, the riot police did not enter the church, especially the
Myungdong Cathedral to suppress the democratic movement Thus, leaders of the democratic movement
ran into the church to temporarily avoid state suppression, and the clergy tried to protect and negotiate for
their safety with the state repression apparatuses. This special status of the church in society caused the
religious communities to have relatively autonomous position in the relationship with the state.
m For example, on 28 November 1973, dozens of Protestant church ministers and 200 believers
gathered in Seoul, prayed for the nation, and demanded to stop repressive policy toward churches. In the
prayer meeting, the riot police took 21 ministers and believers to police station. Dong-A Daily, 28
November 1973.
2,1 “Jaeya” or “Jaeya movement circle" had been sometimes used to refer generally to the
opposition party and dissident movement together. The authoritarian regime and the ruling bloc
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class origins and consisted of a wide range of occupational categories from former
professional politicians to university professors, religious clergy, journalists, and
lawyers.282 They were a group of people who raised social issues such as improvement
o f civil rights and representation of isolated classes. In addition, Jaeya leaders presented
a direction of the democatic movement and encouraged acitve political sruggle during the
Yushin regime.283 Thus, with a student group, the Jaeya force was very important in
leading the democratic movement by civil society. For example, the Jaeya force acted as
the opposition party under the Yushin regime because the major opposition NDP was
controlled by the regime and thus could not play the role of coordinating the democratic
movement or leading democratic civil society.
The National Council for the Safeguard of Democracy, formed on 19 April 1971,
was the first national organization, established by the Jaeya force. The council played an
important role in preventing rigging of the election by sending 6,100 election observers to
electoral precincts. After the inauguration of the Yushin regime in 1972, the Jaeya force,
like other democratic groups and organizations in civil society, had to be silent because
of harsh suppression. However, Jaeya leaders eventually broke their silence and

particularly preferred such a genetic usage. The regime often described the Jaeya force as communistinstigated.
212 Yun Sang-Chul, 80nyundae Hcmkookui Minjuhwaehanggwajung (The Process of Democratic
Transition of South Korea in the 1980s), 75-6; Park Tae-Kyun, Hankook Minjujuuiui Judoseryuk (The
Leading Force of Democracy of South Korea), (Seoul: Changjakgwa bipyung, 1994), 171-72.
m For example, on March I, Jaeya leaders, including former President Yun Bo-Sun, publicly
announced that democracy was impossible under the Park regime, and also said that the Park regime was
more authoritative than the previous Rhe regime. In addition. South Korea could not won over North
Korea, and there was no way except for democracy in order to win the confrontation with North Korea. On
22 March 1977, Jaeya leaders, such as Yun Bo-Sun, Jung Gu-Young, Chun Kwoan-Woo, Yun HyungJung, Ji Hak-Soon, Park Hyung-Kyu, Yang II-Dong, Jung Il-Hyung, and Cho Hwa-Soon, publicly
announced statements for abolition of the Yushin constitution and guarantee of human rights. In addition,
on 9 January 1978, Jaeya leaders publicly announced that the Yushin regime and emergency law should be
abolished, and the regime should guarantee workers’ living rights. In addition, they asserted that any
election could not be justified the authoritarian regime. Institute of Gladness and Hope, Amheksokui
hwoibul (A Torch of Darkness: Testimony of Democratic Movement in the 1970s and 1980s), vol. 2 and 3.
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launched the first organized anti-regime movement, the “One Million Signature
Campaign for the Revision of the Yushin Constitution” on 24 December 1973.284 In
addition, 71 Jaeya leaders, such as Yun Bo-Sun, Kim Young-Sam, Ham Se-Ung, and
Kang Won-Yong, established the National Conference for the Restoration of Democracy,
on 27 November 1974 to reconstruct the disassembled National Council of the prt-Yushin
period.285
After that, there were cycles of protest, confrontation, repression and
reconstruction. The first cycle of the struggle between the Jaeya force and the
authoritarian regime was from 1973 to 1974. It began with the “One Million Signature
Campaign for the Revision of the Yushin Constitution” and ended with the Emergency
Decrees no. 1 and 2 in 1974. The second cycle started with the establishment of the
National Congress for Restoration of Democracy (Minjuhoebok Kookmin Hoeui), and
ended with the Emergency Decree no. 9 on 13 May 1975. After the promulgation of the
Emergency Decree no. 9, the democratic movement of the Jaeya force had to stop due to
unprecedented harsh repression. Nevertheless, the Jaeya force acted as a bridge that
connected other democratic groups and organizations with the opposition party. After
another quiet period, the Jaeya movement’s political struggle for democratization began
in early 1976.
The “Declaration of Democratic National Salvation” on 1 March 1976 at the
Myungdong Cathedral was the first organized protest of the Jaeya force after the
Emergency Decree no. 9. In the declaration, the Jaeya force strongly requested Park to

214 Christian Institute for the Study of Justice and Development (CISJD), I970nyundae Minjoowha
Undonggwa Kidoggyo (Democratization Movements and the Church in the 1970s), (Seoul: CISJD, 1983),
130-37.
2,5 Dong-A Daily, 28 November 1974.
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restore the democratic constitution, to release political prisoners, and to resign from
office.2*6 The “Myungdong Incident” was the beginning of the third cycle of protest and
suppression which showed the unyielding resistance of the Jaeya force against the regime
in spite of unprecedented harsh suppression under the Emergency Decree no. 9. Between
1977 and 1978, many Jaeya organizations, such as the Council of Ousted Professors,2*7
Council of Democratic Youth for Human Rights, and Council of Korean Human Rights
1£j>

Movements, were established.

In order to coordinate individual movements and

organizations at the national level, Jaeya leaders re-established a nationwide organization,
the “National Coalition for Democracy” on July 5, 1978. Its goal was peaceful
democratization through cooperation with other democratic forces of civil society. In
order to do so, this organization focused on coordinating individual movements and
organizations at the national level. There were 12 affiliated organizations under its
umbrella.2*9 However, those affiliated organizations were not under the tight control of
the National Coalition, but were loosely connected with each other under the umbrella
organization of the National Coalition for Democracy. On 1 March 1979, the National
216 Washington Post, Wednesday, 2 March 1977, AIO; John K. C. Oh, “South Korea 1976: the
Continuing Uncertainties,” Asian Survey 17, no. 1 (1977): 73.
The Council of Ousted Professors, established by ousted professors, such as Kim Dong-Kil,
Kim Yong-Jun, Rho Myung-Sik, Kim Chan-Kook, Lee Young-Hee, Han wan-Sang, and Lee Woo-Jung, on
2 December 1977, struggled for democratization, overthrow of the Yushin constitution and the military
dictatorship. This organization mainly used public statements, and criticized governmental policies and
reactions toward democratic forces. Dong-A Daily, 3 December 1977.
31 The Council o f Korean Human Right Movement was established by 32 religious leaders and
journalists, such as Cho Nam-Ki, Father Kim Seung-Hun, on 29 December 1977. This organization
struggled for improvement of human rights. As a strategy o f the struggle, this organization mainly issued
public statements and comments about certain policies or reactions of the regime.
2,9 Those organizations were the Council for Korean Human Rights Movement, Catholic Priests
Body for the Realization of Justice, Council of Ousted Professors, Council of Literary Men for the
Realization of Freedom, Council of Families of Conscientious Prisoners, Council of Korean Christian
Social Mission, Council o f Democratic Youth for Human Rights, Committee of Dong-A Daily for the
Struggle o f Safeguarding Free Press, Committee of Chosun Daily for the Struggle of Safeguarding Free
Press, Council of Prisoners for the Restoration of Democracy, National Committee of Workers for Human
Rights, and National Committee of Farmers for Human Rights. KNCC, I970nyundae Minjoohwaundong:
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Coalition for Democracy changed its name to the National Coalition for Democracy and
Unification.290 Especially, Jaeya leaders played an important role in refurbishing the
NDP into a genuinely autonomous opposition party in May 1979 under the leadership o f
Kim Young-Sam. After that, a coalition between the NDP and the Jaeya force was built,
and intensified the pressure on the Yushin regime until Park’s death.
However, because most constituents of the Jaeya force were from highly
diversified professional and intellectual groups with a middle class background, they
were in a difficult position to establish coalitions with other democratic groups of civil
society such as workers, farmers, the urban poor, or students. Thus, the democratic
movement of the Jaeya force without the popular support could not be influential.
Second, the organizational strength and cohesiveness of the Jaeya force was too weak to
mobilize mass followers. Thus, there was a limitation in maximizing their struggle with
the regime and thus its political struggle had been inconsequential.291 Third, the diverse
ideological and occupational nature of the Jaeya force made it difficult to coordinate a
coherent and unified strategy against the regime. More importantly, harsh suppression
was a serious obstacle to their struggle with the Yushin regime.
In spite of these difficulties, however, the Jaeya force, composed of socially and
politically respected people, was the only group in the democratic movement able to
strongly criticize and influence the authoritarian regime. Thus, the authoritarian regime
could not just ignore their political struggle. However, this active political struggle of the

Kidoggyo Inkwonundongeul Joongsimetro (The Democratization Movements in the 1970s: with Special
Reference to Christian Human Rights Movement), 1719.
290Joongang Daily, 2 March 1979.
291 In spite of struggle for democratization, participants of the Jaeya force had respectively
different goals. For example, former opposition politicians in the Jaeya force had a strong political
ambition. Therefore, the cohesiveness of the Jaeya force was relatively weaker than other democratic
groups and organizations of civil society.
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Jaeya force unfavorably affected the oppsition party during 1970s. The active
involvement of the Jaeya force in the democratic movement made the NDP weaken, and
thus making it impossible for the NDP to lead the democratic movement As a result the
regime and the ruling party considered the Jaeya force, consisting of many respected
political and social leaders, as its counter-part instead of the NDP. In this respect, the
active Jaeya movement influenced obstructively the development of the opposition party
during the Yushin regime.

2) Changes of Democratic Civil Society
The unique characteristic of democratic civil society was that most democratic
groups and organizations agreed that the restoration of a democratic constitution was a
necessary condition for achieving their individual goals, such as improvement of human
rights conditions, social and economic justice, and political freedom. Having a common
goal made various democratic groups and organizations cooperate easier in their
democratic struggle. Nevertheless, they differed in ideologies and strategies, thus making
it difficult to build a coalition within civil society.292 As a consequence of this internal
division, the political struggle o f democratic civil society had not been influential during
the 1970s in spite of active struggle.
The harsh repressive policy was another important element that hindered the
influential democratic movement of civil society. The Yushin regime anticipated that the
emergence of an active opposition movement could destablize the political, social, and

292 According to Park Eun-Sook, a former student movement activist, various ideological
differences from liberalism to Marxism had existed within a student group during the Yushin period. As a
result, student groups had to face both internal power struggle and external suppression by the regime.
Park Eun-Sook, interviewed by author, Seoul, 13,14, and 13 September 1999.
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economic situation, and thus the main goal of the repressive policy was to destroy the
autonomous democratic civil society. Along with the harsh suppression on democratic
civil society, the regime also tried to isolate democratic groups and organizations from
the public.293 These efforts of the regime made the democratic struggle of civil society
inconsequential, and caused democratic civil society difficult to overthrow the regime.
Thus, it was impossible for democratic civil society to draw popular support and
participation from outside their organizations because of the solid power base and
cohesiveness of the ruling coalition. Rather, most democratic groups and organizations
were isolated from the public by threats of the regime and manipulation of the
government controlled mass media. Thus, during the Yushin period, the size of the
democratic movement could not be large, and demonstrations of democratic civil society
took place only in certain places such as university campuses and churches.294 In
addition, there were many cases in which the public did not know whether there were
protests due to limited locations, tight governmental censorship, and tight control of the
mass media. As a result, the democratic movement grew more frustrated, more radical,
and inconsequential. In spite of this inconsequential democratic movement, however,
democratic struggle of civil society indirectly but significantly contributed to the collapse
of the Yushin regime.

293 According to the interview with Hong Seung-Sang, the regime was very cautious about the
connection between students and workers because the establishment of a coalition between two groups
could threaten the regime. Thus, the regime prevented possible establishment of a coalition and suppressed
those groups through using every state power apparatus. Hong Seung-Sang, interviewed by author, Seoul,
19 August 1999.
291 During the Yushin period, university campuses and churches were not even safe places because
the police usually stayed in campuses to spy on the students’ movement, and the riot police entered
campuses to suppress the student movement Furthermore, the police entered churches to arrest wanted
personals. Thus, there were not many places where democratic groups and organizations could express
freely their dissatisfaction toward the regime.
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In terms of character, an inconsequential character of civil society had not much
changed during the Yushin period because of several restrictions. Democratic civil
society had been organizationally weak, divided by various ideologies and strategies, and
had not been supported by the middle class. Because of this inconsequential character,
democratic civil society was vulnerable to suppression and could not maximize its
resources in struggling with the Yushin regime. However, it did not mean that
democratic civil society did not contribute to anything in the collapse of the Yushin
regime. Along with the economic crisis in 1978, active political struggle of democratic
civil society contributed to destabilizing political situation, and made the ruling coalition
split295 In addition, several internal and external factors had favorably and unfavorably
affected the character of civil society during the Yushin period.
First political culture, which had authoritarian and parochial characters, did not
much changed, and thus it had not favorably influenced changing the character of civil
society during the 1970s. Especially, the Confucian political culture had unfavorably
affected changing the character of civil society. In the early 1970s, the middle class who
had been influenced by the traditional political culture for a long time was more
concerned with economic justice and prosperity than political development For
example, the 1971 survey, intended to tap the Korean attitudes toward modernization,
asked the respondent the following: “With regard to modernization, which do you find
more important economic aspects such as better income and economic stability or
political aspects such as greater freedom and political stability?” Fifty-two percent of the
respondents considered economic issues more important than political issues. Although
this number was not significantly larger than the opposite respondents, economic issues,
295 See Juergen Kleiner, Korea: A Century o f Change, 164-70.
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such as economic justice and economic development, were considered as the more
important than political issues, such as democratization, during the 1970s.296
As another consequence of the domination of the traditional political culture,
political consciousness of Korean people had remained low during the Yushin period. As
Huntington points out, “Confucian political culture is generally hostile to social bodies
independent of the state, and the culture was conceived as a total entity, no part of which
could be changed without threatening the whole.”297 During the Yushin regime, the
traditional Confucian political culture, which had firmly remained in most parts of the
society, contributed to maintaining the vertical structure of the society and superior status
in the relationship with the public, including civil society.29* For example, most people,
concerned with possible political and economic instability from political struggles of civil
society, assented or supported the repressive policy toward democratic civil society, and
also supported a strong leadership, at least before the economic crisis in 1978.2" Unlike
democratic civil society groups, such as student, religious clergy, and the Jaeya force,
ordinary people did not have many opportunities and channels to meet democratic values
and principles. Rather, they had been familiar with the traditional political culture and
thus could not have critical attitudes and perceptions toward the authoritarian regime. In
this sense, the Confucian political culture strongly influenced people, especially the
middle class, to be passive in their relationship with the state, and made them accept

296 Lee Young-Ho, “Modernization as a Global Vale in Koran Society,” Korean Journal 12, no. 4
(1972): 35-6.
297 Samuel P. Huntington, “Will More Countries Become Democratic?" Political Science
Quarterly 99, no. 2 (1984): 208.
299 Simone Chambers and Will Kymlicka, Alternative ConceptionsofCivil Society (Princeton and
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), 194-96
299 Robert A. Scalapino, “Democratizing Dragons: South Korea & Taiwan,” Journal o f
Democracy A, no. 3 (July 1993): 73.
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authoritarian rule more easily. In particular, the passive middle class and their favorable
attitude toward authoritarian rule made the character of civil society difficult to change.
Although the traditional Confucian political culture slowly changed to the
democratic civic culture along with successful and rapid economic development and
spread of Christianity in this period, its influence on the character of civil society during
the 1970s had been insignificant because of a couple of reasons. First, the change of the
traditional Confucian political culture did not reach the point that could advantageously
influence changing the character of civil society in the 1970s. Because of this
insignificant influence, in the Korean society of the 1970s, parochial and authoritarian
characters had still broadly remained and influenced thoughts and behaviors of
individuals and organizations.300 Therefore, it was not easy to artificially change the
political culture by socioeconomic development in a short time. Second, the outright
authoritarian regime kept away the influence of the changing political culture on civil
society through state power apparatuses and government-controlled mass media.
In addition, the middle class, familiar with the Confucian political culture, did not
have a clear identity as a part of civil society throughout the Yushin period.301 In
particular, they had been passive in the relationship with the government because of
influence of the traditional political culture that emphasized a vertical relationship
between the state and people. This dominance of traditional political culture made the

100 According to interviews with Chun Yong-Ho, Park Eun-Sook, and Lee Tae-Bok, former
student movement activist and labor movement activist, the existence of traditional Confucian political
culture was a major obstacle in their democratic movement. According to them, the most difficult task of
the democratic civil society was to draw support from the public who had been influenced by the Confucian
political culture. Thus, as a means for drawing the public anention, those democratic groups used violence.
101 Although the size o f the middle class increased to 322 % in 1985 from 14.8 % in 1960, the size
of the middle class was still small in the 1970s. Pak Kwang-Ju, “Kookgaronul tonghan Hankook Jungcui
Paradaim Mosaek" (The search for a Paradigm of Korean Politics through a Theory of State), Hyusangkwa
Insik 2 (1985): 30-78.
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middle class reluctant to support the democratic movement and caused them to be
isolated from democratic civil society. Thus, democratic civil society failed to draw
popular support, especially from the middle class who was essential for changing the
character of civil society. Without strong support and active participation of the middle
class, democratic civil society had a limitation in changing from inconsequential to
influential in the democratic movement
The traditional Confucian culture also unfavorably affected building solidarity
among various democratic groups and organizations because those groups and
organizations were very heterogeneous in terms of culture and ideology.302 For example,
the labor movement had been excluded from other democratic groups that had higher
educational and social backgrounds.303 For instance, the Jaeya force did not actively
pursue to build a coalition with the working class because of the ideological and cultural
differences. This exclusion of the working class from other democratic groups made the
democratic struggle inconsequential, and made building a coalition within civil society
difficult during the Yushin regime. In this respect, the political culture that had been
slowly changing did not positively affect the character of democratic civil society in the
1970s. Rather, it unfavorably affected not only the relationship between the state and
civil society but also the relationship among various democratic groups and
organizations. That is, the Korean society had remained a society, dominated by a
vertical social structure, and there was no balance of power between the state and civil

302 Under the traditional Confucian culture, the working class had been considered as an inferior
class by other social classes in Korean society. This social division made civil society difficult to unite and
build a coalition for the more active and effective struggle for democratization. In addition, there were only
few numbers of the political struggle by coalitions among various democratic civil society groups and
organizations.
m Larry Diamond and Kim Byung-Kook, Consolidating Democracy in South Korea, 13-4.
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society during the 1970s. In this situation, the traditional political culture functioned as
an advantage for the Yushin regime and its maintenance.
In addition, this unfavorable political culture indirectly influenced the character of
civil society by affecting other factors such as external support and political opportunity
structure. First, the political culture during the Yushin period negatively affected the
external environment. The dominance of the traditional political culture in the 1970s
made it difficult for other countries, such as the U.S., to support Korean civil society and
its democratic movement because they considered Korean civil society too weak to
challenge the authoritarian regime. Under the situation, it was meaningless for the U.S.
to support Korean democratic civil society for democratization. In this respect, political
culture of the 1970s unfavorably affected external factors, and the unfavorable external
environment negatively influenced the character of democratic civil society.
Second, the political culture also unfavorably influenced the political opportunity
structure during the 1970s. The parochial and authoritarian characteristics o f political
culture facilitated the establishment of the authoritarian Yushin regime and affected the
response of the regime toward democratic civil society. Because of this negative
influence of political culture, there was no strong resistance by ordinary citizens and
democratic civil society to the installation of the Yushin regime or the suppression on
democratic civil society. In addition, because o f the closed political opportunity
structure, strongly affected by political culture, provided an excuse for harsh suppression
of the democratic movement. In this situation, the authoritarian regime did not need to
open the political opportunity structure to relax the suppression of civil society and the
opposition party; it had maintained a repressive policy toward democratic civil society
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during the Yushin period. Therefore, the political culture during the Yushin period not
only impeded the changing character of civil society, but also other factors.
Second, economic development is also an important factor that can directly and
indirectly affect the character of civil society. For example, economic development can
provide people more opportunities for education and facilitate creation of the large
middle class with political consciousness. The middle class who is qualitatively and
quantitatively grown by successful economic development becomes a power base of
democratic civil society, and helps civil society become actively involved in the political
process.304 The economic development can also indirectly affect the character of civil
society by affecting other factors such as political culture and political opportunity
structure. Therefore, economic development is a very significant factor that can change a
character of civil society.
During the Yushin regime, however, successful economic development
obstructively influenced the character of democratic civil society and its political
struggle. That is, the Yushin regime took advantage of successful economic development
in the 1970s as a justification for its authoritarianism.

Based on successful economic

performance, the Yushin regime received strong support from the middle class.
Consequently, democratic civil society failed to draw popular support Thus, democratic
civil society had been isolated from the public, and its democratic struggle was
inconsequential despite its active struggles. The rapid and successful economic

304 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture; Seymour Martin Lipset, Political
Man: The Social Bases o f Politics', James S. Coleman, “Introduction: Education and Political
Development," in Education and Political Development, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960);
David H. Karmens, “Education and Democracy: A Comparative Institutional Analysis," Sociology o f
Education 61, no. 2 (1988): 114-27.
305 Park Sung-Ung, “Culture, Ritual and Political Change: the democratic transition in South
Korea,” Hankook Sahoehak 22, no. I (1998): 40.
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development of the 1970s was not enough to influence to change the character of civil
society. In spite of the successful economic development, as Table 3-4 shows, the per
capita GNP was still low. Thus, it was not a period for people to think about political
development such as democratization. Instead, it facilitated to create the middle class
who was more interested in economic prosperity than political development. Thus, the
regime could obtain support from the middle class until the late 1970s. In this respect,
democratic civil society was not ready to take advantage of successful economic
development to change its inconsequential character in this Yushin period.
Table 3-4
Economic Indicators (1972-1979)
Year

GNP (current Per capita GNP
Export (in
Economic
(US$)
price)*
million of $)
Growth rate (%)
1972
318
4177.5
1624.1
5.3
1973
395
5355.5
3225.0
14.0
1974
540
4460.4
7564.5
8.5
1975
10064.6
590
5081.0
6.8
1976
797
13818.2
13.4
7715.3
1977
1008
10.7
17728.6
10046.5
1978
1392
23936.8
12710.6
11.0
1979
30741.1
1640
7.0
15055.5
* in billions of won
Source: John Kie-chiang Oh, Korean Politics: The Questfo r Democratization and
Economic Development, 62.
Unlike the unfavorable influence of the economic development, the successful
economic development in the late 1970s facilitated creation of the middle class and
provided a foundation to the middle class for changing their perception of the
authoritarian regime in the future. For example, from the late 1970s, the middle class
began to be critical of the regime and its economic policies albeit their dissatisfaction was
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not clearly expressed.306 In this respect, the successful economic development had
positively influenced the political culture. The change of the public perception, strongly
influenced by socioeconomic development and change of political culture, began to
influence the character of civil society favorably. From the late 1970s, democratic civil
society that realized the change in public opinion showed a more active and aggressive
character in its democratic struggle. For instance, in the general election in 1978, the
opposition party gained more popular votes than the ruling party: 32.8% vs. 31.7%. This
active and assertive character of democratic civil society appeared in the demands and
slogans of the democratic movement in the late 1970s. On 1 October 1979, a large
number of citizens and thousands of students gathered and marched through the streets,
chanting anti-government slogans such as “abolition of the Yushin regime.”307
In this respect, successful economic development in the 1970s affected the
character of democratic civil society, both favorably and unfavorably. In the unfavorable
perspective, the successful economic development provided legitimacy to the Yushin
regime.308 In the positive perspective, serious economic problems, caused by the rapid
economic development, triggered a political crisis in the late 1970s, and led to a collapse
of the regime in 1979. Therefore, the economic development during the 1970s not only
helped the Yushin regime to justify its authoritarian rule, but also provided a potential
and a foundation for the change of civil society in the following years. However, in the
Yushin period, the rapid and successful economic development had affected the character
of democratic civil society more negatively than positively. Thus, democratic civil
306 Roger L. Janelli, Making Capitalism: The Social Construction o f a South Korea Conglomerate
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 81-8.
307Nam Koon-Woo, South Korean Politics: The Search fo r Political Consensus and Stability, 169.
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society had a limitation in struggling for restoration of a democratic constitution with the
Yushin authoritarian regime.
The political opportunity structure is another significant factor that can influence
the character of democratic civil society. If the political opportunity structure is opened,
civil society can have more opportunities to increase its resources and establish strong
alliances. However, during the Yushin regime, the political opportunity structure had not
been opened because of various internal and external reasons. One of them was the
controlling power of the regime over not only civil society but also the ruling coalition.
Because of this controlling power, any opening or expansion of the political opportunity
structure had not taken place during the whole Yushin period, and thus it was impossible
to expect a change of character of civil society by the expansion of the political
opportunity structure. Rather, democratic civil society had to concentrate its efforts and
energy on survival and be satisfied with passive movements such as distributing anti
government handbills and issuing public statements.309 In addition, the Yushin period
was a difficult period for democratic civil society to draw popular support because the
regime implemented a harsh repressive policy to isolate democratic civil society from the
public. This lack of popular support unfavorably affected opening of the political
opportunity structure, and thus it was difficult for democratic civil society to have a
united and aggressive character and struggle effectively with the regime.
Moreover, there had been no serious fragmentation within the ruling coalition
until the collapse of the regime, and the relatively cohesive ruling coalition prevented the
301 John Kie-Chiang Oh, Korean Politics: The Questfo r Democratization and Economic
Development, 51 -8.
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political opportunity structure from expanding or being created. For example, the regime
used both a repressive policy and political and economic incentives to control the ruling
coalition and prevent possible breaking up of the ruling coalition.310 Through this dual
policy, the ruling coalition could maintain its cohesiveness, and the political opportunity
structure had not been opened until Park’s death. Thus, this closed political opportunity
structure obstructively affected the character of civil society, and the democratic
movement had remained inconsequential during the 1970s.
In addition, most external events were unfavorable to democratic civil society
during the 1970s, except for the strong pressure of the Carter administration for
improving human rights in the late Yushin regime.311 Instead, most external events, such
as the U.S. defeat in the Vietnam War, the Cold War, the Nixon doctrine, and the
confrontation with North Korea, made it easy for the Yushin regime and to justify
suppressing democratic civil society. In this respect, the external environment had
unfavorably affected the political opportunity structure, and the closed political
opportunity structure negatively influenced the character of democratic civil society. In
addition, the external environment had hindered development of political culture. For
example, the Cold War made the middle class consider national security and economic
development as more importantly than democratization. As a result, the external
environment made it more difficult for not only the middle class but also civil society to
criticize authoritarian rule. Therefore, the external environment during the 1970s

309 According to Park Eun-Sook, especially under emergency decree, neither students nor other
democratic groups and organizations could resist and struggle against the repressive regime. Park EunSook, interviewed by author, Seoul, 13, 14, and IS September 1999.
310 Yun Sang-Chul, 80nyundae Hankookui Minjuhwaihaenggwajung (The Process of Korean
Democratization in the 1980s), 61-2.
311 Robert E. Bedeski, The Transformation o f South Korea, Reform and Reconstruction in the Six
Republic under Roh Tae fVoo, 1987-1992,25.
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impeded the development of democratic civil society by affecting other important
internal factors such as the political opportunity structure and political culture.
Despite the fact that most external factors unfavorably affected the character of
democratic civil society, some factors favorably influenced the character of democratic
civil society in the late 1970s, both directly and indirectly. As a direct influence, in the
late Yushin regime, the Carter administration pressured the Park regime to improve
human rights conditions, and expressed its support to the opposition force as a means of
the pressure. This pressure caused the ruling coalition to divide into hardliners and
moderates in dealing with the political crisis. However, the Park regime could not accept
the U.S. demand to improve human rights conditions because accepting the U.S. demand
meant giving up its authoritarianism. Although the U.S. pressure didn’t completely
change the inconsequential character of civil society, it certainly affected democratic
groups and organizations to have more united and aggressive character, and encouraged
them to struggle more actively in the late 1970s. For instance, when President Cater
visited South Korea in June 1979, he met Jaeya leaders and encouraged their democratic
movement.312 In addition, international economic condition in 1970s positively affected
the economic development and evolution of political culture. This positive influence
strongly contributed to facilitating creation of the middle class who had political
consciousness. In particular, this positive influence of the external environment
advantageously affected the democratic movement of civil society in the late Yushin
regime, and contributed to the collapse of the Yushin regime.

312 Kim Yeonk-Kwang, “Interview with Park Jun-Kyu,” Wolgan Chosun, (February 2002): 281319. For example. When President Cater met Kim Young-Sam, Kim said “the U.S. government had
supported Korea militarily and financially. However, it had also neglected the military government that
suppressed people. Why did not the U.S. government overthrow this undemocratic government?”
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During the 1970s, those four factors had not favorably and consistently affected
the character of civil society. Rather, most factors unfavorably affected democratic civil
society. Under these circumstances, the divided, isolated, and inconsequential
democratic civil society did not change much, and remained the same throughout the
Yushin period. Nevertheless, there was a small but important change in the democratic
movement of civil society in the 1970s. The main target of the political and economic
struggle of democratic civil society began to change from the mid-1970s. In the early
Yushin period, democratic groups and organizations respectively had different goals,
such as improvement of human rights conditions, political freedom, and economic
justice, and thus they had different targets such as the authoritarian regime, and
employers. Because of these different goals and targets, the democratic movement of
civil society had been inconsequential, and democratic civil society could not have the
capacity to overthrow the regime in spite of its active struggle. However, after the mid1970s, democratic groups and organizations began to realize that the diversity of goals
and targets was one of the major reasons for the inconsequential democratic struggle
against the repressive regime. Thus, democratic civil society showed more united and
political character in its struggle with the regime in the late 1970s. This changed
character greatly contributed to destabilizing political situation, and the active political
struggle by civil society caused the ruling coalition to divide the moderate and hardline
factions. After all, this split of the ruling coalition led the Yushin regime to its collapse
in 1979. In addition, democratic civil society could not get active support from the
middle class nor have an active, united, aggressive, and influential character because of
unfavorable influence of those factors.

1S8

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER IV

THE FAILURE OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND EMERGENCE OF THE
FIFTH REPUBLIC (1979-1983)

1. Aborted Democratic Transition
Right after the collapse of the Yushin regime, political and social conditions were
favorable to the democratic transition. Park’s sudden death weakened suppression on
democratic civil society, and provided a great chance for democratic civil society to
vitalize. Many democratic organizations in various sectors were established and actively
involved in the transitional process by mobilizing their members and public.313 Another
favorable condition for democratic transition was that Park’s sudden death pushed the
military and ruling DRP in internal power struggle. This power struggle made the
military and the DRP difficult to be involved actively in the transitional politics. Thus,
democratic civil society could more space to vitalize and get involved in the transitional
politics. In addition, the U.S. government also showed outright support for a peaceful
transition to democracy, and warned the military not to intervene in politics.314

3,3 Kim Young-Myung, Hankook Hyundaejungchisa: Jungchibyundonggwayokhak (The Modem
Political History o f South Korea: Political Change and Dynamics), 321-27.
314 Chu, Yun-Ham, Hu Fu, and Moon Chung-ln. “South Korea and Taiwan: The International
Context,” in Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, eds. Diamond, Larry, Plattner Marc F., Chu,
Yun-han, and Tien Hung-mao (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). The new policy of
the United States toward South Korea can be summarized as follows. First, although Park’s death was a
domestic matter o f South Korea, the U.S. government should actively involve in the Korean political
situation. Second, the authoritarian regime like the Yushin regime was more advantageous to prolong the
pro-American regime. Third, the transitional process should be accomplished under the Choi regime.
Fourth, the Korean military should not intervene in the transitional process and a new government. Fifth,
when these processes progressed smoothly, the U.S. government should officially and unofficially support
the transitional process. Chung Sang-Yong and Yu Si-Min, Kwangju Minjung Hangjaeng (The Kwangju
Democratic Movement), (Seoul: Dolbege, 1990), 37.
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In spite of these favorable political and social conditions, however, the democratic
movement of civil society was not influential because of several internal and external
reasons. First, democratic civil society did not have enough time to become organized
and set unified strategies for the democratic struggle.315 The internal conflict within
democratic civil society still existed after the collapse of the Yushin regime. Rather,
ideological and strategic conflicts within democratic civil society were more clearly
expressed, and those conflicts made the democratic movement inconsequential in the
critical moment for democratization.316
Second, there was a serious legal restriction in political activities of democratic
civil society and political parties because acting President Choi proclaimed martial law
immediately after Park's death. Martial law prohibited every political activity of not only
political parties but also civil society. For example, the military-guided government
imposed total martial law, one of a series of moves that included the arrest of prominent
opposition leader Kim Dae-Jung, the banning of all political activity and the closing of all
universities throughout the country.317
Third, there was a little cooperation between democratic civil society and the
opposition party. Opposition politicians worried that the active political involvement of
democratic civil society could trigger direct military intervention in the transitional
politics. Thus, opposition politicians did not want democratic civil society to be actively
313 According to Park Eun-Sook, a former student movement activist and currently social
movement activist, most democratic groups and organizations did not have a specific plan to involve
effectively in the transition process, and did not know how to achieve their ultimate goals. Moreover,
along with Park’s death, internal conflicts in some groups of democratic civil society, such as students and
the Jaeya force, were getting more severe. Under this circumstance, democratic civil society had a
limitation in taking advantage o f Park’s death.
316 Yun Sung-Yi, “Sahoiundongui Kwanjumesu Bon Hankook Kwonuijuuicheje Byundong:
jugchikihoegujo gainyumul jungsimeuro” (The Change of the Authoritarian Regime in the Perspective of
the Political Opportunity Structure), 116.
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involved in the transitional politics. On the other hand, democratic civil society saw and
criticized the opposition party. Democratic civil society saw the opposition party was
more interested in their political interest than the peaceful democratic transition. In this
situation, influential democratic struggles, based on a coalition between democratic civil
society and the opposition party, were impossible.
Unlike inconsequential struggle of civil society, negotiations for democratic
transition between the ruling and opposition parties progressed.318 Even though the
ruling and opposition party faced re-structuring and internal power struggle, they tried to
be main actors in the transitional politics through cooperation with each other.319
However, the real power went to the military as the executor of martial law. The military
was the only group that could fill the power vacancy left behind by Park's death.
Nevertheless, the military also faced a serious internal power struggle between the
politically oriented junior officers and moderate senior officers.320 The hardliners of the
military sought to take control the transitional politics over the moderate faction that had
controlled the political situation since Park’s death. In addition, the hardliners did not
want to rush into dismantling the Yushin structure and move too quickly toward
democratization because the hardliners had been the main beneficiaries of Park’s
patronage for a long time.321 The new military force that took real power strongly
influenced the Choi government, and began to express its intention. For example, in

3,7 Dong-A Daily, 27 October 1979.
311 Washington Post, Sunday, 18 May 1980, AI.
319 Dong-A Daily, 5 December 1979.
320 Moon Byung-Joo, “Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Korea: With Special Reference
to the Relationships and Internal Dynamics of the State-Political Society-Civil Society,” (Ph.D. diss.,
Kunkook University, 1994), 79.
321 The New York Times, 2 November 1979.
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acting President Choi said that the Constitution would be revised by the end of 1980, and
a direct presidential election would ensure within 6 months.322
On the other hand, democratic civil society began to express accumulated
discontent and aspirations for democracy. On 3 May 1980, a large student meeting
denounced the country's military-backed government, and demanded an immediate end
of the martial law and the removal of officials left in power after Park’s death.323
However, despite the change of political situation and vitalization of civil society,
democratic transition didn’t take place because existing political structure was tailored to
execute authoritarian rule.324 Less than two month after Park’s death, a group of junior
Generals, led by Chun Doo-Hwan, seized power through the intra-military coup on 12
December 1979.325
After the intra-military coup, the new military force slowly approached the center
of the transitional politics, and began to suppress democratic civil society more harshly.
At the same time, the new military force began to exercise the plan for taking power.326
In order to do so, the new military force needed an excuse for a direct involvement in the
transitional politics. In fact, civilian politicians and democratic civil society that had
322 Dong-A Daily, 1 December 1979.
323 Washington Post, Saturday, 3 May 1980, A7. In addition, S31 professors of Yonsei University
signed a declaration for democratization on May 7. In the declaration, they expressed that I) support
resolution o f students association of Yonsei University, 2) abolition o f the martial law, 3) democratization,
4) freedom of press and guarantee of workers' rights, S) reinstatement of expelled students and professors,
and 5) changing policy o f students' military training. Institute o f Gladness and Hope, Amheksokui hwoibul
(A Torch of Darkness: Testimony of Democratic Movement in the 1970s and 1980s), vol. 4, (Seoul:
Catholic Publisher, 1997), 506.
324 Geir Helgesen, Democracy and Authority in Korea, 71.
323 Major Gen. Chun and his followers moved some 7,500 troops including 6,000 Special Forces
of the 9th Division stationed at the truce line to Seoul without permission of Gen. John A. Wickham, the
United States-ROK Combined Forced Commander. They arrested the former Army Chief of Staff and
Martial Law Commander General Chung Seung-Hwa and 15 other Generals, on the pretext of suspicion of
involvement in Park’s assassination. Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 December (1979): 13.
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been cautious of the possible military intervention tried not to provoke the direct military
intervention. Thus, democratic civil society and opposition party didn't mobilize masses
but instead asked students and workers to restrain themselves from escalating militant
protests. Furthermore, the ruling and opposition party agreed to lift martial law, and to
restore normalcy when the National Assembly would open on May 22.327
Under these circumstances, the new military force, fearing that it might lose an
opportunity to rule the country, began to fabricate conditions to justify their direct
intervention in politics. As a strategy, the new military force left student demonstrations
and labor strikes unchecked and made them uncontrollable. In spite o f civilian actors’
cautiousness, a democratic uprising took place in Kwangju on 17 May 1980. The new
military force used the suppression of the Kwangju uprising as an excuse for direct
intervention in transitional politics. Along with the harsh suppression, martial law
commander, who was a Chun's strong supporter, declared the extension of martial law on
17 May 1980, and prohibited all kinds of political and social activities, politically
oriented assemblies, and rallies.328 In particular, the new military force concentrated on
destroying and suppressing leaders and organizations of democratic civil society. Thus,
democratic civil society became rapidly shrink, and faced a crisis of their existence. In
this situation, democratic civil society could not play a significant role in the transitional
politics, and the great chance for democratization was aborted. In this respect, the failure
326 However, according to the interview with Chun Doo-Hwan, he did not have a plan to take a
control over the government, and also did not intend to be a president Roh Jae-Hyun, Chungfnvadae
Bisusil (The Secretary’s Office of the Blue House), vol. 3, (Seoul: Joongangllbosa, 1994), 319-23.
327 Dong-A Daily, 17 May 1980.
32t Washington Post, Sunday, 18 May 1980, Al. The new martial law from the earlier one in that
its enforcement was extended to the whole country and, more importantly, that the military-the Martial Law
Command, the Defense Security Command, and the Special Forces, in particular-was granted, in effect full
power to run the country by cuning the Cabinet out of the decision making role of the president The
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o f the democratic transition in 1980 was a result of internal divisions and the emergence
of the new military force.

2. Emergence of the New Military Force
After the collapse of the Yushin regime, democratic civil society and political
parties paid close attention to the military, and made every effort to lure the military to
their side. Nevertheless, this effort could not prevent direct military intervention in the
transitional politics. The direct military intervention was closely related to the internal
power struggle within the military. The internal conflict within the military that had
existed since the early 1970s began to appear more clearly after Park’s death. One
faction, consisting of high-ranking career military officers in the regular hierarchy of the
Army, advocated the integrity of the military-as-institution and a return to barracks after
order was restored. Leaders of this faction consisted of the first generation of Korean
military officers, trained by the Japanese Army, or educated and trained in a short course
at the Korean Military Academy (KMA) during the infant days of the Army.329 Thus, its
cohesiveness was very low and most of them acted on their individual interests.
Because this faction had not been directly involved in politics, they did not have
to be afraid of retribution of civilian democratic rule.330 This disinvolvement of
suppressive activities in the past made the moderate faction to share a view on
liberalization and democratization with democratic civil society. Considering the
situation that a return to Yushin-like authoritarianism trigger violent confrontations with
sudden announcement of martial law on May 17, 1980, has been called the new military’s “second coup,”
the first being the intra-military coup against General Chung on December 12, 1979.
329 Lee Chong-Sik, “South Korea 1979: Confrontation, Assassination, and Transition,” Asian
Survey 20, no. 1 (1981): 63-76.
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the already mobilized popular masses, the best strategy for them was the liberalization of
authoritarian rule. The second best option was democratization with a guarantee.
Therefore, this group was willing to open dialogue with the opposition force if the
military institutional interests were protected.
The other faction consisted of politicized military officers in the security force,
such as officers in the Defense Security Command and the Capital City Defense Division,
and other officers who were close proteges of Park under the Yushin regime.331 This
group was composed of the first generation of the regularly educated (four-year course)
graduates of the KMA and had maintained a high internal cohesiveness.332 This group
wanted the continuation of authoritarian rule because this faction had been directly
involved in suppression, torture, clandestine operation, and interrogation. Thus, they had
no other option except to defend the authoritarian regime. This group, therefore, sought
to return to Yushin-like authoritarianism with the repression of popular demands for
democratization.
In the beginning of the transitional period, the power of the military went to the
moderate military officers, led by the martial law commander and the Army Chief of
Staff, Gen. Chung Seung-Hwa. Immediately after becoming the Martial Law
Commander, Gen. Chung publicly stated that the military did not intend to intervene in
civilian politics, the transition process in particular.333 Gen. Chung and other senior
officers were willing to accept a gradual restoration of civil rights and a democratic

330 Lee So-Dong, interviewed by author, Seoul, 15 July 1999.
331 Lee Jong-Gak, “Jeohgonghwakukkwonryukeui Poori: Hanahoe” (The Roots of Power o f the
Fifth Republic: Hanahoe), Sin Dong-A, (January I9S8): 312-23.
332 The leaders of this faction were the graduates o f the first regularly educated KMA class but, in
record, they were the 11th graduates of the KMA.
3 Chung Seung-Hwa, “Chung Seung-Hwa Speaks,” cited from Mijoo Joongang Daily, 5 January
1988.
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transition in exchange for some guarantees for the military as an institution. Because the
prime objective of the moderate faction was to defend its institutional integrity, they
could assure civilian politicians of the military’s neutrality in the transitional process.
Although Gen. Chung was at the top of the military command hierarchy and,
indeed, had the real power to influence the political situation, he was vulnerable in
exercising power as a martial law commander. At the time of Park’s assassination, he
was a few hundred yards away from the spot of assassination, and the assassin, Kim JaeKyu escorted him to the commanding headquarter of the Army to control the situation.
Chun Doo-Hwan, the chief investigator of the President’s death, did his best to exploit
Gen. Chung’s personal weakness. Thus, Gen. Chung attempted to transfer him to a
powerless post as the East Coast Defense Commander far away from Seoul. Then, Gen.
Chun, as the Defense Security Commander, detected Chung’s every move and struck
back in advance of Chung’s move by staging an intra-military coup334 against senior
officers on the night of December 12, 1979.
After the night of an exchange of shooting on 12 December 1979, Chun’s faction
gained control over the military despite the protest of the U.S. commander Gen. John
Wickham who was enraged about the move of the frontline 9th Division without the
permission of the U.S. military authorities.335 On the day after the violent shoot-outs,
Chun’s faction pressured President Choi to appoint Chun’s supporter, Gen. Lee Hui-

334 According to the new military force, led by Chun Doo-Hwan, this military operation was an
indispensable confrontation with a moderate faction within the military to investigate General Chung
Seung-Hwa. Thus, they did not agree that this was a military coup because they did not take power right
after the military confrontation. Nevertheless, this incident was defined as a military coup, the hardline
faction o f the military force tried to take power, in the court in 1994.
335 Asia Watch, Human Rights in Korea (New York: the Asia Watch Committee, 198S), 32. Gen.
Wicham protested Chun’s move because by the treaty between Korea and US during the Korean War, the
Korean military has been formally under the command of US Army Commander in Korea and thus could
not move an army unit without permission of the US military authorities.
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Sung, to the new Army Chief of Staff and Martial Law Commander. Thereafter, the
precarious balance between these two factions was broken, and Chun became the de facto
ruler of the military and even in the country. The influence of the moderate military
faction on the government as well as the military organization sharply decreased, and the
repressive power apparatuses were in the hands of hardline military officers. However,
Chun’s hardline military faction did not come to the political foreground. They publicly
claimed that the December 12 coup was an internal military matter to clean up corruption
within the military, and had no intention to intervene in the transitional process.336 In
fact, they first needed time to consolidate power within the military before they could
become directly involved in transitional politics. As hardliners took control of the
military, the transition process entered a new phase. Under the powerless civilian Choi
government, the transition game became an open process that no body could control.
Although major civilian political forces watched the movement of the military more
closely, the new military force did not give up their plan for taking power.

3. The Failure of Negotiations for Democratic Transition
After Park’s death, the ruling DRP elected Kim Jong-Pil as a new president of the
party. However, the party decided not to nominate Kim Jong-Pil as a candidate for
President to succeed Park. Although the Yushin regime collapsed, the repressive state
apparatuses were intact, and thus the party would have to take heavy risks if it promoted

336 Dong-A Daily, 18 December 1979. However, senior military officers agreed and considered
the internal coup as a mutiny by younger generation o f generals, Chun Doo-Hwan and Rob Tae-Woo. Mun
Gu-Kang, “The Military Seizure of Power in 1979-1980 in Korea: Analysis and Implications for
Democracy,” The National Community and State Development (Seoul: Korean Political Science
Association, 1989), 196-97. However, because the leadership of the military, which was the powerful force
in that period, was changed, it can be considered as a military coup.
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its candidate to succeed Park without the consent of hardliners of the ruling coalition.337
Thus, the DRP decided to concede the presidency to a technocrat controlled by the
military. The DRP chose to transform itself under the tutelage o f the power apparatus to
an autonomous mass-based party preparing for democratic competition in the posttransitional period.
On the other hand, the opposition NDP also needed time to recover from internal
factional infighting. The internal power struggle and restructuring prevented the NDP
from leading the democratic movement of civil society in the early transitional period.
The first priority of the NDP was the election of the interim president who would preside
over the transition. Kim Young-Sam, president of the NDP, tacitly agreed with the acting
President Choi with the caretaker government’s schedule in exchange for a couple of
conditions.338 This tacit agreement cleared the last obstacle for the acting president, Choi
Kyu-Ha, to be elected President in the special election held on 6 December 1979.
Thus, taking control of the transition process from the Choi government and
hardline military officers was more important for the DRP and NDP than fighting each
other on the nature and course of the transition. Because of this common interest, the
DRP and NDP reached an agreement to compromise the future schedule of the
transitional process. Yet, both the DRP and NDP had not been a center of power even
though political parties had been reinvigorated after Park’s death. When political parties
do not have the capacity to initiate the transition, the possibility of an extra-systemic

337 According to a DRP congressional representative, Kim Chang-Geun, both military leaders and
technocrats who were close associates o f Park opposed the Kim Jong-Pil’s succession to Park’s presidency.
Cho Gap-Je, Yugo 2, (Seoul: Hanghilsa, 1987), 196-97.
33SThose conditions were 1) the new president, who would be elected by the rule of Yushin
constitution, serves provisionally until the next election by the new constitution and 2) the parties and the
National Assembly, not the caretaker government, should initiate and control the process of the new
constitution drafting. Chosun Daily, 18 November 1979 and Chosun Daily, 23 November 1979.
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solution to the transition increases. As Antonio Gramsci suggests, this kind of situation
makes “conflicts between the representatives and represented reverberate out from the
terrain of parties throughout the state organism, reinforcing the relative power of the
bureaucracy of high finance, the church, and generally o f all bodies relatively
independent of the fluctuation of public opinion.”339 As a mechanism of parties for
political inter-mediation had been destroyed by Park’s dictatorship, the political
mediation fell into the hands of irresponsible extra-party actors such as the military.
Under this situation, the DRP tried to restore the leadership in the transition
politics by making a compromise with the NDP on the course of the transition. However,
the compromise solution between the two parties did not work well because of the
emergence of the new military force. After the power struggle within the military, the
Choi government, controlled by the new military force, changed its neutral position on
the transition process. On 18 January 1980, President Choi announced that the
government, not the parties, should initiate the project of constitutional revision and
dispatched a dual system of government.340 Choi’s announcement revealed the intention
of the new military force to take power.
The plan of the government differed from that of the political parties on the
timetable for the constitutional revision, the fundamental structure of the government,
and who initiates and controls the process. According to the tentative drafts of the two
parties presented on February 9, both the DRP and RDP easily agreed on the basic
provisions of the new constitution, including the governmental structure based on a

339 Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, ed., Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New
York: international Publishers, 1971), 210.
340 Dong-A Daily, 19 January 1980.
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directly elected presidential system.341 On the other hand, according to the plan of the
government, the new constitution would be a form of the dual system of the government
under which the President takes charge of national security and foreign policy and the
Prime Minister, elected by the National Assembly, manages internal affairs. In addition,
the draft of the new constitution needed a year and more to prepare, and the revision
process should be initiated and controlled by the government, not only the National
Assembly and political parties.
Besides these differences, both political parties had an another problem. The
DRP and NDP did not represent the government and opposition force. The DRP had not
been assured of support from the power apparatuses of the military hardline. Rather, the
DRP conflicted with the power apparatuses on the matter of transition. The dilemma lay
in two contradictory requirements for the party. On the one hand, the DRP needed to
expand it popular base to be a competitive political force, and on the other and, the party
should not excluded from the power apparatuses that supported authoritarianism in order
to maintain a status of ruling party. Because of the lack of representativeness and
ambiguous status, democratic civil society and the opposition party did not regard the
DRP as the viable counterpart in the negotiation for the transition to democracy. On the
other hand, the NDP was not able to control the diverse voice of the opposition
democratic force. Democratic civil society that had seen the NDP critically did not
provide unconditional supports to the opposition party. The weak representativeness of
the NDP made democratic civil society difficult to cooperate actively with the NDP in the
democratic movement
341 In addition, two parties agreed that the Constitution should be revised as soon as possible but
no later than in six months and the whole process of the revision should be initiated by the political parties
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Both ruling and opposition party also faced an internal conflict between hardliners
and moderates. Because of this internal conflict, hardliners and opportunists of the RDP
gradually defected from the party, and secretly collaborated with the new military force
to organize a new party.342 In addition, the NDP also experienced a severe internal power
struggle. The more radical dissident faction, led by Kim Dae-Jung, was displeased by the
party’s timid stance towards the power apparatuses. This radical faction first tried to take
leadership of the party through an internal power struggle, and later tried to establish a
new more intransigent opposition party when gaining control of the party became
hopeless.343 Because of this internal power struggle, the party could not concentrate on,
and lead the democratic movement of civil society. In this respect, both the RDP and
NDP were weakened by internal power struggles and mass defection, and it was
impossible for them to reach an agreement for peaceful democratic transition.

4. The Kwangju Democratic Movement
When democratic civil society began to be resurrected by Park’s death, the
hardline military officers who had taken charge of suppression during the Yushin regime
began to be afraid of their future. Thus, they had to strike preemptively to control the
political situation before civilian politicians took action. In order to do so, the new
military force needed to create a situation that only they could handle because they could
not justify any suspension of the constitutional system by the Martial Law Decree no.

which was the sole representative of the people. Dong-A Daily, 9 February 1980.
342 In early 1980, persistent rumors were spread that the new military elites and technocrats tried to
organize a new party of their own, excluding the DRP from ruling power bloc. Doing-A Daily, 24 January,
22 February, and 25 April 1980.
Chosun Daily, 24 February; 9 March, and 13 April 1980; Dong-A Daily, 3 March and 7 May
1980; Hankook Daily, 4 April 1980.
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10.344 In the meantime, political parties, especially the NDP, began to accommodate
requests from democratic civil society. For example, on May 14, the NDP submitted to
the National Assembly a resolution to lift emergency martial law with the signatures of
all members of the National Assembly in the party. The DRP also planned to show a
positive attitude toward the lifting up of martial law at the temporary meeting of the
National Assembly scheduled on May 20, because of the increasing crucial awareness of
the new military force that had prolonged its power through martial law.
After the agreement between the DRP and NDP, the new military force was more
frustrated, and looked for excuses for direct military intervention. The uprising that took
place in Kwangju provided the basis of its reign of terror as an excuse for direct
intervention. The only way for the new military force to quiet people who had hopes for
a democratic transition was through brutal suppression. Thus, Kwangju City was chosen
to be an example case of the brutal suppression.345 Although there were many
demonstrations and protests by democratic civil society in early 1980, the Kwangju
uprising from May 18 to May 27 was the first direct violent confrontation between the

344 This was a response of the hardline military force toward the eruption o f civil society. The
content o f this Martial Law Decree no. 10 was to prohibit any kind of political activities, to close every
university, and to arrest or house arrest Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Young-Sam. Chosun Daily, 20 May 1980.
145 There are many hidden stories why the new military chose Kwangju City and how the
democratic uprising was taken place in Kwangju City. Some group of people said that it was closely
related to strong regionalism of South Korea, and other group of people said that it was closely related to
deployment of the military troops at that time. However, according to interviews with related people who
were actively involved in the Kwangju democratic movement, there were major two reasons. One was that
there were relatively well-organized student organizations even under harsh suppression, and thus the
uprising, led by the student group, was possible to develop to the massive uprising. The other was closely
related to the deployment of the military after Park’s death and strong intention o f the military to take
power. That is, after Park’s death, the regime and the new military force put large scale of troops in this
area, and thus it was easier for the military to induce a uprising and suppress it. In addition, this city had
been isolated and excluded from economic development policy since the early 1960s. Thus, Kwangju
citizens had extreme relative deprivation, and this dissatisfaction led to them to support Kim Dae-Jung.
The new military regime used this anti-regime feeling for direct military intervention in the transitional
politics. Ahn Chong-Chul, interviewed by author, Kwangju, 3 September 1999.
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military and democratic civil society and became a turning point in the history of the
democratic movement in South Korea.346

1) The Outbreak of the Uprising
In early 1980, the most powerful civil society organization that could be an
obstacle in the taking of power by the military force was a student group. After the intra
military coup on December 12, the student movement changed its character from a
campus autonomization movement to the political struggle. In addition, other civil
society groups and organizations also concentrated their energies and efforts on the
political struggle for democratization. The reaction of the military controlledgovemment toward political struggles of democratic civil society was harsh suppression.
For example, the regime expanded the emergency Martial Law no. 10 to the whole
country.

547

The Martial Law Decree no. 10 made the whole country stunned and silent. The
new military force broke the silence and provoked the people to push to the streets.348 In
Kwangju, a small group of Chunnam University students protested Kim Dae-Jung’s
arrest and against suppression of students’ demonstration in front of the campus. Then,
the special troopers raided Chonnam and Chosun University, and arrested tens of students
and two professors on May 17. That morning, about 200 students of Chunnam
University demonstrated against the overnight raid. The paratroopers over-reacted to a
small group of demonstrators, indiscriminately beating and bayoneting the demonstrators,
346 Choi Jang-Jip, “Kwangju Hangjaengkwa Minjutaehyuk” (The Kwangju Uprising and
Democratic Reform), Hankook Daily, 7 May 1995.
347 Washington Post, Sunday, 18 May 1980, A1
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resulting in several deaths. In this series of incidents, ordinary citizens and other
democratic groups and organizations joined the student demonstrations, and they were
violently confronted with paratroopers. At that point, the slogans that students and
citizens shouted on their way were “lift the martial law,” “release Kim Dae-Jung,” “stop
closing schools,” “down with Chun Doo-Hwan,” and “withdraw martial law forces.”
Along with students, citizens of Kwangju City began to be agitated with shock
when students told them about the news of Kim Dae-Jung’s arrest and the suppression of
students. Citizens of Kwangju City and Chunnam province had been identifying with the
persecutions and hardships of Kim Dae-Jung because he was from their region. Kim
Dae-Jung’s arrest was interpreted as the hopeless frustration of their desires and
expectations for democracy. From that point, the public could not hide their anger and
shock at the paratroopers’ cruel suppression of student demonstrations, and formed
sympathy with students’ sacrificial struggles with the military. Moreover, they were no
longer simply to be suppressed, but armed themselves with square bars, iron pipes, and
kitchen knives to fight back against paratroopers. The so-called Kwangju incident was
escalated into the Kwangju People’s Uprising.349
Citizens who did not become involved in the demonstrations in the beginning
took to the streets as a means of self-defense as well as an expression of popular outrage
at the brutality of the troops. Under the situation, the phase of demonstrations had
already changed from defense to offense, and the public replaced the core participants
(students) of demonstrations. As a response to violent demonstrations, the paratroopers
141 Donald N. Clark, The Kwangju Uprising: Shadows over the Regime in South Korea (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1988).
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began to fire on demonstrators, killing dozens of unarmed civilians, and they isolated the
city by blocking traffic and communications in order to prevent the expansion of the
movement to other regions.350 Violent confrontations between the military and
democratic civil society escalated into mass insurrection. The rebellious citizens
demanded democratic reform including the step-down of Gen. Chun, and an apology
from the government for the brutality of the paratroopers.351 However, the martial law
authority responded to those demands with an armed invasion of Kwangju City. The
regular army 20th Division was dispatched under the permission of the U.S. military
commander, Gen. John Wickham, to put down the mass revolt and to reoccupy the city.
The Martial Law Commander announced the result of the investigation of Kim
Dae-Jung. The reason the Martial Law Commander announced the result of the
investigation so quickly was that the new military force tried to characterize the Kwangju
democratic movement as a riot controlled and supported by the North Korean
government. Thus, the Kwangju uprising came to be distorted in reports of the mass
media..352
Beginning May 23, internal conflicts in citizens’ army, democratic civil society
groups, and organizations began to take place. For example, the Student Committee for
Resolution of the Incident, which organized the previous day, agreed on many issues, but
there was a strong controversy over the collection o f weapons. One group of committee

349 Jang Eul-Byung, “Kwangju S warl Minjunghangjaengesuui Mujangtujaeng” (The Armed
Struggle in the Kwangju Democratic Movement), in Kwangju 5 warl minjunghangjaeng (The Kwangju
Democratic Movement), The Institute of Korean Modem History (Seoul: Puibit, 1990), 154-76.
350 Kim Jun, “ I980nyunui Chungsebaljunkwa Daeripgudo” (The Political Situation and
Confrontational Structure in 1980), in Kwangju Minjuhangjaeng Yongu, ed. Chung Hae-Gu (The Kwangju
Democratic Movement), (Seoul: Sagyejul, 1990).
351 Washington Post, Thursday, 22 May 1980, AI
352 Chung Sang-Yong and Yu Si-Min, Kwangju Minjung Hangjaeng (The Kwangju Democratic
Movement), 253.
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members wanted an unconditional return of weapons and another group wanted a
conditional return. Contrary to the worsening conflicts within the Resolution committee,
the city was recovering order gradually. On May 26, former members of the resolution
committee, upon hearing of a possible attack by the martial law troops, persuaded people
to escape from the Provincial Office, headquarters of the citizens’ army. At midnight on
May 27, the long distance telephone was disconnected from the control room in the
Provincial Office, and the Office was completely surrounded by tanks of the martial law
force in the early morning of May 28. The martial law forces attacked the Provincial
Office and broke the resistance line of the citizens’ army. The citizens’ army was already
out of ammunition, and it was impossible for them resist against the martial law force.
Eventually, the martial law force accomplished their suppressive mission in 4 hours, and
the democratic uprising was closed the 10 days.

2)

The Interpretation and Significance of the Kwangju Democratic Movement
There were two interpretations of the Kwangju Uprising (democratic

movement).353 According to the official investigation report of the government, the
Kwangju Uprising was a riot premeditated by Kim Dae-Jung and his followers.354
However, the official investigation was erroneous because Kim Dae-Jung and his
followers were already arrested on charge of mass agitation, a popular uprising, and the

353 There is still an argument about the official name of the Kwangju Uprising. Some group of
people called it the Kwangju Democratic Movement, and some people called it Kwangju Uprising.
354 Report on the “Investigation o f Kim Dae-Jung, July, 1980” in Korea under New Leadership:
The Fifth Republic, ed. Harold Hinton (New York: Praeger, 1983), 133-50.
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overthrow of the government before May 17. In fact, it was not Kim Dae-Jung but the
new military force that was responsible for triggering the uprising in Kwangju City.355
The second interpretation was that the Kwangju uprising was a premeditated plot
by the new military force.356 The evidences were: first, the new military force arrested
Kim Dae-Jung to provoke a popular protest before the uprising; second, the new military
force sent paratroopers, specially trained to put down armed insurrectionary revolts,
instead of riot police, to Kwangju even before the martial law Decree no. 10 was
proclaimed. According to this interpretation, the new military force tried to intimidate
the whole country by setting an example in its response to the popular protest in
Kwangju. The killing of between 200 and 2000 people was enough to intimidate any

The Kwangju uprising was a watershed in the history o f relation between the
civilians and the military. After ordinary people saw that the paratroopers killed many
unarmed civilians, they thought that the military would be willing to kill ordinary people
for political ambitions.358 Second, when the U.S. authority permitted the army unit to

353 According to leaders of the Kwangju Uprising, like Chun Yong-Ho, citizens of Kwangju City
did not have a clear plan and political objective, such as overthrow of the government when the Kwangju
uprising took place. They rebelled spontaneously and reacted to the provocation by harsh suppression of
the military force. Their slogan and demands, such as the democratic reform, the release of Kim Dae-Jung,
and the apology from the government, were developed later after the armed civilian occupied the City Hall
of Kwangju City. Chun Yong-Ho, interviewed by author, Kwangju, 4 September 1999.
According to interviews with Chun Yong-Ho, Ahn Chong-Chul, and Chung Hyun-E, many of
those who were involved in the Kwangju Uprising did not agree that the Kwangju Uprising was a result of
the plot of the new military force. They were more likely to think that the uprising was a spontaneous
event as a response of harsh suppression o f the military.
337 According to the government and civil society, death toll was estimated from 200 (government
figure) to 2000 (dissident). Asia Watch, Human Rights in Korea, 41-2.
338 Donald N. Clark, “The Kwangju Uprising: An Introduction," S. As an evidence of this, after
the Kwangju democratic movement, civil society strongly demanded Gen, Chun’s withdrawal from
governmental and military position because he was a leader of the new military force that provoked the
Kwangju uprising. In addition, after the democratic movement in Kwangju, the new military force was
more actively involved in the transitional politics, and pressured acting president Choi to resign from the
presidency. Therefore, many people believed that the harsh suppression in Kwangju City was a
demonstration of the new military force for taking power.
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quell the Kwangju uprising, anti-American sentiment sharply increased. Thus, the U.S.
became increasingly considered not as a benevolent friend but as a neo-imperialist force
trying to exploit the Korean popular masses politically and economically in alliance with
the ruling power bloc of the military, bourgeoisie, and technocrats. Third, because of the
Kwangju massacre, people believed that the political military officers’ greed for political
power was the main motive behind the intra-military coup of 1980. Since the coup, the
power was believed to be illegitimate, and thus anti-government activities were justified
as a high moral cause. In addition, the violent take-over of power by the new military
force caused the student and labor movement radicalized.359
There were several important features of the Kwangju democratic movement.
First, it reinforced the tradition of grassroots movements that have always been important
in Korean history. The Kwangju democratic movement originally resisted the emergence
of the new military force which had denied the democratic spirit of the “April 19
Revolution” through the military coup in 1961. Second, the Kwangju democratic
movement was significant because it provided a great opportunity for democratic civil
society to be seen as a driving force of the democratic movement in the 1980s. This was
made possible by the recognition of its positions by all kinds of civil society groups, such
as workers, farmers, paupers, students, religious leaders, cultural leaders, intellectuals and
opposition leaders, thanks to its efforts of self-assessment and the success of its spirit and
roles.360

359 After the military coup on 12 December, two of the labor disputes in April 1980 were marked
by widespread violence: one at the coal mining town of Sabuk City in Kangwon province, and the other at
the Tongkuk Steel Mill in Busan City. For example, in Sabuk City, miners blocked the approach of the
police andparalyzed the whole town for four days. Dong-A Daily, 2 April 1980.
In fact, those who were involved in the Kwangju democratic movement led establishments of
many democratic organizations and their political struggles with the Chun regime in the 1980s.

178

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Third, the Kwangju democratic movement became identified for the first time as a
legitimate grassroots movement by a self-depending armed struggle. Although dismissed
as a rebellion of armed mobs by the military government after the coup in 1980, it was
later recognized as the Kwangju democratic movement Fourth, it discredited the
morality of the military government under the Fifth Republic, which had followed the
oppressive dictatorship of the late president Park. Last the Kwangju democratic
movement played a key role in dismantling the repressive government of the Fifth
Republic.361 From this point of view, the Kwangju democratic movement enlightened the
nation at the front-end of the national democratization movement throughout the 1980s.

5. Restoration of Authoritarian Regime
1) The Establishment of the 5th Republic and Its Repressive Policy
When the new military force emerged as a central force without a legitimate base,
the only way to achieve its objectives was the systemic use of state terror.362 The purge
campaign of 1980 focused on depoliticizing the whole society. Thus, there could be no
competition with the new military force for state power. Right after the Kwangju
democratic movement, the new military force began to take over the formal state
apparatuses, step by step. On 31 May 1980, for example, a junta, the 25 member Special
361 Since the Kwangju Democratic Movement, in Kwangju and other major cities, various
democratic groups and organizations staged large-scale demonstrations in May of every year. For instance,
on May 18 1980, about 2,500 citizens of Kwangju City celebrated 1-year anniversary of the Kwangju
Uprising, and marched on streets. In the process of the demonstration, citizens confronted with the riot
police. They wanted to urge the regime to change policies of peasants' matters and labor problems. In
addition, on May 27, about 1,000 students gathered, and celebrated 1-year anniversary of the Kwangju
Uprising. After the celebration, they demonstrated and demanded democratization. Their slogans were
"abolition of fascist regime,” and “abolition of the Chun regime.” In the end of demonstration, Kim TaeHun fell down from a building, and died. Institute of Gladness and Hope, Amheksokui hwoibul (A Torch of
Darkness: Testimony of Democratic Movement in the 1970s and 1980s), vol. 4,523.
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Committee for National Security Measures (SCNSM) was established to reform the
political system.363 Under this situation, President Choi could not act as president
because of the influence of the new military force. After all, he resigned on August 16,
and Chun, the leader of the new military force, made himself the new president on
August 27, 1980.364
Right after Chun became president, he drafted a new Constitution, on September
29, and promulgated it on 27 October 1980.365 Although the new Constitution appeared
to be less dictatorial, it was designed to produce similar consequences. However, the
president was limited to a single seven-year term of office unlike the Yushin
Constitution. The supplementary provisions of the new Constitution called for the
dissolution of the National Assembly and all existing political parties.366 Until the
election of a new National Assembly, the new Constitution authorized the legislative
body of the Junta, the Legislative Council on National Security, to enact all laws. Since
October 28, the 81-member Legislative Council appointed by Chun had built up a legal
structure for the new authoritarian regime.
The new military authoritarian regime also launched series of suppression to
intimidate democratic civil society and the opposition party. The main targets of the
suppression were dissident workers and students, politicians, journalists, and civilian
bureaucrats. Thousands of students, workers, and dissident intellectuals were arrested
and sent to military reeducation camps, called the “Samchung Education Camps,” in the
362 Paul G. Buchanan, “The Varied Faces of Domination: State terror. Economic Policy, and
Social Repture during the Argentine Process, 1976-81 American Journal o f Political Science 3 1, no. 2
(1987): 344.
343 Harold Hinton, Korea Under New Leadership: The Fifth Republic, 131.
364 Korea Newsreview, 30 August 1980,4.
365 Dong-A Daily, 28 October 1980.
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name of cleansing society. In addition, the “Political Purification Law” was passed by
the Legislative Council to prohibit politicians’ political activities.367 This law seriously
undermined the constitutionally guaranteed citizens’ political rights. For instance, 811
politicians were banned from running for public office, supporting or opposing others
running for office, or joining any civil society organization and political party.368 After a
review of appeals, the regime trimmed the final list to 567 banned politicians on
November 24.
The purification campaign was extremely harsh on democratic civil society,
especially students and labor union leaders.369 In the case of labor unions, 106 leading
democratic unions were forcibly disbanded and 203 union leaders, including 12
presidents of industrial union federations, were purged from union activity on August
20.370 Thus, as Table 4-1 shows, the number of unions between 1979 and 1980 sharply
declined. The regime also revised the “Law on Assembly and Demonstration” to expand
its range of application. First, it defined the “demonstration site” as places where the
public freely passes to all roads and the outdoors. Second, the law provided
imprisonment for up to five years, foe those who prepare for, conspire, make propaganda
for, or incite assemblies or demonstrations that could cause social unrest. In fact, the
newly revised “Law on Assembly and Demonstration (Jipsibupf was used to prevent

366 Lee Chong-Sik, “South Korea in 1980: The Emergence of a New Authoritarian Order,” Asian
Survey 21, no. 1 (1981): 134.
367 The Political Purification Law was created by the Legislative Council of National Security
(LCNS) in November 1980.
141 Asia Watch, Human Rights in Korea (New York: The Asia Watch Comminee, 1985), 51-2.
369 CISJD, Bubgwa Minjoohwa (Law and Democratization), (Seoul: Minjungsa, 1986), 69-89.
370 Chang Myung-Kook, “Haebanghoo Hankooknodongwoondongeui baljachwuf’ (The Trail of
Korean Labor Movements since Liberation, in Hankook Nodongwoongdongron 1, (Perspectives on Korean
Labor Movements 1), eds. Kim Keum-Soo and Park Hyun-Chae (Seoul: Miraesa, 1985), 140.
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peaceful assembly and free expression of political opinion in civil society.371 The harsh
suppression was only way for the new authoritarian regime to control democratic civil
society and the opposition party.
Table 4-1
Union Membership and Number of Unions (1979-1984)
Year

Employees
Unionized
Membership
employees
(thousand)
Rate(%)
1979
1,088
16.7
6,519
1980
948
14.6
6,485
1981
12.9
6,624
853
1982
12.3
6,867
843
1983
7,184
811
11.3
1984
839
11.0
7,630
Source: FKTU, Annual Report; EPB, Social Indicators in Korea, 1985.

Number of
Unions
4,947
2,618
2,141
2,191
2,238
2,365

2) Creation of the Artificial Political Party System
The new authoritarian regime, after taking power, tried to institutionalize power
through the establishment of a new party system, a hegemonic party system like a multi
party system with a hegemonic ruling party.372 Under this system, opposition parties
were not permitted to compete with the hegenonic ruling party in antagonistic terms and
on an equal basis.373 Thus, the new military regime not only established its own
Democratic Justice Party (DJP) on 15 January 1981, but also artificially created loyal or
semi-loyal opposition parties: the DKP (Democratic Korean Party) and the KNP (Korean
National Party).
571 Asia Watch, A Stem, Steady Crackdown: Legal Process and Human Rights in South Korea,
(New York: The Asia Watch Committee, 1987).
372 For example. President Chun mentioned in a press conference that he preferred a multi-party
system to the previous two-party system because the latter had “prompted political polarization and
confrontation, effectively immobilizing politics and the National Assembly, as well as precluding a climate
conducive to compromise and cooperation.” Secretariat for the President, The 1980s Meeting a New
Challenge: Selected Speeches o f President Chun Doo Hwan,\o\. 1,(Seoul: Korea Textbook, 1981), 198.

182

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

In the process of creating semi-loyal opposition parties, members of those
opposition parties were carefully selected by state power apparatuses, such as National
Security Planning Agency.374 There were some differences between the Yushin regime
and Chun regime in the party politics. The Chun regime intended to control political
agendas through institutionalized party politics whereas the Yushin regime excluded the
institutional political arena from the decision making process. In addition, the electoral
system was slightly different from that of the Yushin era, but virtually assured a solid
working majority for the ruling party. The effect of institutional manipulation in favor of
the ruling party was clear in the National Assembly election of 1981, in which the ruling
DJP successfully elected 90 out of 92 electoral districts and 61 out of 92 seats alloted to
PR seats. Thus, the new regime created an artificial multi-party system to prevent
political challenge from opposition parties and to control them trough institutional of the
party system.375
Table 4-2
The Outcome of the National Assembly Election in 1981
DJP
DKP
Total
KNP Fringe Parties Independent
District
90
184
57
18
8
11
P.R.
61
24
7
92
Total
151
81
8
276
25
11
Votes (%)
35.6
8.8
100
21.6
10.7
13.3
Source: Kim Young-Soon, “Gonggae jugdokkecheje Chungchi yukhakgwangye
Tooyoung” (A Reflection on Political Dynamics of Open Dictatorial Regime),
Sasanggwa Chungchak 5, no. 3 (1988), 231 and Central Election Management
Committee: Korean National AssemblyMembers Election Act, Seoul 1983.
373 Giovanni Sartori, “The Typology of Party System: Proposal for Improvement,” in Mass
Politics, eds. Erik Allart and Stein Rokkan (New York: Free Press, 1970), 327-28.
374 Choi Han-Soo, Hankook Chungchiui Saedochun (The New Challenge of Korean Politics),
(Seoul: Daechungjin, 1995), 177. The military regime changed the official name of the Korean Central
Intelligence Agency to the Natioal Security Planning Agency because the former KCIA had many negative
images to the people. However, the basic characteristic and missions of the Natioal Security Planning
Agency were same as those of former KCIA.
375 Hankook Daily, 2 and 30 April, and 1 May 1991.
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6. Democratic Civil Society and Its Democratic Movement
Park’s sudden death provided a great opportunity for democratic civil society to
revitalize and struggle actively for democratization from early 1980. For example, on
May 3, several thousand students from 13 colleges gathered and protested the transitional
government Students denounced the country's military-backed government demanding
an immediate end of martial law and the removal of officials left in power after Park’s
death.376 Especially, as it became clear that political parties did not accommodate the
aspirations, energy, and pressure of the masses, democratic groups and organizations took
their demands directly to the streets by exploiting the new political space.
The first reaction to the weakening of suppression was the proliferation of
autonomous organizations in civil society. For example, student movement activists
organized autonomous representative bodies opposed to the existing student
organizations that had been moderate during the Yushin period. They also tried to
establish nationwide organizations coordinating differences among individual student
representative bodies at the college level.377 The democratic unions and labor
organizations sought to reform existing unions, such as the FKTU.378 The struggle of
democratic civil society to attain autonomy spread to all sectors of civil society.
However, this active struggle did not go smoothly because of the lack o f preparation for
taking advantage of favorable political and social situation. This internal problem

376 Washington Post, Saturday, May 3, 1980, A7.
377 According to Chun Yong-Ho, a former student movement activist, after Park’s death, many
student movement activists, expelled by the Yushin regime, returned and concentrated their efforts on
taking over the leadership of existing student organizations. There were some conflicts in strategies of the
movement between the returned students and existing leaders of student organizations. After a series of
internal struggles, the returned students came to control the student organizations. Chun Yong-Ho,
interviewed by author, Kwangju, 4 September 1999.
371 For example, workers succeeded in ousting Kim Young-Tae, who had actively collarborated
with anti-labor Yushin authorities, from the chairmanship of the FKTU. Chosun Daily, IS February 1980.
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became an excuse for direct military intervention in the transitional politics as a central
actor. After the new military force emerged, democratic civil society had to face harsh
suppression that it had not experienced before. Thus, just-vitalized democratic civil
society returned to being divided, isolated, and inconsequential, and this character had
continued until until late 1983.

1) The Jaeya Force
There was no coherent strategy for democratic struggle of the Jaeya force because
of internal splits and external suppression in this period. As an internal restriction, the
Jaeya force had difficulty in setting united strategies and establishing networks among its
various Jaeya organizations because of Park's sudden death. Although there were many
organizations within the Jaeya force, such as the Youth movement, ousted politicians,
priests, ousted professors, literary men, ousted journalists and relatives of political
prisoners under the leadership of the NCRD, each group or organization had different
strategies and ideologies for dealing with the transitional politics. Those organizations
within the Jaeya force were divided into two major groups, depending on their strategies
for the democratic struggle in the transitional period. One group was the “gradual line,”
and the other group was the “activist line.”379 Actually, there was no significant
difference between these two lines on the path to democratic transition. Both lines
suggested the same sequence of democratization; 1) the establishment of formal
democracy with civilian government, 2) the expansion of the power base of popular
forces, and 3) the realization of substantive socio-economic democratization.

379 Kim Young-Myung, Hankook Hyundai Jungchisa (The Modem Korean Political History), 345.
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The major differences between these two lines were interpretation of democracy
and strategy of achieving formal democracy. The “gradual line” had moderate members
and was composed mainly of former politicians who had been restricted in their political
activity under the Yushin regime. Because of their political and social backgrounds, the
gradual line who pursued a procedural democracy had similar strategies as the NDP
regarding the military and democratic transitions. On the military, the gradual line
agreed with the NDP to oppose the radical mobilization of the masses because it might
provoke military intervention in transition politics. The gradual line supported the
strategy of the NDP for democratic transition through the election.380
However, the gradual line of the Jaeya force differed from the NDP on the matter
of mass mobilization. Unlike the NDP that tried to avoid any kind of mass appeal, the
gradual line argued for appealing directly to the people by revealing the conspiracy of the
power establishment to extend authoritarian regime. Nevertheless, this line believed that
the popular movement could not be the alternative to a political party in taking over the
government. Thus, the popular movement should remain as a springboard to organize a
new party in the case that the existing opposition party could not play its role of
representing interests of the democratic opposition coalition. Later, supporters of the
gradual line denounced the NDP for having too optimistic view about the new political
situation, and this wasting of time since Park’s death provided time for the Yushin force

iK The "Opening through Elections” model emphasizes the role o f democratic formalism which
survives the authoritarian exacerbation. The constitutional continuity can provide the political space to
opposition forces for democratization. That is, the transition from above and the hegemonic bourgeoisie
model regard the democratic transition as a project o f specific actors. However, the “Opening through
Elections” model argues that transition is not the project but a process whose outcome is a result of the
interaction among contending actors.
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to regroup and counter-attack.381 Thus, the Jaeya force tried, in early April 1980, to
establish a new party under the leadership of Kim Dae-Jung after Kim announced that he
would not to join the NDP. However, this line of the Jaeya force consistently opposed
the massive student demonstrations on the streets in May 1980 out of their fear of
provoking military intervention.
On the other hand, the “activist line” o f the Jaeya force was composed mainly of
the leaders of grassroots popular movements that had actively struggled with the Yushin
regime, such as former student activists, progressive church leaders and radical dissident
intellectuals. This line who pursued substantive democracy relied heavily on popular
mobilization and direct pressure on the regime to negotiate at the elite level under the
leadership of a political party. Thus, in order to appeal to the people, they used street
demonstrations to reveal the danger of an authoritarian restoration by the new military
force and the remnants of the Yushin regime. For example, this line of the Jaeya force
held a rally to oppose the presidential election by the Electoral College in November 24,
but they failed to draw mass followers.382 In order to solve the problem of mass
mobilization, the Jaeya force sent the returned students to press the incumbent student
leaders on campus to change the direction of the student movement from the struggle for
“campus autonomization” to political struggle. Many student demonstrations in the
spring of 1980 were organized by this line of the Jaeya force. Although they relied on the
students’ street power, they never tried to establish a coalition with workers. This line
strongly believed that the middle class should initiate the democratic movement. Thus,

311 Lee Chong-Sik, “South Korea in 1980: The Emergence of a New Authoritarian Order,” 128;
Dong-A Daily, 25 April 1980.
3,2 Dong-A Daily, 24 November 1979.
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the Jaeya force could not be actively involved in the transitional politics because of
divisions in terms of ideologies, strategies, and organizations.
As an external restriction, the Jaeya movement was limited because martial law
was proclaimed, and thus many Jaeya leaders’ political activities were prohibited. As a
result, the Jaeya force was limited in restructuring its organizations and cooperating with
other democratic groups and organizations. In spite of these internal and external
limitations, the Jaeya force concentrated their efforts on criticizing the democratization
process that the Choi regime led. For example, the NCRD and the Catholic Justice and
Peace Committee3*3 separately issued public statements objecting to acting president
Choi’s special statement of November 10th in regard to holding a presidential election
based on the Yushin Constitution.384 In addition, on 11 January 1980, the Council of
Ousted Professors held a meeting to demand the reinstatement of arrested students and
professors, claiming that this was the quickest way to achieve democracy.385
In this period, the main goal of the Jaeya movement was to achieve liberal
democracy based heavily upon procedural terms. For example, the contents of major
anti-govemment declarations included: abolition of the President’s Emergency Measures,
release and amnesty of political prisoners, guarantee of freedoms o f the press,
publication, and assembly, normalization of the legislature, and independence of the
judiciary.386 The active Jaeya movement was closely related to the unique characteristics
of the Jaeya force, composed of socially and politically respected individuals. The

3U The Catholic Justice and Peace Committee was established on October 13, 1969. The main
goals of this organization were to contribute to realization of human dignity and social justice and to
support democratic struggle of democratic civil society during the Yushin period.
394 Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 November 1979,26.
3M Institute of Gladness and Hope, Amheksokui hwoibul (A Torch of Darkness: Testimony of
Democratic Movement in the 1970s and 1980s), vol. 4, SOI.
3,6 Kim Sun-Hyuk, The Politics o f Democratization: The Role o f Civil Society, 73.
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intensity of suppression on the Jaeya force even under martial law was weaker than that
for other democratic groups. In addition, the Jaeya force could avoid harsh suppression
because their struggle with the regime fell within the domain of domestic laws.
However, after the Choi regime expanded the Martial Law to the whole country,
the democratic movement of the Jaeya force came to face harsher suppression.387 As
with other democratic groups and organizations, the Jaeya movement sharply declined
after the Kwangju uprising. Nevertheless, the military authoritarian regime could not
completely control the Jaeya force; nor did it prevent their expression of
dissatisfaction.388 In short, despite active struggles, the Jaeya force showed many
limitations in the democratic movement because of internal division, lack of preparation,
and harsh suppression by the regime.389

2) Student Movements
The first priority of the student movement in this period was the “autonomization
of campus.”390 In order to achieve this goal, student movement activists needed

3,7
Kim Young-Myung, Hankook Hyundai Jungchisa (The Modem Korean Political History), 350.
Through the Martial Law Decree no. 10, the new military force closed the National Assembly and
universities, and prohibited any kind of political activity. In addition, leaders of the student movement and
labor movement were arrested. Especially, Kim Dae-Jung was arrested for subversion of the state.
3MKim Young Sam, a former president o f the New Democratic Party, started a hunger strike since
May 17 to dramatize the popular desire for democracy. In his statement announcing the hunger strike, Kim
demanded specific democratic reforms that include: release of all prisoners of conscience; restoration o f the
civil rights of those who have been deprived o f them for political reasons; guarantee of freedom of
expression; and rescinding of all antidemocratic laws. In addition, Kim also strongly criticized the U.S.
support on the Chun regime. The Hew York Times, 9 June Thursday 1983.
>n For example, the police arrested and house arrested 145 Jaeya and religious leaders right before
President Reagan visited Korea. Institute of Gladness and Hope, Amheksokui hwoibul (A Torch of
Darkness: Testimony of Democratic Movement in the 1970s and 1980s), vol. 4 ,.
390 According to Chun Yong-Ho, after Park’s death, student movement activists who were
expelled by the Yushin regime believed that guarantee of the absolute autonomy in campus was a necessary
to struggle effectively with the uncertain political situation. Thus, they struggled for the “autonomization
of campus.” In addition, they believed current student organizations were too weak and moderate to deal
with the uncertain political situation, and the incumbent leadership should be replaced with those student
movement activists, who had more radical and aggressive ideologies and strategies. In the process of
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independent organizations and united strategies and ideologies. The so-called “campus
autonomization” movement demanded the restoration of an autonomous student
representative body, an independent campus press, the restoration of autonomous student
activity circles, and the restoration of an independent faculty, and expelling professors
and college managers who had collaborated with the Yushin regime.391 However, it was
not easy for them to attain autonomization because of internal divisions and a repressive
policy. For example, there were serious conflicts about strategies and ideologies between
returned student movement activists and incumbent student leaders.392 When student
activists expelled by the Yushin regime returned to campus, they denounced incumbent
student leaders because they thought the incumbents did not try to develop the student
movement into a coalition with other groups and organizations of civil society.
The incumbent student leaders criticized returning students as being adventurers
without knowledge of the student movement. In addition, incumbent student leaders
argued that the student movement first needed to accumulate the power base to struggle
effectively with huge state institutions, such as the military. Thus, they insisted that the
student movement should focus not just on raising students’ political consciousness but
also on the struggle for campus autonomy. The incumbent students insisted that students
go into the streets only when the power of the student movement becomes equal to that of
the military.

replacing leaders of the student movement, a serious conflict between these two groups took place. Chun
Yong-Ho, interviewed by author, Kwangju, 4 September 1999.
191 Kim Dong-Young, “80nyundaeui Hankook Chungchieui Sanghanggwa Koojo” (The Political
Situation and Structure in Korea of the 1980s), in 80nyundae Hankooksahoe: Jaengjumgwa Chunmang
(The Korean Society in the 1980s: issues and prospects), eds. Kim Chung-Suk et al. (Seoul: Gongdongche,
1986), 49.
392 Ilsongjung, “ 10.26 ihu jungsedaeeunge kwanhan nonjaeng” (The Dispute about Political
Situation after 10.26), Haksaengundongnonjaengsa /, (The Dispute History of Student Movements),
(Seoul: Ilsongjung, 1990), 14-20.
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On the contrary, the returned student group argued that students should struggle
with the military-controlled regime immediately because they considered that the intra
military coup of December 12 to be the first step in the new military force’s taking
power. According to them, it was too late to wait for accumulation of a power base. By
the time they accumulated power, the authoritarian regime backed by the new military
force would have already taken the power. Thus, returned student activists asserted that
the student movement must focus on political struggle with the regime through organized
student demonstrations and mass rallies. In April 1980, after an intense internal power
struggle, the returned student group took over the leadership of the student movement and
led the student movement. In spite of this different strategy, there were many things both
groups shared in common. For example, both groups underestimated the workers’ role in
the democratic struggle and thus did not try to establish a coalition with workers.
Another student group advocated Hyunjangron (go to the workplace), and paid
close attention to the potential of the labor movement in the democratic movement.
According to this view, democratization could be possible only when the popular masses
were organized politically as well as economically. Thus, they argued that students
themselves should not initiate a democratic struggle with the authoritarian force but had
to wait until the popular masses gained the ability to lead the democratic struggle. They
asserted that struggle with the authoritarian regime without the accumulation of power
would naturally lead to a disastrous political defeat.
Although this third student group was the most radical, they did not get actively
involved in the democratic movement because of their ideological narrowness. Namely,
their strategy of waiting until the working mass gained political consciousness tied their
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hands. Later, this group was criticized for having a kind of populism that idolized and
mystified the popular masses and also for its moralist tendencies.393 In fact, they opposed
going to the streets and instead went to work places to raise workers’ political
consciousness. Thus, they did not influence the transition process because they stayed in
work places to educate workers when the transitional process began. Because of this
diversity and conflict of strategies and ideologies, students groups had to spend their time
for fighting each other rather than the democratic struggle with the regime. In spite of
these ideological and strategic conflicts and suppression however, student organizations
were gradually revitalized and came to lead the democratic movement in the early
transitional period.
With the emergence of the new military force, the direction of the student
movement dramatically changed. Student movement activists came to concentrate on a
political struggle rather than campus autonomization. Characterizing the Choi regime as
a mere extension of the Yushin dictatorship, student groups asked the government to lift
the martial law immediately, to sweep out the remnants of the Yushin regime, and to
accelerate the process of democratic transition. After a short period of early 1980,
students’ street demonstrations resumed in April. Students from most of the nation’s
colleges and universities gathered at Seoul National University and Korea University on
May 2 and waged demonstrations, calling for the removal of Chun Doo-Hwan from all
public posts.394 In addition, the student association of Jungang University demanded 1)
abolition of emergence martial law, 2) Chun Doo-Hwan, Choi Kyu-ha, and Shin Hyun191 Lee Jong-Oh, “80nyundae Nodongwoondongroneui Jungaewajungeui Ihaereul Wuihayu” (For
the Understanding of the Development o f Labor Movement Strategies in the 80s), in Hankook
Nodongwoondongeui Inyum (The Idea o f Korean Labor Movement), ed. Korean Christian Industrial
Development Institute (Seoul: Jungamsa, 1988), 230.
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Hwak's removal from their official positions, 3) politicians' self-examination 4) release of
political prisoners, and S) urging professors at their university to express their opinion on
the current political situation.395 Student demonstrations culminated on May IS when
70,000 to 100,000 students from 35 universities demonstrated in the heart of Seoul.396
However, student movement activists faced a dilemma. Even though they admitted the
necessity of active struggle with the regime, they were worried about possible military
intervention. Thus, they eventually decided to call off further demonstrations because
they might provide an excuse for direct military intervention in transitional politics.397
The peak of the student movement in 1980 was the Kwangju uprising on May 17
1980. Students played a major role in organizing and leading mass demonstrations.398
As a result, the student group was a main target of suppression, and thus the student
movement lost its leadership and organizations after the Kwangju uprising.399 Until the
decompression policy in late 1983, as Table 4-3 shows, the student movement had to be
quiet even though there were some small-scale demonstrations and aggressive activities
against the Chun regime and the U.S. government For example, on 18 March 1982, a
youth and student group violently occupied the Culture Center of the United States in
Busan and protested the U.S. role in suppressing the Kwangju uprising.400 This incident

394 Washington Post, Friday, 2 May 1980, A32
395 Washington Post, Saturday, 3 May 1980, A7
396 The Dong-A Daily, 16 May 1980.
397 Chosun Daily. 17 May 1980.
39> However, according to student leader (Chun Yong-Ho) of the Kwangju democratic movement,
the Kwangju Uprising was accidentally occurred, and it was a self-defensive activity against the
suppression of the military. In addition, student organizations were established by students, teachers of the
“DeulBul Night School,” and it was a place where provided ideological education to workers and other
students. Chun Yort-Ho, interviewed by author, Kwangju, 9 September 1999.
399 On June 12, South Korea's universities were warned that no student activism would be tolerated
when classes are reopened. In a move to prevent a revival of student protests, the new education minister
declared that all "collective actions" by students would be banned. Washington Post, Thursday, 12 June
1980, A21.
400 The Dong-A Daily, 19 March 1982; The New York Tunes, 28 March 1982.
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occurred in response to the barbaric massacre of the Kwangju uprising in 1980, during
the General Chun’s reign. However, most student movement activists could not leave
their campuses, so they had to be satisfied with small scale and passive activities such as
distributing handbills and shouting slogans.401
Table 4-3
Number of Student Demonstrations, Student Demonstrators, and Expelled Students
Due to the Demonstration (1979-1983)
Year
Demonstrations
Demonstrators
Expelled Students
1979
17
25,970
46
1980
283
289,855
538
1981
43
15,666
300
61
1982
33,145
198
1983
235
Source: Ministry of Education, Transformation and Characteristics o f Korean Student
Demonstration, Seoul: Minister of Education, 1984.
In this suppression period, student movement activists engaged in rigorous selfcriticism, reflected on the failure of the student movement, and established future
strategies for democratization. Debate on their future direction centered on the proper
relationship between the student movement and ordinary students and on the possibility
of a coalition with other democratic groups and organizations. The major debate on
strategies and ideologies was “Moorim vs. Hakrim.” In December 1980-1981, this was
the first debate among student activists on establishing proper strategies for the student

401 1980: I) returning the military to the front
2) to dissolve emergency martial law
3) to explain unclear political situation
1981-1983: I) thorough examination of the Kwangju Democratic Movement
2) to overthrow military dictatorial regime
3) to stop suppression on students
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movement against the new authoritarian regime.402 Their different perspectives within
the student movement caused internal conflict and wasting time and resources.
The Moorim group emphasized the protracted strengthening of movement
organizations and thus argued that reckless demonstrations would bring about harsh
suppression and the destruction of student organizations. According to them, the only
force that had the capacity to struggle with the regime was a student group, not the
working class. However, this student group was completely collapsed by harsh
suppression in December 1980. On the other hand, the Hakrim group stressed continuous
political struggle with the authoritarian regime. They felt that the Moorim group
concentrated too much on organizational survival. After the Moorim group was
collapsed in December 1980, the Hakrim group led student movements until the summer
of 1981,403 The Hakrim group thought the major reason for the failure of the democratic
movement of 1980 was the weakness of the advance guard, such as the Federaton of
National Democratic Students.
Table 4-4
Comparisons of the Moorim and Hakrim Group of Students

Status in Student Movement
Strategy for Struggle

Organizational Orientation

Moorim
Leader of Student
Movements
Sublation of Struggle
Preparation in Working
Places
Reinforcement of Mass
Organizations

Hakrim
Guidance o f Student
Movements
Guidance of Struggles
Direct Confrontation
Establishment o f Advance
Guidance Organizations

402 Kang Shin Chul, 80nyundae Hankuksahwoiwa Haksaengundong, (Korean Society and Student
Movements in the 1980s), (Seoul: Hyungsungsa, 1988), 38-40.
403 According to Hong Seung-Sang, a former police officer, the police arrested leaders of this
Moorim group that had led the student movement after Park’s death, and its organizations were collapsed in
December 1980. After the Moorim group was collapsed, the Hakrim group of students had led the student
movement until summer of 1981. Hong Seung-Sang, interviewed by author, Seoul, 19 August 1999.
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Through this internal conflict, several changes in the student movement took
place. First was a change in the goal. Until early May 1980, student movement activists
concentrated on autonomization of student organizations in campuses. In addition,
student organizations tried to establish a foundation for real democracy by completely
eliminating the remaining Yushin authoritarianism.404 However, the main goal of the
student movement changed dramatically after the intra-military coup and the Kwangju
democratic movement. That is, student organizations agreed to stop the struggle for
liberal democracy, and focused on realizing Minjung (masses) revolution. In this respect,
the student movement of this period began to have anti-democratic character. That is, the
ultimate goal of the student movement began to change from liberal democratic to
popular democracy. However, this radical groups of students was sill marginalized in
this period.
Second, students’ attitude toward the United States radically changed after the
Kwangju uprising. Although anti-Americanism had existed since the Yushin regime, it
was not strong and did not spread to the whole society. However, strong antiAmericanism spread widely among student activists because of the approval of using the
military to suppress the Kwangju uprising. Furthermore, President Reagan reaffirmed
that the U.S. government strongly supported the Chun regime when Chun visited the
United States in February 1981. As a consequence, students’ anti-Americanism
manifested itself in concrete actions which were often violent. For example, student
movement activists set fire to the United States Cultural Center in Kwangju and Busan on

404 Seoul National University Students, “Sikuk Seoneumun” (Declaration on the Situation), May 2,
1980, in 80nymdae Hankuksahwoiwa Haksaengundong (Korean Society and Student Movements in the
1980s), ed. Han Young (Seoul: Chungnyunsa, 1989), 29.
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9 December 1980 and March 1982 respectively.405 In addition, on 22 April 1982,
students at Kangwon University chanted “Yankee Go Home” and burned the American
Flag.
Along with this change of characteristics, the student group strongly influenced
the democratic movement and continued to struggle with the authoritarian regime under
suppression. In addition, the student movement contributed to changing public
perception of the authoritarian regime. Ordinary people who had witnessed the student
movement for a long time began to grow critical of the Chun regime. In this regard,
despite the fact that the student movement failed in its use o f the strategy of the “war of
movement” in the democratic movement, the tactic of the “war of position” slowly began
to work.406 In addition, the student movement stimulated and actively supported
economic and political struggles of other democratic groups and organizations. For
example, on 11 October 1982, students of Seoul National University distributed antigovernment handbills and supported the statement of the Wonpung Apparel union about
suppression process.407
Nevertheless, during this period, the fundamental problem of an internal division
within the student group could not be solved. Moreover, under the repressive policy, the
student movement deteriorated as did other democratic groups. In spite of these internal
and external difficulties, student movement activists continuously struggled with the
Chun regime even when the scale of the movement was relatively small and the means of
the struggle were passive, such as demonstrations on campus and distribution of anti405 Dong-A Daily, 19 March 1982.
406 In fact, ordinary citizens had a very critical perception o f student demonstrations because it was
very violent and there were many pro-Communist slogans in demonstration. However, this critical
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government handbills. For example, student movement activists established the Youth
Council for Democracy Movement (YCDM) on 30 September 1983. The YCDM tries to
facilitate discussion and debates on various theories of democratization, and contributed
to the development o f strategies for the influential democratic movement It emphasized
establishment of solidarity among conscious intellectuals, religious organizations,
politicians, workers, and peasants, and struggled for democratization and national
unification. The YCDM also emphasized following things for influential struggles; 1)
restoration of the struggle potential; 2) collection of youth energies; 3) formation of
concrete ties with other movement forces, such as labor, peasant, and student movements;
4) support for minjung (mass) movements as they seek solutions to their problems; and 5)
investigations and research for the purpose of guiding the direction of movements. In
addition, this organization published the "Path to Democratization” as a means of
expression."408 In this respect, the student movement in this period was active even
under harsh suppression, but it could not be influential because of internal conflicts and
suppression. In addition, anti-democratic elements within the student movement began to
take place from this period.

3) Labor Movements
Like other democratic groups and organizations, labor movement activists at first
tried to establish autonomous unions and replaced leaders of pre-existing unions.409

perception began to change slowly. Sometimes, citizens protected students who chased by the policy in the
process of demonstration. In addition, more people began to have sympathy for the student movement
407 Dong-A Daily, 11 October 1982.
401 Dong-A Daily, 3 October 1983.
409 For example, while in December 1979, workers in Hyundai Shipyard foiled to organize
autonomous unions, workers succeeded in organizing autonomous unions in several companies of the Kuro
Industrial Estate. Since March 1980, the reformed FKTU and industry level union federations helped
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Militant union leaders, jailed by the Yushin authority and later returned to work places,
tried to organize new unions and to mobilize workers to attain autonomy.410 Until the
expansion of the Martial Law to the whole country, about 80,000 new workers joined
unions including the nurse assistants’ union and private high school teachers’ union.411
Labor movement activists also began to express their dissatisfaction and advocate an
increase in wages, improvement of working environment, democratization of labor
unions, and gaining autonomy from the state.412
However, their struggle had been unorganized and isolated from other democratic
groups, organizations, and the public because of the relatively short history of the labor
movement. Thus, the labor movement of the early 1980s quickly proved inconsequential
even though some protests were successful in increasing wages and improving working
conditions. The sporadic and spontaneous labor movement was easily broken down by
suppression. Thus, labor movement activists realized that satisfaction of their demands
was contingent on the democratization of the political system. Based on this realization,
the labor movement slowly came to have a political character.
After the establishment of the 5* Republic, labor unions and organizations, like
other democratic groups and organizations, were harshly suppressed. The new

actively the workers’ efforts to organize new autonomous unions in three Japanese companies in Masan
Free Export Zone, Doosan Glass in Changwon Industrial Estate, and seven companies in Woolsan
Industrial Estate. Even without the help of union federations, workers themselves succeeded in organizing
15 new unions in fCyungnam Province, 9 in Iri Industrial Estate, and 4 in Taegu area.
410 According to Hong Seung-Sang, students who had radical ideologies and expelled by the
Yushin regime began to penetrate actively in work places, and establish labor organizations. Especially,
those who were former student movement activists had Marxist and Leninist ideologies, and led the labor
movement to revolution. Hong Seung-Sang, interviewed by author, Seoul, 19 August 1999.
411 Chang Myung-Kook, “Haebanghoo Hankooknodongwoondongeui Baljachwui” (The Trail of
Korean Labor Movements since Liberation, on Kim Keum-Soo and Park Hyun-Chae et al., Hankook
Nodongwoongdortg I (Perspectives on Korean Labor Movement I), 136-39.
412 Urn Joo-Ong, “Byunhyukjuk Nodongundongui Daejunghwawa gyegeupjuk jipyungui
hwakdae” (The Popularization of Labor Movements and Expansion of Class Struggle), in 7%e History o f
Korean Social Movement, ed. Cho Yen-Hee (Seoul: Jooksan, 1990), 145-49.
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authoritarian regime considered the labor movement as a serious obstacle to national
security and to their staying in power.413 In addition, the new regime worried that the
labor movement could delay economic recovery, so it strongly pursued a repressive
policy to stablize the economic sector. For instance, the regime arrested many leaders of
democratic unions, dissolved active and uncooperative unions, and replaced them with
cooperative and captive ones 414 Because the regime was particularly anxious about the
possibility of a coalition being established between students and workers, the suppression
focused on disconnecting the relationship between workers and students.
Given government obstruction of the labor movement, other democratic groups
and organizations were reluctant to establish a coalition with workers and even tried to
hinder workers’ political struggle. For example, the NDP tried to persuade labor
movement activists not to radicalize their movement, even on economic issues. The
Jaeya force also consistently insisted that the democratic movement should be based on
mobilizing the politically awakened middle class and not on the working class. Even
students, the most radical sector in the democratic movement, did not make sincere
efforts to establish a coalition with workers. Because of their exclusion from other
democratic groups, especially from the Jaeya force, the labor movement found it difficult
to get involved in the democratic movement during the early 1980s.
The more serious limitation was the issue of the proper objectives of the labor
movement. Union leaders and organizations concentrated their efforts on economic

413 According to Hong Seung-Sang, the regime dealt with the labor movement with ideologies of
national security and anti-communism. Thus, the violent labor movement was considered as an antigovernment and pro-Communist movement Based on this perception of the regime toward the labor
movement the regime harshly suppressed the labor movement. Hong Seung-Sang, interviewed by author,
Seoul, 19 August 1999.
414 Yun Song-Chun, “Hankook Nodongge ottoke Dailajutna” (How the Labor Sector Changes in
Korea), Shindong-A, (June 1981): 192-201.
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issues after the collapse of the Yushin regime. Because workers had been excluded from
the benefits of successful economic development since the early 1970s, their first priority
was economic compensation for the previous suppression on workers. As a result, the
number of labor disputes over economic interests sharply increased. For example, as
Table 4-5 shows, the number of labor disputes increased dramatically from 102 cases in
1978 and 105 cases in 1979 to 848 cases in 1980. .
Table 4-5
Number of Labor Disputes, Labor Unions, Union Members, and Unionization Rates
(1975-1983)
Year

Union Members Org. Rate (%)*
Number of
Unions
(thousand)
1975
3,521
133
750
18.8
1976
no
3,863
846
19.3
1977
96
4,046
955
20.1
4,304
1978
102
20.4
955
1979
4,392
105
1,088
20.2
1980
2,618
17.4
206
948
1981
2,141
186
967
16.7
2,194
1982
88
15.9
975
2,238
1983
15.4
98
1,010
* Organisation rate: union members as proportion of total number of employed workers
minus public employees and teachers [total number of union members/(total employed
workers-total number of public employees and teacher)].
Source: Nodong Kyungje Yongam (Yearly Labor Review), (Seoul: Korea Employers
Federation), 1985, 1996, and 1997.
Disputes

By the means of collective action, autonomous democratic unions achieved a
remarkable success in raising wages and improving working conditions. For example,
the Chunggye garment union achieved a 34% wage increase, 150% bonus increase, and
severance payment in the workplace for those who employed more than 10 workers. As
Table 4-6 shows, the labor struggle, however, was achieved mostly through wildcat
strikes that led to enormous mass violence. A typical case was the Sabuk miners’ strikes.

201

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Twenty five hundred miners, demanding a wage increase and the resignation of Oyong
union leaders, seized the Sabuk mine town, and fought with the riot police for 4 days.415
Although workers succeeded in securing a 30% wage increase and the resignation of
corrupt union leaders, these achievements did not represent an improvement of workers’
future relations of coping with the management
Table 4-6
Number of Labor Disputes and Their Patterns (1979-1983)
Year
Total Refusal to Work Sit-in Strikes Demonstration The Other
1979
105
60
2
43
1980
206
76
5
100
25
1981
186
88
32
40
26
1982
88
67
3
16
2
1983
98
62
27
6
3
Source: “Adapted from Korea Employee’s Federation,” Nodonggyungje Yongam 1984
(Yearbook of Labor Economy, 1984), 61
Because of the lack of labor mobilization and cooperation with other democratic
groups, most labor mobilizations, such as the wave o f strikes and street demonstrations,
were organized by workers at the isolated shop floor level, and these mobilizations were
not acted upon for any strategic political goal. Moreover, most workers’ protests
occurred in the labor-intensive manufacturing sector. The strategic sector of the HCI
industries was unaffected by the wave of the labor movement during the transition period.
As a result, labor mobilization could neither disrupt nor paralyze the national economy.

413 Chang Myung-Kook, “Haebanghoo Hankook nodongwoongdongeui baljachwui” (The Trail of
Korean Labor Movement after the Independence), in Hankook Nodong Undongron (.(Perspective on
Korean Labor Movements I), eds. Kim Keum-Soo and Park Hyun-Chae, 136-39; Asia Watch Committee,
Human Rights in Korea, (New York: and Washington D. C.: Asia Watch Committee, 1987), 188-190. This
strike began as a protest against their corruptive union chief who had privately agreed with management on
a 20% wage increase, ignoring the guidline of national unions for 42.8% increase. In the beginning, the
strike was not violent However, the sit-in strike turned into a violent confrontation when a scared
intelligence detective rammed into three miners blocking his exit while trying to escape from the angered
crowed. This confrontation produced 70 casualties, and 28 workers were arrested.
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Rather, the heightened labor mobilization provided hardliners within the authoritarian
regime with a crucial weapon to provoke middle class backlashes against the turbulent
transitional politics at the time of serious economic crisis. The business sector labeled
“labor movement” as synonymous with “instability” or “chaos.”
With the respect to the democratic transition, the issue was not whether there
existed a strong or a weak labor mobilization, but whether or not there existed a
strategically controlled labor mobilization. Although strong labor mobilizations erupted
in the spring of 1980, ii was not controlled by political parties, political leaders, or
national labor organizations. Most labor movements arose as a sporadic and spontaneous
outburst of workers' discontent not possible during the Yushin era. When the intense
working class mobilization distance itself from a political strategy of democratic
transition, the working class could not become a political resource for the democratic
movement, and thus it could not greatly contribute to the democratic movement.
In this respect, the explosion of the labor movement was closely related to the
political and economic situation after Park’s death. In the political perspective, the
collapse of the Yushin regime naturally induced an active labor movement Under the
transitional regime, labor pressures for increasing wages, improving the working
condition and establishing new unions became much less risky than before. Thus, labor
movement activists attempted to reestablish or build new autonomous labor unions to
struggle for economic issues. From an economic perspective, Korea had suffered
severely since the late 1970s due to problems in the domestic economic structure, the
second oil shock, and depression of the international market. This economic difficulty
made workers dissatisfied with their economically unstable lives and with the economic
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policies of the regime. Due to these changed political and economic situations, the
number of labor disputes in 1980 dramatically increased over previous years.
After the new military force took power, the regime resorted to both legal
restrictions and physical violence to suppress the labor movement and its leaders.416 For
example, the new government passed the “Guidelines for Labor Union Activity Under
Martial Law” on 1 July 1980, “Guidelines for Purification of Labor Unions” on 21
August 1980, and the “Prohibition o f Labor Activities by Purged Labor Union Cadres”
on 4 November 1980. The new regime revised labor laws to control and isolate the
working class from other civil society groups and organizations as parts of their strategy
to weaken the labor movement. Furthermore, those revised labor-related laws made it
harder to create autonomous labor unions and organizations.
Another strategy to suppress the labor movement was to expel union leaders
through purification measures and violent union-busting. For example, the regime
removed 12 leaders of the Federation of Korean Labor Unions and industrial unions on
20 August 1980. As the second purge of labor, 191 democratic union leaders were
ousted and 106 local chapters were illegally dissolved on September 20. The regime sent
those leaders of labor unions to the barracks of the “Samchung Education Camps” and
brutalized them by subjecting them to insults and beatings and otherwise being treated

416 As Launius pointed out, Chun and his followers were clearly aware o f the role that the militant
activism of labor had played in endangering the political crises of 1979-1980. Accordingly, the new
government was determined to take a more repressive stance on labor than the Yushin regime. Michael
Launius, “The State and Industrial Labor. Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Korea’s Fifth
Republic,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1990).
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like dogs.417 Through the use o f distorted labor laws, the regime purged leaders of
democratic labor unions, dissoved unions and replaced them with pliant unions.
For instance, the Chungkye Textile Union, which had played a leading role in the labor
movement since the Chun Tae-Il’s immolation in 1970, was forcibly dissolved by the
regime in January 1981 and replaced by a compliant union on March 1981.41* As a
consequence, the number of union members and the rate of union density continuously
decreased until the regime implemented a decompression policy in late 1983.
In spite of these limitations, however, the workers’ realization of their potential in
the democratic movement came to influence the future democratic movement in the mid1980s.419 In addition, the change of the labor movement’s character in this repressive
period was important for the future democratization movement Moreover, workers
began to be considered as an important democratic group of civil society on equal footing
with the Jaeya force.

4) Religious Communities
After the Yushin regime collapsed, the democratic movement of religious
communities began to appear in three directions. First under the transitional
government religious communities supervised the transitional process and presented a
417 Kim Jin Ok, “80nyeondae nodong undongeui cheongae” (The Development of the Labor
Movement in the 1980s) in Nodong Hyunsilkwa Nodong UndongfThe Current Labor Situation and the
Labor Movement), no. 2, in a series called Hyunjang (On the Scene), (Seoul: Dolbegae, I98S), 306.
4I* Institute of Gladness and Hope, Amheksokui hwoibul (A Torch o f Darkness: Testimony of
Democratic Movement in the 1970s and 1980s), vol. 4,518.
419 However, even though the workers' political struggle after the Kwangju Democratic Movement
began to be considered significantly by other democratic civil society groups and organizations, the
political struggle was not influential, and did not threaten the regime. Because o f the state suppression not
only on the labor movement activists but also on other democratic groups, it was difficult for them to
cooperate with other democratic civil society groups and organizations in workers’ political struggle.
Under the situation, the workers’ democratic movement could not be influential and threat to the
authoritarian regime.
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direction for political reform. For example, the National Catholic Priest’s Corps for the
Realization of Justice (NCPCRJ) sent a letter to the Chairman of the Special Committee
of Revision of Constitution on 16 January 1980. In this letter, the church demanded
freedom of press, withdrawal of the Emergency Martial Law, release and instatement of
political prisoners, guarantee of the basic three labor laws, and exclusion from the
transition process of people involved in the Yushin regime.420 Moreover, the religious
communities asserted that the will of the national unification should be expressed in the
new constitution and emphasized the restoration of liberal democracy and the exercise of
distributive justice.421 In fact, the religious communities were critical of the transitional
government from the beginning. For example, the NCPCRJ criticized the Choi
transitional government for concentrating on crisis management of the political system
rather than on transition to democracy. However, the capacity of the religious
communities to observe and criticize was limited. They did not understand the
significant role of the military in the transitional politics. As a result, the religious
communities failed to respond appropriately to the changed political environment after
the collapse of the Yushin regime.
Second, Catholic and Protestant organizations focused their efforts on the release
and instatement of political prisoners and other individuals who were suppressed by the
Yushin regime. For example, the NCPCRJ and Protestant church leaders strongly urged

420 Institute of Gladness and Hope, Amheuksokui hwoibul (A Torch of Darkness: Testimony of
Democratic Movement in the 1970s and 1980s), vol. 4,76*78.
421 Catholic Seoul Parish, Seoul Jubo (Seoul Weekly Newsletter), no. 96. In addition, on 3 May
1980, Kang Won-Yong who was a Chairman of the Council of Protestant Church publicly stated S
demands. Those demands were 1) every power should be checked by people, 2) every political prisoner
should be released and instated, 3) punishment of corrupt companies, 4) need to relax of intention between
South and North Korea, and S) revolution should be accomplished by peaceful democratic ways. Institute
of Gladness and Hope, Amheksokui hwoibul (A Torch of Darkness: Testimony o f Democratic Movement in
the 1970s and 1980s), vol. 4, 183.
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newspaper companies, such as Dong-A and Chosun Daily, to reinstate expelled
journalists.422 In addition, the NCPCRJ emphasized that freedom of the press was a
necessary condition of democratization, and therefore demanded the restoration of
freedom of the press. Whenever the religious communities expressed its demands to
regime, the release and reinstatement of political prisoners was always included.423
The third direction of their democratic movement was to protect and represent
weak democratic groups and organizations of civil society. One of those organizations
was the Catholic Peasant Association (KCFM, Kanong). The KCFM, established in
March 1972, struggled to improve peasants' conditions, overcome social contradiction,
and support urban and rural community. It also tried to organize grassroots movements
among farmers and bring up problems of social injustice related to peasants. The Council
of Social Mission of Korea and the Korea Catholic Labor Youth Association424 also
focused their efforts on supporting the labor movement. Although both organizations
focused on violation of human rights and problems of economic development policy by
the authoritarian regime, they continued to play a role of popular advocate through
expressing apprehension that they were considered as socialists.
However, the religious communities made a significant mistake in defining Park's
assassination

on 26 October 26 1979. The religious communities considered Kim Jae-

Kyu, the assassin, as a leader of the democratic movement. For example, on 5 February
422 Dong-A Daily, 29 February 1980.
423 For example, on 20 February 1981, the NCC Committee of Human Rights suggested to
President Chun to release arrested citizens and students who were arrested during the Kwangju uprising in
1980. On May 1981, about 800 Presbyterian ministers held a prayer meeting and demanded the release of
168 students and the reinstatement of 83 professors ousted from their jobs for political reasons. Far
Eastern Economic Review, 27 November 1981,30.
424 The Korea Catholic Labor Youth Association (Hankook Catholic Nodong Chungnyunhwoi),
established by Catholic Youth workers in 1958, concentrated its efforts on supporting the labor movement
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1980, the NCPCRJ evaluated that the Oct. 26 incident contributed to restoring human
dignity, and Kim’s action was the most effective and efficient way to restore
democracy.425 Moreover, the Catholic and Protestant church organizations declared that
they would try to save Kim’s life.426 The church naively relied upon Kim Jae-Kyu’s
statement and thereby ignored the serious conflicts and tensions within the ruling
coalition in dealing with the political and economic crisis. Because o f this lack of
capacity to observe and analyze the new political situation after Park’s death, the
religious communities could not anticipate the emergence of the new military force and
of internal conflicts within the democratic opposition force. Thus, religious communities
did not present appropriate responses based on objective judgements o f the political and
social situation that resulted from the collapse of the Yushin regime. In addition, the
religious communities were too much optimistic about the transitional process, and their
efforts were conducted by individual organizations within the communities, failing to
build coalitions with other democratic groups and organizations.
Particularly, the limitation of the religious communities in the democratic
movement appeared well in the Kwangju democratic movement During the Kwangju
democratic movement the participation of the religious communities was limited to the
local level and thus cooperation with other democratic groups and organizations of civil

and establishment of labor unions and organizations. However, there were limitations in its activities
because of its top-down structure.
425 Park Jae-Jung, “Kookga, Siminsahoeui Catholickyohoeui gwangye” (The Relationship among
the State, Civil Society, and the Catholic Church), Korean Political Science Review 29, no. 2 (1995): 3123.
426 For example, the NCPCRJ sent a petition lener for Kim Jae-Kyu’s clemency to the commander
of the martial law on 5 February 1980. Institute o f Gladness and Hope, Amheksokui hwoibul (A Torch of
Darkness: Testimony of Democratic Movement in the 1970s and 1980s), vol. 4,502.
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society could not be expected.427 For example, only Catholic and Protestant clergy and a
few religious organizations that were in the Kwangju area could participate in the
democratic movement because of the blockade by the military. Besides harsh
suppression, the divided character of the religious communities also unfavorably
influenced their democratic movement. Because of the internal split between church
leaders and grassroots movement activists within the religious communities, Churches
could not intensify their influence on the transitional process.
For example, on May 24, Archbishop Yun Gong-Hee stated that Kwangju citizens
sacrificed for the sake of democratization, and he called the Kwangju democratic
movement a misfortune.428 Later, Cardinal Kim Soo-Hwan also publicly stated that the
Kwangju democratic movement was a very sad incident and that it should be solved
peacefully by people’s reconciliation with each other. When a group of Korean bishops
visited the Vatican in December 1980, Pope John Paul II emphasized unification of the
church and suggested forgiving and reconciling with the military force. On the other
hand, the NCPCRJ discussed the facts about the Kwangju democratic movement and
demanded that leaders of the Catholic Church should insist that 1) the regime give the
dead bodies of those killed in Kwangju City back to their families, 2) injured people be
treated in hospitals outside Kwangju city, and 3) the regime release people who were
arrested during the Kwangju democratic movement.429 The passive reaction of the
church leaders and the internal split within the religious communities provided a limited
427 When the Kwangju uprising occurred, the military completely blockaded the Kwangju area,
and isolated the uprising from the public. In this situation, the religious leaders and organizations of other
areas could not enter the Kwangju area, and furthermore they could not help the democratic civil society
that struggled with the military.
Institute of Gladness and Hope, Amheksokui hwoibul (A Torch o f Darkness: Testimony of
Democratic Movement in the 1970s and 1980s), vol. 4,103-4.
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legitimacy through emphasizing reconciliation, peace, and national unification, but did
not deny the existence o f the transitional regime itself.
Another limitation in the influence of the religious communities on the
democratic movement of early 1980 can be found in the church structure, especially in
the Catholic Church. The Church, divided into parishes since the colonial period, had
been operated by different missionary organizations. Because of this church structure,
parishes other than the Kwangju parish did not express any appropriate response to the
Kwangju uprising. After the Kwangju uprising, in addition, the new military regime did
not hesitate to suppress the religious communities and their democratic movement. For
example, on July 2, suspicious group of people assaulted Catholic priest Park ChangShin, a leader of the Catholic Peasant Association, in his church.430
In spite of suppression and internal divisions, however, grassroots religious
leaders and organizations were actively involved in the democratic movement. For
instance, Catholic churches in the Kwangju parish directly participated in the democratic
movement of civil society and tried to preserve detailed records about the Kwangju
democratic movement. Archbishop Yun Gong-Hee sent a letter to President Choi on
May 26, demanding a complete investigation of the Kwangju uprising and then
disclosing the truth about the democratic movement. He also asserted that the
government should punish military leaders for their violent suppression in Kwangju.431
In this period, especially, the church concentrated its efforts on soliciting support for the
democratic movement from outside the country. In response to this effort, the Chun
429 Institute o f Gladness and Hope, Amheksokui hwoibul (A Torch of Darkness: Testimony of
Democratic Movement in the 1970s and 1980s), vol. 4,61.
430 Institute o f Gladness and Hope, Amheksokui hwoibul (A Torch of Darkness: Testimony of
Democratic Movement in the 1970s and 1980s), vol. 4,512.
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regime attacked all radical democratic movement activists and organizations within the
religious communities and tried to isolate the grassroots level movement of the church
from the institutionalized church through the permanent use of violence and state
ideological institutions. According to the National Intelligence Agency and the police,
for example, the 0.065 percent of 10 million Christians claimed to follow the liberation
theology were considered as impure religious forces.432 State propaganda in the mass
media emphasized the communistic character of the Catholic Church, and tried to isolate
the religious communities from other democratic groups and organizations.
Because of active struggles of radical organizations in the religious communities,
not only the Choi transitional regime but also the new authoritarian regime began to
consider the churches to be a threat to social stability. In particular, some radicalized
religious organizations and liberal clergy promoted the regime to intervene inside the
church. The church, considered by the regime as a hegemonic instrument, became
impure; thus, the state should protect the church from the crisis of impure elements. In
fact, the church would automatically be considered as an enemy of the state if it did not
return to its traditional role. In response to this ideological attack, the religious
communities began to more actively support the democratic movement, and they
considered the democratic movement as a social missionary movement.
More serious confrontations between the Chun regime and the church began with
the arrest of Catholic priests such as Moon Bu-Sik.433 On 18 March 1982, at the USIS
(United States Information Service) in Busan, arson was committed by a student group,
431 Catholic Kwangju Parish Justice and Peace Committee of Korea, Kwangjuuiguijaryojip
(References of Kwangju Democratic Movement), (Kwangju: Bitgouil Publisher, 1985), 20-1.
432 Hong Seung-Sang, interviewed by author, Seoul, 19 August 1999.
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including priest Moon Bu-Sik. They were protesting the barbaric massacre in the
Kwangju democratic movement434 Several days later, Moon was arrested along with
other participated students. This suppression of the clergy reawakened the religious
communities which had been dormant since the Kwangju democratic movement435
Cardinal Stephen Kim strongly endorsed Father Moon’s decision, saying it was a priest’s
job to show compassion to people in distress, including those pursued by the police.436 In
addition, after Moon’s arrest, an ecumenical group called the Korean Christian Action
Organization (KCAO),437 blamed the U.S. approval of Chun’s use of regular troops to
quell the Kwangju democratic movement as providing ample cause for the fire at the U.S.
Cultural Center in Busan. Thus, many religious organizations urged the recall of United
States Ambassador Richard Walker, who called the South Korean people lemmings who
would follow any political leader.438 The Busan incident thus became a turning point in
changing the character of the religious communities.
In spite of the activation of the religious communities, there was a fundamental
limitation in their democratic movement One fundamental problem was a sharp
ideological division within the religious communities concerning the democratic
433 Institute of Gladness and Hope, Amheuksokui hwoibul (A Torch of Darkness: Testimony of
Democratic Movement in the 1970s and 1980s), vol. 5, 627.
434 Dong-A Daily, 19 March 1982; The New York Times, Sunday, 28 March 1982.
435 For instance. Catholic clergy and believers gathered in Wonju on 18 April 1983 and prayed for
father Choi Ki-Sik. In the prayer meeting, they publicly demanded that the regime should release Father
Choi, and urged to release political prisoners. Institute of Gladness and Hope, Amheuksokui hwoibul (A
Torch o f Darkness: Testimony of Democratic Movement in the 1970s and 1980s), vol. S, 63-1.
436 Institute of Gladness and Hope, Amheuksokui hwoibul, vol. S, 93-5; Far Eastern Economic
Review, 23 April 1982,10. In addition, on 25 October 1982, the Catholic Justice and Peace Committee of
Korea and NCC wrote a report about the investigation record of firing U.S. Culture Center. In this report,
these two organizations pointed out that the investigation record of the government was not fair, and
manipulated to suppress democratic civil society.
437 The Korean Christian Action Organization (KCAO) was established by religious leaders, such
as Kim Kwan-Suk, Oh Myung-Kil, Kang Won-Yong, Oh Jae-Suk, and Kim Kyung-Rak, on 14 January
1971. The goal ofthe KCAO was to realize social reform, and struggle for social justice. TheKCAO
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movement. Because most church leaders were conservative, they were critical of their
junior clergy and liberal religious organizations that were deeply involved in the
democratic movement However, it did not mean that those church leaders were in favor
of the authoritarian regime and against democratization. Differing opinions concerning
the role of the church hindered unification of the religious communities and made it
difficult for liberal junior church clergy and organizations to get deeply involved in the
democratic struggle with the Chun regime.
The role of the religious communities in the democratic movement had altered
based on the political environment and activities of other democratic groups and
organizations. Right after Park’s death, its role shrank because other democratic groups
and organizations rapidly revitalized and got involved actively in the transitional politics.
Thus, many democratic groups and organizations did not need protections and supports
of the religious communities. However, when the new authoritarian regime implemented
a harsh repressive policy, democratic groups and organizations sought a shelter to avoid
harsh suppression and therefore came to gather under the church’s protection once again.
Under the situation that leaders of democratic civil society were arrested and their
organizations were destroyed, the role of the religious communities was once again
emphasized. Clergy and religious organizations actively participated in the democratic
movement through various means, such as prayer meetings, the issuance public
statements, and hunger strikes. For example, on 18 October 1981, about 800,000
Catholic priests and Christians gathered in 5.16 Plaza to pray. At the prayer meeting,
Cardinal Kim stated that today's ultimate problem was disappearing humanity and the
continueously criticized suppression by the regime on labor movement, and supported democratic
movement of other civil society groups and organizations.

213

Reproduced with permission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

violations of human rights, and also said that these problems should be solved to restore
democracy.439 In particular, the religious communities contributed to integrating
democratic groups and organizations, protecting leaders and organizations of civil society
and educating people to grow in political consciousness. The religious communities in
this period thus concentrated on the Gramscian strategy of the “war of position.”

7. Changes of Democratic Civil Society
Since the collapse of the Yushin regime, the character of democratic civil society
began to change slowly. The change became obvious in the democratic movement
during the transitional period although the divided, isolated, and inconsequential
character did not completely change to a united, assertive, and influential character. In
particular, the temporary expansion of the political opportunity structure by Park’s death
allowed the rapid vitalization of democratic civil society. The size of student
demonstrations became larger, and the means of democratic struggle was getting violent
in cases of confrontation with the riot police. In addition, the number of the labor dispute
sharply increased with Park’s death. Right after the collapse of the Yushin regime,
various social groups dormant under the Yushin period began to participate in transitional
politics. This change in democratic civil society was directly related to the temporary
expansion of the political opportunity structure after Park’s death.440 However, in spite

431 Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 May 1982,54.
439 Institute of Gladness and Hope, Amheksokui hwoibul (A Torch of Darkness: Testimony of
Democratic Movement in the 1970s and 1980s), vol. 4,369.
440 According to student and labor movement activists, such as Park Eun-Sook, Chun Yong-Ho,
and Lee Tae-Bok, the revitalization and active involvement of the democratic civil society in early 1980
was a consequence of sudden weakening of the suppression. As evidence, most democratic groups and
organizations did not anticipate Park’s, and thus they did not prepare for the struggle after Park’s death.
Hence, the democratic struggle right after Park’s death was not well organized and influential because
democratic civil society was divided and did not have effective and united strategies and goals. Park Eun-
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of the active democratic struggle in the early transitional period, democratic civil society
were still weak and divided in terms of organizations, strategies, and ideologies, and not
supported by the middle class.
The great opportunity for civil society to further evolves slowly fading with the
emergence of the new military force. During the short period before the emergence of
the new military force, both democratic civil society and the opposition party failed to
take advantage of favorable political and social conditions. As a main reason, democratic
groups and organizations were not ready to maximize their power because of internal
divisions by ideological and strategic differences. Thus, after the collapse of the Yushin
regime, student groups devoted most of their time and energy on internal struggle for
taking leadership of organizations rather than concentrating on political struggles.441
Another reason was harsh suppression by the regime, controlled by the new military
force. Because of these internal and external restrictions, democratic civil society
remained divided, isolated, and inconsequential in this period.
In spite of this inconsequential character, the opening of the political opportunity
structure played a significant role in revitalizing democratic civil society. However, the
revitalization of democratic civil society did not reach the point that led the transitional
politics to democracy, and faced harsh suppression with emergence of the new military
force. Therefore, the democratic civil society could not effectively struggle in the
transition period. Furthermore, after the emergence of the new military force, democratic
civil society faced harsh suppression and thus lost a great opportunity to be united,
Sook interviewed by author, Seoul, 13,14, and IS September 1999; Chun Yong-Ho, interviewed by author,
Kwangju, 4 September 1999; Lee Tae-Bok, interviewed by author, Seoul, 21 October 1999.
441 In my observation, interestedly enough, the student group, who were supposed to be most
democratic, was most undemocratic, divided, and their democratic struggle was most violent among
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assertive, and influential. Besides the quick reverse of the political opportunity structure,
other factors also unfavorably affected the change of civil society.
The more democratic political culture than that of the 1970s favorably affected
civil society in this period. Although not many people joined democratic organizations
and participated in the democratic movement, they firmly believed the collapse of the
Yushin regime could bring democratization. The strong popular desires for
democratization, influenced by the spread o f democratic civic culture, advantageously
affected political activities of democratic civil society. In particular, when the Kwangju
uprising took place, citizens’ active participation in the democratic movement was an
expression of a hope for democratization and of the dissatisfaction toward suppression on
democratic civil society. Although their participation in the democratic movement in
Kwangju was not motivated purely by the change of political culture, the penetration of
democratic civic culture certainly influenced them to participate more actively in the
democratic movement442
The 1981 survey of public opinion clearly indicates a change of political culture.
As Table 4-7 illustrates, as many as 77 percent of the 1218 respondents believed that
democracy should be realized even if it hindered economic development.443 Compared
with that majority people were interested in political stability and economic justice and
development in the 1970s, the public opinion of the early 1980s dramatically changed.
That is, more people began to believe that political development was more important than
economic prosperity. Nevertheless, many people still wanted political and economic
various democratic groups. In this respect, it was difficult to say that the change of political culture did
significantly affect the character of democratic civil society.
442 Chun Yong-Ho, interviewed by author, Kwangju, 4 September 1999.
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stability, and had a critical perception of radical strategies and ideologies of the
democratic movement
Table 4-7
Value Preference for Democracy
Question: Should democracy be realized even if it hinders economic development?
Yes
77

Yes
No
DK
Total

Male
84
11
5
100
(612)

No
11
Female
70
11
19
100
(606)

Urban
77
10
13
100
(680)

Don’t Know (DK)
12
Rural
77
12
14
100
(537)

20-29
77
12
11
100
(332)

30-39
72
14
14
100
(318)

Total
100(1218)
40-49
78
8
14
100
(278)

50 and up
79
10
11
100
(287)

Level of Education Completed
Middle School
Elementary
High School
School*
Yes
81
73
75
No
9
10
14
DK
17
10
11
Total
100(214)
100(483)
100(302)
* Including those who did not graduate from elementary school

College and up
83
7
10
100(143)

Occupation
Profess/Manage/Adm
SelfPrimary
Manufacturing
in
employed
industry
Yes
76
80
82
77
7
No
13
13
10
7
DK
11
10
13
100 (146)
Total
100(316)
100(136)
100(112)
Source: Kim Tong-11, “Kookminuisik Byunwha Yongu" [A Study of Change of National
Consciousness), Hyundae Sahoe, (winter 1982), 103-47.

443 Kim Tong-11, “Kookminuisik Byunwha yongu” (A Study of Change of National
Consciousness), Hyundae Sahoe, (winter 1982): 103-47.
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Thus, the early 1980s was a transitional period in which the traditional political
culture was transforming to a democratic civic culture. In particular, the middle class of
this period wanted both political and economic development With influence of
democratic civic culture, most people had strong desires for democratization.444 At the
same time, they did not want political and social instability by the democratic movement
of civil society. Thus, they were still reluctant to openly support the democratic
movement because of insecurity of political and social stability and possible suppression.
In addition, suppression also hindered the acceptance of the democratic civic
culture by the society. Under the suppression, it was difficult for civil society to change
its divided, isolated, and inconsequential character to an active, united and assertive
character. However, the suppression could not completely stop the spread of the
democratic civic culture in a society. The middle class began to view the new
authoritarian regime critically and to express their desires for democratization over
economic development. In this respect, this was time when democratic civil society
could not act openly and become inconsequential because of suppression. Nevertheless,
the spread of democratic civic culture greatly contributed to changing the public
perception of the regime. Although the outcome of this shift did not obviously appear in
this period, it favorably affected the character of civil society in the mid-1980s.
Second, economic development of this period affected the character of democratic
civil society, both favorably and unfavorably. The economic slowdown, caused by rapid
economic development of the late 1970s, provided a new justification for the direct
military intervention in the transitional politics. In addition, after the establishment of the
new authoritarian regime, as in the Yushin regime, the Chun regime also focused on
444 Kim Tol-II, “Kookminuisik Byunhwa Yongu,” 103-47.
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economic development policy to attain its legitimacy.445 As a result of the regime’s
efforts, in 1980, real wages in the manufacturing sector dropped by 4.7%, and in 1981
they dropped by 2.6% despite sharpe gains in labor productivity of 10.7% in 1980 and
15.8% in 1981.446 This successful economic recovery and development, as Table 4-8
shows, facilitated creation of a “new middle class” who could support the regime.447
Although the middle class had strong aspirations for democratization, they supported the
economic performance of the regime and were satisfied with the political and social
stability. In this respect, temporary slowdown of economy in the early 1980s made the
middle class consider economic stability and prosperity more important.
Table 4-8
Major Economic Indicators (1980-1984)
1980
1981
1984
1982
1983
GNP Growth Rate
-4.8
6.6
5.4
8.4
11.9
Per capita GNP (US$)
1589
1719
1773
2044
1924
Current Account Balance ($ billion)
-4.6
-5.3
-2.6
-1.6
-1.6
Consumer Price Index
28.7
7.1
21.6
3.4
2.3
Source: Economic Planning Board, Major Statistics o f Korean Economy, 1988.
For example, right after the collapse o f the Yushin regime, economic slowdown
made the labor movement erupt and turn its focus to economic issues. As Figure 4-1
shows, although the number of labor struggles soared right after the collapse o f the

445 For example. President Chun emphasized the importance of economic development. In
addition, he suggested to increase job opportunities through increased public investment, to improve
working conditions, to close the wage gap, to provide economic security for workers and to improve labor
management cooperation. Juergen Kleiner, Korea: A Century o f Change, 79.
446 Michael L. Launius, “The State and Industrial Labor in South Korea,” Bulletin o f Concerned
Asian Scholars 16, no. 4 (1984): 9. Along with this restriction o f wage increase, the new regime dropped
the increasing rate of government budget from 21.9% in 1981 to zero in 1984. Economic Planing Board
(EPB), Economic Indicators (Seoul: EPB, 1986).
447 Leaders of the authoritarian regime thought that the economic recovery and continuous
development was only way to make people, especially the middle class, support the regime and to solve the
lack of the legitimacy. Based on this consideration, the military regime concentrated the economic
recovery and development policy.
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Yushin regime, the main issue of the movement in the early transitional period was
economic matters, such as working conditions and wages.448 This concentration on
economic issues made labor organizations isolated and difficult to build a coalition with
other democratic groups and organizations that concentrated on political issues.
As a result of unfavorable influence of economic development, democratic civil
society was limited in its democratic struggle because it was isolated from the middle
class who supported the economic performance of the Chun regime. Thus, in the
situation that the regime attained hegemony, successful economic development was used
as an excuse for suppression on civil society, and democratic civil society failed to draw
public support.
Figure 4-1
Tendency of Workers-Involved Events, 1978-1984
15 H

Number

Quarter

123*1234123*123*123*123*1.
78 79 80 81 82 83 84

On the other hand, the economic development of this period contributed to
development of political culture and to building a foundation for active participation of
the middle class in the democratic movement of the mid-1980s. In addition, successful
*** After the collapse of the Yushin regime, sit-down strikes, walk-outs and other labor protests,
some of them violent, spread across South Korea in a wave of worker uprisings that were never tolerated
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economic development in this period also influenced the regime’s policy toward civil
society and the opposition party in the future. The successful economic development
provided the regime enough confidence in its power and changed its repressive policy to
the decompression policy in late 1983.449 This policy change greatly contributed to
expanding the political opportunity structure and led to a more influential democratic
struggle in the mid-1980s.
In this respect, successful economic development and its influence on other
factors were not enough to change the divided, isolated, and inconsequential character of
civil society in this period. Nevertheless, the economic development in this period
provided a foundation for active supports of the middle class to the opposition force and
changing the regime’s policy toward civil society in the mid-1980s. This economic
development also made it possible for the regime to hold the Asian and Olympic Games,
and it strongly affected the regime to implement the decompression policy in late 1983.
Therefore, economic development that influenced internal and external factors favorably
affected social and political conditions of the early 1980s although its outcome did not
clearly appear in this suppressive period.
Third, the suddenly opened political opportunity structure positively affected the
character of civil society although it was soon reversed by the emergence of the new
military force and their harsh suppression. For example, most democratic groups and
organizations of civil society focused on internal restructuring and attaining autonomy

during the reign of the late president Park Chung Hee. Washington Post, Thursday, 1 May 1980, A21.
449 Im Hyug-Baeg, “Hankookesui Minjuhwagwajung Bunsuk” (An Analysis of Democratization
Process in South Korea), Korean Political Science Review 24, no. I.
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from the state.450 In addition, the revitalized civil society began to express their demands
and forced not only the ruling party and the regime but also the opposition party to reach
an agreement for peaceful democratic transition. As Figure 4-2 shows, the number of
democratic struggle sharply increased after the collapse of the Yushin regime. That is,
the weakening of the suppression by Park’s sudden death caused democratic civil society
to become temporarily active in transitional politics 451 In this respect, the expanded
political opportunity structure constructively affected the character of civil society, at
least in the early transitional period.
In addition, the expanded political opportunity structure positively influenced the
external environment. The U.S. government expressed its support of a peaceful transition
to democracy. This U.S. expression had favorably influenced the active involvement of
civil society in the transition politics. Moreover, the expanded political opportunity
structure accelerated the spread of democratic civic culture, and made not only civil
society but also the public have strong aspirations for democratization. This strong desire
for democratization made democratic civil society struggle more actively. In this respect,
the expanded political opportunity structure of a short period significantly influenced not
only revitalization o f civil society but also the changing public perceptions of the
authoritarian regime. However, because of the sudden and temporary expansion of the
political opportunity structure, democratic civil society did not take advantage of this
450 After the Yushin regime collapsed, the first priority of democratic civil society was to replace
leaders of the pre-existing organizations that were controlled by the Yushin regime. Through replacing the
leadership, each group o f democratic civil society tried to attain absolute autonomy and pursued their
individual goals.
According to democratic movement activists, the major reason why democratic civil society
could rapidly vitalize and actively struggle with the transitional government was the weakening of
suppression on democratic civil society. In addition, not only democratic civil society but also ordinary
people felt that the Choi transitional government would tolerate the democratic movement of civil society.
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great opportunity for changing its character and did not prevent the emergence o f the
military intervention.
Figure 4-2
Tendency of Democratic Movement, 1979-1983
30 20 Number
10"

Q uarter

12*1 Z3412341234123412
79 80 81 82 83 84

On the contrary, the sudden expansion o f the political opportunity structure also
negatively influenced the character of democratic civil society. The sudden expansion of
the political opportunity structure after a long period of suppression brought about an
internal power struggle within civil society and opposition party. After Park’s death,
many political prisoners were released, and expelled students returned to campus.432 In
this process of revitalization, democratic groups and organizations could not avoid
internal power struggles and conflicts of ideologies and strategies433 Consequently, they

Because of these reasons, vitalization and active struggle o f democratic civil society were possible even
though it did not last long.
432 The transitional Choi government released 63 political prisoners, 224 were acquited o f the
charges against the regime, and the prominent opposition leader, Kim Dae-Jung, was freed from house
arrest. On 23 January S11 ousted dissident students were allowed to return to campuses, and jailed workers
were allowed back in the workplaces. On February 29, the government restored the civil rights o f 687
dissident politicians, labor leaders, students, professors, journalists, and clergymen. Kim Ho-Jin, “Je S
Gonghwakookui Jungkwonjuk Sunggyuk” (The Political Characteristic of the Fifth Republic), in The
Discussion about the Evaluation o f the Fifth Republic (Seoul: Dong-A Ilbo Press, 1988), 97.
433 According to former democratic movement activists, such as Park Eun-Sook, Chun Yong-Ho
and Lee Tae-Bok, democratic groups, especially students and the Jaeya force, spent too much time in the
internal struggle within democratic civil society. Thus, democratic civil society could not struggle
effectively for democratization in the short period before the emergence of the new military force.
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wasted valuable time in restructuring organizations and developing strategies, and thus
their movement could not be influential in this critical period. More importantly, this
internal power struggle provided a strong motive for the new military force to intervene
in the transitional politics. In this respect, the expansion of the political opportunity
structure influenced the character o f civil society, both favorably and unfavorably.
With the emergence of the new military force as a central actor after the intra
military coup and suppression of the Kwangju uprising, the expanded political
opportunity structure was sharply reversed by harsh suppression of the Choi government,
controlled by the new military force. The police arrested many leaders of democratic
civil society and the opposition party.454 The number of political prisoners was larger
than that of the Yushin regime, and they were sentenced to longer terms than had
occurred during the Yushin regime.455 Thus, in spite of the temporary expansion of the
opportunity structure, the divided, isolated, and inconsequential character of civil society
did not much change because of internal conflicts within civil society and harsh
suppression.
Along with the harsh suppression, there was no strong public and external support
for changing a character of democratic civil society. Rather, unlike early this period, the
new authoritarian regime received popular and external support. The middle class
believed that the new authoritarian regime could stabilize political and social disorder
albeit they were critical of the new regime. This public desire for economic prosperity
and political stability made democratic civil society isolated from the public and their
454 The United States Department o f State, Country Reports on Human Reports Practice 1982
(Washington: GPO, 1983), 743; The United States Department of State, Country Reports on Human
Reports Practice 1984 (Washington: GPO, 198S), 813; International League for Human Rights and the
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democratic struggle with the regime inconsequential. In addition, the U.S. government,
which initially favored the democratization process, changed its policy and supported the
authoritarian regime after the new military force emerged. The U.S. government tacitly
approved moving the military into Kwangju to suppress the democratic uprising and then
supported the establishment of the new military authoritarian regime.456 The U.S.
preferred political stability over political development because it considered its national
interests in the Korean peninsula was more important than political development of South
Korea.457 In this respect, the change of the U.S. foreign policy toward the Korean
peninsula influenced the reverse of the expanded political opportunity structure.
In addition, the middle class had mixed feelings about the political and economic
development after the Yushin regime collapsed. On the one hand, they were critical of
the new military regime because they realized the importance of democratization. On the
other hand, they also strongly wanted political stability and economic prosperity. This
ambivalence hindered the expansion of the political opportunity structure after the
establishment of the new authoritarian regime. Under this culturally ambiguous situation,
the Korean public chose political stability and economic prosperity over political
development, thus showing that expansion of the political opportunity structure without
strong popular support had a limited impact on the character o f civil society. This
support of the middle class to the authoritarian regime showed that the political culture of
International Human Rights Law Group, Democracy in South Korea: A Promise Unfulfilled (New York:
International League for Human Rights, 1985), 113.
455Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 December 1983,43.
456This strong U.S. support on the new military force and government, especially the suppression
on the Kwangju Democratic Movement, caused strong anti-Americanism o f democratic civil society groups
and organizations. Thus, anti-Americanism was one of common issues in democratic movement of this
period. For example, student groups violently occupied U.S. governmental offices and demanded apology
for supporting the new military force.
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this period was not completely changed to democratic civic culture and economic
development did not reach the point that the middle class was concerned with political
development, such as democratization.
In this respect, as in the Yushin period, most internal and external factors had
obstructively affected democratic civil society and its political struggle. First, as in the
Yushin period, economic development in the early 1980s had influenced the character of
civil society, both unfavorably and favorably. Namely, slowdown of economic
development and its recovery provided an excuse for the direct military intervention and
establishment of the new authoritarian regime. Thus, economic development did not
advantageously affect the character of civil society in this period. On the other hand,
successful economic development advantageously influenced political culture as it did
during the Yushin regime, but outcomes of the changed political culture by the economic
development did not clearly appear in this period.
As Table 4-8 shows, in spite of successful economic development, the economic
condition of this period did not reach the point in which the middle class could express
their desires for democratization and dissatisfaction toward the authoritarian regime
through political activities. Instead, the economic development during this period
significantly influenced the policy of the regime toward the opposition force in the mid1980s. The regime became confident of its rule based on successful economic
performance and thus could implement a decompression policy to solve legitimacy
problem in late 1983. Therefore, economic development that unfavorably affected the
character of civil society positively influenced other factors, such as political culture and

417 Steven W. Hook, “Inconsistent U.S. Efforts to Promote Democracy Abroad,” in Exporting
Democracy: Rhetoric vs. Reality, ed. Peter J. Schraeder, (Boulder Lynne Rienner, 2002), III.
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the regime’s policy in this period, and the positive influence advantageously affected the
character o f civil society in the mid-1980s.
Second, political culture, which changed to more democratic, also positively
affected the character of democratic civil society in this period. Right after Park’s death,
the changed political culture was shown in the revitalization process of democratic civil
society and peoples’ strong desires for democratization. Nevertheless, this change of
political culture did not prevent the emergence of the new authoritarian regime nor bring
about political participation of the middle class. In addition, many people still believed
that political stability and economic development were as important as political
development in this period. Thus, democratic civil society found it difficult to draw
popular support, so democratic struggles without active popular support had been
inconsequential. In this respect, the spread of democratic civic culture did not reach the
point that people who had political consciousness could explicitly support or participate
in democratic organizations and their democratic struggles.
In addition, like economic development, the development of political culture also
influenced democratic civil society indirectly but favorably although its outcome was not
obvious in this period. For example, the development of political culture had
advantageously influenced the future policy of the Chun regime toward democratic civil
society. Along with the spread of democratic civic culture, the regime that recognized
$

more people, especially the middle class, became critical of its authoritarian rule began to
seek different strategies to control the middle class. This regime’s effort appeared as an
implementation of the decompression policy toward civil society in late 1983. Therefore,
the spread of democratic civic culture in this period had more positively affected not only

227

Reproduced with permission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the character of democratic civil society but also other factors than that o f the previous
period.
Third, the political opportunity structure, unlike the previous period, was
temporarily opened by Park’s sudden death. The opened political opportunity structure
provided an opportunity for democratic civil society, which had been suppressed during
the Yushin era, to vitalize and to be actively involved in transitional politics. Therefore,
the political opportunity structure significantly and constructively affected the character
of civil society, at least until the establishment of the new authoritarian regime. This
expanded political opportunity structure made it possible for democratic civil society,
such as students and the Jaeya force, to establish organizations and to struggle for
democratic transition through mobilizing their members and supporters. In this respect,
the expansion of the political opportunity structure in this period greatly contributed to
changing the character of civil society even though it was rapidly reversed by the
emergence of the new military force. In addition, unlike the Yushin period, the expanded
political opportunity structure of this period favorably affected other internal and external
factors. Although it was a short period, the expanded political opportunity structure
provided a chance for the middle class to re-evaluate authoritarian rule. In this respect,
unlike the Yushin period that the closed political opportunity structure unfavorably
influenced development of political culture, the temporary expansion of the political
opportunity structure positively affected the development of political culture.
Last, the external environment of this period, like the Yushin period, did not
change much in favor of democratic civil society and its democratic movement The
Cold War and confrontation with North Korea remained; this harsh international
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environment did not promote a change in the character of democratic civil society.
Furthermore, during this period, terrorist acts of North Korea made people think national
security was very important,458 and political struggles of civil society for democratization
were often considered Communist activities, controlled by the North Korean government.
This harsh external environment provided a good excuse for the authoritarian regime to
suppress democratic civil society and its struggles for democratization in this period.
Thus, as in the Yushin period, the external environment of this period did not
constructively affect the character of civil society and other factors, such as political
culture and the political opportunity structure.
In this harsh repressive period, most factors negatively affected the character of
democratic civil society. Although there was an expansion of the political opportunity
structure for a short period, democratic civil society was not capable to take advantage of
the opportunity for changing its character. Other factors also impeded development of
democratic civil society in this period. Compared with the Yushin period, however,
influence of each element affected on the character of civil society more favorably in this
period.

451 On 9 October 1983, 17 Korean cabinet members and president’s secretaries were killed by
exploring a bomb in Burma. O f course, President Chun was the main target of the attack. Fortunately, he
did not arrive in the place when the bomb explored. He cancelled the rest of the trip, which was to have
included visits to India, Sri Lanka, Australia, New Zealand, and Brunei, and returned to Seoul. Later, two
North Korean agents were arrested and confessed their intention to assassinate President Chun. Far
Eastern Economic Review, 27 October 1983; Korea Times, Special Edition, 10 October 1983; Korea Times,
11 October 1983.
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CHAPTER V

THE DECOMPRESSION POLICY AND REVITALIZATION OF CIVIL
SOCIETY (1983-1985)

1. The Decompression Policy of the Chun Regime
In theories o f democratic transition, the decrease of suppression level is defined as
liberalization. Liberalization encompasses the more modest goal of merely loosening
restrictions, and expanding individuals and group rights within an authoritarian regime.
Thus, liberalization may include releasing political prisoners, decreasing media
censorship, tolerating political opposition, reintroducing some legal safeguards for
individuals and groups, and allowing greater freedom for the organization of autonomous
working-class activities.459 The decompression policy in South Korea can also be
considered as a liberalization policy, but it is strictly limited in the political sphere.
In late 1983, the Chun regime announced a series of decompression measures
designed to relieve some of the social tension that had arisen as a result of earlier political

459 Scott Mainwaring, “Transition to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical and
Comparative Issues,” in Issues in Democratic Consolidation, eds. Mainwaring, O’Donnell, and Valenzuela
(Notre Dame, Ind.: Published for the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies by University of
Notre Dame Press, 1992), 29S-302. In addition, O’Donnell and Schmitter defined liberalization as the
process of making effective certain rights that protect individuals and social groups from arbitrary or illegal
acts committed by the state or third parties. On the level of individuals, these guarantees include the
classical elements o f the liberal tradition: habeas corpus; sanctity of private home and correspondence; the
right to be defended in a fair trial according to pre-established laws; freedom of movement, speech, and
petition; and so forth. On the level of groups, these rights cover such things as freedom from punishment
for expressions of collective dissent of government policy, freedom from censorship of the means of
communication, and freedom to associate voluntarily with other citizens. O’Donnell and Schmitter,
Transitionfrom Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusion about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 7.
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struggle by democratic civil society and the opposition party.460 Those decompression
measures included the reinstatement of expelled students and professors, rehabilitation of
purged politicians, withdrawal o f the police from campuses and the release of political
prisoners. The decompression policy began with the “campus autonomization” policy.461
350 student movement activists were released from prisons, 1,363 expelled students were
readmitted, 8 professors ousted for political reasons were reinstated, and the police
detectives and informers stationed in the campuses were withdrawn.462 The campus
liberalization measures were followed by the lifting of the ban on political activities of
202 opposition politicians in February 1984.463 As Table 5-1 shows, thus, the number of
political prisoners sharply decreased between late 1983 and 1984.
Table 5-1
Number of Political Prisoners (1982-1984)
Others
Law of
Rebellion
meeting and
and
demonstraton inendiarism
1982. 11. 10
413
204
14
30
1983. 7. 7
428
285
3
457
1983. 11.25
362
2
109
1984. 11.27
Source: HankookJddokkyosahoeyonguwon (The Social Institute of Korean Protestant),
(Seoul: The Social Institute of Korean Protestant, 1986), 105.
Time

Total

National Security
and anti
communism
168
137
93

460 Gaston J. Sigur, Jr., “Prospects for Continuing Democratization in Korea,” Current Policy 829
(Washington: United States Department of State, 1986): 2.
461 On 20 March 1984, President Chun’s new policy of leniency toward dissenting college students
ushered in a new and unpredictable phase of the govemment-campus conflicts that marked South Korean
politics for decades. In a reversal of strategy, Chun offered to let students expelled for antigovemment
demonstrations return to classes, removed official police from the campuses, and turned campus discipline
over to university authorities. Washington Post, Tuesday, 20 March 1984, A18.
462 The United States Department of State, Country Reports on Human Reports Practice 1983,
(Washington: GPO, 1984), 817; Wonmo Dong, “University Students in South Korean Politics: Patterns of
Radicalization in the 1980s,” Journal o f International Affairs 40, no. 2 (1987): 241.
463 However, 99 politicians remained under the ban. In addition, the government released all
politicians except for 15 politicians including the three Kims, Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung, and Kim
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There were several reasons that the Chun regime implemented the decompression
policy toward democratic civil society and the opposition party. First, the Chun regime
became confident not only in the economic development but also in institutional
mechanisms, designed to detect, prevent, check, and control social resistance. For
instance, the national economy began to return to steady growth, and unemployment
gradually decreased. Unlike the Yushin regime, the Chun regime achieved relatively
high economic growth with low inflation. As Table 5-2 illustrates, the rate of economic
growth grew to 12.6% in 1983 from -3.7% in 1980, the unemployment rate decreased to
4.1% in 1983 from 5.2% in 1980, inflation was down to 3.4% in 1983 from 28.7% in
1980, and for the first time, the financial balance went into the black in 1983.
Table 5-2
National Economy Indexes (1982-1986)
1982
1984
1985
1986
1983
7.2
7.0
12.9
Economic Growth(%)
12.6
9.3
4.4
4.1
4.0
3.8
3.8
Unemployment(%)
7.2
3.4
2.5
Inflation(%)
2.3
2.8
643.9
Financial Balance(Billion)
-712.6
663.2
958.5
292.0
Source: Jung Woon Chan, Sgongeui Kyimgjerul Pywngga/jamfo.(Evaluating the Economy
of the Fitth Republic) in Dong-A Ilbosa, 5gong Pyungga Datorongoi (A Grand Forum on
the Fitth Republic), (Seoul: Dong-A Uibosa, 1984), 174 and 176.
Second, the regime started with a series of state-led social campaigns and anti
democratic laws that changed the nation’s political atmosphere. Thus, the regime
believed that institutional and legal measures, such as the Political Climate Renovation
Law, the Basic Press Law, the laws regarding assembly and demonstration, and various

Jong-Pil, on 30 November 1984. The United State Department of State, Current Reports on Human Rights
Practice 1983,817.
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labor-related laws, could effectively block and stem any undesirable or unnecessary
developments in both democratic civil society and the opposition party.464
Third, the ruling elites had confidence in the institutional mechanism of control.
The restructuring of ideological apparatuses, such as the Saemaul (New Village)
movement,463 the Unification Study Institute, the Consciousness-Reforming Program,
and the Research Institute on Spiritual Culture (Chungsin Munhyva Younkoowon, and
Hwarang Program),466 the hegemonic political party system, legal control mechanisms of
the press, workers and students provided the regime safety values in case of resurgent
opposition. Fourth, the authoritarian regime needed to recover its damaged legitimacy by
showing gestures of reconciliation toward the people because legitimacy of the regime
was badly damaged by the brutal suppression of the Kwangju democratic movement.467
The Chun regime had to obtain support from the middle class at the next National
Assembly election, scheduled in February 1985. Thus, the Chun regime needed to seek a
different strategy to isolate the democratic opposition force from the ordinary people, and
choke off this possible venue for additional opposition to the authoritarian regime.
Besides these reasons, the decision for the decompression policy was based on the
calculation of costs and benefits. The regime realized the ineffectiveness of a repressive
policy.468 State terror kept ordinary people quiet, but the repressive policy made some
464 Kim Sun-Hyuk, The Politics and Democratization in Korea: The Role o f Civil Society, 81.
465 For example, the Chun regime endeavored to galvanize Saemaeul Undong, which had been
effective in introducing developmentalism as well as obtaining political support from farmers.
446Gregory Henderson, “The Politics of Korea,” in Two Korea-One Future?, eds. John Sulivan
and Roberta Foss (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987).
467 Yun Sang-Chul, I980nyundae Hankookui Minjuhwaihaengkwajung (The Democratic
Transition Process of South Korea in the 1980s), 100. For example. President Chun said that the
establishment of the 5* Republic was a transitional regime, and had a dear goal of stabilizing political and
economic condition. Thus, the Chun regime tried to re-produce legitimacy through a formal democracy,
such as elections. Dong-A Iibosa, Dong-A Yongam 1984 (Dong-A Yearbook 1984), 549.
464 Kim Jang-Sil, Democratic Transition in South Korea, 1985-1988: The Electic Approach,
(Ph.D. diss.. The University o f Hawaii, 1991), 91.
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democratic groups and organizations, in particular student activists, violent and
radicalized. Furthermore, many ordinary people became more sympathetic to the
democratic struggle of civil society. The suppression allowed the opposition a sense of
moral superiority, and thus proved to be counter-productive.469 This decompression
policy was designed to reduce the costs of coercion by relying more on ideological
indoctrination and less on physical suppression. Another means of control as a substitute
for physical suppression was co-optation.470 The Chun regime tried to isolate the radical
opposition groups, and to strengthen the collaborationists through co-optation and
bribery.
In addition, the regime tried to improve its image at home and abroad, and to
broaden the support base of the technocrats, businessmen, and the middle class 471 South
Korea was scheduled to host two big international athletic games: the Asian Games in
1986 and the Olympics Games in 1988. Thus, the Chun regime needed to make most of
these two occasions to demonstrate and publicize to the international community that
South Korea was a legitimate and stable democracy. In order to do so, it was essential to
allow and encourage a certain degree of free political contestation and participation.
Therefore, the decompression policy was an alternative strategy to solve problems that
the Chun regime faced with.
When the regime implemented the decompression policy, democratic civil society
evaluated the policy by various ways. First, the Jaeya youth groups evaluated that the

469 Wonmo IDong, “University Students in South Korean Politics: Patterns of radicalization in the
1980s,” Journal o f International Affairs: 241.
470 Jim Butterfield and Marcia Weigle, “Unofficial Social Groups and Regime Response in the
Soviet Union,” in Perestroikafrom Below: Social Movements in the Soviet Union, Jim Butterfield and
Marcia Weigle (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1991), 176-78.
471 Chang Baek-San, “The Phoenix of 1984: A Vibrant Democratic Mass Movement Erupts in
South Korea,” AMPO: Japan-Asia Quarterly Review 17, no. 1 (1985): 3.
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decompression policy was a result of the ineffective suppression, the regime’s effort for
solving its legitimacy problem, and a means to expand the power base. The Jaeya force
thought that the regime tried to change its authoritarian image, and prevent an
establishment of solidarity within democratic civil society.472 In addition, student
movement activists were divided into two groups in evaluating the decompression policy.
One group saw the decompression policy as a consequence of external pressure, and the
other group saw this policy as a result of efforts by democratic civil society.473
Neverthelss, these two groups agreed that the decompression policy was an alternative
strategy for dealing with the political struggle o f democratic civil society.474 The
response of the academic circle was not generally different from the Jaeya force and
student groups.475 That is, most democratic groups of civil society considered the
decompression policy as a consequence of various internal and external elements: 1)
pressure of mass mobilization from democratic civil society, 2) the U.S. pressure, and 3)
a political strategy of the ruling coalition to maintain its political system.
472 Youth League for Democratic Movement, “Hanbando Jubyun jungsewa Hankookui
Jungchikyungje” (Political Environment around Korean Peninsula and Korean Politics and Economy),
Minjuhwaui Gil (Road to Democratization), 1 (March 25, 1994): 9.
473 Yu Suk-Chun and Park Byung-Young, “Hankook Haksaengundongui Gujowa gineung” (The
Structure and Function of Korean Student Movement), in Hankook Sahoehakhoe (Korean Sociology
Association), Hyundae HankookSahoeMoonjeron (The Study of Korean Social Problem), (Seoul: Institute
of Korean Welfare Public Policy, 1991), 102.
474 Kang Sin-Chul, 80nyundae Haksaeng Undongsa (The History of the Student Movement in the
1980s), (Seoul: Hyungsungsa, 1988), 52.
473 For example, according to Choi Jang-Jip, the regime pursued the decompression policy because
of the politically stable regime, the regime was stable politically, the effectiveness of suppression toward
democratic civil society, and the influence of the Reagan administration. Im Hyug-Baeg asserted that the
regime tried to divide the opposition forces through inducing the moderate opposition force to make
conflict with the students and workers, and tried to consolidate and expand the political power base of the
regime through the decompression policy. On the other hand, according to Cummings, the decompression
policy was possible because the economic foundation was reinforced by economic liberalization that the
United State initiated from the early 1980s. Choi Jang-Jip, “Hankookkookkawa Hyungtaebyunhwae
daehan Eronjuk Jupkeun” (The Theoretical Approach on Korean State and Its Political Change),
Kyungjewa Sahoi (Economy and Society), 4, (1989): 212; Im Hyug-Baeg, “Hankookesuui
Minjuhwagwajung Bunsuk” (The Analysis of Democratic Transition in South Korea), Korean Political
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Despite those evaluations of democratic civil society, it was still unclear why the
regime implemented the decompression policy. First, the pressure of mass mobilization
was not strong enough to force the regime to implement the decompression policy in late
1983. Not only democratic civil society but also the opposition party did not have
political and social resources nor nationwide organizations because of harsh suppression.
For example, the regime arrested and house arrested 145 leaders o f the Jaeya force and
the religious communities in Seoul and other major cities right before President Reagan
visited Korea on 9 November 1983.476 As a consequence, democratic civil society could
not have the capability to challenge directly or overthrow the regime. Moreover, the
struggle of democratic groups and organizations was isolated from other social classes
because of their violent characters and passive middle class. Under these
disadvantageous conditions, not only democratic civil society but also opposition parties
couldn’t pressure the regime effectively to create special measures for dealing with the
opposition force, such as the decompression policy.
Additionally, the explanation of external pressure was also weak. For example,
the Reagan administration approved and supported the Chun authoritarian regime from
its beginning even though the U.S. government showed an unclear stance to the
emergence of the new military force in early 1980. Some people asserted that the U.S.
government pressured the Chun regime to pursue political nomalization because of the
expanding anti-Americanism in the society.477 In addition, the regime needed to improve
its image to hold Asian and Olympic Games. As a strategy for this goal, the regime had
Science Review 24, no. 1 (Seoul: Bupmoonsa, 1990); B. Commings, “The Abortive Abertura: South Korea
in the Light of Latin American Experience," in New Left Review, 173, (1989).
76 Institute of Gladness and Hope. Amheksokui hwoibul (A Torch of Darkness: Testimony of
Democratic Movement in the 1970s and 1980s), vol. S, 389.
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to change its policy to a repressive policy. However, these explanations are weak in
explaining the direct cause of the decompression policy.478 There was still confrontation
between South and North Korea, the U.S. government supported the Chun regime from
the its beginning in spite of emergence of anti-Americanism. In addition, to maintain
authoritarian rule was much more important for the Chun regime than to hold Asian and
Olympic Games. In this respect, the explaination by external factors has a limitation in
explaining the implemetation of the decompresson policy.
In this respect, the decompression policy was an offensive strategy for
overcoming problems of legitimacy and for consolidating the authoritarian power
structure.479 Thus, in spite of the decompression policy, the regime continued to
supervise political activities of democratic civil society 480 In addition, the political
situation in late 1983 was an important element that made the regime decide to
implement the decompression policy. In the middle of 1983, former opposition
politicians began to cooperate with democratic groups and organizations of civil society.
The former opposition politicians, who had disappointed people by the split of opposition
party in early 1980, gradually gained the status that they had at the end of the Yushin
regime. Thus, the ruling coalition tried to absorb those former opposition politicians in
the institutional political arena, and to prevent building coalitions among democratic

477 Juergen Kleiner, Korea: A Century o f Change, 206-7.
471 Park Bo-Kyun, Chunghwadaebisusil (Secretary’s Office of the Blue House), 3, (Seoul:
Joongang Daily, 1994), 212-35.
479 Robert Kaufman, “Liberalization and Democratization in South Korea: Perspectives from the
1970s,” in Transitionfrom Authoritarian Rule, eds. O’Donnell, Schmitter, Whitehead (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 180-96.
According to Lee Tae-Bok and Park Eun-Sook, former labor and student movement activists,
in spite of the decompression policy, the regime was cautious of the political struggle by the student and
labor organizations, and more cautious of the possible establishment of a coalition between these two
groups. Lee Tae-Bok, interviewed by author, Seoul, 21 October 1999; Park Eun-Sook, interviewed by
author, Seoul, 13,14, and 15 September 1999.
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groups and organizations. Because of that, the opposition force, including the opposition
parties, considered the decompression policy as the intent of the Chun regime to divide
former opposition politicians and democratic civil society.481
However, this decompression policy did not work as well as its planners intended.
After the regime implemented the decompression policy, the political and social
situations became too difficult for the regime to control democratic civil society and
democratic struggles. First of all, outbursts of autonomous democratic civil society,
which had been decimated and pacified by the authoritarian regime's severe suppression
between 1980 and 1983, began to reemerge. As Przeworski points out, the relaxation of a
repressive policy provided an opportunity for attaining counter-hegemony by civil
society.482 The resurrection movement of autonomous civil society encompassed not
only democratic groups and organizations but also a broad array of social classes,
occupational, professional, and human rights groups.483 During the suppression period,
although the entire opposition movement was silenced, leaders of democratic civil society
were preparing a counter-attack on the regime through the accumulation of an
organizational base and the establishment of counter-hegemonic ideology.
Underground student groups cast off their clandestine nature and seized the
official structures of student organizations on campuses in a very short time. In addition,
leaders of democratic labor unions began to struggle for restoring the legality of the
democratic unions. Particularly, a phenomenon of separation from the church emerged in
the labor movement. In the 1970s, the role of church-led UMI was crucial in establishing
411 Youth League for Democratic Movement, “Hanbando Jubyun jungsewa Hankookui
Jungchikyungje” (Political Environment around Korean Peninsula and Korean Politics and Economy), 9.
Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991), 54-8.
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labor organizations, whereas student-turned-workers played the leading role in organizing
the labor movement in the 1980s. In this respect, a leadership of the democratic
movement moved from intellectual and religious notables to the former student activist
group in the popular democratic movement organizations in the 1980s.
Nevertheless, the so called “resurrection of civil society” was not allowed to
threaten the regime in this period. As a matter of course, the newly revitalized
democratic civil society was destined to clash with the Chun regime. Thus, the regime
that faced with unexpected results of the decompression policy returned to a repressive
policy in late 1984. However, returning to the repressive policy did not make the
political struggle of democratic civil society end because democratic organizations and
their networks were firmly constructed during the short decompression period.
In spite o f this implementation of the decompression policy, democratic civil
society of this period also faced with serious problems. Under harsh suppression,
democratic groups and organizations could avoid internal conflicts because their first
priority was to survive under the harsh suppression. However, along with weakening
suppression, internal conflicts within civil society began to intensify, and hindered
democratic civil society to concentrate their resources on the democratic struggle with the
regime. In this respect, the ineffectiveness of the democratic movement was mainly
caused by internal conflicts rather than returning to a repressive policy.

413 Sung Kyung-Ryung, “Hankookminjujuuiui Sahoijuk Giwon” (The Social Origin of the Korean
Democracy), i 10-111, and 123.
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2. Democratic Movement of Civil Society
The decompression measures expanded the space available to the democratic
movement of civil society. Since the regime had implemented the decompression policy,
democratic civil society began to reestablish representative organizations that had
collapsed in early 1980. For example, student movement activists established the
Committee for Democratization Struggle (Minjuhwa Chujin Wiwonhoe, Minchuwi) on 18
May 1984.484 Additionally, members of mirtjung movement organizations established the
Minjung Democratic Movement (Mirtjung Minju Undong Hyobuihoe-Minminhyup) on 29
June 1984,485 demanding the restoration of democracy and the guarantee of human rights.
In addition, it tried to integrate various social, religious and political organizations of
JO /

civil society for influential democratic struggle.
One unique characteristic of the democratic movement in this period was that
democratic groups and organizations made substantial efforts in establishing cooperative
linkages between themeselves by building sectoral and regional movement
organizations.487 They also explored opportunities for solidarity and unification among
diverse organizations, possibly, even uniting their forces under leaderships of the
nationwide umbrella organizations. Nevertheless, ideological conflicts among different
student and labor organizations were only aggravated as time went on. Vehement
Joongang Daily, 20 May 1984.
445 The definition of “Minjung” See p. 262.
4,6 The Council of Minjung Democratic Movement had five goals: I) to change the monopolistic
economic system for a few privileged classes into an independent national economy which would ensure a
decent life for the minjung, 2) to disclose the political and social causes that generate distrust, hatred, crime
and decadence, 3) to clean up the polluted environments, 4) to find a peaceful way to national unification,
and S) to keep an eye on international politics around the Korean peninsula in an effort to create peace on
the peninsula. In addition, this organization was linked to the Hanguk Nodongja Pokji Hyobuihoe,
Minchongryun, Minjuhwa Chujin Hyobuihoe, Catholic Clergy for the Realization of Justice (Chunjukyo
Jungui Kuhyun Sajedan), Christian Farmers’ Association (Kidokyo Nongminhoi).
417 Kim Chong-Chan, Nodong Undong Danchui Hyunjuso (The Current Address of Labor
Movement Organizations), Shindong-A, (December 1986): 480.
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ideological debates brought about serious losses of movement resources, and undermined
their capacity of the democratic struggle. For the development o f their ideologies and
wide access to other democratic organizations, the democratic force of civil society
employed a diverse medium o f propaganda, including newspapers, leaflets, stickers,
posters, and tapes.
When the regime implemented the decompression policy, the middle class also
began to slowly express its dissatisfaction with the regime. The policy made the middle
class less afraid of suppression on expressing its dissatisfaction and participation in civil
society and its movement. In fact, one strategy of democratic civil society in this period
was to penetrate in the middle class and to draw their support. As a result of these
strategies, many of the middle class began to pay more attention to the democratic
movement and even participate in protest meetings. However, in spite of the change of
perception, the mddle class was still reluctant to actively express their political
dissatisfaction until the general election of 198S. In this respect, the most distinctive
characteristics of the opposition force in this period were the revitalization of democratic
civil society and the changed perception of the middle class toward the regime.488 The
democratic civil society began to penetrate in the middle class and urban intellectuals,
and thus could draw broader support from various social classes. Another characteristic
of democratic civil society was radicalization of the democratic movement and
establishment of a coalition among various democratic groups and organizations.
As a reaction to the revitalization of democratic civil society and the
establishment of a coalition among democratic groups and organizations, the regime

4S>Choi Jang-Jip, “Hankookkookkawa Hyungtaebyunhwae daehan Eronjuk Jupkeun” (The
Theoretical Approach on Korean State and Its Political Change), 212.

241

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

changed its policy from the decompressive policy to a repressive policy. The regime
realized that the decompression policy brought totally different results from the planners’
intention. However, after the regime returned to the repressive policy, the democratic
struggle of civil society was still active and assertive, and showed a more united
character. For instance, democratic civil society established nationwide umbrella
organizations, such as the National Conference for Democracy and Unification (Minju
Tongil KookminhoeuiJ,489 and resisted against the suppression under united leadership.
Moreover, this active democratic movement by civil society also strongly influenced the
emergence of a strong opposition party in the general election of 1985.

1) Student Movements
After the decompression policy in late 1983, a student group was the most
actively revitalized among various civil society groups because most decompression
measures focused on students’ activties. For example, the regime withdrew the police
detectives and informers from campuses.490 With regard to student activities, student
organizations were allowed to be autonomously organized and self-managed. However,

4,9 The National Conference for Democracy and Unification (Minju Tongil Kookminhoeui) was
established on 16 October 1984. Its major goal was to support individuals and organizations of democratic
civil society for democratization. This organization considered a divided nation as a root source of foreign
dependency, military dictatorship, mental disarray, intra-national animosity, and uneven development For
the National Conference for Democracy and Unification, democratization and unification were inseparable
and had to be achieved for the freedom and emancipation of the Minjung. It tried to undertake the
grassroots movements towards democratization and unification. In order to induce and galvanize the
nationwide mass mobilization. The Minju Tongil Kukminhoeui organized its branches in major cities and
provinces, and published "Minju Tongil (Democracy and Unification).” Dong-A Daily, 18 October 1984.
490 Even after the regime implemented the decompression policy, the government agents disguised
as students and infiltrated the campus to observe student activists. This secret surveillance was often
revealed and caused hostage situations. For example, in September 1984, four secret informers were
exposed by students at Seoul National University 1984, and one of them was detained for 26 hours by
students. These informers were beaten and forced to confess their identity and covert purposes. Asia
Watch Committee, Human Rights in Korea, (New York and Washington D.C.: Asia Watch Committee,
1985), 105.
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unlike the planners’ intention, the regime did not achieve the policy objective, such as
isolation of radical student movement activists from other students and democratic
organizations. Rather, the decompression policy, the so called “campus autonomization”
policy, provided radical students open space for anti-regime movements. Thus, after
three months of preparation, radical students organized a committee for the promotion of
campus autonomy in almost all college campuses as the preparatory organization for
recapturing official student representative bodies.491
During March and April of 1984, radical students focused their efforts on the
internal campus democratization.492 In addition, radical student movement activists
established their own media mechanisms, such as “Freedom Will,” and “Democracy
Wall.”493 They distributed a wide variety of underground publications to the public in
order to reveal the hypocritical nature of the government’s decompression policy, and
challenged the regime’s effort to isolate radical student activists from the public as well
as from ordinary students.494 In this sense, student groups, especially radical students,
emphasized not only the strategy of the “war of movement” but also the “war of
position ” After the intense ideological struggle within student groups, the radical student
organizations finally took over most official student representative bodies by May 1984,
and expanded their activities from campus democratization to the political struggle with

491 Chun Yong-Ho and Park Eun-Sook, interviewed by author, Kwangju and Seoul, 4 and 13, 14,
and 15 September 1999.
Cho Hee-Yon, “80nyundae Hankooksahoiundonguijungaewa 90nyundaeui Baljunbanghyang”
(The Development o f Social Movement of South Korea in the 1980s and Its Future Direction in 1990s),
HankookSahoiundongsa (The History of Social Movement in South Korea), (Seoul: Juksan, 1990), 17.
493 Chang Baek-San, “The Phoenix of 1984: A Vibrant Democratic Mass Movement Erupts in
South Korea,” 5.
494 For example, on 18 May 1984, students of three universities distributed anti-government
handbills in each campus, and protested against the regime. In addition, on May 22, students of
Sungkyunkwoan University distributed anti-government handbills and protested against the regime. DongA Daily, 23 and 31 May 1984.
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the regime. Furthermore, radical students and their organizations pursued the expansion
of their solidarity with other democratic groups and organizations.
From the middle of 1984, the student movement focused on issues of “abolition of
the military authoritarian regime,” “complete disclosure of investigation of the Kwangju
democratic movement,” and “guarantee o f human rights.”495 At the same time, student
movement activists sought to build a coalition with other democratic groups and
organizations, and led most protests of this period 496 Another characteristic of the
student movement in this period was that the student movement became more violent.
For example, on 10 October 1984, about 3,000 students demonstrated inside and outside
of campus, and destroyed a near by police station by throwing stones and firebombs.
They demanded the guarantee of student associations, abolition of laws that were related
to student meetings, abolition of labor repressive laws, removal of the violent
authoritarian regime, and the guarantee of the Chunggye labor union.497 Especially, in
this period, the student movement questioned the legitimacy of the liberal democratic
framework and the U.S. role in the democratization movement. Particularly, two student
organizations, the National Association of Student Representatives and the National
Student Coalition for Democratization Struggle,498 became actively involved in, and led

495 For example, on May 17, students o f 26 universities demonstrated on each campus, and
demanded democratization and total disclosure o f records about the Kwangju uprising. The riot police
confronted students, and forcefully made them disperse. Dong-A Daily, 18 May 1984.
Changes of Slogans in the Student Movement
1984: I) to stop repression toward universities and colleges
198S: I) thorough re-examination of the Kwangju Democratic Movement
2) release of arrested students
3) revision of constitution
496 Choi Yon-Gu, 80nyundae hakseaengundongui enyumjukjojikjuk baljunggoajung (The
Ideological and Organizational Development of the Student Movement in the 1980s), (Seoul: Juksan,
1990), 251.
497 Dong-A Daily, 11 October 1984.
49* The National Student Coalition for Democratization Struggle (Chunkook Minjuhwa Tujaeng
Hasaeng Yunhap) was established by student movement activists of various universities on 3 November
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the student democratic movement in this period. Under the leadership of these
organizations, students began to directly challenge the authority of the regime.
As a sub-organization of the National Student Coalition for Democratization
Struggle, the Committee for Democratization Struggle (Michuhwa Chujin Whvonhoe,
Minchuwt), established on 18 May 1984, foreshadowed a stronger anti-govemment
protest during the summer of 1984. Armed with radical idealogies and strategies, this
underground student organization defined students as the vanguard force of a revolution,
workers as the main force, and farmers and the urban poor as the complementary force,
and opted for the popular uprising by organized masses as the means of revolution.499
The most theatrical event carried by this radical organization was its occupation of the
headquarters of the ruling DJP on 14 November 1984. During two days of a siege
demonstration, 264 students from five well-known universities in Seoul made 14
demands, including an end of the suppression on the labor movement, a lift of the
political ban, the repeal of anti-democratic laws concerning assembly, demonstration, and
the press, the approval of autonomous student associations, and the guarantee of a
minimum standard of living for the minjung.so°
From the beginning of spring semester, student movement activists organized
councils for the promotion of campus autonomy, focusing on internal campus

1984. This organization simultaneously pursued democratization of campus and society. In order to do so,
this organization first resurrected the general student associations as a student body for self-government,
which greatly contributed to the expansion of a mass base for the student movement, evolved later into the
Chundaeui. Second, this organization established the Committees for the Democratization Struggle in
major universities to lead anti-govemment activities and to stand up for the rights of the minjung that
developed into the Mintuhaknyun. In addition, this organization tried to build a nationwide network of
student movement organizations. Especially, it put a lot of energy into creating a structure of mass
persuasion through posters, newsletters, handbills, and pamphlets. Dong-A Daily, 4 November 1984.
499 Kang Shin-Chul and et a!., 80nyundae Haksaeng Undongsa (The History of Student
Movements in the 1980s), 67-8.
500 Hankook Daily, 14 November 1984.
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democratization. In addition, they put a lot of energy into creating a structure of mass
persuasion through posters, newsletters, handbills, and pamphlets.501 In this sense,
student movement activists came to the conclusion that the strategy of the “war of
movement” was not enough to struggle for democratization with the regime that had
already attained hegemony. Thus, student movement activists adopted the strategy of the
“war of position” with the “war of movement” in struggling with the repressive regime.
In terms of strategies, the student movement was carried based on joint
demonstrations with other democratic groups and organizations, such as labor and Jaeya
organizations. For example, in order to maximize the influence of demonstrations,
several neighboring colleges carried out collective demonstrations. Another strategy for
influential demonstrations was carrying them out in several places simultaneously.502
Second, the student movement built a coalition with labor movement activists for
maximizing the influence o f the demonstrations.503 Because third party intervention in
labor organizations was prohibited by the new revisions of labor laws, many students
worked as workers, educated workers, and helped to organize labor organizations during
the repressive period.504

301 Kim Hae-U, “Jayuhwalul numo Minjuhwaro” (Going beyond Autonomization to
Democratization), in Pak Hyun-Jae and et ai., Hyunsilkwa Junmang (Reality and Outlook), 2, (Seoul:
Pulbit, 1985).
502 For example, on May 18, 1984, several hundred students of three universities distributed antigovemment handbills in each campus, and demanded democratization. The riot police arrested 16 students,
and put them in jail for attempting to lead demonstrations. Dong-A Daily, 23 May 1984.
503 As an example case, on 19 September 1984, about 2,000 students and workers demonstrated,
and demanded a guarantee of the Chunggye Labor Union and three basic labor rights. In the confrontation
process, the police arrested about 140 students and workers. Dong-A Daily, 20 September 1984.
304 According to former student movement activists, such as Chun Yong-Ho and Park Eun-Sook,
radical students who were expelled during the harsh suppression period from 1980 to 1983 went to
workplaces to educate workers and helped to organize the labor movement In the decompression period,
those students played a crucial role in establishing a coalition with the radical student organizations. Chun
Yong-Ho, interviewed by author, Kwangju, 4 September 1999; Park Eun-Sook, interviewed by author,
Seoul, 13,14, and 15 September 1999.
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Third, the duality of student organizations was another distinctive characteristic of
this period. Along with official student organizations, radical student movement activists
established illegal violent student organizations. They struggled with the Chun regime
through violent means, such as the occupation of governmental offices and violent
confrontations with the riot police. Students threw stones, bricks, molotov cocktails, and
torches to bum police boxes and vehicles. Finally, along with the radicalized student
movement, the major goal of the student movement changed to a more radical direction
in this decompression period. After student organizations were controlled by radical
student movement activists, they applied radical ideologies in the democratic
movement.505 The ultimate goal of the radical student movement in this period was the
realization of the social revolution. In this respect, an anti-democratic element within
democratic civil society which began to emerge from the previous period beame more
widely spread, and this different goal of movement impeded the influential democratic
movement of civil society.
Although the student group was actively revitalized and led the democratic
movement, it could not avoid a fundamental problem, internal conflicts. There was a
serious ideological and strategic conflict in struggling with the regime within civil
society.506 For example, because of internal divisions within the student group, student
movement activists had difficulty in establishing coalitions with other democratic groups,

505 According to former police officer, Hong Seung-Samng, the state power apparatuses, such as
the police and National Security Planning Agency, believed that the radical student movement was
controlled by the North Korean government, and their ultimate goal of the movement was a social
revolution not democratization. Hong Seung-Sang, interviewed by author, Seoul, 19 August 1999.
506 For example, the “CNP” debate was a representative ideological conflict within the democratic
civil society.
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such as labor unions and organizations, the Jaeya force, and religious communities.507 In
spite of these ideological, strategic, and organizational divisions, the student movement
created a concrete foundation for the future democratic movement, and established
networks with other civil society organizations.
After the regime returned to a repressive policy in late 1984, the student
movement was a main target of the repressive policy again. However, the repressive
policy did not eliminate radicalized student organizations and their movements. Instead,
the regime began to lose control over the student movement. Student movement activists
continuously established their organizations, such as the National Student Coalition for
Democratization Struggle and National Association of Student Representative, and
actively struggled for democratization. Moreover, their political struggles were
intensified along with the emergence of the new opposition NKDP. Student movement
activists believed that the NKDP, led by two Kims, was different from previous
opposition parties because it strongly supported students’ democratic struggle.
From late 1984, the student movement focused on the general election of 1985.
After the NKDP (Sinhanminjudang) was established in January, students voluntarily
helped the election campaign of the new opposition party and fought for changing the
unfair election laws. For example, the Committee for Democratization Struggle
expressed that it supported for the NKDP from December of 1985.508 In addition, on 29
January 1985, about 1,500 students from 15 universities in the Seoul area gathered and
demanded 1) revision of election laws, 2) the guarantee of minimum wages, and 3) the
507 Oh Keun-Suk, 80nyundae Minjokminjuundong (The National and Minjung Movement in the
1980s), (Seoul: Nonjang, 1988), 67.
501 According to Hong Seung-Sang, the members of the Committee for Democratization Struggle
(Minchuwi) held meetings to support the opposition party, and those meetings led to demonstrations. In

248

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

release and reinstatement of arrested politicians and students.509 In this respect, a student
group was the most actively revitalized democratic groups in civil society during the
decompression period and showed radicalized ideologies and strategies in their
movement, even after returning to a repressive policy.

2) Labor Movements
Labor organizations have been one of the most rapidly developed sectors in the
decompression period although the decompression policy did not directly revitalize the
labor movement. However, the decompression weakened the suppression of the labor
movement. Consequently, labor movement activists came out to open ground and
explored new strategies for the labor movement under the decompression period. First,
labor movement activists demanded abolition of a blacklist that the regime made to
prevent politicizing of the labor movement.510 In addition, workers tried to organize new
autonomous unions and to restore democratic unions that had been dissolved by the new
military regime in the early 1980s. For example, in the year 1984 only, about 200 new
unions were established, and the trend of diminishing number o f unions and membership
between 1980-1983 reversed.511

addition, during the election campaign, students visited stumping places, and shouted anti-Chun regime
slogans. Hong Seung-Sang, interviewd by author, Seoul, 19 August 1999.
509 Institute of Gladness and Hope, Amheksokui hwoibul (A Torch o f Darkness: Testimony of
Democratic Movement in the 1970s and 1980s), vol. 6, SOS. In addition, on February 2, about ISO students
of three universities gathered in downtown Seoul, and distributed handbills, which asserted a need of a
democratic election, to citizens.
510 Yun Sang-Chul, I980nyundae Hankookui Minjuhwaihaengkwajung (The Democratic
Transition Process of South Korea in the 1980s), 108.
311 Shin Keum-Ho, “Nodomgundongeui Daejungjug Jungaewa Jojikhwaeui Gwaje” (The
Development of Mass Labor Movement and Its Organizational Tasks, in Chunhwan: 6wol Toochanggwa
Minjoohwaeui Jinro (Turning-over June Struggle and the Direction of Democratization, (Seoul: Sagyejul,
1987), 175.
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In this period, two distinctive labor groups emerged with different strategies. One
group, who were leaders o f democratic unions in the 1970s and expelled by the new
regime in the early 1980s, asserted the continuation of the tradition of democratic union
movement The other group, represented by student-tumed-workers, had been actively
involved in the student movement of the 1970s, and later participated in the labor
movement as disguised workers. This group emphasized the importance of political
struggle and direct street protests outside workplaces.512 Thus, these two groups saw the
decompression policy o f the Chun regime differently. The first group saw the
decompression was a new strategy for the regime to adjust to the changed situation. In
contrast with this fired workers group, the former student group viewed the
decompression policy as an outcome of the intransigent struggle against the regime.513
The fired workers group established the Korean Workers’ Welfare Council
(Nohyup) with Catholic priests and students on 10 March 1984.514 It demanded I)
guarantee of basic standard of living, 2) revision of labor laws, 3) fair publication and
broad casting of newspapers and media, 4) stopping repression of the regime toward
students organization which educated workers, and 5) establishment of solidarity with
religious, student, and peasant groups. The Nohyup struggled for 1) improvement for
workers' welfare, 2) publications for individual development, 3) establishment of
scholarships for workers, 4) medical support for workers' health, and 5) improvement for
workers' human rights. It published its own magazine, “Minju Nodong” (Democratic
Labor), to convey workers’ voices that had not been represented in the institutionalized

512 Lee Tae-Bok, interviewed by author, Seoul, 21 October 1999.
513 Lee Jong-Oh, “80nyundae Nodongwoondong roneui Jungaewajungeui Ihaereul Wuihayu” (For
Understanding of the Development o f Labor Movement Strategies in the 80s), 234-35.
514Joongang Daily, 10 March 1984.
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media.515 It called for educated workers to raise their consciousness about deprived
rights, and to understand the structural problems that caused their impoverishment and
alienation. The Nohyup led the petition campaign for the revision of repressive labor
laws, and attempted to reconstruct democratic unions. On the other hand, the studentturned workers group denounced the Nohyup group for its economic unionism and its
emphasis on the struggle within the workplace. Instead, this group stressed the struggle
outside the workplace and organizing street rallies in alliance with radical students in the
worker-concentrated areas.516
The labor movement often emerged sporadically over grievances about working
conditions, as in the case of the taxi drivers’ strikes in Daegu and Busan. Along with
demonstrating for economic issues, labor movement activists continued to demand the
revision of labor laws and criticized the repressive policies toward workers.517 In each
workshop, workers tried to organize new autonomous unions. For example, the
Chunggye apparel labor union, dissolved by the military regime in 1981, was fully
restored on 8 April 1984.518 In addition, the Nohyup and Chunggye apparel labor union
jointly launched a massive campaign against the arbitrary labor laws enacted by the

515 Hankook Nodongja Bokji Hyupuihoi (Korean Workers’ Welfare Council), “Nodong Undongui
Saeroun Chulbalul wihan Soron” (The Declaration for a New Start of Labor Movement), in 80nyundae
Minjung Minju Undong Jayojip I (The Data Collection o f Minjung Democratic Movements in the 1980s),
ed. Hankook Nodongja Bokji Hyupuihoi (Seoul: Hakminsa, 1984).
5l6Lee Jong-Oh, “80nyundae Nodongwoondong roneui Jungaewajungeui Ihaereui Wuihayu” (For
Understanding o f the Development of Labor Movement Strategies in the 80s), 237-38.
s>7 Although the suppression on the labor movement was weakened compared with previous
periods, the regime still suppressed labor movement activists and organizations with physical and legal
means because the decompression measures focused the student organizations and their activities.
511 Workers o f labor unions in the Chunggye area established Chunggye Apparel Labor Union for
improvement of working condition, raising working wage, guarantee of basic working rights. In addition,
this organization tried to establish solidarity with students and other labor organizations, and supported
other labor movements. It published "Chunggyenobo.” The regime announced that this creation of union
was a violation of the labor law, and the regime will strongly respond toward future activities of this
organization. Dong-A Daily, 9 April 1984.
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LCNS (Legislative Council for National Security) during the formative years of the
Chun’s authoritarian regime.
The most distinctive characteristic of the labor movement in this period was that it
focused on building national or regional organizations to expand workers’ solidarity.519
Workers realized that an individual union was not strong enough to secure their demands,
and thus umbrella organizations were required to collect and organize resources of
isolated labor unions. The relaxation o f the suppression on workers’ collective actions
created spontaneous outbreaks of workers’ protests against the wage freeze policy, long
working hours, and insecure working environments. Additionally, they tried to build
solidarity with other democratic groups and organizations, especially with students, and
struggled against the Chun regime. For example, about 2,000 students and workers
demonstrated and demanded guarantees for the Chunggye labor union and three basic
labor rights on September 19, 1984.520 The major reason labor movement activists tried
to build solidarity with students was that the students’ role in educating workers through
“night schools” was very significant in the success of the labor movement.521 Through
the “night school,” workers could have a close relationship with students in their struggle
with the regime. For example, the Kuro alliance strike in 1985 was an examplary joint
action of solidarity with students and the urban intellectuals involved in the strike.522 For
119 Shin Keum-Ho, “Nodongwoondongeui Daejungjug Jungaewa Jojikhwaeui Gwaje” (The
Development of Mass Labor Movement and Its Organizational Tasks), 175.
520 Dong-A Daily, 20 September 1984.
521 According to democratic movement activists, many expelled students, became employees,
concentrated on educating workers and supported the labor movement and labor movement In the “night
school,” former and current students educated workers to have political consciousness. Especially, in the
“night school,” workers leaned why they needed well-organized unions and needed to struggle with regime.
Chun Yong-Ho, interviewed by author, Kwangju, 4 September 1999; Hagen Koo, “The State, Minjung, and
the Working Class in South Korea,” 151.
522 As a consequence of this strike, 30 workers were arrested, 20 were charged, and more than
1,000 lost their job. Hangukyeoksa yeonguhwoi (A Society for the Study of Korean History), Hanguk
Hyundaesa 4_(Korean Modem History 4), (Seoul: Pulbik, 1991), 120.
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two reasons, the Kuro alliance strike strongly affected a character of the labor movement
First, after this strike, class consciousness among workers was gradually developed.
Second, after this event the priority of the labor movement changed from an economic
struggle to a political struggle against the authoritarian regime.523
However, along with returning to a repressive policy in late 1984, the labor
movement like other democratic groups and organizations, faced harsh suppression. The
regime arrested leaders of labor unions and organizations, and tried to isolate the labor
movement from other democratic groups and organizations, especially from student
movement activists. In addition, the regime focused on finding expelled students in
working places, and arrested them.524 As a consequence of the harsh suppression on
labor organizations, the labor movement sharply shrank and lost its movement direction.

3) The Jaeya Force
The political space opened by the decompression policy accelerated the
reconstruction of the Jaeya force. Along with student groups, the Jaeya force played a
active role in struggling for democratization. Due to the decompression policy, many
Jaeya leaders were released and reinstated. For example, on 21 December 1983, the
government announced that it released 172 political prisoners and reinstated 142 of
them.525 In fact, the regime intended to divide democratic civil society through absorbing
Jaeya leaders into the institutional political arena. However, unlike the regime’s
523 Um Joo-Ung, “Byunhyukjuk Nodongundongui Daejunghwawa Gyegeupjuk jipyungui
Hwakdae” (Popularization of Revolutionary Labor Movement and Expansion of the Class Consciousness),
155.
524 According to Hong Seung-Sang, the police caught more than 300 workers, who were expelled
students, and investigated them from August 1983 to June 1984. Hong Seung-Sang, interviewed by author,
Seoul, 19 August 1999.
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intention, the Jaeya force played a significant role in revitalizing other democratic groups
and in establishing the new opposition NKDP. For example, the Youth Coalition for
Democratic Movement (Minchtmgryun)526 was the first voluntary organization o f the
Jaeya force after the decompression policy was implemented. The Minchtmgryun,
established by a group of former student movement activists on 30 September 1983,
concentrated on supporting the political struggle of other democratic groups, such as
professors, journalists, and other sympathetic intellectuals and professionals.527 In
addition, dissident artists, musicians, poets and novelists formed the Council of Minjung
Culture Movement (.Minjung Munhwa Undong Hyupuihoe)52* in April 1984. In their
view,
Culture which has thrived up to today in this society is the culture of
slaves which tames masses and makes them spiritless and loyal subjects
subordinated to capital and power. Thus, it was not national culture, but a
colonial one; not a culture as an expression of the minjung (mass), but a
government-manufactured one imposed unilaterally upon them by internal
and external forces of domionation; a culture oriented not to national
unification, but to national division.529

525 Institute of Gladness and Hope, Amheksokui hwoibul (A Torch of Darkness: Testimony of
Democratic Movement in the 1970s and 1980s), vol. S, 658.
526 The Youth Coalition for Democratic Movement (Minchtmgryun) was an organization for
official and open democratic struggle against the regime. The Minchungryun emphasized to establish
solidarity among conscious intellectuals, religious organizations, politicians, workers, and peasants, and to
struggle for democratization and national unification. The Minchungryun tried to do following things for
struggles: 1) the restoration of the struggle potential, 2) the collection o f youth energies, 3) the formation of
concrete ties with other movement forces such as labor, peasant, and student movements, 4) the support for
minjung movements as they seek solutions to their problems, and 5) investigations and research for the
purpose of guiding the direction o f movements. It had a regular publication. Path to Democratization.
Dong-A Daily, 3 October 1983.
527 Choi Jang-Jip, HyvndaeHankookjungchiui Gujowa Byunhwa (Contemporary Korean Politics:
Structure and Change), (Seoul: Ggachi, 1989), 214.
J2> The Council of Minjung Culture Movement (Minjung Munwha Undong Hyobuihoe),
established on 14 April 1984, concentrated on development of Minjung culture and guarantee o f human
rights. The Minjung Munhwa Undong Hyobuihoe endeavored to overcome the monopoly structure of
culture and promote the creation and development o f minjung culture, which represented the minjung's
aspiration to and practice for independence and human integrity. Dong-A Daily, 15 April 1984.
529 Minjung Munhwa Undong Hyupuihoe, “Balkimoon (The Statement of the Foundation),” in
80nyundae Minjung Minju Undong Jayojip //(The Data Collection o f Minjung Democratic Movements in
the 1980s), ed. Minjung Munhwa Udong Hyupuihoe (Seoul: Hakminsa, 1984), 14.
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Thus, they endeavored to overcome the monopoly structure of culture and
promoted the creation and development of the mirtjung culture,530 which represented their
aspirations for independence and human integrity. In addition, on March 24, discharged
journalists established the Council of Discharged Pressmen (Haejik Ollonin Hybuihoe).
It argued that maintenance of freedom of the press would be necessary for national unity
and democratization by making it possible to articulate and mediate various opinions
from all walks o f life. This organization tried to connect itself with minjung groups and
organizations by expressing its support for the minjung’s efforts to insure their rights to
survival.531 On 19 December 1984, Jaeya writers, such as Kim Yon-Han, Park Doo-Jin,
Kim Chun-Han, Yang Sung-Woo, and Lee Ho-Chul, also established the Council of
Writers for Freedom (Chayu Silchun Munin Hyubuihoe) to support other democratic
groups and organizations through developing Minjung literature. It also laid its plans for
establishing theories and methods for national and minjung literature, legally
guaranteeing the freedom of literary expression, and strengthening the solidarity among
literary men. This organization published th e "Silchun MunhaK' in order to convey its
assertions532
Especially, the Council for the Promotion of Democratization {Minchuhyup),S33
formed by the co-chairmanship of the two Kims on 18 May 1984, strongly influenced the
democratic movement of not only the Jaeya force but also other groups and organizations
as well as the opposition party. The Minchuhyup resolved to wage struggles for the end
530 The “minjung' was different from the mass because the former was not simply the object of
domination but the subject of history which could transform the relationship of domination from those who
suppressed it Yu Jae-Chun,” Seoron: Minjung Gaenyumui Naepowa Oewon” (Introduction: the
Connotation and Denotation of the Concept of Minjung), in Minjung (Mass), ed. Yu Jae-Chun (Seoul:
Munhak kwa Bipyung, 1984).
531 Joongang Daily, 25 March 1984.
532 Dong-A Daily, 19 December 1984.
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of miliary politics and the construction of liberal democracy to protect and expand
citizen’s rights to political participation.534 It also professed to act in concert with the
efforts of workers, farmers, the urban poor, and students for the minjung's right
In order to enhance solidarity and cooperation among democratic groups and
organizations and embark on more influential anti-govemment activities, two national
organizations were established in 1984. First leaders of the youth, labor, farmers, and
religious communities formed a coalition organization, the Council o f Minjung
Democratic Movement (Minjung Minju Undong Hyobuihoe-Minminhyup),535 on 29 June
1984. Later, the National Conference for Democracy and Reunification (Minju Tongil
kookmin Hoeeui), successor to the National Coalition for Democracy and Unification of
the late 1970s, was established as a national organization for a number of anti
authoritarian coalition forces. After these two nationwide coalition organizations were
established, numerous regional Jaeya organizations joined either the Minminhyup or the
National Conference as affiliated organizations. In addition, the Jaeya force was also
activated in local areas. For example, members of the Jaeya force in the Inchon area
created the Inchon League of Social Movements (Insayun) on 19 November 1984, and
533Joongang Daily, 19 May 1984.
334 Minjuhwa Undong Chungnyun Yonhap, “Monjuhwa Donghyang" (The Tendency of
Democratization), Minjuhwaui Gil, 3, (1984): 10-14.
335 The Council of Minjung Democratic Movement (Minjung Minju Undong HyobuihoeMinminhyup), established under leadership o f Kim Seng-Hun, Lee Boo-Young, and Kim Dong-Wan on 29
June 1984, demanded restoration of democracy, guarantee of human rights, and integration of various
social, religious and political organization o f democratic civil society. The Minminhyup also tried to
enhance solidarity and cooperation among the movement groups and embark on more influential antigovemment activities. It had five goals: I) to change the monopolistic economic system for a few
privileged classes into an independent national economy which would ensure a decent life for the minjung,
2) to disclose the political and social causes that generate distrust, hatred, crime and decadence and to take
measures against them, 3) to clean up polluted environments, 4) to find a peaceful way to national
unification, S) to keep an eye on international politics around the Korean peninsula in an effort to bring
peace to the peninsula. This organization linked with the Hankook Nodongja Bokji Hyobuihoe,
Minchongrun, Minjuhwa Chujin Hyobuihoe, Catholic Clergy for the Realization o f Justice (Chunjukyo
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struggled for liberal democracy, improvement of human rights, and the constitutional
revision. In addition, it tried to establish solidarity with other democratic organizations
as a strategy for an influential struggle.
Especially, the Jaeya force was actively involved not only in the democratic
struggle, such as issuing public statements and demonstrations on streets, but also in
unifying diverse democratic groups and organizations, setting agandas, and coordinating
the democratic movement. After the decompression policy, the Jaeya force was different
than it had been in the 1970s. Most Jaeya organizations in the 1970s were established by
the progressive middle class, such as religious and intellectual notables concerned mainly
with human rights violations. Thus, those organizations paid secondary concern to the
socioeconomic conditions of base popular masses, such as workers, peasants, and the
urban poor. Such elitism prevailed in the Jaeya force of the 1970s to the extent that the
popular masses were not a leading part of the movement but the object of mobilization
and education. In contrast, the Jaeya force of the 1980s expanded their base at the
grassroots level, and developed a mass character. As a consequence, the leadership of the
Jaeya force shifted from the middle-class intellectuals to leaders of workers, peasants,
and students. However, the largest and most powerful Jaeya force organizations were
under the control of two Kims.536
With a change of the leadership, the Jaeya force faced an internal ideological
conflict, as did student groups. The major issue of the conflict was an ultimate goal of
the struggle. Whereas conservative Jaeya groups concentrated on restoring a democratic
constitution and changing the political power structure, the progressive Jaeya groups had
Jungui Kuhyun Sajedan), Christian Fanners' Association (Kidokyo Nongminhoi), and it published
"Minjung ui Sori (The Voice o f Minjung)." Dong-A Daily, 29 June 1984.
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a violent and revolutionary character and demanded substantial democracy. In particular,
the ideological conflict within the Jaeya force appeared as an ideological confrontation
between these two Kims because most Jaeya organizations were strongly influenced by
the two Kims. Kim Young-Sam’s ideology and strategy for the democratic movement
was a more moderate than Kim Dae-Jung’s. Thus, radical factions of the Jaeya force
came to gather under Kim Dae-Jung’s leadership, and moderate factions supported Kim
Young-Sam. This ideological confrontation functioned not only to obstruct the
democratic movement in the decompression period, but it also prevented uniting
presidential candidates in the 1987 election. Along with this ideological conflict within
the Jaeya force, the participation of many Jaeya leaders, including Kim Young-Sam and
Kim Dae-Jung, in the new opposition NKDP unfavorably affected the Jaeya movement.
In fact, the regime did not anticipate the establishment of a new opposition party at the
time it implemented the decompression policy. Rather, the regime expected that the
Jaeya leaders would be integrated into the pre-existing opposition parties that had been
artificially established by the regime. Thus, the regime believed that it could control the
Jaeya leaders and opposition party as it had controlled the former opposition parties.
Along with the estblishment of the NKDP, the role of the Jaeya force began to
decline and the center of democratic movement moved from the Jaeya force to the
NKDP. Jaeya leaders’ participation in the NKDP made the Jaeya force difficult to
struggle effectively with regime, and the Jaeya movement that lost its prominent leaders
became inconsequential. On the contrary, there was a positive effect. Democratic civil
society was able to struggle more actively and effectively with the regime because the
new opposition party, which Jaeya leaders participated in, strongly supported political
536 Dong-A Daily, 12 October 1984.
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struggles of civil society. Moreover, democratic civil society could build a coalition and
cooperate more easily with the NKDP that understood and had a close relationship with
democratic civil society. Therefore, the democratic movement of civil society came to be
more influential and assertive. In this respect, Jaeya leaders’ participation in the NKDP
had both positive and negative effects on democratic civil society and its democratic
movement537

4) Religious Communities
After the Chun regime implemented the decompression policy in late 1983, the
role of religious communities changed again. During the suppression period from 1980
to 1983, religious communities had concentrated their efforts on behalf of the interests of
labor unions, peasants, and the urban poor by protecting and supporting other democratic
groups and organizations. For example, the Catholic Peasant Association (Kanong)
carried out a movement that tried to destroy a structural contradiction for solving
peasants’ problems and to establish a genuine peasants community.538 On the other hand,
during the decompression period, the role of religious communities declined because
other democratic groups and organizations, such as students and workers, came to have
more leeway in opposing the authoritarian regime. Ironically, the expansion of the
political opportunity structure weakened the role of religious communities.
Thus, religious communities sought new directions of their struggles. At the same
time, religious organizations, such as the Council of Korean Human Rights Movement,

537 Yun Sang-Chul. I980nyundae Hankookui Minjuhwa ihaengkwajung (The Democratic
Transition Process of South Korea in the 1980s), 111.
S3SCatholic Peasant Association, Nongmin Haebanggoa MinjoktongUeul hyanghaye (For the
Liberation of Peasants and National Unification), (Seoul: Minjungsa, 1986), 48.
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established in December 1977, more actively struggled for improvement of human rights.
In addition, religious communities realized the necessity of basing the democratic
struggle on organizations. Thus, they concentrated their efforts on building a coalition
with other democratic groups and organizations. For instance, Catholic and Protestant
organizations protested President Chun's visit to Japan when they gathered and
celebrated the Independence Day on 15 August 1984 with about 1,500 students and
members of Jaeya organizations.539
Religious communities also supported democratic struggles of other democratic
groups and organizations. Protestant workers established the Coalition of Korean
Protestant Labor (Kinoryun) on 3 February 1985. The Kinoryun worked to improve
working conditions, raise wages, and support the democratic movement by mobilizing
workers. It also focused on building solidarity with a student group.540 In addition, the
Protestant church organizations, such as the UIM, supported struggles for the
improvement of human rights conditions, social and economic justice, the release of
arrested workers, and punishment o f people who suppressed workers. In particular, the
UIM concentrated on building solidarity with other democratic groups, such as labor
organizations, and exchanging information with workers.541
Catholic clergy and organizations concentrated their efforts on educating people
at the parish level and supporting struggles of other democratic groups and organizations.
Through these efforts, the Catholic church and sub-organizatons, like the Council of
Catholic Social Movement, focused on social issues, such as the improvement of human

539 Dong-A Daily, 16 August 1984.
340This organization also published newsletter the "Gitbal." Dong-A Daily, 5 February I98S.
541 Joongang Daily, 5 February 1985.
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rights conditions.542 Along with this social movement, some religious organizations,
such as the NCPCRJ, continued to criticize the authoritarian rule of the Chun regime and
also worked on educating people to be politically aware. For example, the NCPCRJ sent
a letter to President Chun on 31 October 1983, demanding an end to illegal arrest and
torture, and pointing out the decrease in credibility of the Justice Department as well as
the presence of discrimination inside jails and other violations of human rights.543
The Protestant church also sought ways to contribute to the democratic movement
of civil society. One effort was to integrate various divided organizations for more
influential struggles for democratization. For instance, the NCCK integrated various
religious organizations of the Protestant church and supported other human rights
movements in the early 1980s. In addition, the Korean Ecumenical Youth Council
(EYC) issued a public statement on 16 January 1984 which strongly demanded to stop
harsh suppression of students who served in the “night school” in working places and
churches.544 The Korean Student Christian Federation (KSCF, Hankook Kidok Haksaeng
Chongyonmaeng), established on 25 April 1984, also strongly opposed the regime by
cooperating with other democratic groups and organizations.545
However, the regime continued to constrain political activities of religious clergy
and organizations through legal and physical measures under the decompression policy.

542The Council of Catholic Social Movement, established by leaders of religious organization
(Catholic) and members of Catholic social movement organizations in August 1984, was especially
interested in improvement o f human rights and improvement of conditions of the urban poor.
543 Institute of Gladness and Hope, Amheksokui hwoibul (A Torch of Darkness: Testimony of
Democratic Movement in the 1970s and 1980s), vol. 5, 6S4.
344 Institute of Gladness and Hope, Amheksokui hwoibul (A Torch of Darkness: Testimony of
Democratic Movement in the 1970s and 1980s), vol. 6,616-17.
545 In addition, this organization issued a pubic statement on October 30. In the statement, the
KSCF demanded to stop suppression on the labor movement, and urged to guarantee the labor union of the
Daewoo Apparel. Institute o f Gladness and Hope, Amheksokui hwoibul (A Torch of Darkness: Testimony
o f Democratic Movement in the 1970s and 1980s), vol. 6,622, and 631.
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For example, the regime’s response to the establishment of new organizations, such as
the Korean Workers’ Welfare Council, was severe. The regime immediately defined
these new organizations as anti-government organizations, and arrested their leaders.546
In spite of the decline o f their role in the democratic movement during the decompression
period, both Catholic and Protestant churches were actively involved in social
movements. Religious communities continued to establish social organizations and
supported social movements of civil society at the organizational level. After the regime
changed its policy to a repressive plicy, religious clergy and organizations began to play
an important role once again in the democratic movement. Especially, after the new
opposition NKDP was established, religious communities became actively involved in
the election campaign.547

5) Minjung Movement
In this period, no word came to mean more to anti-govemment activists and
critical intellectuals than “minjung,” in both its cognitive and moral aspects. A group of
intellectuals became preoccupied with the people who were alienated and oppressed in
the process of industrialization, calling them “minjung.” Literally, “minjung' meant “the
majority of people governed by a few power elites.” The “minjung' was different from
the mass because the former was not simply the object of domination but the subject of
history.548 Nevertheless, there has been no agreement over the precise definition of

546 Hong Seung-Sang, interviewed by author, Seoul, 19 August 1999.
347 Because defacto leaders of the NKDP, Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung, were Protestant
and Catholic Christians, religious communities could involve naturally in the election campaign and
supported the opposition party.
541 Yu Jae-Chun,” Seoron: Minjung Gaenyumui Naepowa Oewon” (Introduction: the Connotation
and Denotation o f the Concept of Minjung), in Minjung (Mass), ed. Yu Jae-Chun (Seoul: Munhak kwa
Bipyung, 1984).
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minjung. Minjung scholars from various disciplines tried to identify the minjung, and
understand their consciousness and the artistic expression of restrained feelings of anger,
despair, and hope. The minjung ideology took shape in the process o f and as the outcome
of debates on the definition of minjung, the structure of domination and the historical
mission the minjung took upon their shoulders. The discourse of the minjung tended to
be against the ruling ideology because an analysis of the minjung involved a critical
reading of the ruling ideology and the imaginary creation of a “better’' world.
The minjung movement began from the early 1970s when the negative effects of
rapid industrialization and authoritarian rule on civil society began to appear. One
significant event that stimulated intellectuals was a worker’s sucide. On 13 November
1970, Chun Tae-Il burned himself to death during a labor strike to be treated as a human.
It was a great shock not merely to the general public but, more profoundly, to many
intellectuals.549 Chun’s death turned the intellectuals’ attention to the dark side of
industrialization, including labor problems, which had been overlooked due to the
dominance of developmentalism. The immediate response to his death came from
students. Student movement activists waged demonstrations for the protection of
people’s rights, and tried to build a coalition with the labor movement This incident
awakened the concern for equality and social justice, and many liberal intellectuals came
to embrace those issues under a general theme of democratization.550
The meaning of the “minjung? began to change to more radical from the early
1980s. The failure of the “Spring of Democracy” in 1980, which had ushered in new
549 Yi Tae-Ho, “I970nyundae Nodong Undong ui Kwejuk” (The Track of Labor Movement in the
1970s), in Yushin Chejewa Minjuhwa Undong (The Yushin Regime and Democratic Movements), ed. Han
Sung-Hun (Seoul: Samminsa, 1984), 194.
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hopes for establishing a democratic government after President Park’s death, forced the
minjung intellectuals to critically reflect upon the past theoretical discussions and their
practical implications. They attributed the failure of democratization and frustration over
the Kwangju democratic movement to several limitations of the democratic movement in
the 1970s .S5> First, previous democratic movements were denounced as political
romanticism which merely made a moral critique of political coercion and economic
inequality without a perspective of or will to acquire political power and the
transformation of the economic system. Second, the movement intellectuals understood
the absence of a purposive vanguard that could change the autogenous mass movement
into a system-transformative movement. Third, they pointed out the class limitations of
the intellectual-led democratic movement of the 1970s and felt it necessary to encourage
the politicization of the working class as a main force for the democratic struggle.
Finally, self-crticism was undertaken for not recognizing the foreign force, particularly
the United States, behind the military dictatorship.
In the discourse of the minjung, a more radicalized orientation that was
unambiguously distinguished from the ideology of the 1970s’ minjung intellectuals was
shown. For example an unknown author claimed:
The revolution we want to achieve must be defined as the minjung
democratic national revolution. Why is it the minjung democratic
revolution? Because the subject of revolution is the minjung and the new
political system the revolution will build is not bourgeois democracy in
which the minjung dominates. Why the national revolution? Because it is
the revolution against the imperial, comprador monopoly capital, and the

550 Sohn Hak-Kyu, Authoritarianism and Opposition in South Korea (London: Routledge, 1989),
34-5.
S]l Cho Hi-Yon, “80nyundae Sahoe Undong kwa Sahoegusungche Nonjaeng (Social Movements
of the 1980s and Debates on Social Formation),” in Hankook Sahoe Gusungche Nonjaeng (The Debate on
Korean Social Formation), 1, eds. Pak Hyon-Chae and Cho Hi-Yon (Seoul: Chuksan, 1989), 15.
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new economic system the revolution will construct is an economy taking
the form of national revolution.552
It is not difficult to find Marxist elements in the above statement The new
discourse of the minjung was constructed not from the ideals of liberal democracy which
had occupied the hearts of the minjung intellectuals in the 1970s, but from the theoretical
logic and ideology of Marxism and neo-Marxism. In contrast democracy was
understood as a political form of class domination or as a political means to realize class
interest. In this respect an anti-democratic element which began to emerged within
radical student groups in the previous period spread to the Minjung movement.

3. Emergence of the New Opposition Party and the General Election in 1985
One distinctive characteristic in the institutional political arena in this period was
the appearance of a genuine opposition political party. Between 1980 and 1983,
opposition parties, such as the Democratic Korean Party and the Korean Nationalist
Party, had been unable and unwilling to critcize and challenge the regime because tight
control of the regime. What the authoritarian regime had in mind in implementing a
series of liberalizing measures in 1983 and 1984 was further fragmentation of the
opposition force and restoration of legitimacy.553
However, the decompression policy provided an opportunity for the establishment
of a disloyal opposition party. In November 1984, the Chun regime lifted the ban on

552 Kidok Chungnyun Munhwa Yonguso, Chiha Munso (Underground Document), (Seoul:
Komok, 1989), 14.
333 Yun Sang-Chul, !980nyundae Hankookui Minjuhwaihaengkwajung (The Democratic
Transition Process of South Korea in the 1980s), 111.
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political activities for 84 persons who had been on a blacklist554 Many of newly
reinstated opposition politicians later actively paricipated in the establishment of the
NKDP on 18 January 1985, immediately before the National Assembly election in
February 1985. Moreover, Kim Dae-Jung, expelled to the United States by the Chun
regime, announced his return to Korea.555 Thus, Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung,
veteran opposition politicians previously banned from political life, became de facto
leaders of the NKDP.
The politics of the authoritarian breakdown began in earnest with the formation of
the NKDP and its electoral alignment with democratic civil society. Although there were
some radical groups and organizations in civil society that attempted to boycott the
National Assembly election, the majority of civil society groups and organizations
decided to participate in the election, raising the issues of democracy, a direct presidential
election, and local autonomy. Furthermore, democratic civil society directly and
indirectly supported the newly established NKDP. In January 1985, for instance, the
Youth League for Democratic Movement publicly announced that its members would
back the NKDP which represented “the pain of the people.”556 Many student and
religious organizations vigorously campaigned for the NKDP. In spite of the active
support, leaders of the new NKDP were skeptical about the outcome of the election. Not
only were election laws much more advantageous for the ruling DJP, but also there were
many restrictions on individual and party campaign rallies. For instance, opposition

554 The United State Department of State, Current Reports on Human Rights Practice 1983
(Washington: GPO, February 1984), 817.
55 Washington Post, Thursday, 3 January 1985, A2
536 Yun Sang-Chul, I980nyundae Hankookui Minjuhwaihaengkwajung (The Democratic
Transition Process of South Korea in the 1980s), 121.
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candidates were prohibited from using the term “dictatorship” in reference to the present
government, and they suffered from physical attacks by government agencies.
Nevertheless, voters were excited by various pro-democracy slogans used by
democratic groups and organizations, and also enthusiastic about the possibility of having
a real opposition party. In particular, South Korean voters were particularly excited
about the NKDP’s proposal of direct presidential election. Besides this issue, other
important campaign issues were as follows; 1) the end of the military dictatorship, 2) the
re-investigation of the Kwangju democratic movement and punishment of people who
0

were involved in suppression, 3) the censure of injustice and corruption, and 4) the
removal the prohibition of political activities and house arrest of Kim Dae-Jung and Kim
Young-Sam.
The turnout in the National Assembly elections on 12 February 1985, was 84.6%,
which was the highest since the 1950s. As Table 5-3 shows, the NKDP emerged as a
leading opposition party, unexpectedly winning 29.26% of the votes, compared to
35.25% for the ruling DJP. After the election, the strategy of nationwide civil society
organizations and the NKDP was to make the legitimacy question the only and the most
important political issue.557 The coalition between democratic civil society and the
NKDP lived beyond the National Assembly elections, and later developed into a grand
opposition coalition. The wind o f the opposition party unexpectedly turned out to be a
typhoon. One reporter observed that:
It was an explosion of public opinion that had been hidden so far. It was a
“tornado of public opinion,” which neither the ruling party nor opposition
parties, neither candidates nor the electorates could expect at all. The 12th
general election of 1985 was a stem judgement to the parties and
557 James Cotton, “From Authoritarianism to Democracy in South Korea,” Political Studies 37
(1989): 251.
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politicians that did not read the wishes of the people. It was a victory of
the popular will reconfirming the common truth that people are not stupid,
a positive advance for democracy in Korea teaching a lesson on the power
of the people to bring about a change if necessary. It was a fearful
election that neutralized money, organization, career, and prestige before
firm judgements of the electorate.5
The NKDP emerged as a formidable disloyal opposition party through the general
election. The “new party tornado” swept the entire country, shocking not only the
authoritarian regime and the DJP but also the NKDP itself. Moreover, in early April, 29
out of the 35 newly elected legislators belonging to the Democratic Korean Party, the
loyal opposition between 1980 and 1985, switched their allegiance to the NKDP. With
additional defections from another minority party, the Korea Nationalist Party, the NKDP
increased its representation to 102 seats in the 276-member National Assembly.
Table 5-3
Results of the National Assembly Election in 1985
Party
Others
NKDP
DJP
DKP
KNP
Total
Seats
67
148
35
7
19
276
Vote(%)
29.26
19.68
6.66
32.25
9.15
100.00
Source: CE\ C(Central Election Management Committee), Je 12 dae kooi how uiwon
sungu chongram, Seoul: CEMC, 1985.
Boosted by the election result and the defections of many legislators from other
opposition parties, the NKDP vigorously began to press the ruling DJP and regime to
open a dialogue for constitutional revision. Particularly, the new NKDP pressured the
regime to adopt a direct presidential election system that had been the focus of its pledge
during the election campaign.559 However, the motions of the NKDP legislators to deal

551 Yi Kyung-Jae and Kim Tae-Gon, “Minuiga whoiorichin Chongsun Hyunjang” (The Scene of
General Election whirled by Public Opinion), Shindong-A (March I98S): 187.
SS9 As strategies for the election campaign, the new party emphasized 1) cessation of the military
regime, 2) complete investigation of punishment of its related people, 3) censure of injustice and
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with the issue of the constitutional revision inside the National Assembly were only met
by the categorical rejection of the DJP.
One distinctive change after the election was that the NKDP and civil society
eatablished a grand opposition coalition. Another change was that the center of the
democratic movement moved from democratic civil society to the NKDP. The
repression policy that resumed from late 1984 constrained the political struggle of
democratic civi society. The policy focused on democratic groups and organizations, and
less on the opposition party. Because of this dual policy of the regime, the opposition
party struggled with the regime more actively than demcratic civil society. Therefore, the
emergence of the strong opposition NKDP was another important turning point in the
democratic movement of the mid-1980s. As a result, the regime had to deal with the
democratic struggle inside and outside the institutional political arena, and it was more
difficult to control the democratic movement of civil society and the NKDP.

4. Retreat to a Repressive Policy
When democratic civil society continued to take advantage of the decompression
measures, the government rescinded its decompression policy and returned to a
repressive policy in late 1984. In particular, students’ violent activities strongly affected
the decision of the regime to return to a repressive policy. For instance, after students
had occupied the headquarters of the DJP in November 1984, the government announced
that it would investigate not only students who participated in the occupation, but also

corruption, 4) increase o f national debt, 5) demand of Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung’s release from
house arrest
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leaders who might have masterminded it from behind the scenes.560 The government
used the incident as an opportunity to eliminate radical democratic organizatio n s and
their leaders.561 As a result, 102 students were dismissed in the seven months between
March and October 1985, while only 47 students had been expelled from their schools in
allof 1984.562
Besides the student movement, the Chun regime began to suppress other
democratic groups and organizations, such as workers and religious communities. For
example, on 23 November 1984, the police arrested Rev. Go Young-Geun because of the
contents of his new book that criticized the goverment.563 As a result of suppession, the
political prisoner population also increased rapidly. While there were 109 political
prisoners on 27 November 1984, this number swelled to 704 on 20 November 1985.564
However, there was a big difference in the repression policy of this period. The regime
was tolerant of political activities of the Jaeya force and opposition politicians whereas it
harshly suppressed the student movement and labor movement activists. For instance, in
spite of harsh suppression on democratic civil society, the regime released and reinstated
former opposition politicians and Jaeya leaders, such as Moon Ik-Hwan and Lee HaeChanon 1 December 1984.565

560 Dong-A Daily, 17 May 1984.
561 For example, on December 14,1984, the police arrested Chairman of the Minjuhwa Tujaeng
HaksaengYonhap for the occupation of the headquarters of ruling DJP. Dong-A Daily, 14 December 1984.
Chosun Daily, 7 November 1985.
563 Institute of Gladness and Hope, Amheksokui hwoibul (A Torch of Darkness: Testimony of
Democratic Movement in the 1970s and 1980s), vol. 6,632.
564 Christian Institute for the Study of Justice and Development, I970nyundae
Minioowhaundonggwa K/</qggyo.(Democratization Movements and the Church in the 1970s), (Seoul:
CISJD, 1983), 105.
165 The United State Department of State, Current Reports on Human Rights Practice 1983,
(Washington: GPO, February 1984), 817. Moreover, the regime reinstated 14 former politicians and Jaeya
leaders, including Kim Young-Sam, Kim Jong-Pil, and Kim Dae-Jung on March 6,1985. Institute of
Gladness and Hope, Amheksokui hwoibul (A Torch of Darkness: Testimony of Democratic Movement in
the 1970s and 1980s), vol. 6,637.
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The goal of this dual policy o f the Chun regime was to make democratic civil
society quiet through harsh suppression, and to make the opposition parties activate.
Through this policy, the regime attempted to break down the grand coalition, and to
isolate civil society from not only the political party but also the public. In addition, the
DJP tried to maintain majority status in the National Assembly through inducing split of
the opposition parties by the dual policy.
However, the supression of democratic civil society was not quite effective in this
period. Under the suppression, democratic civil society struggled more radically and
violently with the Chun regime. Furthermore, the support of the middle class to
democratic civil society did not decline. For example, not only democratic groups and
organizations but also the middle class did actively support and participate in the election
campaign of the NKDP in spite of threats of the regime.566 In this respect, the public
discourse was slowly shifting from the regime to the opposition force. Unlike the
expectation of the regime, the result of the dual repressive policy made a strong
opposition party appear rather than split the opposition parties. The dual repressive
policy also caused the center of the democratic movement to change from democratic
civil society to the NKDP, and made democratic civil society have a more radical and
violent character in struggling with the regime.
In this respect, the retreat to the repressive policy for controlling revitalized
opposition force did not work. Rather, the regime was slowly losing its hegemony.
Democratic civil society was more radicalized and actively struggled for democratization

566This active support of the middle class to the opposition force was shown in the turnout 84.2%
o f the turnout in the general election of 1985 was the highest turnout since the establishment of the Yushin
regime. Institute of Gladness and Hope, Amheksokui hwoibul (A Torch of Darkness: Testimony of
Democratic Movement in the 1970s and 1980s), vol. 6,636.
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under harsh suppression. In addition, the emergence of the strong opposition party
helped democratic civil society to be more assertive, active, united, and influential one.

S. Changes of Democratic Civil Society
The decompression policy of the regime in late 1983 decisively changed the
character of both democratic civil society and the opposition party. After the political
opportunity structure was opened, democratic civil society rapidly developed into a
strong social force that could directly challenge the regime. Although democatic civil
society had struggled since the Yushin regime, its divided, isolated, and inconsequential
character had rarely changed due to internal conflicts within civil society, harsh
suppression, and passive middle class. However, the decompression policy weakened the
suppression of democratic civil society and the opposition party, and made the middle
class express its dissatisfaction and aspirations for democratization easily and clearly,567
Thus, the expansion of the political opportunity structure allowed civil society to become
active, united, and assertive.
In addition, democratic groups and organizations, especially students and the
Jaeya force, actively supported the genuine opposition NKDP during the establishment
process and election campaign. As a result, the NKDP became a strong opposition party
and struggled for constitutional revision through its solidarity with democratic civil
society. The expansion of the political opportunity structure thus significantly and
favorably influenced the character of civil society. Besides the implementation of the
decompression policy, other internal and external factors also influenced the character of

567 Yun Sang-Chui. I980nyundae Hankookui Minjuhwaihaengkwajung (The Democratic
Transition Process of South Korea in the 1980s), 107.
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civil society. In particular, since this period, internal and external factors began to more
favorabl affect the character of democratic civil society than those of previous periods.
First, democratic civic culture, mainly brought by socioeconomic development,
clearly and significantly influenced the character of democratic civil society in this
period. For instance, democratic movement activists of this period were major
beneficiaries of socioeconomic development, and thus they could have more
opportunities to meet democratic values and principles through education. Thus,
democratic movement ativists’ desires for democratization in this period was stronger
than in any other periods, and their democratic struggle was enthusiastic.568 Albeit the
traditional political culture had changed to a more democratic direction since the early
1970s, its influence on the character of democratic civil society had not been significant
until the early 1980s because of harsh suppression, lack of civil society’s readiness for
change, and the passive middle class.
Since the early 1980s, however, the regime found it increasingly difficult to
control the public, who was being influenced by democratic civic culture, and their active
supports. The regime thus implemented a decompression policy before public
dissatisfaction erupted. In this respect, the implementation of the decompression policy
was strongly influenced by the rapid and wide dissemination of democratic civil culture.
The result of a survey on national consciousness conducted in 1983 showed a growing
shift in value preference from national security and economic development to democracy.
According to the result of the survey, 74.1 percent of 2,388 respondents regarded the
establishment of democracy as more urgent than economic growth. In addition, 66.5
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percent agreed that democracy should be realized even if it may cause some difficulties in
national security.569 These results of survey, as those of the previous period, can be seen
as evidence of changing the public discourse and normative discontent with
authoritarianism, and also they show the strong popular aspirations for democratization.
One of the regime’s intentions in implementing the decompression policy was to
embrace the middle class who had begun to turn away.570 Because the middle class had
increasingly gained political consciousness, the regime had to seek a different strategy to
prevent eruption of the middle class and block the influence of the democratic civic
culture. Its means of doing this was the decompression policy which expanded the
political opportunity structure.571 In addition, the regime needed supports of the middle
class which was getting critical of the authoritarian regime in order to get the majority
seats in the general election in 1985. Therefore, the spread of democratic civic culure
influenced the regime to implement a decompression policy as an alternative strategy to
control the middle class and democratic civil society, and this decompression policy
positively affected the character of civil society.
Under the decompression policy, one distinctive change of democratic civil
society was active support of the middle class to the democratic movement This active
support was based on the change of basic perception brought about in large part by the
change of political culture. That is, a political value of the middle class, which
emphasized “the rule of law” over “the rule of man” was influenced by the change of

561 Whang In-Joung, “The Korean Economy Toward the Year 2000,” in A Dragon's Progress:
Development Administration in Korea, eds. Gerald E. Caiden and Bun Woong Kim (West Hartford:
Kumarian, 1991), 113-14.
569 Hyundae Sahoe Yonguso, Kukmin Uisike kwanhan Chosayongu (A Survey Research on
National Consciousness), (Seoul: Hyundae Sahoe Yonguso, 1983), 96.
570 Shin Doh C., Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea, 1-2.
371 Hong Seung-Sang, interviewed by author, Seoul, 19 August 1999.
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political culture.572 This change appeared through active support to the opposition party
in the general election. The middle class began to be aware of the problem about the
indirect presidential election and expressed their dissatisfaction in the election through
supporting the opposition NKDP.573
More importantly, after a short period of the decompression, the shift to a
repression policy could not control the spread of democratic civic culture and the
democratic movement of civil society. It was too late to control already revitalized
democratic groups and organizations o f civil society and their political struggles by using
suppression.574 Instead, the regime had to contend with the unified opposition force
which became increasingly popular among the middle class and other segments of the
population.575 The successful outcome for the NKDP in the general election clearly
showed that the effort of the Chun regime for controlling the opposition force failed. The
success of the NKDP in the election was a result of the strong support given by the
middle class and democratic civil society.576
As Figure 5-1 illustrates, the number of political struggles by democratic civil
society did not sharply decline, but gradually increased, even under suppression. This
continuous struggle of civil society was possible because the middle class, affected by
democratic civic culture, showed active support to civil society. In this period, active
support of the middle class and emergence of the NKDP, directly and indirectly
influenced by the development of political culture, made democratic civil society more

572 Shin Doh C., Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea, 187.
573 Shin Doh C., Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea, 2
574 Hong Seung-Sang, interviewed by author, Seoul, Seoul, 19 August 1999.
575 Hsin-Hung Hsiao and Hagen Koo, “The Middle Classes and Democratization,” in
Consolidating the Third Wave Democrcies, 312-33.
576 Minjuhwaui Gil, u12dae Sungugyulgwa bon myukgaji Moonje” (Several Problems of 12d>
General Election), Minjuhwaui Git (Road to Democratization) no. 8, (March 1985); 11.
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active, united, and assertive. Therefore, the development o f political culture in this
period not only faciliated the expansion of the political opportunity structure, but also
made the already expanded political opportunity structure difficult to be reversed by
suppresssion. In addition, the development of political culture significantly affected
outcomes of the general election that indicated the transfer o f hegemony from the regime
to the opposition force. Therefore, the development of political culture was an important
factor that changed the character of civil society.
Figure 5-1
Tendency of the Democratic Movement, 1983-1985
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Second, economic development of this period also significantly influenced not
only the character of civil society but also the regime's policy toward the opposition
force. Due to the regime’s concentrating on economic policy, as Table 5-4 illustrates,
economic conditions significantly improved in this period. Based on this successful
economic development in the previous period, the Chun regime became confident of its
rule and could implement the decompression policy to expand its power base and more
effectively control the opposition party. In addition, the Chun regime realized that there
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were limits to its control over democratic civil society and the middle class who had been
strengthened by economic growth.577 Thus, the regime implemented the decompression
policy to control the opposition force more effectively.
Table 5-4
Major Economic Indicators (1983-1987)
1983
1984
1985
1986
11.9
5.4
GNP Growth rate
8.4
12.3
Current Account
-1.6
-.0.9
-1.4
4.6
Balance (& billion)
3.4
2.5
Consumer Price Index
2.3
2.8
1924
2194
2044
Per capita GNP (US$)
2503
Source: Economic Planning Board, Major Statistics o f Korean Economy, 1988.

1987
12.0
9.9
3.0
3098

Despite these intentions of the Chun regime, democratic civil society came to
have a great opportunity to attain autonomy and counter-hegemony, and change its
character. The middle class also began to express more clearly its political dissatisfaction
and desires for democratization. Even though economic development did not directly
influence the character of democratic civil society, it did so indirectly through various
channels. One indirect influence of the economic development was Chun's decision to
implement the decompression policy based on the confidence in successful economic
performance. As a result, the political opportunity structure was expanded, and thus
democratic civil society could revitalize and express its voice more clearly and loudly.
After the political opportunity structure was expanded, many democratic
organizations were established, and the grand coalition between civil society and the

577Youn Jung-Suk, “Korean Democracy and the Limits o f Political Engineering," in A Dragon's
Progress: Development Administration in Korea, eds. Gerald E. Caiden and Bun Woong Kim, 68.
Especially, university students of this period were beneficiaries of economic development. Thus, they had
more chances to meet democratic values and principles. Therefore, it was very difficult for the
authoritarian regime to control democratic groups, especially the student group.
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NKDP was built578 Through the establishment of the coalition, the democratic struggle
of civil society became more aggressive and influential, and their demands broadened to
many political and social issues. For example, on 28 September 1984, about 350 students
occupied the headquarters of the Democratic Korean Party, demanding an end of
suppression on students.579 In addition, students led by the Minjuhwa Chujin Wrwonhoe
occupied the headquarters of the ruling DJP on November 14,1984. During two days of
siege, 264 students demanded 1) an end to the suppression of the labor movement, 2)
withdrawal of the political ban, 3) revision of anti-democratic laws concerning assembly,
demonstration, and the press, and 4) a guarantee o f autonomous student associations.580
In this respect, successful economic development decisively influenced democratic civil
society to be aggressive, united, influential, and supported by the middle class.
For example, the weakening of suppression encouraged an upsurge in militant
labor union activity. When the labor movement resurfaced in 1984, it demonstrated
greater organizational strength and a higher level of political consciousness than ever
before. Labor disputes sharply increased in frequency from 98 cases in 1983 to 113 cases
in 1984, and to 265 cases in 1985.581 More importantly, the focus of workers' struggles
was no longer on isolated economic issues but on organizing new independent unions.
Their new tactics centered on promoting solidarity among workers across several
factories located within the same industrial area. The clearest demonstration of these

Slt One example coalition organization in this period was the Korean Workers’ Welfare Council
(Hankook Nodongja Bokji Hyupuihwoi: Nohyup) which workers. Catholic priests, and students
participated. Joongang Daily, 10 March 1984.
179 Dong-A Daily, 29 September 1984.
510 Hankook Daily, 14 November 1984.
511 Hagen Koo, “The State, Minjung, and the Working Class in South Korea,” I IS.
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changes in the movement was the solidarity strike that occurred in the Kuro Industrial
Park in June 1985.582
In addition, the strong support given by the middle class to the NKDP caused the
dynamics of the institutional political arena to change. The appearance of the strong
opposition party led democratic civil society to take on a more assertive character in the
democratic movement by building a coalition. For example, the NKDP, after the general
election, aggressively demanded a constitutional revision inside and outside the
institutional political arena. This active struggle of the NKDP was possible because the
middle class and democratic civil society, strengthened by economic development,
strongly supported the NKDP. In this respect, economic development of this period
indirectly affected the opposition party to be active in the institutional political arena. In
addition, successful economic development led to the qualitative and quantitative growth
of the middle class, and their active support became a foundation of the active and
aggressive struggle of democratic civil society.583 Therefore, economic development of
this period constructively affected the character of democradc civil society. More
importantly, this changed character o f civil society remained even with the return to a
repressive policy in late 1984.
In this period, the economic development also favorably affected other internal
and external factors. As mentioned above, the successful economic development made
the Chun regime confident in its rule and thus implemnted the decompression policy that

582 According to Lee Tae-Bok, this characteristic change of the labor movement was influenced by
students’ efforts. One of them was student movement activists’ “night school." Students educated workers
to have clear political consciousness, helped them to organize unions, and connected the labor movement
and student movement Lee Tae-Bok, interviewed by author, Seoul, 2 1 October 1999.
583 According to Hong Doo-Seung’s study, population of the middle class increased to 39.9% in
the early 1980s from 20.5% in 1960s. Hong Doo-Seung, “Jungsangcheng Sungjanggwa Sahoebyundong”
(Growth of the Middle Class and Social Change), (Seoul: Hanul, 1992), 257.
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expanded the political opportunity structure in this period. The expanded political
opportunity structure directly influenced revitalization of democratic civil society. In
addition, the successful economic development also positively influenced the spread of
democratic civic culture. This influence of economic development on political culture
appeared as active supports by the middle classs to the opposition party in the general
election. In this respect, the economic development positively and consistently affected
political culture and contributed to changing the character of civil society.
Third, the expansion o f the political opportunity structure in this period strongly
influenced the character of civil society. The decompression policy expanded the
political opportunity structure by weakening suppression on democratic civil society.
This expansion of the political opportunity structure was influenced by several factors.
First, the development of political culture made the middle class think of the Chun
regime as illegitimate, and the change in public perception influenced the regime to
implement the decompression policy to solve the legitimacy problem.
Second, the Chun regime faced a limitation in controlling the democratic
movement of civil society and public opinion through using harsh suppression. For
example, although the number of demonstrations decreased under harsh suppression,
democratic civil society became more radical and violent. For example, 22 September
1983, students of radical student organizations explored and occupy the U.S. Culture
Center in Daegu. In the process of the confrontation with the riot police, one person was
killed and four people were injured.584 Democratic groups and organizations, especially
student and labor organization s, needed violent demonstrations or protests that could

SMInstitute of Gladness and Hope, Amheksokui hwoibul (A Torch of Darkness: Testimony of
Democratic Movement in the 1970s and 1980s), vol. 6,653.
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draw public attention. In this situation, the Chun regime realized that a repressive policy
was limited in being able to the changed public discourse and controlling active and
radicalized democratic movement Thus, the regime decided to implement the
decompression policy, and the policy caused the political opportunity structure to expand.
Third, the Chun regime was confident it could safely implement the
decompression policy. The economic growth rate had increased from -3.7% in 1980 to
12.6% in 1983, and the rate of unemployment decreased to 4.1%. In addition, the
inflation rate had decreased to 3.4% in 1983 from 28.7% in 1980.S8S Based on this
successful economic recovery and development, the regime believed that the public,
satisfied by the economic performance of the Chun regime, continued to support the
government, and it could therefore expand the power base.
After the political opportunity structure was expanded in the late 1983, many
nationwide umbrella organizations were established to coordinate various democratic
organizations in their struggle with the Chun regime. In addition, democratic groups and
organizations began to cooperate actively not only with the opposition party but among
themselves. For instance, the number of students who entered workplaces to help to
establish unions and educate workers sharply increased. The number o f students who
entered workplaces increased to 800 on August 1985 from 50 on March 1980.S86 Thus,
the labor movement also showed a different character in this period. Whereas the labor
movement of the 1970s and early 1980s focused mainly economic issues, the labor

st5 Itn Hyug-Baeg, “5gongui Minjuhwa Tujaengkwa Jiksunje Gaehun” (Democratic Struggle and
the Constitutional Revision for Direct Presidential Election), Sgong Pyungga Daetoronhoe (The
Conference about the Evaluation of the 5th Republic), (Seoul: Dong-A Ilbosa, 1994), 460.
5,6 Kim Chong-Chan, “Nodong Undong Danchui Hyunjuso” (The Current Address of Labor
Movement Organizations), 480; Joongang Daily, 7 November 1986.
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movement from 1983 began to focus on political issues and became more violent and
radical.5*7
More importantly, the establishment of a coalition between democratic civil
society and the opposition party strongly influenced changing the character of civil
society. Based on the coalition, democratic civil society could be more united, and
struggle more actively and aggressively with the regime. In addition, the middle class
became less afraid of supporting democratic civil society and its movement after the
political opportunity structure was expanded. This active support also stimulated
democratic civil society to become more united and assertive. These aggressive
democratic movement and active support of the middle class strongly influenced the
regime to return to a repressive policy.
However, the expanded political opportunity structure was not easily reversed by
renewal of the repression policy. As Figure 5-2 shows, the number of struggls that civil
society organizations got involved did not dramatically decrease. Rather, the political
struggle of democratic civil society became more aggressive. In addition, the political
dissatisfaction of the middle class toward the Chun regime clearly appeared in results of
the general election in 1985. The NKDP, supported by the middle class and democratic
civil society, was successful even though it failed to become a majority party. In this
respect, the regime’s returning to the repression policy had a limitation in controlling the
already expanded political opportunity structure. Therefore, the expansion of the
political opportunity structure strongly affected the formerly divided, isolated, and
inconsequential nature of democratic civil society in this period.

5r7 Hong Seung-Sang, interviewed by author, Seoul, 19 August 1999.
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Figure 5-2
Tendency of Civil Society Organizations-Involved Events, 1982-1985
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In addition, the external environment of this period contributed to expanding the
political opportunity structure and thereby provided space for democratic civil society to
revitalize and struggle actively with the regime. For example, the Chun regime needed to
show a politically developed image to the international society as a host country of the
Asian and Olympic Games, so it implemented the decompression policy. As another
external factor that influenced the opening the political opportunity structure was the U.S.
policy for promoting democracy in the Third World countries, the National Endowment
for Democracy (NED).588 These external events and pressure favorably influenced the
expansion of the political opportunity structure and caused democratic civil society to
have a more active, aggressive, united, and influential character in its democratic
movement. In this respect, the external environment in this period constructively affected
the character of civil society by influencing the political opportunity structure.

5MSteven W. Hook, "Inconsistent U.S. Efforts to Promote Democracy Abroad,” 113.
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In addition, the external environment indirectly contributed to spreading
demcratic civic culture. The expansion of the political opportunity structure, affected by
external events and pressure, accelerated the spread of democratic civic culture. This
spread of democratic civic culture encouraged continuous support of the middle class for
the opposition force, even under harsh suppression, and decisively influenced the
outcome of the general election. Thus, democratic civil society, supported by the middle
class, could build a coalition with the opposition party, and showed a more united,
aggressive, and influential character in its democratic movement.
In this period, those internal and external factors affected the character of
democratic civil socety much more favorably than those of the previous period. First,
economic development of this period more constructively influenced the character of
democratic civil society. Until the regime implemented the decompression policy,
economic development had unfavorably affected the character of civil society, or the
positive outcome of economic development had not appeared. However, in this period,
economic development began to influence the character o f civil society more
advantageously than that of previous periods. For instance, the influence of successful
economic development appeared as a change of the regime’s policy toward the
opposition force in this period. This policy change advantageously affected the character
of civil society. In addition, the influence of successful economic development on
political culture resulted active support of the middle class to the civil society in this
period. Although it was possible because of the expansion of the political opportunity
structure, the influence o f economic development on political culture certainly
contributed to active support of the middle class to civil society. Therefore, economic
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development of this period more significantly and positively affected not only the
character of civil society but also the middle class by affecting other factors.
Second, poitical culture was also an important factor that advantageously affected
the character of civil society in this period as it did in the previous period. Especially, the
middle class, influenced by democratic civic culture, supported democratic civil society
more actively. Furthermore, unlike previous periods, the middle class with democratic
civic culture strongly supported the opposition party, and the support caused the new
opposition NKDP to be successful in the election.589 This active support of the middle
class became a foundation for changing the divided, isolated, and inconsequential civil
society to an active, united, and aggressive one in this period. Therefore, positive
outcomes of the changed political culture began to appear from this period as an active
support of the middle class and expansion of the political opportunity structure.
Third, whereas the temporary expansion of the political opportunity structure in
the previous period was accidental, the opening of the political opportunity structure in
this period was planned by the regime albeit it did not work as its planners anticipated.
Besides, there were a couple of differences in the expansion of the political opportunity
structure between the previous and this period. One significant difference was that the
expanded political opportunity structure in this period was not easily retracted by the
suppression as it was in the previous period. Another difference was that democratic
civil society effectively took advantage of the expansion of the political opportunity
structure. Because of these differences, democratic civil society of this period could
struggle more actively and aggressively with the authoritarian regime and began to attain

5,9 B. C. Koh, “The 1985 Parliamentary Election in South Korea,” Asian Survey 25, no. 9 ( 1985):
890.
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counter-hegemony after the general election in 1985. Therefore, the political opportunity
structure, influenced by development of political culture, economic development, and
external environment, decisively affected democratic civil society to have an active,
united, and assertive character and encouraged the middle class to support more actively
the democratic movement in this period.
Last, the external environment of this period also more constructively influenced
democratic civil society by affecting other factors than that of the previous period. For
example, the external environment positively influenced the opening of the political
opportunity structure. The U.S. pressure and S. Korea's image as a host country of the
Asian and Olympic Games strongly influenced the regime's decision to open the political
opportunity structure, which in turn favorably affected the character of democratic civil
society.590 In addition, this external environment caused the regime not to suppress the
democratc civil society as harshly as the previous period when the regime returned to a
repressive policy from the decompression polcy. Compared with the previous period in
which the external environment unfavorably affected the character of civil society, the
influence of the external environment affected the character of democratic civil society
much more favorably in this period. Therefore, the external environment was an
important factor that allowed democratic civil society could have a more active, united,
and assertive character in its democratic movement
There were several differences in the democratic movement of civil society in the
1980s from those of previous years. First, the ideological discourse of democratic civil
society in the 1980s differently presented a different view of democratization from that of

590 Sung Kyung-Ryung, “Hankook Jungchiminjuhwaui Sahoijuk giwon: Sahoiungdongjuk
jupgeun” (The Social Root of the Political Democratization: social movement approach), 110-11

286

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the traditional institutional opposition. While traditional party politicians stuck to a
liberal vision of democratization, such as the restoration of formal citizenship taken away
by the military dictatorship and of procedural rules for contesting power, democratic
groups and organizations tried to articulate a new concept of democratization which was
broader in scope and more radical in ideological discourse.
The democratic force in the early 1980s understood democratization not as just a
change in powerholders or the take-over of power by opposition politicians, but as the
construction of democracy in every sector of society.591 Because of this radical ideology
and ultimate goal, an anti-democratic character of civil society, which began to appear in
the previous period, spread. However, those anti-democratic groups and organizations
were isolated by moderate democratic civil society that persued liberal democracy. In
addition, heterogeneous democratic civil society that had different goals and
understanding of democracy was one of major obstacles for the influential democratic
movement in this period.
Second, the democratic movement of civil society in the 1980s were strongly anti
imperialist, especially anti-American. A decade earlier, even radical civil society
organizations had not been critical of the U.S. role in the maintenance of the authoritarian
regime. These radical organizations regarded the U.S. as a benevolent superpower that
had the capacity and will to check the authoritarian abuse of a client state like Korea.
However, this benevolent image of the U.S. was shattered when the U.S. cooperated with
the new military force during the Kwangju massacre. The U.S. was no longer regarded
as a friend of democratic forces but as a key behind-the-scene force in the installation of
an authoritarian regime by the new military force.
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Third, a strongly anti-elitist attitude was dominant in democratic civil society of
the 1980s, whereas the democratic movement was led by small group of social and
political elites in the 1970s. Democratic groups and organizations of civil society
doubted the ability o f the opposition party to lead a democratic struggle and were
especially wary o f elitist democracy led by professional politicians. They thought that
procedural democratization might hinder realization of the substantive demands for social
justice. Thus, they were skeptical of the institutional approach to democratization.
Instead, they believed that the heroic popular pressure of the democratic groups and
organizations, including the middle class, was more influential.
Finally, democratic civil society in the 1980s explored counter-hegemonic
ideological apparatuses. They realized that the regime maintained the authoritarian
coalition through the control of ideological institutions, such as education, media, arts,
and literature.592 Thus, democratic groups and organizations started to rediscover and
reformulate traditional popular arts, such as talchum (mask dance), Pansori (folk opera),
Nongak (peasant folk music), Madanggeug (folk drama), and madanggut (folk exorcise
ceremony).593 The decompression policy furnished an opportunity to develop new forms
of expression. That is, the popular democratic movement created alternative media,594
education,595 and arts. This counter-hegemonic cultural expression contributed to

5,1 UMMDU, Minjoo 7b/ig//(Democracy, unification), vol. 3 (1985): 12-23.
592 Louis Althusser, “Ideology and ideological State Apparatuses,’' in Lenin and Philosophy, (New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1971).
593 Chae Hee-Wan, “70nyundaeeui Munhwa Undong” (Culture Movements in the 70s) in CISDJ,
ed. Munhwawa 7<mgcA/_(CuIture and Rule), (Seoul: Minjungsa, 1982).
594 Several prominent magazines were Minjoohwaeui Ghil (Road to Democratization), Minjoo
Nodong (democratic labor), Minjunghwa (Massification), Chungnyun Yesu (Young Jesus), and Yusung
Pyungwoohoe (Women’s Companion).
595 For example. Nodong Yahak (night labor school), Nonghwal (village community activity),
Minjoo Daehak (democracy college).
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spreading ideas of the new popular movement to the masses, promoting solidarity among
different movements, and forming a collective identity of counter-hegemonic bloc.
In this respect, democratic civil society in the 1980s was better developed, in
terms of organization, strategy, and ideology, than it as in the 1970s. It encouraged the
emergence of a strong opposition party and built a coalition with the new opposition
party. However, the dual repressive policy aimed primarily at democratic civil society
caused the coalition to break temporarily, and thus the democratic movement of civil
society became inconsequential once again. In this respect, the dual repressive policy of
the regime was effective in breaking a coalition between democratic civil society and the
opposition party.
In spite of suppression, the character of democratic civil society in this period was
radically changed by the decompression policy of a short period and emergence of the
strong opposition party, and the changed character contributed to the influential struggle
of civil society. Moreover, the middle class, began to actively support democratic
organizations and participated in the democratic movement from this decompression
period. In addition, heterogeneous democratic groups and organizations began to
establish a coalition and cooperate for influential struggles even though it did not
continue after the regime’s change of the policy toward democratic civil society.596 For
example, as Figure 5-3 illustrates, the number of democratic organizations sharply
increased in this period. As a result, democratic civil society became more assertive in its
democratic struggle with the regime.
596 For example, in this period, major democratic organizations, such as the Hankook Nodongja
Bokji Hyupuihwoi (workers, Catholic priests, and students). Council of Minjung Culture Movement
(members of Minjung movement organization). Committee for Democratization Struggle (radical students
of universities in Seoul), Council for the Promotion of Democratization (Opposition politicians and Jaeya
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Figure 5-3
Tendency of Establishment of Democratic Organizations, 1983-1987
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Then, why did not democratic transition take place in this period ? This question
could be answered several ways. In general, despite the fact that varous internal and
external factors advantageously influenced the character of civil society, democratic civil
society had not yet attained counter-hegemony against the regime in this period,
primarily because the regime still had the capability of controlling the democratic
movement of civil society.597 In addition, democratic civil sociey itself had not yet fully
prepared to maximize its force for an influential struggle. Although leaders of
democratic civil society recognized the importance of merging their competing ideologies
and strategies, they failed to do so.

leaders), and Council o f Minjung Democratic Movement (members of Minjung movement organization)
actively established democratic organizations for the influential democratic struggle.
597 The regime that monopolized physical and ideological apparatuses had confidence of
suppressing democratic forces and their democratic movement. However, the regime hesitated to suppress
harshly democratic forces and their democratic struggle because of internal and external restrictions, such
as the image from the world society and legitimacy problem. Hong Seung-Sang, interviewed by author,
Seoul, 19 August 1999.
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Moreover, the decompression policy caused internal conflicts within democratic
groups and organizations to surface. Linder the situation of harsh suppression,
democratic civil society had to focus on organizational survival, so they had to cooperate
with each other. However, the self-restrained internal conflict between radical and
moderate factions began to erupt under the situation of weakened suppression. As a
result, democratic civil society had to concentrate its efforts on both internal power
struggle and the democratic movement. The moderate-radical conflicts within the student
groups and the Jaeya force were especially severe and made democratic civil society
difficult to concentrate its efforts on the democratic struggle. In this respect, the
decompression policy of the regime induced democratic civil society to face its internal
conflicts. Therefore, this internal conflict made the democratic movement
inconsequential. Another reason was the breakdown of the coalition between democratic
civil society and the opposition party. The coalition lasted until the regime's opening of
negotiations for constitutional revision, but began to come apart because of a conflict
over the leadership of the democratic movement and the dual repressive policy of the
regime. In particular, the discriminative suppression of the opposition force was another
important reason for breaking up the coalition. This breaking the opposition coalition
caused the democratic movement to become divided and inconsequential.
Finally, even though the middle class began to support the democratic movement
in this period, the number of persons directly involved in street demonstrations was
small. Most middle class citizens were still reluctant to participate in the democratic
movement for two reasons.598 One was fear of suppression. Although the role of

}9t Minjuhwaui Gil, “ I2dae Sungugyulgwa bon myukgaji Moonje” (Several Problems of 12*
General Election), 11.
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intellectuals who had the middle class background is very important in changing
hegemony, as Gramsci notes, most intellectuals o f this period did not play an important
role in the democratic movement599 The other reason was a negative perception o f some
radical groups and organizations of civil society. Most of the middle class also had a
very negative attitude toward strategies and ideologies of these groups, especially radical
student groups and labor organizations because o f their radical ideologies and violent
strategies.600 This negative perception of volent democratic struggles made democratic
civil socety difficult to draw popular support, and made democratic civil society
inconsequential in spite of active struggle.
For these reasons, democratic civil society did not achieve its ultimate goal of
democratic transition in this period. However, it did show its potential for attaining
counter-hegemony. Moreover, the opposition party also showed a possibility of leading
the democratic movement inside and outside of the institutional political arena.
However, democratic civil society and the the opposition party did not overcome the
problems of internal conflict and coalition building between democratic civil society and
the NKDP. In this respect, the Chun regime took advantage of this split between the
opposition forces and thus could maintain its power.

Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebook, 5-23.
600 According to Hong Seung-Sang, the regime tried to show violence of the democratic
movement and radical ideologies of certain democratic groups and organization to ordinary people through
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CHAPTER VI

BEGINNING OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION (1985- June 1987)

1. Outcomes of the General Election in 1985
The outcome of the general election in 1985 strongly influenced not only the
ruling coalition but also the opposition force and its democratic movement After the
election, it was more difficult for the regime to control the democratic movement of civil
society and opposition party, and the opposition force came to have the momentum to
struggle for democratization. The most important consequence of the election was that
not only the opposition party but also democratic civil society became sanguine about the
prospect of democratization. The outcome of the election proved that the ruling coalition
had been losing hegemony.601 In this respect, the general election of 1985 had a very
significant meaning to not only democratic civil society but also the authoritarian regime.

1) The Government and the Ruling Party
Most people considered the general election of 1985 as a referendum on the
legitimacy of the Chun regime.602 Unlike the anticipation of the regime and ruling DJP,

the government controlled mass media as a strategy for preventing the active participation of the middle
class in the democratic movement Hong Seung-Sang, interviewed by author, Seoul, 19 August 1999.
601 According to Kim Hyun-Woo’s analysis, 42.6% of people who voted for the ruling DJP in
1981 voted for the opposition party in 1985. This result also illustrates that there was serious defection of
the urban middle class from the ruling party. Kim Hyun-Woo, “80nyundae Hankookinui Sunguhyungtae,”
(The Voting Pattern of Korean People in the 1980s), in Hankookui Sungu I, (Election in Korea) I, (Seoul:
Nanam, 1993), 213-14.
602 Yun Sang-Chul, I980snyundae Hankookui Minjuhwaehaenggwajung (The Process of
Democratic Transition in the 1980s), 113-22.
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the outcome of the election frustrated the ruling coalition about post-election politics.
Although the DJP maintained a majority in the National Assembly, the outcome of the
election caused the NKDP to have a strong position in the institutional political arena. As
another important result, the artificially imposed multi-party system was replaced by a
two-party system, and DJP no longer controlled the agenda of post-election politics.603
In addition, the success o f the NKDP in the election created internal dissension
within the ruling power bloc. Many ruling party politicians considered the result of the
election as a clear signal that the disenchantment of the popular masses was so high that
the regime could not be maintained without paying high costs. Thus, moderate
politicians within the DJP strongly demanded a more open and accommodating stance
toward the opposition force and a democratic reform of internal party decision-making
processes.604 As a response to these demands, President Chun changed several cabinet
members and reshuffled rank and file members of the DJP.605 He appointed Roh TaeWoo, a strong potential presidential candidate, as the chairman of the DJP. After Roh
became the president of the ruling party, he stressed the need for dialogue with the NKDP
albeit he promised nothing with substantive content.606 At the same time, Chun also
appointed his hardline proteges to the key cabinet posts and repressive state apparatuses.
For instance, Chang Se-Dong, the Chief of the presidential guard, was appointed as the
director of the National Security Planning Agency, and Roh Sin-Young, the director of
603 The New Korea Democratic Party absorbed defecting members of the loyal opposition parties
within a month after the election. As a result, other semi-loyai opposition parties gradually disappeared.
James Cotton, “From Authoritarianism to Democracy in South Korea,” Political Studies 37, no. 2 (June
1990): 251-52.
604 Pak Seung-Sik, Sunkubunsukeui Irongwa SiljeJJheoty and Practice in Election Analysis),
(Seoul: Daeyoung Moonhwa, 1985), 277-89.
605 Yang Gil-Hyun, “Hankookui 1987nyun Minjuhwaihaengkwa wirobutuui Chaekryak” (The
Democratic Transition o f 1987 and the Strategy from the Upper), Hankookkwa Kookjejurtgchi (Korea and
International Politics) 11, no. 1 (Seoul: Keukdong Moonjeyonguso, spring/summer 1995): 118.
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the NSPA, was transferred to the post of Prime Minister.607 Despite the fact that some
softliners60* gained influence within the regime, the balance of power was still heavily
tilted toward the hardline faction because Chun was a strong supporter of hardliners.
Unlike ruling coalition leaders' intention, the DJP failed to absorb key leaders of
civil society, such as Jaeya leaders, and to divide the opposition force through the
election. However, the artificially created multi-party system was re-established as a
concrete two-party system, and the base of legitimacy of the regime became weaker than
before because of the emergence of the strong opposition party. This unexpected result
of the election caused the opposition force, including the polisition party, to build a
coalition. In addition, the result of the election made the democratic movement of civil
society uncontrollable, and the regime had to open the dialogue for constitutional revison.
Therefore, the unexpected result of the election brought an unfavorable political situation
for the regime, and it advantageously affected the character of civil society. Moreover,
the result of the election showed that the public opinion was moving from the regime to
the opposition force.

606 Interview with Roh, Wolgan Chosun, (April 198S): 80-91.
407 Those persons, identified as hardliners of the ruling coalition, opposed any concession to the
democratic force of civil society and the opposition party. Their basic strategy to maintain the authoritarian
rule was to hand the presidency to one of Chun’s loyal followers, according to the existing constitutional
rules. Thus, after succession, Chun wanted to retain the power over the successive president As one
strategy of this. President Chun would keep the presidency of the ruling DJP, and had a plan to put Chun’s
successor as a vice-president of the ruling DJP. This strategy was designed to maintain the defacto power
of the hardline incumbents through a formal succession process.
601 The softliners of the regime consisted of a coalition of another military faction, who competed
with the hardline faction in the succession struggle, and a group of civilian party politicians who were
concerned more with the demand of the mass electorate to maximize votes. Softliners of the regime
wanted to have dialogues with the moderate group of the opposition party for constitutional revision
because they needed to break existing constitutional rules, which favored hardline incumbents in the
struggle for succession.
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2) Emergence o f the Strong Opposition Party
After the election, many conciliatory opposition party politicians defected from
their semi-loyal opposition DKP and KNP, and moved to the NKDP. Thus, the NKDP
increased its member of the assembly from 67 to 102.609 This number had a very
significant meaning to not only the ruling party but also the opposition party. In the twoparty system, the NKDP gained the power to open National Assembly sessions at any
time without the consent of the ruling party, and to prevent attempts of the ruling party to
pass any bill related to the constitutional revision. As a result, the ruling party had to deal
with the autonomous NKDP as a counterpart.
After the election, however, the talks between the DJP and NKDP could not touch
the core issues of post-election politics, such as student activism and labor unrest. Many
issues raised at the negotiation table were not core issues of democratization, nonetheless,
there were few productive outcomes because hardliners in the authoritarian regime
rejected any agreement between the two parties. Moreover, the successful result of the
election caused the close relationship between democratic civil society and the NKDP to
split. Due to the successful result, the opposition NKDP became confident that it could
achieve democratization through negotiations with the ruling party in the political
institutional arena. Thus, the NKDP began to focus on the politics within the legislature,
and the coalition with democratic civil society became peripheral.610 Especially after the
negotiation for the constitutional revision started, democratic civil society and the
opposition party pursued separate courses in their movements without cooperating. In
fact, keeping a distance from democratic civil society was a condition of opening the
609 Robert E. Bedeski, The Transformation o f South Korea: Reform and Reconstruction in the
Sixth Republic Under Roh Tae Woo, 1987-1992,66.
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negotiation for the constitutional revision. This split caused the democratic movement to
be inconsequential and inefficient early in this period.

3) Democratic Civil Society
After the election of 1985, democratic civil society also significantly changed.
Democratic civil society that confirmed strong popular support were more aggressive.
With this significant change, democratic civil society faced a dilemma in formulating the
post-election strategy. The dilemma was whether to delegate their power to the
opposition party or to retain the power of mobilization outside the institutional political
arena. In one sense, democratic civil society rediscovered the importance of the
institutional political space for an influential democratic movement, and in another sense,
the emergence of a strong opposition party might cost them the identity, organization and
the power for direct actions. That is, the main issue for democratic civil society was who
was the agent of whom.
In reality, however, the momentum of the democratic movement went to the
opposition party after the election. It meant a shift from the fight for democratic
principles to rule manoeuvering, from mass activism on the streets and workplaces to the
National Assembly with authoritarian elites. In this situation, democratic groups and
organizations of civil society decided not to give the party the monopoly status of
representation of the oppositon force.611 They did not want to sacrifice principles for
behind-the-door wheeling and dealing among elites, and to give up their power of direct
6,0 Kim Sun-Hyuk, The Politics o f Democratization: The Role o f Civil Society, 87.
611 In feet, the split between the opposition party and democratic civil society began from Kim
Dae-Jung’s public announcement that denounced the militant position of some radical and violent
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actions. Rather, democratic civil society tried to influence the NKDP such that it would
not to deviate from the people’s will as expressed in the election. In order to do so,
democratic civil society first established an nationwide umbrealla organization outside
the institutional political arena to coordinate concerted strategies and activities.
Secondly, leaders of democratic civil society tried to link their organizations with others
for effective resistance against the regime. The parallel organizations of civil society
curtailed the influence of the opposition party, and made it difficult to establish
coordinated strategies of the opposition as a whole.
In order for democratic civil society to struggle effectively, two national
organizations, the Council of Minjung Democratic Movement (Minminhyup) and the
National Conference for Democracy and Unification (Minjoo Tongil Kukmin Hoeui),
merged and established a unified organization, the United Mingjung Movement for
Democracy and Unification (UMMDU) by leaders of 23 organizations from dissidents,
labor, the religious community, farmers, the poor and intelletuals, such as Moon IkHwan, Kye Hoon-Je, Kim Seung-Hoon, Lee So-Sun, Song Kun-Ho, Lee Chang-Bok, and
Baek Ki-Wan, on 29 March 1985. The UMMDU struggled for realization of social
democracy, national unification by democratic force, the guarantee of a democratic labor
movement. In addition, this organization tried to obtain a position that could integrate
various democratic organizations, and play a political role outside a political institution.
It emphasized the minjung movement for national unification, and criticized the NKDP
that concentrated its efforts on the negotiation for the constitutional revision. In the mid1980s, the UMMDU played a very significant role in producing cooperation and

democratic organizations, such as radical student organizations, on 26 April 19S6. Dong-A Daily, 26 April
1986.
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solidarity among diverse movement sectors and organizations.612 The UMMDU and
other civil society organizations kept their distance from the NKDP and tried to impose
movement logic upon the party strategy. Democratic civil society did not put itself under
the party network, but regarded the party as their affiliation in the institutional political
arena.
In order for democratic civil society to show its strong identity, democratic civil
society, especially student organizations and labor unions, became more radical and
militant. For instance, on 12 April 1985, about 3,000 workers and students held a street
rally to demand the restoration of the Chunggye Garment Union, dissolved by the
authoritarian regime in 1980.613 The strike action was first confined to workplaces but
soon expanded into the streets in working class districts, and became radicalized when
students joined. It was the workers’ first attempt to overcome the collective action
problem among isolated shop-floor level unions through intra-solidarity among workers
and inter-solidarity with other sectors in the sphere of civil society.
In order to carry out a more influential democratic movement, labor movement
activists established workers’ mass political organizations, such as the Seoul Area Labor
Movement League (Seonoryn)614 and the Inchon Area Labor Movement League

612 Dong-A Daily, 29 March 198S; Selig S. Harrison, “Dateline from South Korea: A Divided
Seoul,” Foreign Policy 67, (1987): 154-75.
613 The United Mingjung Movement for Democracy and Unification (UMMUD) et al„ “Our
Position to Support the Solidarity Struggle o f Workers,” (June 27,1985). After this event, the UMMDU
and 31 social movement organizations issued statements supporting the strikes, and provided shelters for
striking workers.
614 Labor movement activists and union members in the Seoul area established the Federation of
Labor Movements in the Seoul Area (Seonoryun) on August 25, 1985. The Sonoryun, like any other
minjung movement group, asserted that the constitutional revision must go beyond the issue of the direct
presidential election to guaranteeing basic rights of workers, farmers, and the urban poor. The Sonoryun
propagandized the Sammin revolution to doctrinize and organize the workers’ struggle for increasing
wages. The "Sunoryun Sinmoon" was its newsletter to advocate ideologies and strategies and criticize the
authoritarian regime. Joongang Daily, 27 August 1985.
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(Innoryun).615 Leaders of the Seonoryn and Innoryun emphasized that industrial action
alone was not enough to achieve their goals because the authoritarian regime always
suppressed workers’ demands on behalf of employers. Thus, they concluded that the
influential labor movement was not possible without struggling with the repressive
regime. The emergence of the Seonoryn and Innoryun signified that the most radical
sector of the working class was transforming workers’ economic struggle within the
confinement of labor unions into the political struggle against the authoritarian regime.
Student movement activists also established radical organizations, such as the
National Federation of Student Associations (Chunhakryun)616 and the Struggle
Committee for Three Mins: People, Nation, and Democracy (Sammintuwi), as a political
arm of the Chunhakryun. The major goals of the Sammintuwi were: 1) to promote the
iabor-student solidarity (Nohak Yundae), 2) to struggle politically against Chun’s
authoritarian regime through establishing a coalition with opposition politicians and other
civil society organizations, and 3) to directly attack U.S. policy that colluded with the
military dictatorship.617 The most radical incident by this student organization was the
three-day occupation of the United States Information Service building from May 23-25,
6,5 Labor movement activists in the Inchon area established the Federation of Labor Movements in
the Inchon Area (Innoryun) on February 17,1986. The Innoryun had a very similar internal structure,
goals, and strategies as the Seonoryun. It criticized the conservative NKDP for having too narrow a
definition of democracy by equating it with a direct presidential election. It published the "Nodongja
Sinmoon" as a newsletter. Dong-A Daily, 8 February 1986.
616 Nationwide student organization members of 23 universities established the National
Federation of Student Association (Chunhaknyun) on 17 April I98S. The Chunhaknyun was especially
interested in Minjung democracy and struggled to overthrow the dictatorial regime and for democratization.
In particular, this organization opposed the main position of the opposition party. In addition, this
organization tried to control various student organizations and tried to maintain common strategies and
ideologies through communication with other student organizations o f every university and college. In
order to mobilize students and violently struggle against the regime, the Chunhaknyun linked with various
student organizations, including Sammintuwi. Joongang Daily, 18 April 1985.
The Struggle Committee for Three Mins: People, Nation, and Democracy (Sammintuwi) was
established by radical university students on 17 April 1985. Its ideologies were based on Leninism, and it
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6i« jjy s emergence 0f radical organizations and movement created the political

space for the NKDP to maneuver and constrained moderates of the DJP.
Although democratic civil society intended to maintain a cooperative relationship
with the NKDP for an influential democratic movement, the cooperative relationship
gradually changed to a competitive relationship, especially after the NKDP agreed to
open the negotiations with the regime for constitutional revision. Thus, democratic civil
society became more radical and violent because the NKDP emerged as a leading force
of the democratization.619 This radical and violent character caused democratic civil
society to divide into radical and moderate factions and put them in ideological and
strategic conflicts. Nevertheless, compared with previous periods, democratic civil
society became more active, assertive, united, and influential in the general struggle for
democratization, and the middle class increasingly supported the democratic movement.

2. Negotiations for the Constitutional Revision and Suppression of Civil Society
1) Politics of the Constitutional Revision between the DJP and NKDP
Opposition forces succeeded in forcing the regime to open negotiations for
constitutional revision. President Chun made a crucial concession to accept the
opposition’s demand on 30 April 1986. In the meeting of three leaders o f the ruling and
stressed national unification, struggle for democracy, Minjung liberation and Minjung revolution.
Joongang Daily, 18 April I98S.
11 Especially, after the incident of the occupation of the United States Information Service
building by the radical students, the police were sent to the campuses directly without prior request from
college authorities. The massive police hunting of radical student movement activists signified the end of
the decompression policy. Washington Post, Friday, 24 May 198S, Al.
61 For instance, on 19 April 1983, about 20,000 of S6 universities gathered in each university and
celebrated the “4 .19 student revolution.” After this, students marched outside campus and demanded an
end o f suppression on student organizations. Students and the riot police violently confronted with each
other. Students threw stones toward the police and destroyed police stations and cars. In this process, the
riot police violently crashed demonstrators and arrested dozens of students. Joongang Daily, 20 April
1985.

301

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

opposition parties, Chun said that he would not oppose the constitutional revision before
his term expired in 1988, if all parties reached an agreement on the time table of the
constitutional revision. In addition, he asked the NKDP to stop the petition campaign and
mass rallies, and confine the debate on constitutional revision within the institutional
political arena. The Chun regime intended to break the united front between the NKDP
and democratic civil society. In this sense, the authoritarian regime adopted a classical
divide-and-rule strategy.620
It was first time that both the regime and the opposition force had “threat power’'
which enabled each actor to threaten the other in order to deter certain moves in future
playing of the game.621 Starting in May 1986, the NKDP distanced itself from
democratic civil society, and acquiesced in the suppression of militant students and
workers. It agreed to limit its role as a player of political dialogue at the elite level. The
politics for the constitutional revision between the DJP and NKDP officially started from
the establishment of the “Special Committee for Constitutional Revision” in the National
Assembly.622
When constitutional talks opened, the DJP proposed a parliamentary cabinet
system with a strong prime minister and a relatively weak president. The DJP proposed a
parliamentary system not because this kind of Westminster model was more democratic
than the presidential system but because it was the only possible formula to remain in
620 Yun Sang-Chul, I980snyundae Hankookui Minjuhwaehaenggwajung (The Process of
Democratic Transition in the 1980s), 136-7.
621 Steven J. Brains and Marek P. Hessel, “Threat Power in Sequential Game," International
Studies Quarterly 28, (March 1984): 23-44.
622 In fact, the proposal of the NKDP for establishing the “Special Committee for Constitutional
Revision" in the National Assembly was initially rejected by the government and the ruling DJP. The
major reason was that the softliners within the regime did not have much autonomy from the hardline of the
regime. Christian Institute for the Study of Justice and Development (CISJD), Gaehungwa
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power. On the other hand, the NKDP proposed a presidential system with a direct
popular election.623 Two parties engaged in a typical conflict about institutions, assuming
that the institutional arrangement can determine the prior probabilities in which particular
interests will be realized to a definite degree and in a specific manner.624
The constitutional talks between the DJP and NKDP faced difficulties in the
beginning of the process. For instance, the “Special Committee for Constitutional
Revision” had never held a single session to debate on the constitutional reform. The
position of the DJP was to force the NKDP either to accept a parliamentary system, or to
face the continuation of the existing system. However, the fundamental problem of both
DJP and NKDP was that neither party had an autonomous political base. For the DJP,
support of the hardline was the biggest obstruction in order to remain in an advantageous
position in the relationship with the NKDP. The NKDP also needed the support of
democratic civil society for organizing popular masses to press the regime to accept its
proposal of the presidential system by a direct presidential election.625 Thus, as long as
the coalition between the NKDP and democratic civil society broke down, the DJP did
not have to be afraid of the pressure of the NKDP.

Minjoohnvawoondong_(Cons\iXux.\onal Revision and the Democratization Movement), (Seoul, Minjungsa,
1986), 79; James Cotton, “From Authoritarianism to Democracy in South Korea,”251.
623 Pak Se-Jin, “Two Forces of Democratization in Korea,” SI.
624 Adam Przeworski, “Democracy as Contingent Outcome of Conflicts,” in Constitutionalism and
Democracy, eds. Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1988), 68.
6-3 According to the position of democratic civil society, most democratic groups and
organizations were distrustful about the regime's intention for democratization. The democratic groups and
organizations in civil society believed that the real intention of the opposition party was to take power
rather than democratization. Because of this distrust toward the opposition party, democratic civil society
was reluctant to establish a coalition with the opposition party.
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2) Suppression o f the Democratic Movement o f Civil Society
Since negotiations for constitutional revision stalled as soon as they were started,
the hardline of the regime and radical civil society organizations each gained strength.
As a result, the leadership of the democratic transition politics moved from moderates
opposition626 and the softline within regime to radical civil society organizations and
hardliners within the regime. These two militant adversaries went on a determined
course o f confrontation on the streets without any intermediation. As a response to this
confrontation, the authoritarian regime continued to pursue the double-edged policy
toward the opposition party and democratic civil society. The Chun regime was tolerant
of political activities of the opposition party, but intensified suppression on radical groups
and organizations of civil society.627 For instance, the regime was politically generous to
the NKDP and pro-NKDP organizations, such as the Council for the Promotion of
Democratization, while arresting organizers and followers of radical democratic
organizations, such as the Self-Reliant Democratization Struggle Committee Against the
United States and Fascism (,Jamintuwi),628 the National Democratic Struggle Committee

626 The moderate opposition was composed of most NKDP politicians and some civil society
organizations, such as the Council for the Promotion of Democracy, the Alliance for Democratic
Constitutional Politics and Minjoo (democracy) University. For the NKDP and supporting groups outside
the National Assembly, democratic transition meant to return to the people the right to choose the form of
government and the right to choose their representative. For example, Kim Dae-Jung suggested adopting
the Greek pattern of democratic transition, such as the constitutional system of the Third Republic (19631972) which had been abrogated by Park Chung-Hee through the Yushin coup. Ryu Chung-Hyun,
Interview with Kim Dae-Jung, Wolgan Chosun, (April 1985): 126-7.
627 For example, on 7 October 1985, the police sought two organizations of civil society and
confiscated anti-govemment handbills that criticized the government and demanded democratization. On
October 22, 1985, the police arrested leaders of democratic organizations, such as Mintongryun, Hankook
Kidokkyo Chungryun Yonhaphwoi, and Minjuunron Undong Yonhaphwoi. In addition, on November 23,
1985, the government blockaded headquarters of the Minjutongrun, and prohibited political activities of the
chairman and vice chairman of this organization. On 7 May 1986, the government passed a special law
that could heavily punish demonstrators who used firebomb, pipes, and stones. Dong-A Daily, 8 and 23
October 1985; Dong-A Daily, 23 November 1985; Dong-A Daily, 7 May 1986.
621 The Self-Reliant Democratization Struggle Committee against the United States and Fascism
(Jamintuwi) was established by radical student movement activists, such as Lee Myung-Jea, on 10 April
1986. The Jamintuwi understood the importance of the constitutional struggles to achieve the minjung’s
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Against Imperialism and Fascism (Minmintuwi),629 the Minbulryun, the Federation of
Labor Movements in Inchon Area, the Federation of Labor Movements in Seoul Area,
the Coalition of Social Movements in the Inchon area, the Youth League for Democratic
Movement, the UMMDU and its umbrella organizations.
In addition to the double-edged policy, the regime launched an ideological
campaign against radical organizations by mobilizing the state-controlled mass media to
label the radical organizations as pro-Communist, subversive forces.630 Against this
suppression, democratic civil society responded with more violent anti-government mass
protests. However, the mass mobilization was not enough to intimidate the authoritarian
regime which monopolized physical forces and the government controlled mass media.
More importantly, civil society did not have the capacity to overthrow the regime because
the coalition with the opposition party was broken by the double-edged policy.631
However, in spite of harsh suppression, democratic organizations continued to be
established, and their democratic struggle became more radical and violent For example,
two thousand Korean students, some hurling stones and gasoline bombs, clashed with

democratic rights as a cornerstone o f anti-American struggles for national liberation. The Jamintuwi
conceived of constitutional banles between military fascism and conservative oppositions as a process by
which the U.S. would rearrange the structure of fascist power to deceive the transformative will of the
minjung. In addition, it emphasized the role of labor and student’s organizations that should support
workers' revolution. It also tried to turn the mass enthusiasm for the constitutional change into anti-U.S.
and anti-govemment struggles. In order to succeed the struggle for democratization, this organization
emphasized on alliance between workers and peasants with students. This organization considered workers
and peasants as support groups, and considered student organizations as leading forces of democratization.
The Jamintuwi was closely related to the Minmintuwi, Ehaktu, and Chunhakryun, and published a
newsletter, "Habangsunen." Joonaang Daily, 12 April 1986.
629 The National Democratic Struggle Committee Against Imperialism and Fascism (Minmintuwi)
was established by radical student movement activists on 29 March 1986. The Minmintuwi criticized
democratic struggles of the Jaeya force and the opposition party, and asserted restoration of a national
democratic constitution. Its ideology was an anti-American and anti-nuclear line. This organization used
boycotting o f students’ military training and violent struggling against the authoritarian regime as
strategies. Dong-A Daily, 29 March 1986.
630 Hong Seung-Sang, interviewed by author, Seoul, 19 August 1999.
631 Korea/Update, 80, (August 1986): 1-2.
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police on three Seoul campuses in demonstrations against the Chun regime.632 The
fundamental reason that democratic civil society could resist and be more aggressive
under suppression was the active support from the middle class. Additionally, it was
difficult for the regime to destroy democratic organizations completely because most
democratic organizations of this period were established as a form of the coalition
organization.633 The regime was also difficult to control democratic struggles because of
the large size of the movement, the participation of many organizations, and the radical
and violent character of the movement.634 Because of these changes and the
ineffectiveness of the repressive policy, the Chun regime seriously considered using the
military to suppress the democratic movement at the end of this period.

3) Politics of the Street and the Cessation of Talks
Bcause of the regime's harsh suppression of democratic civil society, Kim DaeJung and Kim Young-Sam of the NKDP threatened to withdraw from the “Special
Committee” if the DJP unilaterally pushed through its proposal of the parliamentary
system.635 In spite of the threat o f the NKDP, however, the DJP continued to press for a
parliamentary system. Thus, the NKDP decided to return to the street politics in alliance

632 Chicago Tribune, 13 March 1986.
633 For example, the National Federation of Student Association (Chunhaknyun), established on
April 1 7 ,198S, consisted of nationwide Student organization members of 23 universities. In addition, the
Federation of Labor Movements in Inchon Area (Innoryun), established on 7 February 1986, consisted of
labor movement activists in the Inchon area.
634 For instance, on September S 1985, about 1,000 students o f six universities gathered at Korea
University in Seoul, and demanded the regime not suppress students and the minjung minju democratic
movement In addition, on October 8, about 2,800 students of 12 universities demonstrated and criticized
the economic policies of the government After a campus meeting, students got out o f campus and
distributed anti-govemment handbills to citizens. On November 4, a group of student dissidents occupied
the U.S. business organization's third-story office suite in the Chosun Hotel, and protested against the South
Korean government and U.S. trade policies. Dong-A Daily, 6 September 1985; Dong-A Daily, 9 October
1985; Asahi Shinbun, 4 November 1985.
435 Dong-A Daily, 21 October 1986.
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with democratic civil society to put pressure on the regime to accept their demand for a
directly elected presidential system after early October 1986. For example, on 29
November 1986, the NKDP with radical organizations held a mass rally in downtown
Seoul even though it was blocked by the largest police mobilization in history.636 The
rally failed, although not only because of the blockade. The divisions between the NKDP
and democratic civil society was still too deep. Democratic civil society did not
enthusiastically cooperate with the NKDP because they were distrustful of the party’s
commitment to democracy.
This failure of the mass rally provided a lesson to leaders of the NKDP that the
party’s strategy based on street power would never succeed without reconciliation with
democratic civil society. The first sign of the healing process appeared when two Kims
and dissident church leaders discussed the necessity of reconstructing a united front
between the NKDP and civil society on December 12, 1986.637 After the meeting, these
two leaders decided to shift the moderate strategy of the NKDP to a maximalist strategy,
and this shift made the voice of the moderates within the regime weak.63'
There were several reasons why the NKDP gave up compromising with the DJP
on the constitutional revision. First, there was so much distrust between the regime and
the NKDP. Second, the opposition party realized that the compromise solution was
considered as breaking a coalition by civil society. Third, in Korean culture, compromise
is seen not as a sign of rationality and good will, but as a signal of weakness and lack of

636 Korea Weekly Report, 18 December 1986.
637 Korea Weekly Report, 18 December 1986.
631 For example, the NKDP came out from the National Assembly Hall, and opened a street
parliament. On February 12, 1986, the first anniversary o f the National Assembly election, the NKDP
launched the 10 million-signature campaign to petition for a Constitutional revision to allow direct
presidential elections. Dong-A Daily, 12 February 1986; James W. Morley, Driven by Growth: Political
Change in the Asia-Pacific Region (New York: An East Gate Book, 1993), 177.
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resolve, not only by one’s adversaries but by one’s allies as well. Any gesture toward
compromise was likely to be met by further demands of the adversary who tries to take
advantage of the opponent’s perceived weakness.
On the other hand, the regime’s hardliners, encouraged by the successful blockade
of the Seoul rally, became more confident of the police power and stepped up the
suppression. Along with suppression of democratic civil society, the Chun regime also
tried to divide the NKDP. The first fruit of the regime’s effort to split the NKDP was the
“Lee Min-Woo Plan.”639 Lee Min-Woo proposed the so called “Lee Min-Woo plan” or
“Democratization First Plan” without consultation with the de facto leaders of the NKDP.
According to the proposal, the NKDP would agree to reopen the “Special Committee for
Constitutional Revision” if the regime accepted a new compromise plan. The NKDP
could accept the parliamentary system if the regime accepted several conditions: 1)
freedom of press and freedom of speech, the abrogation of the “Basic Press Law,” 2)
guarantee of people’s full basic rights, 3) political neutrality of government officials, 4)
release of prisoners of conscience and restoration of civil rights, 5) establishment of a two
party system, 6) implementation of local autonomy, and 7) fair election laws.640 The two
Kims dismissed Lee’s plan and reaffirmed the direct presidential system as an
unnegotiable party position, arguing that Lee’s seven democratization measures were
prerequisites for constitutional reform, not subject to bargaining.
On the contrary, the DJP initially greeted Lee’s proposal warmly because the DJP
interpreted it as a sign of Lee’s independence from the real leaders of the NKDP.
However, after the meeting between Lee Min-Woo and Kim Young Sam, Lee retracted
639 Han Sung-Joo, “South Korea in 1987 ” Asian Survey 28, no. 1 (January 1988): 53; Dong-A
Daily, 24 December 1986.
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his original proposal and confirmed the direct presidential system as the unchanged party
plan. However, Lee Min-Woo, encouraged by the government-controlled press, began to
push his seven-point proposal after two months of dormancy.641 When Kim Young-Sam
and Kim Dae-Jung pressured Lee Min-Woo to withdraw his plan, Lee refused to back
down and even tried to become independent from the de facto leadership. The two Kims
eventually decided to establish a new opposition party to purge Lee Min-Woo's faction.
Of the 92 assembly members, 73 supported the two Kims’ leadership, abandoned the
NKDP, and formed a new party, the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP), on 8 April
1987.642
Due to the establishment of the RDP, the NKDP became virtually defunct. The
RDP was more intransigent toward the regime, not through compromise with softliners
within regime but through mobilizing masses from below. However, the regime did not
accept the RDP as a legitimate counterpart in the institutional political arena. The
collapse of the NKDP provided hardliners of the regime an excuse to shut down
constitutional talks. On April 13, President Chun officially announced the indefinite
suspension of all debates on constitutional reform, and that his successor would be
selected by the existing electoral college system.643 He said that the emergence of the

640 Korea Weekly Report 6, no. 1 (January 1987).
641 On February 9, Lee Min-Woo met Ambassador James Lilley and discussed his 7-point plan.
After the meeting, Lee said “our party’s stand is a revision of the Constitution for a direct election.
However, the cabinet system has enough value to warrant consideration.” CISJD, Lost Victory: An
Overview ofthe Korean People's Strugglefo r Democracy in 1987 (Seoul: Minjungs, 1988), 63. William
Clark. Assistant undersecretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific visited Seoul in early March and
made it clear that the United States supported the Lee Plan. After the meeting with Clark, Lee emphasized
that his position must not be modified or canceled. Lilley praised Lee for resurrecting the plan in a highly
publicized meeting with Lee on March 13 after Secretary of the State, George Shultz, had stopped in Seoul
on his way from China. Tim Shorrock, “South Korea: Chun, the Kims and the Constitutional Struggle,"
Third World Quarterly 10, no. I (1988): 95-110.
642Joongang Daily, 8 April 1987.
643 Nicholas Eberstadt, “Taiwan and South Korea: The Democratization of Outlier States," World
Affairs 155, no. 2 (fall 1992): 86. According to Kim Ik-Sung, President Chun assigned the announcement
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RDP made it impossible to reach a constitutional compromise. In the statement, Chun
said that “it had become impossible to revise the Constitution during his tenure due to the
shortage of remaining time.”644
The RDP and democratic civil society protested Chun’s announcement with street
demonstrations, issuing public statements, sits-in, and hunger strikes.645 Thereafter, the
democratic struggle followed a different pattern. After Chun’s announcement, the
democratic movement was initiated and led by broad sectors of the middle classes, such
as religious leaders, including previously dormant Buddhists, college professors, and high
school teachers, artists, poets, novelists, drama people, movie actors, directors, lawyers,
and medical doctors.646 In addition, since then, the middle class actively joined
democratic organizations and participated in the democratic movement in spite of
suppression. Because of this, the confrontation between the regime and democratic civil
society slowly escalated into a level of civil war.

3. The Democratic Movement of Civil Society
After the general election in 1985, democratic civil society struggled more
actively with the Chun regime by building solidarity. At the same time, democratic civil
in early March, and he finally decided to announce the statement on the day when the new opposition party
(RDP) was established on April 8. Kim Sung-Ik, Chun Doo-Hwan yuksungjeungun (Chun Doo-Hwan's
Testimony), (Seoul: Chosun Ilbosa, 1993), 286.
64 Hankook Daily, 13 April 1987.
645 For example, on 22 April 1987, 1,475 professors from 48 universities in Seoul and other major
cities criticized the Chun's decision of suspending the negotiation for a constitutional revision. Dong-A
Daily, 22 April 1987.
646 On May 9 1986, 152 Buddhist and priests maintained that anti-American, anti-war, anti-nuclear
slogans were not necessarily meant to deny the liberal democratic system. They also called for
constitutional revision. In addition, after Chun’s announcement, even lower classes expressed their
aspiration of democratization. For example, on June 18,50-100 taxis stopped on the street of Busan City,
sounding horns. In the process, students joined with taxi drivers' demonstration, and demanded
democratization. Chosun Daily, 10 May 1986; Hankook Kidokkyo Sahoe Munje Yonguwon, Kaehon kwa
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society faced a severe ideological conflict, so called the “CNP” debate. Through this
ideological conflict, democratic groups and organizations came to unite, and to have the
capacity to challenge hegemony of the state. In addition, democratic nationwide
umbrella organizations were established, and democratic civil society could struggle
more effectively with the Chun regime.

I) The “CNP” Debate within Civil Society
The year 1985 witnessed the “CNP” debate in the movement sector and the social
formation debate in academic circles that contributed to the theoretical elaboration of the
minjung ideology.647 The “CNP” represented the initial letters of three strategic lines
among democratic groups: Civil Democratic Revolution (CDR), National Democratic
Revolution (NDR), and People’s Democratic Revolution (PDR). The CNP debate,
initiated by the Youth League for Democratic Movement in late 1984, was an effort to
articulate the problem of social formation, its contradiction, and the strategy and tactics
of the transformative movement from a more practical angle than ever, as the government
had carried out the decompression policy.648
First, the CDR group considered South Korea as a peripheral capitalist society
where the main contradiction was between the military dictatorship and the minjung, who
Minjuhwa (Constitutional Revision and Democratization), (Seoul: Minjungsa, 1986), 1S2; Dong-A Ilbo, 18
June 1987.
647 According to Hong Seung-Sang, a former police officer, the “CNP debate" began within the
Minchungryun from late 1984. Later, this debate spread to the whole democratic civil society. The regime
claimed that the “CNP” debate was strongly influenced by the North Korean government Thus, the
hardliners of the regime thought it was dangerous to leave the debate unchallenged so it suppressed those
democratic organizations that were involved in this debate. Hong Seung-Sang, interviewed by author,
Seoul, 19 August 1999.
648 Ilsongjung, Haksaengundongnonjaengsa (The History of Dispute about the Student
Movement), (Seoul: Ilsongjung, 1990), 57-70; Kwon Hyung-Chul, Hankook Byunhyuk Undong Nonjaeng
(The History of Korean Transformative Movement), (Seoul: Ilsongjung, 1990); Cho Kwang, Minju
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consisted not only of workers, farmers and the urban poor, but also of the national
bourgeoise and petty bourgeoisie because they all suffered from economic dependency.
The major goal of this group was to overthrow the authoritarian regime and to establish a
civilian government Since the Korean proletariat was still weak, this group asserted that
the democratic movement should be led by the middle class, including intellectuals,
students, and conscientious politicians.649 Those democratic groups mainly used radical
and violent demonstrations, such as occupations of governmental and U.S. offices as a
strategy of its struggle.
On the other hand, the NDR group, led by Moon Yong-Sik and Park Moon-Sik,
viewed South Korea in terms of a neo-colonial monopoly capitalist country, in which the
primary contradiction was between imperial forces and military fascism based on
monopoly capital, on the one hand, and the Korean minjung, on the other. The NDR
contended that since the national contradiction was intertwined with the fascist
contradiction, the minjung’s struggle should be anti-imperial and anti-fascist at the same
time.650 With regard to the subject of a transformative movement, the NDR indentified
workers as a main force, farmers and the urban poor as an auxiliary force, and
progressive youth and students as advanced groups. The national capitalists and the
middle class were considered necessary partners to replace the military fascist force with
a national democratic government.

Byunhyuk Nonjaenge Daehayo (The Debate on Korean Social Formation), vol. 1, eds. Pak Hyon-Chae and
Cho Hi-Yon (Seoul: Chuksan, 1989).
649 Moon Byung-Joo, “Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Korea: with Special Reference
to the Relationships and Internal Dynamics o f the State-Political Society-Civil Society,” (Ph.D. diss.,
Kunkook University, 1995), 104.
630 Moon Byung-Joo, “Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Korea: with Special Reference
to the Relationships and Internal Dynamics o f the State-Political Society-Civil Society," 104.
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The PDR, the most radical wing, defined South Korea as a state monopoly
capitalist society with the main conflict between imperialism, military fascism, and
bourgeois democratic force, on the one hand, and workers, farmers, the urban poor and
revolutionary intellectuals, on the other. The latter was, of course, the agent of
revolution.651 Unlike the NDR, the PDR dismissed the importance of alliances with the
national capitalists and the middle class. The CDR, which echoed the ideological
orientation of earlier minjung discourse, was criticized as petty-bourgeois romanticism
and opportunism, the PDR as radical leftism. On the other hand, the NDR earned wide
support among the movement intellectuals.652
Table 6-1
Differences of “CNP” Lines

CDR (Civil
Democratic
Revolution)

Status of the
State
dependent
capitalism

Contradiction

Leading Force

Struggle Phase

the regime —
Minjung

the middle class

- Leading force—
workers, peasants,
and the poor
- Guiding force—
students
- Cooperative
force—
the middle class
workers, peasants,
the poor and
revolutionary
intellectuals

anti-fascists
struggle—anti
imperialist
struggle
anti
imperialists and
anti-fascists
struggle

NDR
(National
Democratic
Revolution)

new colonial
monopolized
capitalism

Imperialist
regime and
monopolized
capitalist—
minjung

PDR
(People’s
Democratic
Revolution)

State
monopolized
capitalism

Imperialist
regime and
capitalists
group

anti
imperialists and
anti-fascists
struggle

631 Kim Jang-Sil, “Democratic Transition in South Korea, 1985-1988: The Eclectic Approach,”
171-75.
632 Yun Sung-Yi, “Sahoeundongronui kwanjumesu bon Hankook kwonwijuuicheje Byundong”
(The Change of the Authoritarian System in the Perspective of the Social Movement Theory), 120-21.
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Toward the end of 1985, the NLPDR (National Liberation People's Democratic
Revolution) thesis was advanced to bring the issue of imperial domination to the center of
attention.653 This thesis defined South Korea as colonial semi-feudalist, whose
fundamental feature of social formation was colonial dominance. In the political
perspective, the Korean state was seen as a neo-colonial agent of the U.S. under her
military occupation and at the same time as a “comprador military dictatorship” which
served the interests of pro-American classes, such as comprador capitalists, landlords,
and reactionary bureaucrats. In the economic perspective, the NLPDR thesis
characterized Korean economy as colonial in the sense that the foreign monopoly
capitalists and comprador capitalists possessed the basic means of production, and as
semi-feudal because of the coexistence of pre-modem and capitalist modes of production.
The proponents of the NLPDR distinguished two contradictions between the U.S.
imperial force and the Korean minjung and between the pro-American classes and the
minjung. Accordingly, an anti-imperial and national liberation was set as the main goal
of a transformative movement The subject of revolution was a nationalist force,
including the working class, peasants, students, intellectuals, national capitalists, and
patriot soldiers.
In the critical response to the NLPDR, the NDR group criticized the NLPDR for
failing to differentiate colonial from neo-colonial rule and to appreciate the relative
autonomy of the neo-colonial state, based on democratic monopoly capital, from the
imperial state. Defining the South Korean system as neo-colonial state monopoly

633 Kwon Hyung-Chul, Hankook Byunhyuk Undong Nonjaeng (The History of Korean
Transformative Movement), (Seoul: Ilsongjung, 1990); Cho Kwang, Minju Byunhyuk Nonjaenge daehayo
(The Debate on Korean Social Formation), eds., Pak Hyon-Chae and Cho Hi-Yon, vol. I, (Seoul: Chuksan,
1989).
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capitalism, this position emphasized two stages of revolution: first, a bourgeois
democratic revolution, and second, a socialist revolution. The first revolution intended to
eliminate political and economic obstacles, such as military dictatorship and imperial
forces, to the development of working class interest and power, without changing the
capitalist relation of production. Political freedom of the minjung and national liberation
from economic and political domination by the imperial force were believed to be the
preconditions for a socialist revolution. Categorizing political forces into reactionary
bourgeois, liberal bourgeois, and proletariat, the advocates of NDR assigned the latter to
the mission of revolution by armed uprising.

2) Student Movements
Students were the most active and leading group among various civil society
groups in struggling for democratization in this period.634 After intense internal debates
and power struggle, radical student organizations took control over moderate student
organizations and led the democratic struggle of not only the student movement but also
of other democratic groups and organizations. In the first half of 19S5, an internal
conflict, the so called “MT-MC” dispute took place.655 The MC group believed that the
first priority of the student movement was an autonomization of the campus that should
gradually develop into a political struggle. The MT group criticized that strategy was
ineffective, and argued that the student movement needed a direct political struggle with

454 Bret L. Billet, “The History and Role of Student Activism in the Republic of Korea: the politics
of contestation and conflict resolution in fledgling democracy.”
655 MT is an abbreviation of the Committee of Struggle for Democratization (Minjuhwa Tujaeng
Uiwonhoi), and MC is an abbreviation of “Main Current.”
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the regime in order to achieve democratization.656 Eventually, those two groups
compromised and together led the student movement For example, unlike the strategic
difference, they agreed the necessity of a coalition with workers in the democratic
movement and tried to represent workers’ interests.657
Student movement activists in this period especially emphasized radical and
violent strategies, and their ideological origins came from leftist ideologies, such as the
Marxist dependency theory and new imperialism.658 Besides these radical ideologies,
strong anti-Americanism was a feature of their platform, and it was often expressed by
radical movements. For instance, on 24 May 198S, about 100 students forcefully
occupied the U.S. Information Service Library in Seoul, and barricaded themselves inside
the building to protest American support for the Chun regime.659 Furthermore, many
radical movement organizations, such as the Sammintuwi, were established, and directly
challenged the state authority through radical and violent protests. Students’ radical
protests were based on a critical perception of political parties. That is, those radical
student movement activists were skeptical of the intent of the ruling and opposition
parties regarding democratization, and therefore did not believe negotiations could bring

656SinDor%-A, (April 1989): 446-47.
457 According to Hong Seung-Sang, the “MT” group was destroyed by the arrest of leaders of this
group. The MC group was divided internally by an ideological difference, and self-destructed in 1985.
Hong Seung-Sang, interviewed by author, Seoul, 19 August 1999.
431 According to Hong Seung-Sang, in this period, the regime thought that the main channel of
these leftist ideologies was through the North Korean government and radical students closely contacted to
North Korean spies and organizations. Hong Seung-Sang, interviewed by author, Seoul, 19 August 1999.
659 Washington Post, Friday, 24 May 1985, A l. Besides this protest, on 4 November 1985, a
group of student dissidents occupied the U.S. business organization’s third-story office, and protested
against the South Korean government and U.S. trade policies. In addition, on 12 November 1985, three
students rushed into the office of the Bank o f America in the southeastern port of Busan and briefly
occupied a room to protest the U.S. economic policies toward South Korea. On 18 November 1985,
students occupied the ruling DJP's political training institute outside of Seoul, and called for the repeal of
the fascist Constitution.
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real democracy.660 Additionally, most student movement activists did not strongly
support the position of the NKDP until it gave up negotiations with the ruling party.
In this period, the student movement for constitutional revision was mostly
organized by newly established radical student organizations, such as the National
Federation of Student Association (Chunhaknyun) and the Sammintuwi.661 Leaders of
these student movement organizations defined the constitutional movement as a part of
the movement toward the minjung democracy,662 along with national unification and
emancipation of the minjung, rather than as a mere change of the presidential election
law. Because of this radical ideology, suppression by the regime was harsher, and it was
best revealed in the attempt to enact “Campus Stabilization Lsw'\Hakwon Anjung Bup)
in August 1985. The main purpose of this law was to send students who were deeply
involved in social movements to labor concentration camps for re-education without due
process of law.663 Namely, the regime tried to isolate student movement activists from

660 Major demands of the student movement between 1986 and 1987 were:
1986: I) to deny system of graduation fixed number
2) to overthrow American imperialism and withdrawal of U.S. Army
3) to overthrow military dictatorial regime
4) revision of the Constitution toward direct presidential election
1987: I) abolishment of assertion for sustaining previous constitution
2) to establishment of neutral cabinet
3) to denounce torture of the regime
4) to return the right of military operation to the Korean government
661 Hankook Kidokyo Sahoe Yonguwon (Kisayon), Kaehunkwa Minjuhwa (Constitutional
Revision and Democratization), (Seoul: Minjungsa, 1986), 27-31.
662 After the general election in 198S, democratic civil society was ideologically divided into two
groups: liberal democrats and minjung democrats. The liberal democrats, most the middle class and
moderate civil society organizations, aspired for liberal democracy, supporting the NKDP. Minjung
democrats were movement intellectuals and politicized workers, fanners and urban poor, who advocated
minjung ideology, represented the minjung as the center of the nation and identified the authoritarian state,
monopoly capital, and the U.S. as anti-minjung, anti-national, and anti-democratic evils. In their view,
liberal democracy was a political form of bourgeois domination, which contradicted the interests of the
minjung. Thus, they had a critical and suspicious stance on the NKDP, understanding it as a conservative
partner vis-a-vis the authoritarian regime. Instead of liberal democracy, they argued for minjung
democracy, which would realize the economic interest and political domination of the minjung.
643 Dong-A Daily, 6 August 1985.
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other democratic groups of civil society. In spite of this repressive policy, the student
movement for constitutional revision continued and became even more radicalized.
However, the draft of the “Campus Stabilization Law” became not only the main
issue of the political confrontation between the regime and the opposition force but also a
source of internal dissension between the moderates and hardliners within the regime.664
When the regime introduced the law, the opposition party and democratic civil society
declared that they would struggle for its withdrawal. For example, the Minchuhyup
established the Committee of Struggle for Anti-Campus Stabilization Law, composed of
31 Jaeya organizations, and struggled for the withdrawal of the law. In addition, other
social classes, such as professors and lawyers, participated in the struggle, and expressed
opposition to the law by issuing public statements. After this episode, the politics of
dialogue disappeared, and confrontations between the regime and democratic civil
society became more severe.
From the fall semester of 1985, the student movement had been led by the re
organized radical organization, the Sammintuwi, and was becoming more radical. For
example, on 18 November 1985, 191 students from 14 universities occupied the political
training institute of the ruling DJP, calling for end of the fascist Constitution.665 In 1986.
more radical student movement organizations, such as the Jamintuwi and Minmintwwi,
were established and led the students’ political struggle. Particularly, the National
Coalition of Anti-imperial Anti-dictatorial Patriotic Students (Ehakryrt)666 was the most

664 For instance, Lee Jong-Chan, a leader of the moderate faction and the floor leader of the ruling
DJP, opposed the “Campus Stabilization Law.” As a result o f his oppose, Lee had to step down from the
post of floor leader, and the tension between the hardliners and moderates within the regime became more
severe.
665 Dong-A Daily, 18 November 1985.
666 The National Coalition of Anti-imperial Anti-dictatorial Patriotic Students (Ehakryn) was
established by radical students under the Chunhakryun on November 3, 1986. The ideological root o f this
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radical and violent student organization. Its ideologies were exactly same as the NLPDR
line of North Korea. The members of this organization considered South Korea as a
colony of the United States, and believed that the U.S. government wanted a dictatorial
regime in South Korea for its own national interest Thus, this student organization
struggled to evict the U.S. military from the South Korea, as a first priority for
democratization, by using every non-violent and violent means. In addition, those radical
student organizations denied the possibility of gradual democratization by any
compromise with the ruling coalition. They believed that real democratization should
start from the overthrow of the authoritarian regime by a student revolution.
In spite of suppression on the radical student movement, the student movement
for the constitutional revision and democratization was not eliminated but grew even
more radicalized. From 1986, student movement activists defined the current
constitution as a fascist constitution and struggled to establish a new constitution,
“Sammin Hunbup."661 For example, on February 4, about 1,000 students of nine
universities gathered in Seoul National University, demanding revision of the fascist
constitution.668 Thus, in most student demonstrations, “abolition of the fascist
constitution” and “establishment of people’s parliament” were common slogans. Along
with physical suppression of the student movement, the regime also ideologically
attacked the radical student movement. The regime defined those student organizations

organizatio came from Kim II-Sung’s “Juche Sasang.” This line of radical organizations was called the
“NL.” This organization struggled for democratization by radical ways and realization of social justice
through overthrowing the dictatorial regime. This organization often used an occupation of governmental
offices or facilities of universities to express its demands. Joongang Daily, 4 November 1986.
667 Kang Shin-Chul, 80nyundae Haksaengundongsa (The History of the Student Movement in the
1980s), 8S.
661 Dong-A Daily, 5 February 1986.
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and leaders as communists controlled by North Korea and thus began to destroy and
arrest their organizations and leaders.669
In addition to the struggle for the Sammin constitution, student movement
activists continuously tried to build a coalition with other democratic groups, such as
labor and religious organizations. As a result, student organizations and other civil
society organizations could show the strength of their opposition coalition through large
demonstrations. On 5 May 1986, a thousand workers, students, religious movement
activists, and dissident intellectuals poured onto a main street of Inchon, and shouted
slogans against the U.S., the Chun regime and NKDP—“Oust Yankees, U.S.
Imperialism!” and “Down with Military Dictatorship!”670 After this rally of the
opposition coalition, the student movement concentrated its efforts on criticizing the
regime’s holding the Asian and Olympic Games as well as the struggle for constitutional
revision. Most student movement activists believed that the Asian and Olympic Game
were being used to divert public attention from discontent with the Chun government.671
In January 1987, a significant incident that influenced not only the ruling coalition
but also the whole democratic civil society took place. Park Chong-Chul, a university
student, was tortured and killed by the police. When the incident was revealed on
January 16, the head of the National Police, denying any torture, announced that Park had
suddenly collapsed, choking when the interrogators banged on the desk, and died while

669 According to Hong Seung-Sang, the regime believed that radical students of this period were
educated and directed by the North Korean government In addition, their ultimate goal was to overthrow
the regime and to establish a socialist government Because of the demands and ideologies of radical
student organizations that the regime could not accept radical students had to be harshly suppressed in the
name of national security. Hong Seung-Sang, interviewed by author, Seoul, 19 August 1999.
670 Chosun Daily, 4 May 1986; Joongang Daily, 31 May 1986.
671 Chicago Tribune, 11 September 1986.
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he was being hurried to a hospital.672 After a doctor examined his body, the police
admitted that Park died from strangulation when his throat was pressed against the edge
of a bathtub while two officers repeatedly stuck his head into the water in an effort to
extract a statement673 In spite of regime’s effort for justification, Park’s death aroused
tremendous moral indignation from the public against the regime.674
Religious organizations, such as the NCPCRJ, and the NKDP demanded a
thorough investigation of Park’s death. On January 19, the NKDP asked for a special
National Assembly investigation and the resignation of senior officials following the
disclosure that police tortured and killed a student during interrogation.676 Not only
student movement activists but also ordinary students began to protest the regime’s
cover-up. More importantly, this incident provided an opportunity for various moderate
and radical groups and organizations to unify and thus struggle more aggressively against
Chun’s authoritarian rule. On March 3, the NKDP and 47 dissident and church groups
called the “Grand Peace March for Anti-Torture and Democratization’’ to mark the 49th
day after Park Chong-Chul’s death.676 Armed riot police stopped the peace march from
beginning by indiscriminately firing teargas bombs into the crowd. The peaceful march
quickly turned into a violent demonstration and confrontation with the riot police. The
police force was not big enough to control the well-organized protests. This people’s
protests eventually caused the regime to decide to comply with demands for a democratic
672 Dong-A Daily, 16 January 1987,11.
673 Dong-A Daily, 19 January 1987,1.
674 Many middle class citizens came to know through the mass media that Park was a sociable,
upright and hard-working man from a very poor yet happy family. He was the single hope of his family.
Although he had participated in student movements and had been arrested two times, he was released
quickly because he had never been a core activist, and was recently much less involved in the movements.
His personal history stirred up the hearts of citizens, particularly the middle class who had children in
universities. Dong-A Daily, 20 January 1987,6.
675 Washington Post, Tuesday, 20 January 1987, A15.
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transition in June 1987. In this regard, a university student’s death was a significant
incident that galvanized not only the student movement but also other democratic civil
society groups.
Furthermore, there was also a significant change in the institutional political arena
on 13 April 1987. President Chun announced that the debate on the constitutional
revision had to be suspended until after the 1988 Olympic Games in order to carry out a
peaceful transfer of power and to insure the success of the Games. Thus, the next new
government would be established on February 1988 through an indirect election that
would be held under the present Constitution toward the end of 1987.677 After Chun’s
announcement, not only student organizations but also ordinary students strongly
criticized his decision.678 Student movement activists, especially radical students,
protested against Chun’s decision to suspend the negotiations for constitutional revision.
For example, students of 18 universities in Seoul area established the Council of Student
Representatives in Seoul Area (Seoul Jiyok Hakseangdaepyoja Hyupuihwoi) on 8 May
1986. The main goal of this radical organization was to reverse Chun’s decision and to
overthrow the dictatorship.679 The biggest demonstration that was led by radical student
organizations and other opposition force participated in took place in Seoul on June 10.
In the process of confronting the riot police, a student, Yi Han-Yol, was killed by
/B A

fragments from a tear gas canister.

This incident further provoked radical and

676 Washington Post, Wednesday, 4 March 1987, A25; The Toronto Star, 4 March 1987.
677 Washington Post, Monday, 13 April 1987, A17.
67> For example, on 17 April 1987, students of 70 universities and college around nation boycotted
classes, and demanded withdrawal o f authoritarian regime. The riot police violently suppressed students
who involved in demonstration with tear gas and arrested leaders of demonstration. Dong-A Daily, 18
April 1987.
679 Dong-A Daily, 9 May 1987.
6(0 He remained in a deep coma for 24 days and finally died on July S.
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moderate student movement activists to be united and made the student movement
escalate to a militant protest against harsh suppression.
After Chun’s announcement and Yi’s death, student demonstrations with other
democratic groups and organizations, including middle class citizens, were carried out
everyday, pressuring the regime to accept popular demands for democratization.681 In
this respect, two students’ deaths made various lines of student organizations united and
stimulate the middle class to actively support the democratic movement.682 At the same
time, the regime completely lost the capability to control the student movement. There
was no choice but to comply with a democratic transition. Especially, one great change
in the student movement in this period, radical student organizations that had anti
democratic elements were marginalized and neutralized by the politically motivated
middle class. In this respect, the eruption of the middle class greatly contributed to
unifying radical and moderate student organizations, and this united student movement
played a significant role in the regime’s concession in 1987.

6(1 For example, on 11 June 1987, about 300 students took over the Myongdong Cathedral
compound in the center of Seoul when anti-government protests flared across country. After the police
withdrawal, astonished students rushed around asking what happened. The government earlier demanded
they surrender and face charges. Priests appealed to the students to end their protest, saying the clergy had
asked the police not to arrest them if they agreed to disperse voluntarily. Nevertheless, many students said
they did not want to leave the compound, which they declared a "liberated zone.” The Toronto Star, 15
June 1987. In addition, June 18, students, workers and citizens more than 100,000 gathered, and
demonstrated in the night They occupied streets, and demanded democratization and non-violence to the
regime. Dong-A Daily, 19 June 1987.
6,3
Since June 10, the middle class citizens participated more oflen in the democratic movement of
civil society. For example, on June 11, thousands o f angry antigovemment protesters gathered in Seoul
downtown, and protested against the regime. In the process of confrontation with the riot police, the riot
police retreated in panic, and the protest continued to June 13. Washington Post, Thursday, 11 June 1987;
A25 and 13 June 1987, A20.
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3) Labor Movements
Since 1985, the labor movement became more radicalized after governmentcontrolled labor union leaders were excluded.683 The main reason was that student
movement activists, expelled by the regime in the early 1980s, went to workplaces,
educated workers, and helped to establish labor unions and organizations. Along with
students' helps, religious organizations actively helped to establish labor organizations.
For instance, Protestant workers formed the Coalition of Korean Protestant Labor
(Kinoryun) on 3 February 1985, with following goals; 1) to improve working conditions
and lift working wages and 2) to support the democractic movement by mobilizing
workers. In addition, supports of the Catholic church for the labor movement was led by
the Korea Catholic Labor Youth Association which focused on establishing labor unions
in work places.684 Furthermore, the character of the labor movement had dramatically
changed by the mid-1980s. The labor strike that most clearly demonstrated this changed
character was the solidarity strike that occurred in the Kuro Industrial Park in June 1985.
Although the strike was harshly suppressed by riot police, the labor movement became
more politicized and radicalized.685
More radical labor organizations, such as the Federation of Labor Movements in
Seoul Area, were established to focus on political issues. The Seonoryun called for
constitutional revision to go beyond the issue of direct presidential election to the
guaranteeing of basic rights to workers, farmers, and the urban poor. In addition, these
coalition organizations strongly criticized the NKDP for having a too narrow definition of

60 Yun Sang-Chul, I980snyundae Hankookui Minjuhwaehaenggwajung (The Process of
Democratic Transition in the 1980s), 125-6.
6.4 Dong-A Daily, 5 February 1985.
6.5 Hagen Goo, State and Society in Contemporary Korea, 151.
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democracy by equating it with a direct presidential election. They also emphasized that a
new constitution should provide a political form o f minjung domination. Like radical
student movement organizations, these labor organizations, influenced by radical
ideologies, struggled for establishment of the Sammin6*6 constitution. The response of
the regime to the radicalization of the labor movement was very severe. The regime
defined the radical labor organizations and their leaders as anti-government forces and
treated them as communists who were a threat to natonal security.687
Table 6-2
Trade Unions and Labor Disputes (1983-1987)
1983
1984
1985
1987
1986
Unions
3,083
2,884
2,868
3,004
4,086
98
Strikes
265
113
276
3,749
Sources: EPB, Hankook Tonggyewolbo (Monthly Newsletter of Korean Statistics) and
KLI, Bungibyul Nodong Donghyang Bunsuk (Quarterly Labor Movement Analysis).
Because o f the radical character, it was isolated from the middle class and other
moderate groups and organizations of civil society. The main reason for the
radicalization of the labor organizations and their iqovement was that most leaders of the
labor movement came from radical student organizations, or were educated by radical
students. Thus, the regime focused on disconnecting the relationship between student
movement activsts and workers who had been student movement activists. Nevertheless,
labor and student movement activists maintained a close relationship. For instance, on 11
November 1986, about 500 students and workers who were affiliated in the Minmintuwi
6,6
Korean Sam means three in English, and three mins indicates minjung (people), minju
(democracy), and minjok (nation).
According to Hong Seung-Sang, a former police officer, the regime recognized that the
radicalization of the labor movement was strongly influenv id by radical student movement activists who
were tinged with communist ideology. Thus, the regime defined radical labor movement activists as
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demonstrated, demanding withdrawal of the authoritarian regime and revision of the
Constitution.688 The regime believed that labor unions would collapse if those workers
who came from campuses disappeared; thus the regime concentrated on finding and
arresting those particular leaders o f the labor movement As a result, organizational
structures of labor unions became weak, and their influence on the democratic movement
gradually decreased. However, a more serious problem for the labor movement was its
isolation from other democratic groups and organizations, including the middle class.
Moderate civil society groups and organizations, such as the Jaeya force, were reluctant
to build a coalition with radicalized labor unions and organizations because of different
social and ideological backgrounds and violent characters of the labor movement.
Because of suppression by the regime and isolation from other democratic groups,
labor movement activists had to participate as individuals in the democratic movement.
After the disclosure of the Park Chong-Chul incident, workers individually participated in
the establishment of the preparatory committee for Park’s memorial and the National
Coalition for a Democratic Constitution.689 For example, only 210 people among the
2,191 establishment proposers of the National Coalition for Democratic Constitution
were workers and peasants.690 Because of workers’ weak position in the democratic
movement, their political and economic interests were not well reflected in the
negotiation for democratic transition between the opposition party and the regime.

communists and suppressed them under the name of national security. Hong Seung-Sang, interviewed by
author, Seoul, 19 August 1999.
“ * Hankook Daily, 14 November 1986.
419 NCDC (National Coalition for a Democratic Constitution), “Minju Hunbup Jaengchui
Kookmin Undong Bonbu Sangbanki Hwaldong Bogosu” (The Report on the Activity of the NCDC in the
First Half of the Year 1987), (Seoul: NCDC, 1987).
6,0 Dong-A Daily, 28 May 1987.
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4) The Jaeya Force
After the general election of 1985, the Jaeya force first began to reestablish
existing organizations and then tried to build coalitions with other democratic groups and
organizations. Jaeya leaders also struggled more aggressively for constitutional revision.
For example, Kim Dae-Jung publicly announced that the regime should release political
prisoners, cancel the program of integration and abolition of press companies, and
guarantee basic labor rights.691 The first outcome of these efforts for establishing
organizations was the birth of the Association of Minjung Movement for Democracy and
Unification (Mintongnyun) on 29 March 1985.692 Leaders of the Mintongryun believed
that democratization could not be accomplished by political force within the institutional
political arena and that the main subjects of the democratization and national unification
should be workers and peasants.693 However, the dual-edge policy of the regime caused

691 Institute of Gladness and Hope, Amheksokui hwoibul (A Torch o f Darkness: Testimony of
Democratic Movement in the 1970s and 1980s), vol. 6. In addition, on May 17, an opposition leader said
that President Chun could face a "serious uprising” and possibly the disruption of the Summer Seoul
Olympic Games in 1988 unless he is willing to accept changes of the Constitution. Kim Sang-Hyun who
said he represented the views of other opposition leaders, including Kim-Dae Jung and Kim Young-Sam,
has met with State Department officials and members of Congress during a two-week visit to the United
States. In his interview, he said Chun must accept a constitutional amendment allowing direct elections for
President. President Chun, who came to power in a military coup in 1980, was confirmed in office a year
later by an Electoral College controlled by the ruling DJP. Mr. Kim said "President Chun will not survive
his term, and the 1988 Olympic Games may not be possible unless something concrete is shown to the
Korean people this year and steps are being taken toward democracy." Kim Sang Hyun said "in order to
avoid bloodshed, to advance democracy peacefully, we have to start the process now." He also said the
committee would consists of about 20 people representing the ruling party, opposition parties, labor leaders
and "others whose civil rights are restricted and who cannot participate in the political process.” "If
President Chun accepts the changes, Mr. Kim said, he will get the credit and be remembered for
democratization. If he refuses, Mr. Kim said, unrest is likely to grow. In addition, he criticized President
Reagan for having said during a visit by President Chun that the South Korean leader had made
"considerable progress” in handling his country’s problems. "There is a communication problem between
the Reagan administration and the Korean public." "Mr. Reagan sees small changes as a political
development, while the Koreans do not There has not been any fundamental change in the political
system." The New York Times, 19 May 1985.
692 Selig S. Harrison, “Dateline from South Korea: A Divided Seoul,” 154-75; Dong-A Daily, 29
March 1985.
693 Minjok Minju Undongyonguso, Mintongryun- Minjutongil minjungundonguonhappyunggasu
(I) (Mintongryun- Evaluation of the Association of Minjung Movement for Democracy and Unification),
(Seoul: Minjok minju undongyonguso, 1989), 6.
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democratic civil society to confront the opposition party in the democratic struggle.
Consequently, the Chun regime took advantage o f the conflict between the opposition
party and democratic civil society in its dealings with the democratic movement
At the same time, the Jaeya force realized the importance of having a formal
political institution, such as the political party although they were skeptical of the intent
of the NKDP regarding democratization. Thus, on 17 March 1986, Jaeya leaders and
opposition politicians established the National Liaison Organization for Democracy.
This organization especially focused on coordinating and mediating various factions of
democratic forces for an influential political struggle.694 Moreover, after the dialogue for
constitutional revision opened in April 1986, the Jaeya force needed a formal institutional
channel to influence negotiations for constitutional revision. Thus, the Jaeya
organizations publicly emphasized the importance of a coalition with the NKDP for the
constitutional struggle.695 The Jaeya force felt that it should take the upper hand in a
coalition with the NKDP. The Jaeya force demanded that negotiations for constitutional
revision should deal with more fundamental things than just the revision of the
Constitution. For example, the Mintongnyun and Minchungnyun contended that the
constitutional revision should not be limited to the matter of direct presidential elections
but be extended to win the minjung’s right to life.
694 The National Liaison Organization for Democracy (Minjuhwanul wihan Kookmin Undong
Yollakgigu), established by opposition politicians and Jaeya leaders, such as Kim Young-Sam, Lee in-Woo,
and Moon Ik-Hwan, struggled with the regime for the restoration of democracy. In order to do so, this
organization tried to coordinate and mediate various factions of democratic forces for the effective
democratic struggle. In addition, this organization cooperated with the NKDP, the Council for Promotion
of Democracy, UMMDU, KNCC, and the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission. Dong-A Daily, 19
March 1986.
695 Although the relationship between the opposition party and democratic groups was not
cooperative in this period, the relationship between the opposition NKDP and the Jaeya force was special in
some degree. That is, because many leaders of the Jaeya force participated in the opposition NKDP before
the election, the Jaeya force had an especially close relationship with the NKDP. Thus, in spite of a
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In addition, the Jaeya force supported other democratic groups and organizations
directly and indirectly. For example, on 4 November 1985,60 leaders of the Jaeya force
and religious organizations, such as Ge Hun-Je, Kim Syeng Hun, Park Hyung-Kyu, Su
Kyung-Won, and Lee Woo-Jung, held a press conference and claimed that the current
regime considered democratization as a communist activity. They also accused the
regime of trying to isolate the democratic movement from ordinary people, especially
from the middle class, and urged people to join democratic movements.696
However, the Jaeya force was not as active as it had been during the
decompression period for a couple of reasons. The first was the weakness of leadership
within the Jaeya force. Many Jaeya leaders participated in the establishment process of
the KNDP in 1985, and key leaders were arrested by the regime right after the regime
returned to a repressive policy. The second reason was an internal conflict of the Jaeya
force. Although most Jaeya organizations agreed on the general direction of the political
struggle for democratization, they were deeply divided into radical and moderate
organizations in terms of strategies and ideologies.697 This division made the Jaeya force
difficult to unite for the influential democratic struggle. For example, on 1 May 1986, the
Mintongnyun announced that it would withdraw from the National Conference for
Democracy and Unification because latter organization was established based on radical
ideologies, such as anti-American, anti-nuclear, and liberation theory.698
After negotiations between the NKDP and DJP opened on 30 April 1986, the
initial response of the Jaeya force was to disagree with the decision of the NKDP to
conflictive relationship between the opposition party and other democratic groups, it was possible for the
Jaeya force to maintain a close relationship with the NKDP.
696 Institute of Gladness and Hope, Amheksokui hwoibul (A Torch of Darkness: Testimony of
Democratic Movement in the 1970s and 1980s), vol. 6,650.
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negotiate for constitutional revision with the Chun regime.699 For them, especially for
radical groups of the Jaeya force, the Chun regime was an enemy to be overthrown, not to
be negotiated with. They insisted that constitutional revision would presuppose the
ouster of an authoritarian regime and guarantee all democratic rights of the minjung. For
example, both the Mintongnyun and Minchungnyun asserted that the schedule for
democratization must proceed with an end to authoritarianism, constitutional revision,
and the establishment of a democratic government700 They intended to turn the issue of
constitutional revision into a political struggle to topple the Chun regime. In addition,
they warned the NKDP that it would be misleading to expect democratic reform through
compromise with the ruling party. In spite of the dissatisfaction o f the Jaeya force with
the negotiations of the NKDP, negotiations continued.
Negotiations between the DJP and NKDP weakened the position of the Jaeya
force, especially the position o f radical groups within the Jaeya force, in the democratic
movement This weak position continued until the regime closed the dialogue for
constitutional revision. During the negotiation, the general relationship between the
Jaeya force, especially radical organizations, and the NKDP was conflictual although it
had a closer relationship with the NKDP than with other democratic groups. The Jaeya
force believed that the NKDP was more interested in taking power than struggling for
democratization. On the other hand, the NKDP thought that the revolutionary demands
of the radical Jaeya groups were obstructing negotiations with the regime. Nevertheless,
the role of the Jaeya force was limited to criticizing the strategy o f the regime and
697 Kim Sun-Hyuk, The Politics and Democratization in Korea: The Role o f Civil Society, 89-90.
691 Seoul Daily, 3 May 1986.
699 Hankook Kidokyo Sahoe Yonguwon (Kisayon), Kaehunkwa Minjuhwa (Constitutional
Revision and Democratization), 15.
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supporting the position of the NKDP because the opposition party had the initiative in
conducting negotiations. Thus, the Jaeya force had no alternative to supporting the
position of the NKDP. At the same time, the Jaeya force checked and criticized not only
the ruling DJP but also the NKDP. Particularly, after Lee Min-Woo met Chun and
agreed on the constitutional revision on December 1986, the Jaeya force strongly
criticized the NKDP and Lee.701 When the NKDP was divided by Lee’s proposal, the
Jaeya force tried to take the initiative in the democratic movement. As they anticipated,
negotiations were suspended, and the NKDP and the Jaeya force came to face a new
political situation.
In particular, Park Chong-Chul’s death also strongly affected the character of the
Jaeya force and its democratic movement. The biggest change was radical and moderate
organizations of the Jaeya force built a united front for the democratic movement
struggles with the Chun regime. Another important change was the participation of the
middle class in Jaeya organizations. Furthermore, after the Chun regime suspended
negotiations for the constitutional revision, the Jaeya force protested more aggressively
against Chun’s decision by building coalitions with other democratic groups, including
the opposition party.702 Since then, the leadership of the democratic movement in civil
society went to the Jaeya force through the participation of the NKDP in nationwide
Jaeya organizations. The establishment of the National Movement Headquarter of
Democratic Constitution (NMHDC, Kookmin Undong Bonbu)703 was a result of efforts

700 Kisayon, Kaehunkwa Minjuhwa (Constitutional Revision and Democratization), 31-3.
701 Park Bo-Gyun, Chunhwadae Bisvsil 3 (The Secretary Office of the Blue House 3), 80-3.
703 Yun Sang-Chul, State and Society in Contemporary Korea, 150-151.
703 The National Movement Headquarter of Democratic Constitution (NMHDC, Kookmin Undong
Bonbu) was established on 27 May 1987. The NMHDC criticized the Chun’s decision to keep the current
constitution, and demanded a direct election for president. In addition, the NMHDC united civil society
and institutional political arena under a united leadership, resolving differences among people’s movement
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for building a coalition with the opposition party, and this organization played a very
important role after negotiations were suspended.
The mass rally in Seoul and other major cities, led by the NMHDC on June 10,
was the biggest protest against the authoritarianism of the Chun regime. The NMHDC, a
nationwide umbrella organization, organized the “People’s Rally to Denounce the CoverUp of the Torture-murder of Park Chong-Chul and the Scheme to Maintain the Current
Constitution” in 22 major cities.704 The regime considered using every measure that
could suppress the democratic movement of civil society, including proclaiming martial
law.705 Nevertheless, demonstrations in which not only the Jaeya force but also other
civil society organizations and the RDP participated continued. The regime tried to relax
this tension between the opposition force and the regime through a meeting between
President Chun and the opposition leader, Kim Young-Sam. However, the meeting was
not productive, and Kim announced that the RDP decided to participate in the “Peaceful
March” on June 26.706
On June 26, the NMHDC organized a huge demonstration which students,
workers, religious organizations, opposition politicians, and middle class citizens
participated in. Not only civil society organizations but also ordinary people strongly
groups and also between civil society groups and the opposition party. I) sectoral rcpresentatives-253
Catholic Priests, 270 Protestant pastors, 160 Buddhist monks, 35 from the PMCDR, 213 opposition
politicians, 162 women’s movement leaders, 308 from the Council for the Promotion of Democracy
Movement, 17 1 peasant activists, 39 labor activists, 18 urban poor activists, 43 publishers and journalists,
43 authors and writers, 66 artists, 55 educators, 12 youth movement leaders, and 74 lawyers; 2)
geographical representatives-11 from Kyunggi province, 73 from Kangwon province, 29 from Kyungnam
province, 54 from Chunbuk province, 40 from Chunnam province, 56 from Busan, and 89 from Kyungbuk
province. Dong-A Daily, 28 May 1987.
704 In the confrontation with riot police, 13 leaders of the NMHDC were arrested. Lee Su-Hoon,
“Transitional Politics of Korea, 1987-1992; Activation o f Civil Society," Pacific Affairs 66, no. 3 (fall
1933): 355.
705 For example, on 19 June 1987, Prime Minister Lee Han Key warned South Koreans that the
government would make an extraordinary decision if peace was not soon restored. The Washingfon Post,
20 June 1987.
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demanded Chun’s stepping down and democratization in the demonstration.707 It was too
late for the regime to control the people’s passion for democratization and assertive
struggle of civil society. The opposition force had already attained counter-hegemony
against the authoritarian regime. Three days later, on 29 June 1987, Roh Tae-Woo, a
presidential candidate of the ruling DJP, eventually announced eight measures of
democratization.708
Figure 6-1
Tendency of the Democratic Movement by Opposition Party and the Jaeya Force
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During this period, the change in character of the Jaeya force was closely related
to the fate of the opposition party in the institutional political arena. For example, as
Figure 6-1 illustrates, when the opposition party actively interacted with the ruling party,
the role of the Jaeya force in the democratic movement shrank. On the other hand, when
the opposition party was excluded from the regime or did not struggle actively against the

106 Washington Post, Saturday, 27 June 1987, A1.
707 Washington Post, Friday, 26 June 1987, A28.
101 Washington Post, Tuesday, 30 June 1987, Al.
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regime, the role o f the Jaeya force was emphasized. The role of the Jaeya force had been
very important in attaining counter-hegemony against the regime and in forcing the Chun
regime to comply with people’s demands for democratization through coordinating and
organizing large-scale demonstrations.

5) Religious Communities
In this democratization period, religious communities were also actively involved
in the democratic movement. After the election, the religious communities focused their
efforts on struggling for constitutional revision and induced public participation in the
democratic movement. For example, the Catholic primate of Korea, Cardinal Stephen,
issued a public statement calling for constitutional revision on 9 April 1986. In addition,
on April 3, the Catholic Justice and Peace Committee of Korea suggested that the
government should revise laws related to workers, and demanded the release of political
prisoners.709 In particular, the religious communities of this period were involved in the
democratic movement by building coalitions with other democratic groups and
organizations. For example, starting with the NCPCRJ, the NCCK and the Council of
Catholic Social Movements710 participated in the petition campaign by collecting
signatures from clergy and believers.711 In addition, on 3 March 1986, a standing
109 Dong-A Daily, 3 April 1985; James W. Morley, Driven by Growth: Political Change in the
Asia-Pacific Region (New York: An East Gate Book, 1993), 177.
10The Council of Catholic Social Movements, led by Je Chung-Gu, affiliated several Catholic
associations of laymen, including the Korean Catholic Farmers’ Association, JOC, the National Council of
Labor Ministry, the Ministerial Council of the Urban Poor, the Federation of Catholic Students, and the
Youth Alliance o f Myung-Dong Cathedral.
711 Hankook ICidokyo Sahoe Yonguwon (Kisayon), Kaehunkwa Minjuhwa (Constitutional
Revision and Democratization), 31-3. In addition, on 29 November 1985, about 100 Jaeya politicians and
religious leaders in the office of the Council for the Promotion of Democratization (Minchuhyup) protested
the regime, and demanded release of arrested politicians and students, abolishment o f authoritative
constitution, and stop repression toward democratic forces. Institute of Gladness and Hope, Amheksokui
hwoibul (A Torch o f Darkness: Testimony of Democratic Movement in the 1970s and 1980s), vol. 6.
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committee of the Catholic Church, the Commission on Justice and Peace, announced that
“‘the present signature-collecting campaign as an expression of people for constitutional
change is a fundamental right of people” and that “to change the constitution in its
process and contents is the beginning of democratization in our society.”712 On March 9,
Cardinal Stephen delivered his support to the constitutional amendment in a sermon
entitled, “Democracy is the Road to Reconciliation with God ” Cardinal Kim also said:
We are now witnessing confrontation... between those who emphasize
“national security” at all costs and those who suffer to restore the
sovereignty o f the people...How then is reconciliation possible?
Reconciliation between human is possible only after we have reconciled
with God.... Those who have tried to destroy the human spirit through
torture and violence must be awakened to the presence of God on this
earth.... The present government ust sincerely workto establish
democracy, for which the people have long waited, and secure justice,
peace and human rights This is the demand of the era.. ..the voice of the
people and the will of God... There is no reason to treat people who
advocate constittional revision as enemies when they are working within
the law and following procedures outlined in the present constitution. The
fundamental way to solve the present crisis and to achieve national
reconciliation lies in constitutional revision. We have to bring democracy
to Korea urgently.713
On March 14, Rev. Kim Jae-Ghil, a chairperson of the NCCK, issued a public
statement calling the constitutional revision and the signature campaign essential to the
task of democratization.714 The NCCK also organized the Pan-Christian Committee to
Promote Democratic Constitution and released the names of 1,050 people who had
signed the petition on March 17. Eight days later, the EYC established a committee to
achieve a minjung democratic constitution to participate in the signature-collecting
campaign. Particularly, after the regime began to negotiate with the NKDP for
constitutional revision, the religious communities tried to build a bridge between radical
1,2 Korea/Update, (April 1986): 20.

335

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

and moderate democratic organizations of civil society. For instance, on 9 May 1986,
Cardinal Kim announced that “what was truly needed in our society was not a revolution
but a true and peaceful democratization based upon human dignity and respect and
realization of social justice rather than the government would have to listen to the opinion
of radical students rather than simply suppressing them as pro-Communist.”715
Unlike previous periods, the religious movement of this period was not limited to
Catholic and Protestant church; it spread to Buddhists. In May 1986,152 Buddhist
priests, calling democratization a materialization of Chongto (Buddhist version of ideal
society), maintained that anti-American, anti-war, and anti-nuclear slogans were not
necessarily meant to deny the liberal democratic system, and called for constitutional
revision.716 During negotiations for the constitutional revision, the religious communities
observed the process and supported the NKDP through issuing public statements and
mobilizing mass. Along with the support to the NKDP, the religious communities
emphasized the improvement of human rights conditions, and struggled on behalf of
other social issues.717
After President Chun suspended the dialogue on the constitutional revision, the
religious communities strongly criticized his decision, demanding reopen the dialogue for
the constitutional revision. On April 14, Cardinal Kim in his Easter message said that
7,1 Korea/Update, (April 1986): 24-5.
714Joongang Daily, 15 March 1986.
711 Dong-A Daily, 9 May 1986. Cardinal Kim mentioned that he understood why the students
became radicalized but did not support what they claimed. He pointed as a main cause o f radical leftism to
the political structure that excluded political participation and the widening gap between rich and poor.
From this viewpoint, he called radical students not pro-Communists but nationalists who were concerned
with and loved the country. He ended his sermon by saying “we must implement a task o f harmony and
unity, standing in the middle, even if the government, opposition party and student throw a stone to us.”
716 Chosun Daily, 10 May 1986; Hanguk Kidokkyo Sahoe Munje Yonguwon, Kaehon kwa
Minjuhwa (Constitutional Revision and Democratization), 152.
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“Chun’s decision had brought deep grief to the Korean people by shattering their hope
that the constitutional revision would open a new era.” He also said “the more dissolute
society seems, the more sacrifice we should make to humanize this society, this land, our
country, and our nation for truthful and valuable life.” The NCPCRJ also refuted Chun's
two excuses for the suspension of constitutional discussions:
Peaceful transfer of government through presidential election under the
current Constitution can never be more than a change in position within
the present regime. The people have never recognized this as
democratization. The Olympic game is accepted by no one as a national
event worthy of a national festival and celebration because it serves only
as regime propaganda and imposes the sufferings of eviction on many
ordinary citizens in the name of urban beautification.718
In Protestant churches, the NCCK called upon the President to revoke his decision
and to respond to people’s aspirations for constitutional revision. Later, they protested
more actively by participating in the NMHDC.719 In addition to the Protestant churches,
the Buddhist organizations also issued a public statement of denunciation. On April 21,
three Buddhist organizations, including the National Association o f Buddhist Preists for
the Realization of Justice, the United Minjung Buddhist Movement, and the Federation of
Buddhist University Students issued a public statement that criticized Chun’s decision.720
Along with issuing public statements, the religious communities struggled for the
reopening of negotiations through other means of peaceful resistance, such as hunger
strikes, sit-in struggles, signature campaigns, and prayer meetings. On 21 April 1987, the

717 For example, the KNCC demanded guarantee of freedom of the press, meeting, and association
to the regime, and declared that the Protestant church would struggle against the authoritarian regime until
they obtained democratization. Dong-A Daily, 7 March 1987.
7lt CISJD (Christian Institute for the Study of Justice and Development), Last Victory: An
Overview o f the Korean People’s Strugglefo r Democracy in 1987 (Seoul: Minjungsa, 1988), 86-7.
7 In the case of the Protestant church, 270 pastors participated in the establishment of the
National Movement Headquarter of Democratic Constitution (NMHDC, Kookmin Undong Bonbu). DongA Daily, 28 May 1987.
720 Chosun Daily, 30 April 1987.
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NCCK Human Rights Committee and the representatives of 23 regional committees for
human rights declared the first week of May to be a week of national prayer for the
resignation of the military dictatorship and for constitutional revision, including direct
presidential elections. On the same day, 12 Catholic priests of Kwangju Diocese began
an indefinite hunger strike, calling for the restoration of citizens’ rights to choose their
government, the unconditional release of political prisoners, the guarantee of freedom of
the press, and the honorable withdrawal of the present regime from politics.
The wave of hunger strikes spread to the Protestant church. Twenty-three clergy
from the Chunnam Council of Clergy for the Realization of Peace and Justice and 35
clergy from the National Council of Clergy for the Realization of Peace and Justice
(Mokhyup, NCCRPJ) began hunger strikes on April 27 and May 4, respectively. In
addition, the NCCK held an all-night prayer meeting to demand a constitutional revision.
Over 1,500 ministers and laity from six denominations participated in this prayer meeting
for constitutional revision.721 The Protestant church not only denounced the authoritarian
regime, but also defended the democratic movement of other forces in civil society. For
example, on May 6, the NCCRPJ issued a public statement of support for labor groups
and for the Association of Minjung Movement for Democracy and Unification. Both had
been depicted by the regime as “pro-Communist radical leftists.”722 On 7 May 1986, the
NCCRPJ declared that “anti-Americanism is not necessarily pro-Communism,”
defending the radicalism displayed in some of the anti-govemment demonstrations.723

721 Mun Myong-Ho, “Kaehun Nonui Chongaerul Cjujanghan Saramdul” (Those who demand the
Rediscussion of Constitutional Revision), Sindong-A, (June 1987): 329-33.
722 Mun Myong-Ho, “Kaehun Nonui Chongaerul Cjujanghan Saramdul” (Those who Demand the
Rediscussion of Constitutional Revision), 329-33.
723 JISJD, Gaehungwa Minjuhwa Undong (Constitutional Revision and Democratic Movement),
(Seoul: Minjungsa, 1986), 40-1.

338

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The most significant role of the religious communities, especially the Catholic
church, in this period was to induce the middle class to participate in the democratic
struggle by revealing the truth of Park Chong-Chul’s death by torture. On 18 May 1987,
the NCPCRJ disclosed this fact and added that the police and the regime had attempted to
conceal the fact.724 This disclosure of the NCPCRJ motivated the middle class politically
and stimulated them to support and participate in the democratic movement of civil
society. As a result, democracratic civil society became more united and aggressive, and
its struggles were more influential. More importantly, this event decisively influeced the
change of the public discourse and played a significant role in attaining counterhegemony against the regime. In this regard, the religious community played a decisive
role in attaining counter-hegemony of civil society.
Since June of 1987, the religious communities had more actively struggled for
constitutional revision through participating in nationwide civil society organizations,
such as the NMHDC. For instance, 253 Catholic priests, 270 Protestant pastors, and 160
Buddhist monks participated in the organization as the establishment proposers.725 Since
then, religious leaders and organizations concentrated on supporting democratic struggles
of other civil society organizations. On 23 June 1987, 1,300 Catholic priests, nuns, and
Christians peacefully marched on the streets in favor of revising the Constitution. They

724 Dong-A Daily, 19 May 1987.
725 In addition, geographical representatives-11 from Kyunggi province, 73 from Kangwon
province, 29 from Kyungnam province, 54 from Chunbuk province, 40 from Chunnam province, 56 from
Busan, and 89 from Kyungbuk province established National Movement Headquarter of Democratic
Constitution (NMHDC, Kookmin Undong Bonbu). The NMHDC asserted to change a policy that
President Chun decided to preserve pre-existing authoritarian constitution, and asserted a direct presidential
election. The NMHDC united democratic civil society and institutional political arena, resolving
differences among people’s movement groups and between civil society groups and the opposition party.
Dong-A Daily, 28 May 1987.
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asserted that democratization should be accomplished by democratic means.726 And, the
next day, Catholic priests in Busan demonstrated for human rights and democratization
and held a mass for getting rid of structural violence.727
In this respect, the religious communities played an important role in bridging the
gap among various democratic groups and organizations and inducing ordinary people to
participate in the democratic movement The religious communities also palyed an
important role in neutralizing radical organizations that had anti-democratic elements. In
addition, the church greatly contributed to providing a place of refuge for democratic
leaders and organizations. Thus, many meetings and demonstrations were held and
waged in churches, especially the Myungdong Cathedral, where provided shelters to
democratic movement activists.728 Therefore, the religious communities directly and
indirectly contributed to the democratic movement and attaining counter-hegemony.

6) The Middle Class
The active participation of the middle class in the democratic movement was one
of the most distinctive phenomena which indicated the change of civil society.729
Scholars, such as Michael Hsiao and Hagen fCoo, have argued that the active
participation of the middle class was the most important factor that forced the Chun

726 At the same time. Catholic preists demonstrated for human rights and democratization, and
held a mass for getting rid of structural violence of the Chun regime. Dong-A Daily, 24 June 1987.
727 Dong-A Daily, 24 June 1987.
721 For example, on 14 June 1987, about 300 students took over the Myongdong Cathedral in
downtown Seoul when anti-government protests flared across the country. After the police withdrawal,
astonished students rushed around asking what happened. The government earlier demanded they
surrender and face charges. Priests appealed to the students to end their protest, saying the clergy had
asked police not to arrest them if they agreed to disperse voluntarily. Nevertheless, many students said they
did not want to leave the church, which they declared a "liberated zone.” The Toronto Star, IS June 1987.
729 In 1987,65% of South Korean considered themselves members of the middle class. Juergen
Kleiner, Korea: A Century o f Change, 217.
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regime to accept the democratic transition process.730 Before the general election of
1985, the middle class did not explicitly express its political dissatisfaction because
people were afraid of the consequences of expression. However, after the general
election, the middle class became more actively involved in the democratic movement
and openly expressed their discontent with the regime. On April 26,1986, for example,
enthusiastic mass rallies drew tens of thousands of supporters, including members of the
middle class, for the petition drive in major cities.731
Particularly, when negotiations for constitutional revision started, the middle class
was enthusiastic and actively supported the opposition party.732 Since the presidential
election was scheduled toward the end of 1987, the middle class worried about the
coming of social confusion and unrest caused by ideological and political struggles
among democratic forces. As the ideological confrontation between the regime and the
democratic movement threatened the prospect of constitutional revision and
democratization in 1986, leaders of civil society urged the middle class to take a central
role in democratization. On January 7, a columnist of the Dong-A Daily wrote that the
middle class would have to cast off social indifference and self-satisfaction and prepare,
with patience and courage, for concrete ways to deal with revolutionary demands in a
non-revolutionary way.733 In addition, Park Chong-Chul’s death strongly stimulated the
middle class to break its silence and provided a strong incentive for participation in the
democratic movement of civil society. As a sign of the breaking of silence, many middle

730 Michael Hsiao and Hagen Koo, “The Middle Classes and Democratization in East Asian NICs:
Taiwan and South Korea Compared," An International Conference on Consolidation the Third Wave
Democracies: Trends and Challenge, 1995.
731 Dong-A Daily, 26 April 1986.
732 Hankook Daily, 1 January 1987,9-11.
733 Dong-A Daily, 7 January 1987, 3.
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class citizens participated in the preparatory committee for the nationwide public funeral
for Park Chong-Chul on Jauary 26.™
The middle class’s orientation sharply changed right after President Chun
suspended negotiations for the constitutional revision. For most of the middle class,
constitutional revision was a symbolic representation of freedom, fairness, humanity,
autonomy and participation. When the opposition party demanded constitutional change,
the middle class supported it because it promised a framework for fair competition that
they believed would enable them to take power.
The active participation o f the middle class included various social classes and
occupations. For example, on 28 March, 28 professors from Korea University
proclaimed that:
It is part of the duties of professors and intellectuals to be constantly
concerned with national and social issues and to express fair opinions
about them....It is right to say that the most fundamental problem today
lies in democratizaton and that this depends upon the amendment of the
Constitution. Free presentation and discussion of ideas about and
petitioning for constitutionalrevision re natural rights of the
people....Today we regard constitutional revision as the demand of all the
nation’s people. The authorities and politicians...must not delay
therealization of the people’s desire for any reason whatsoever.
In addition, on 2 June 1986,265 professors from 23 colleges publicly said that “since the
origin of the crisis facing our country lies in the existence of the present regime, which
lacks legitimacy, the emergence o f a legitimate civilian government is far more pressing
than anything else.” In addition, they strongly demanded an end of suppression on
students and a guarantee of autonomous student organizations.736 When a group of

734 Chosun Daily, 28 January 1987, 11.
733 Wolgan Chosun, “Daehak gyosudului Sikooksununmun" (Statements of Professors on Current
Issues), (June 1986): 476.
736 Dong-A Daily, 2 June 1986.
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reporters expressed their opinion against the Chun regime, they also urgued freedom of
the press. As a whole, the suspension of the constitutional revision talks was perceived
as an obstruction of political freedom. This recognition of the political situation strongly
influenced the middle class to participate in the democratic movement
Through this process, the character of the middle class changed dramatically. The
middle class was no longer a conservative force concerned mainly with economic
prosperity and political order, but took a very critical view of the political regime. For
example, a large portion of the middle class disapproved of developmentalism. They
wanted to improve human rights even if it caused a slowing of economic development.
In addition, most middle class people did not agree with the regime’s political agenda.
According to the result of survey, as many as 85.7 percent of 1,043 respondents agreed
that to improve human rights was desirable even if it slowed economic development.737
In this respect, the active participation of the middle class in the “June struggle” was by
no means contingent. The middle class supported the democratic movement not because
of economic discontent, as the students of political economy argued, but because of
political dissatisfaction toward the authoritarian regime. In the mid-1980s, the middle
class was satisfied with economic prosperity, and this economic satisfaction became a
foundation of its active support on democratic civil society. Particularly, the middle
class, along with religious communities, greatly contributed to marginalization and
neutralization of radcal organizations, especially radical student organizations, that had
anti-democratic elements. Thus, this active support of the middle class became a
foundation for changing the character of democratic civil society.

737 Hankook Daily, 9 June 1987. Hankook Daily conducted in May and released the outcome of
the survey on the “entity of the middle class” in June 9.
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4. Democratic Transition o f South Korea in 1987
After Chun announced the suspension of negotiations for constitutional revision,
the confrontation between democratic civil society and the regime grew more severe,
reaching a peak in June 1987. On June 10, two important events changed the future of
Korean politics. One was that the ruling DJP held its party convention to nominate Roh
Tae-Woo as its next presidential candidate. The other event was that the NMHDC
organized the “People’s Rally to Denounce the Cover-Up of the Torture-Murder of Park
Chong-Chul and the Scheme to Maintain the Current Constitution” in 22 major cities.738
About 400,000 people from around the country took part in the nation-wide
demonstrations. The protests gradually escalated to the extent that even the powerful
police force could not control them. The central districts of Seoul were turning into what
New York Times Reporter Clyde Haberman depicted as a “war zone.”739 In order to
suppress the rally, the government issued a “Class A” emergency alert order and
mobilized 60,000 police, equivalent to half of all the police forces throughout the
.

country.

740

The democratic struggle by civil society and the RDP under the leadership of the
NMHDC was much stronger. Through the establishment of the NMHDC, the RDP and
democratic civil society finally healed their differences and united under a single
leadership of the democratic movement.741 It was a grand pro-democracy coalition that
directly brought about Roh’s democratization declaration in June 1987. Several factors
influenced the restoration of the coalition between the RDP and democratic civil society.
731 Lee Su-Hoon, “Transitional Politics o f Korea, 1987-1992: Activation of Civil Society ” 355.
739 New York Times, 22 June 1987, 1.
™ Dong-A Daily, 9 June 1987.
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The first was the establishment of the new hardline RDP in April 1987. Democratic civil
society was critical of the political stance of the NKDP in the relationship with the ruling
party and the regime. Thus, democratic civil society welcomed the establishment o f the
new hardline RDP, and the coalition between the RDP and democratic civil society was
restored.
The second factor was the President’s announcement of the suspension of
negotiations for constitutional revision. The RDP recognized that the Chun regime did
not intend to revise the Constitution, so it gave up political struggle in the institutional
political arena. In this situation, the only strategy for the RDP was to join democratic
civil society and struggle with the regime by restoring its coalition with democratic civil
society. The third factor was Park Chong-Chul's death by police torture. His death
strongly affected not only democratic civil society but also the opposition party, leading
them to unite and restore the grand coalition. In addition, restoration of the coalition
between the RDP and democratic civil society was made possible because the
suppression of radical democratic groups and organizations induced the creation of a
moderate opposition coalition between the opposition party and democratic civil
society.742 Because the NMHDC used moderate and simple slogans, such as

741 In the ideological perspective, the founding statements of the NMHDC, a moderate democratic
organization, emphasized human rights and the restoration of formal procedural democracy, such as a
direct presidential election. Korea Report, I, no. 3 (July-August 1987): 2.
742 The radical organizations of civil society were shattered by severe suppression in late 1986, and
most leaders of radical movement organizations were arrested by the authority. Under the circumstance,
the active democratic movement of radical groups and organizations could not be expected, and many
radical groups and organizations of civil society had to cooperate with the NMHDC as an alternative
strategy. For instance, radical student movement organizations, such as the Council of Students in Seoul
(Seodaehyup), Jamintu and Minmintu, cooperated with the NMHDC by suspending temporarily the radical
slogans which prevailed in demonstration in 1986 although they did not join the NMHDC. Korea/Update,
84, (summer 1987): 5.
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“constitutional revision for direct presidential election” and “down with dictatorship,” it
could be supported by broad sectors of civil society, in particular the middle class.
In June, the Chun regime first began to concentrate its efforts on disconnecting a
relationship between students and other civil society organizations. Along with this
suppression, the regime urged colleges across the nation to close early for summer recess.
In spite of the closed campuses, massive student demonstrations persisted. The protests
reached a fever pitch on June 18, when 73,600 people in 14 cities, including S8,730
students in 78 universities, staged demonstrations and violently confronted with the riot
police.743 The regime’s threat of military intervention could not stop the democratic
struggle of civil society that already began to attain counter-hegemony against the
regime. After the negotiation between Chun and Kim Young-Sam to end violent
demonstrations failed on June 24, the NMHDC staged another huge rally on June 26.744
This was the last blow to the Chun regime, which finally conceeded to the people’s
demands for democratization.745
There were not many options for the Chun regime. The softliners within the
regime criticized Chun’s decision to suspend negotiations and demanded a compromise
with the opposition force.746 This softliners’ position was publicly supported by the U.S.

743 Dong-A Daily, 19 June 1987.
744 On June 24, opposition politicians, led by Kim Young-Sam, denounced as a sham political
concession offered by President Chun, and suggested they would encourage an escalation of the two-weekold campaign on the streets against his government Washington Post, Thursday, 25 June 1987, Al.
74 The Washington Post, 27 June 1987.
746On May 26, Father Kim Seung-Hoon, a representative member of the National Catholic
Priest’s Corps for the Realization of Justice, revealed the evidence which top ranking police officers were
directly involved in the Park Chong-Chul’s death and in cover-up. This disclosure deeply impacted the
hardliners within the regime. For instance, President Chun had to sept down key members of the
hardliners, Chang Se-Dong, the Chief of National Security Planning Agency and the Prime minister Lho
Shin-Young, and six other cabinet members were fired and their posts were replaced by moderate
members. This replacement of hardliners caused the status and power of Roh Tae-Woo who led the
reformist faction to be stronger. After all, Roh’s faction won over the hardliners in the post-Chun power
succession struggle, and the party and the government passed a resolution that Roh was the official
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through statements issued by the State Department747 On the contrary, hardliners
demanded harsh suppression of the democratic movement at any cost They said that
they could use military force to suppress demonstrators who challenged the authority of
the state. However, if President Chun supported Roh, a leader of the softliners, then
political struggle became meaningless to the ruling coalition. For the regime, the first
priority was to relax the political tension, and to support Roh to be the next president
Thus, the DJP presidential nominee Roh Tae-Woo, after discussion with Chun,
announced that he would accept all the opposition demands on June 29, 1987.74*
Roh’s “June 29 Declaration” constituted a foundamental agreement for the
Korean democratic transition. The focal point of the “June 29 Declaration” was the
restoration of the fair rule of competition. The eight points of the declaration were: 1)
constitutional revision for directly elected president, 2) revision of presidential election
law, including the end of restrictions on campaigning, 3) restoration of political rights for
Kim Dae Jung and release of political prisoners, 4) full respect of basic human rights, 5)
freedom of the press, 6) local government autonomy and self-regulation for educational
institutions, 7) provisions for full political activities, and 8) elimination of crime and
corruption.

candidate to succeed Chun and set the date of the party convention to nominate Roh as a next presidential
candidate on June 10,1987. Joongang Daily, 26 May 1987; Park Bo-Gyun, Chunghwadae Bisusil (The
Blue House Secretary Office), vol. 3,81.
747 When Secretary o f State, George P. Shultz, visited South Korea for the meeting with President
Chun, he expressed that the U.S. government supported the compromise between the regime and the
opposition party. Washington Post, Friday, 6 March 1987, A25.
741 The New York Times, 30 June 1987.
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5. Changes of Democratic Civil Society
After the general election in 1985, the character of democratic civil society
became more active and aggressive because democratic civil society witnessed that the
middle class actively supported the opposition party in the election. In particular, the
coalition between the NKDP (later RDP) and democratic civil society became a
foundation of the active and influential democratic struggle with the Chun regime. In this
circumstance, suppression could not stop the active and well-organized democratic
struggle, and the struggle was even getting more aggressive and violent.749 As one
outcome of this active struggle, the opposition force succeeded in opening negotiations
for constitutional revision in the middle of 1986. Ironically, this opening the negotiation
between the DJP and NKDP caused the oppositon force to divide into radical and
moderate factions.750 Thus, both democratic civil society and the NKDP could not
struggle effectively against the repressive regime in early this period.
Although democratic civil society and the NKDP were in conflict after
negotiations for constitutional revision began, democratic civil society did not have an
alternative strategy and therefore had to support the position of the opposition party. At
the same time, democratic groups and organizations, especially radical organizations,
focused their efforts on forcing the regime to move toward a democratic transition
through active and aggressive demonstrations. Along with aggressive demonstrations,
the middle class increasingly showed signs of supporting the democratic movement, such

749 Wonmo Dong, “University Students in South Korean Politics: Patterns of Radicalization in the
1980s,” Journal o f International Affairs 40, no. 2 (winter/spring 1987): 233-55.
750 To radical groups and organizations, the Chun regime and the ruling DJP were not subject of
negotiation but a struggle. On the other hand, the opposition party was purely power-oriented and thought
the easiest and fastest way to take power was to change the Constitution through a negotiation with the
regime. Because of this different viewpoint, the opposition party and democratic civil society had
difficulty in uniting and building a coalition.
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as joining democratic organizations and their democratic struggles. For example, on 23
March 1986, several tens of thousands of opposition supporters, including the middle
class, rallied in Busan, demanding constitutional revision.751 In this sense, the public
discourse was moving from the regime to the opposition force, and democratic civil
society was attaining counter-hegemony against the regime after the election. The
change of character in civil society and the active support of the middle class made the
Chun regime realize that it could not control popular desires for democratization and
active democratic struggles through negotiations with the opposition party.752
Eventually, the negotiation for constitutional revision was suspended, and the
conflict between the NKDP and democratic civil society was removed by giving up the
institutional politics of the opposition party. After that, democratic civil society and the
NKDP struggled more actively, aggressively, and effctively with the regime under the
united leadership of the UMMDU. Moreover, the active participation of the middle class
in the democratic movement, after the disclosure o f Park Chong-Chul’s death and Chun’s
suspansion of negotiations for constitutional revision, decisively influenced changing the
character of civil society. Based on this changed character, after a series of violent
confrontations between the regime and the opposition force, the Chun regime finally
accepted the demand for democratization through Roh’s “June 29 Declaration” in 1987.
Compared with previous periods, democratic civil society of this period was much
more aggressive, active, and united, and thus its democratic struggles were more
influential. This changed character in civil society significantly contributed to attaining
751 Dong-A Daily, 23 March 1986.
732 In addition, the number o f people who supported Roh Tae-Woo was gradually increased. They
did not favor the parliamentary system because they believed that this system could allow Chun to
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counter-hegemony against the regime. This significant change of civil society was
affected by various internal and external elements. More importantly, those elements
affected the character of democratic civil society simultaneously and favorably in this
period. In previous periods, some elements had advantageously influenced whereas some
other elements had unfavorably affected the character of democratic civil society. Thus,
it had been difficult for democratic civil society to be aggressive, united, and influential
in spite of active struggles. Moreover, civil society could not consistently maintain the
changed character because of suppression and intmai divisions. However, after the
general election in 1985, internal and external factors began to influence the character of
civil society simultaneously and favorably. This unprecedent phenomenon made
democratic civil society strong enough to overwhelm the suppression and to attain
counter-hegemony against the regime. Therefore, the simultaneous and favorable
influence of internal and external factors was crucial in changing the character of civil
society.
First of all, development of political culture significantly influenced the character
of democratic civil society in this period. Although the political culture of this period did
not completely change to democratic civic culture, the change was widely spread in the
society.753 This spread of democratic civic culture constructively affected the character
of democratic civil society through direct and indirect ways. For example, the qualitative

influence post-Chun era. Therefore, the internal situation within the ruling coalition also influenced Chun’s
decision. Oh Byung-Sang, Chunghwadae Bisusil 4 (The Secretary’s office of the Blue House 4), 72-3.
753 In the eyes o f Korean, who were no longer living in dire poverty, they saw the Chun regime as
not only repressive but also illegitimate. This kind change in the public perception toward the regime was
strong influenced by democratic political culture and economic development In addition, this critical
attitude o f the public was clearly expressed in the election. In the election, the opposition NKDP captured
seats in SO out o f 92 electoral districts and won 29% of the total votes. Its popular support was only 6%
lower than the ruling DJP received. Shin Doh-Chul, Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1-2.

350

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

growth of the middle class, strongly influenced by the spread o f democratic civic culture,
greatly contributed to changing the character of civil society. In addition, the middle
class came to place more emphasis on democratic values and principles, such as human
rights, and to actively express their political dissatisfaction. Thus, when the Park ChongChul incident took place, the middle class erupted and actively protested the violation of
human rights. Before this period, when violation of human rights by the regime had
taken place, the middle class had never participated in the protests of democratic civil
society. Unlike previous periods, however, the active support and participation of the
middle class in democratic civil society became a foundation o f the active, united, and
aggressive character of civil society in this period.754
The outcome of a survey, reported by Hankook Daily in early May 1987, foretold
the participation of the middle class in the democratic movement.755 According to the
survey, the middle class in South Korea was not a conservative force concerned mainly
with social order, but had a very critical opinion of the current political regime. A large
part of the middle class responded negatively to developmentalism, the ideological
bedrock of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state. As many as 85.7 percent of 1,043
respondents agreed that to improve human rights was desirable even if it slowed
economic development In addition, 64 percent wanted to amend the Constitution prior
to the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, and 59 percent preferred the presidential system to
the cabinet system.

754 On I January 1987, Hankook Daily reported the results of a survey on the national
consciousness, conducted in early December 1986. According to the results o f the survey, the middle class,
who had more education, were more critical of the reality of political underdevelopment than any other
class and strongly aspired to political change. Based on this result, Hankook Daily expected that the middle
class would appear as a leading force for democratization. Hankook Daily, 1 January 1987,9-13.
755 Hankook Daily, 9 June 1987.
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In addition, the middle class strongly disapproved of the ideological radicalization
o f democratic civil society and the impasse of negotiations over the constitution. That is,
the middle class strongly pressured radical organizations to change their radical
ideologies and strategies, and neutralized those anti-democratic radical organizations.
The middle class spoke out and acted to realize its liberal-democratic values. For
example, on the first day of 1987, Chosun Daily, one of four major daily newspapers sent
a New Years message:
Where are we now and where should we go? And who are we that suffer
historical throes? To answer it, Chosun Ubo addressed “the middle
stratum-led society” as the theme of the year. The direction we are taking
and we should take is an advanced industrial structure and a plural
democratic polity appropriate to it. The former had continued to be
undertaken, but the latter is still undergoing confusion and throes...
Who will iron out the difficulties and how?
What is to be done first, we believe, is that the middle stratum, the
majority of our society, must break its silence. We must overcome the
time of polarization. Time has come when the condensed will of the
middle stratum, who has kept silent in the middle of a sterile atmosphere
polarized between extreme conservatives and extreme revolutionaries, is
to be placed broadly in the center of political society.756
In an interview with two social scientists, A Chosun Daily columnist characterized the
middle class as strongly demanding democratization and social and economic justice. In
addition, they preferred a non-revolutionary, gradual approach to democratization. They
stressed the significance of the middle class in rationally getting the potentially volatile
frictions between two extremisms, authoritarianism and minjungism, both of which were
not representative. The key point is that “democratization will come if the middle class
leads society.”757 As they anticipated, the middle class, strongly influenced by
development of political culture, became a foundation for having a more united, active,

756 Chosun Daily, 1 January 1987.
757 Chosun Daily, 1 January 1987,3.
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aggressive, and influential character, and played an important role in the democratization
process of this period.
In addition, the development of political culture favorably affected the opposition
party in the general election of 1985. Unlike previous periods, the election turnout was
very high, even under the implicit pressure by the regime. That is, the changed political
culture was also reflected by the voting behavior of the middle class who was motivated
politically rather than economically. This active support of the middle class who wanted
democratization made the NKDP successful in the election and contributed to attaining
counter-hegemony against the regime. Moreover, the active support of the middle class
spread to almost every social class, and they did not hesitate to express their aspirations
for democratization.758 For example, a free scribbling board in the front of the
Myungdong Cathedral was filled with words of encouragement. This kind of behavior
was unimaginable until the mid-1980s. Those words of encouragement were:
We fully support the democratic struggles of patriotic students and
citizens. Thanks to your unyielding struggles, a hope for democratization
has been growing in our heart...(democratic workers from Exchange
Bank)
To dear students:
Please forgive a weak, foolish, mid-40 year old man who feels ashamed
and guilty for turning away from the present situation and the students'
patriotic struggles and sacrifices, wishing to be with you... I believe
many citizens who are silently watching you support patriotic students.
Please take care of yourself.
On the other hand, the change of political culture also affected the reaction of the
regime toward the opposition force and their democratic struggle. Within the ruling
751 Values as trust in others, equality, tolerance, and upholding of civil rights had become an
important way of thinking for the young (those under 40 years of age), the urban population and the new
middle class. Han Bae-Ho, The Korean Political Culture: Four Cultural Cleavages and Polarizing Trends
in Political Alignment (Seoul: Korea University, 1985).
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coalition, the number of the moderates who emphasized a dialogue with the opposition
force as a solution for the political crisis increased, and they increasingly influenced the
decision making process for dealing with the political crisis. The moderates within the
ruling coalition recognized that the repressive policy could not solve the crisis and made
the situation worse. The Chun regime that witnessed active support and participation of
the middle class who was politically motivated and did not hesitate to express their
dissatisfaction toward the authoritarian regime could not just use its repressive policy to
solve the political crisis. This influence of democratic civic culture strongly affected the
Chun regime's decision to make a concession to the opposition.760
In addition, the development of political culture advantageously affected the
external environment. The development of political culture in South Korea influenced
the U.S. government, which had witnessed spread of democratic civic culture, to support
democratic civil society and pressure the Chun regime not to use the military to suppress
the democratic movement. The U.S. learned that the military could not stop the
democratic movement of civil society and the middle class who had strong desires for
democratization in the case of the Philippines.761 Thus, the U.S. concluded that the
Korean government could not control the democratic movement, and thus pressured the
Chun regime not to use the military to suppress. In this respect, the spread of democratic

759 Kwon Yong-Ki and et al, 6, 10 eso Myungdong kkagi (From June 10 to Myungdong), Wolgan
Chosun, (July 1987): 142-43.
760 Along with the warning of the U.S. government, the spread of democratic civic political culture
in the society also significantly influenced the Chun’s decision to make a concession to the opposition
force. That is, the Chun regime realized that it was impossible to control the democratic civil society that
was attaining counter-hegemony despite physical suppression. Thus, the Chun regime chose concession to
the opposition force as a second best choice.
761 Yun-Han Chu, Fu Hu, and Chung-In Moon, “South Korea and Taiwan: The International
Context,” in Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, 277.
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civic culture indirectly induced the U.S. support to the opposition force and pressure on
the Chun regime.
Second, economic development of this period directly and indirectly influenced
civil society by affecting other internal and external elements, such as political culture
and the political opportunity structure. As Table 6-3 illustrates, the economy could not
have been better during this period. Successful economic development, such as rapid
industrialization and strong growth, facilitated accumulated effects of social and political
mobilizations. The most significant influence of the economic development was that it
raised a question about the legitimacy of the regime among those in the middle class who
had political consciousness. Thus, successful economic development of this period made
the Chun regime more vulnerable to the challenge from democratic civil society. In
addition, the reaction of the regime toward the democratic movement was also limited by
the consequence of the economic development, such as the politically motivated middle
class.762
Table 6-3
Major Economic Indicators (1985-1987)
Export (in
GNP (current
Per capita GNP
Economic
millions of $)
(US$)
prices in billions
growth rate (%)
of won)
2194
30283.1
1985
78088.4
7.0
2503
34714.5
12.9
1986
90543.0
47280.0
1987
3098
12.8
105629.8
Source: John Cie-chiang Oh, Korean Politics: The Questfo r Democratization and
Economic Development, 62.
Year

762 For example, instead of using the military to suppress the democratic movement, President
Chun, seeking to end the most serious crisis in his seven-year presidency, offered to reopen the suspended
debate on constitutional revision and release from detention dissident leader Kim Dae Jung and others, said
an opposition leader on June 24, 1987. Washington Post, Wednesday, 24 June 1987, Al.
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Unlike in the 1970s and early 1980s, the Chun regime could not take advantage of
successful economic development in this period. Instead, the middle class who had been
more interested in economic prosperity than political development became more
concerned with political development once they were satisfied economically during the
mid-1980s.763 Therefore, the successful economic development made the middle class
more actively support the democratic movement, and this active support caused
democratic groups and organizations to be more united and influential. Moreover, this
active support of the middle class became a foundation for democratic civil society to
overcome suppression and challenge the hegemony of the regime. In this respect,
economic development advantgeously affected development of politcal culture, and the
spread of democratic civic culture positively influenced the character of democratic civil
society in this period.
In addition, economic development also constructively affected the political
opportunity structure by influencing development of political culture. Although the
regime returned its policy to a repressive policy in late 1984, the expanded political
opportunity structure was not reversed by suppression. One of important reasons for this
was active support of the middle class, strengthened by economic development. This
active support of the middle class who had political consciousness led the Chun regime to
uncontrollable situation in spite of harsh suppression. Therefore, the economic
development indirectly caused the regime difficult to control the already expanded
political opportunity structure by harsh suppression.
Besides political culture and the political opportunity structure, the economic
development of this period also advantageously affected the external environment. For
763 Hankook Daily, 1 January 1987,9-13.
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instance, according to successful economic development, developed countries, such as
the United States, began to pressure the Korean government for sweeping trade
liberalization and financial deregulation. This pressure weakened the political base of the
regime and loosened the grip of business sector which had been a part o f the ruling
coalition. This external pressure caused the ruling coalition to be divided and made the
hardliners’ polisition within the regime weaken. Under this weakened and divided
regime, democratic civil society could struggle more actively and effectively.
Third, in the perspective of the political opportunity structure, the regime pursued
a harsh repressive policy toward democratic civil society and its struggles after the short
decompression period. However, there was a great difference between this and previous
periods in the reaction of democratic civil society to suppression. In previous periods,
democratic civil society was easily and sharply shrunk by suppression and therefore
rendered inconsequential. Thus, most democratic organizations and their leaders had to
concentrate on their survival. In addition, the middle class did not or hesitated to
participate in the democratic movement because of the threat of suppression.
However, during the mid-1980s, the expanded political opportunity structure
brought about by the decompression policy and the general election of 1985 was not
rapidly retracted by suppression. Despite the fact that many leaders of democratic civil
society were arrested, some democratic organizations, such as radical student
organizations and labor unions, even struggled more aggressively with the Chun regime,
as Figure 6-2 shows. Moreover, other social classes and groups, such as professors,
lawyers, doctors, and journalists who had been quiet began to actively participate in the
democratic movement and to express their desires for democratization and political
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dissatisfaction. For example, after 28 professors of Korea University issued a supporting
statement for democratic reform on March 28, hundreds of university professors followed
in spite of the threat from the Ministry of Education. In addition, after Chun announced
his decision to suspend negotiations for the constitutional revision, 1,475 professors from
48 universities issued a public statement on 22 April 1987 that criticized Chun's
decision.764
Figure 6-2
Tendency o f Democratic Movement, 1984-1987

4030 _
Number

20

13

Q uarter

341234123412341234
84 85 86 S7

That is, the expanded political opportunity structure, not easily retracted by
suppression, made the character o f civil society more united, active, and aggressive under
harsh suppression. Democratic organizations, established during the decompression
period, were not easily destroyed by suppression because they were well organized in
terms of structure, ideology, and strategy, compared with those of previous periods.
Most democratic organizations were under the control o f well-organized nationwide
umbrella organizations, and their members who gained support from the middle class did
764 Wolgan Chosun, no. 6, (1986): 476; Dong-A Daily, 22 April 1987.
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not easily give up their organizations. Another example was that the number of
democratic organizations established in this period was higher than that of the
decompression period (see Table 6-4). As a result, those democratic organizations
resisted more aggressively against the repressive authoritarian regime, and thus their
democratic movement was getting more violent. For instance, on 29 April 1986, the riot
police and about 1,500 students at Yonsei University battled with rocks, clubs and tear
gas as an antigovemment demonstration turned violent.765
Table 6-4
Democratic Organizations, Established after Returning to Suppression
Name of Organizations
Members of Organizations
Association of Minjung Movement for
Jaeya force
Democracy and Unification (Mintongryun)
Coalition of Korean Protestant Labor
Protestant workers
(Kinoryun)
Coalition of Social Movements in the
members of Jaeya group
Inchon area (Insayun)
in Inchon area
Conference of Democratic Citizens in
social movement leaders
Busan (Buminhyup)
in Busan area
members of expelled
Council of the Democratic Press
Movement (Minju Ollon Undong
teachers in 1980, and
Hyubuihoe)
publishers
Council of Writers for Freedom (Chayu
writers' organization
Silchun Munin Hyubuihoe)
Federation of Labor Movements in Inchon labor movement activists
Area (Innoryun)
in Inchon area
Federation of Labor Movements in Seoul
labor movement activists
Area (Seonoryun)
and union members in
Seoul area
Gukookhaksaengyonmaeng (Gukookryun) radical students
Korea Labor Christian Federation
(Han/cook Kidok Nodongfa
Chongyonmaeng)
National Coalition for Democratic
Constitution (NCDC)

Date
March 29,
1985
February 3,
1985
November
19,1984
May 3,
1985
December
19,1984
December
19,1984
Feb. 7,
1986
August 25,
1985

educator, professors,
lawyers

March 29,
1986
February 3,
1985

religious and intellectual
dissenters

May 27,
1987

765 Chicago Tribune, 30 April 1986.
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Table 6-4—continued

Name o f Organization
National Coalition o f Anti-emperial Antidictatorial Patriotic Students (Ehakryn)
National Council o f University Students
Representatives (Chtmkook Daehaksaeng
Daepyoja Hyupuihwui)
National Democratic Struggle Committee
Against Imperialism and Fascism
CMinmintuwi)
National Federation of Student Association
{Chunhaknyun)
National Liaison Organization for
Democracy (Minjuhwanul wihan Kookmin
Undong Yollakgigu)
National Movement Headquarter of
Democratic Constitution {Kookmin
Undong Bonbu)
Self-Reliant Democratization Struggle
Committee Against the United States and
Fascism (Jamintuwi)
Struggle Committee for Three Mins:
People, Nation, and Democracy
(Sammintuwi)
Sudaehyup {Seoul Jiyuk Daehaksaeng
Hyupuihwe)
United Minjung (masses) Movement for
Democracy and Unification {Mintongryun)

Members of Organizations
radical students under
Chunhakryun
about 3,500 students of 95
colleges and universities

Date
November
3,1986
August 19,
1987

radical student movement
activists

March 29,
1986

nationwide student
organization members of
23 universities
opposition politicians and
Jaeya leaders

April 17,
1985

most democratic
organizations and middle
class citizens*
radical student movement
activists
radical university students

March 17,
1986
May 27,
1987
April 10,
1986
April 17,
1985

students of 18 universities May 8,
in Seoul area
1987
23 organizations from
Mar.29,
among dissidents, labor,
1985
religious community,
farmers, the poor and
intellectuals
* 1) sectoral representatives-253 Catholic Priests, 270 Protestant pastors, 160 Buddhist
monks, 35 from the PMCDR, 213 opposition politicians, 162 women's movement
leaders, 308 from the Council for the Promotion o f Democracy Movement, 171 peasant
activists, 39 labor activists, 18 urban poor activists, 43 publishers and journalists, 43
authors and writers, 66.
In particular, the expanded political opportunity structure was not easily retracted
by the regime's suppression because of the qualitative and quantitative growth of the
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middle class and their enthusiastic support to the democratic movement.766 The spread of
democratic civic culture also unfavorably affected the regime to control the democratic
movement of civil society, and thus the regime failed to reverse the expanded political
opportunity structure. Not only democratic civil society but also middle class citizens,
influenced by democratic civic culture, were not afraid of suppression and resisted more
actively against the repressive authoritarian regime. As Figure 6-2 illustrates, the number
of democratic struggles sharply increased in this repressive period. More importantly,
many middle class citizens began to participate actively in democratic organizations and
their protests. The regime’s harsh suppression of this period provided a strong motive for
civil society to be united and to have a more assertive character in the democratic
struggle. For instance, two students’ death provided an opportunity for moderate and
radical democratic organizations to unite and struggle more aggressively with the
authoritarian regime.767 Therefore, the expanded political opportunity structure favorably
affected changing and maintaining the active, united, and influential character, both
directly and indirectly.
Fourth, external factors also greatly contributed to changing the character of civil
society in this period. One such event was the democratic transition in the Philippines,
providing both courage and confidence to supporters of democracy in Korea. Due to the
influence of the successful democratic transition in the Philippines, democratic civil
society became more aggressive and united. For instance, after the democratization of
766 According to democratic movement activists, the support and participation o f the middle class
in the democratic movement were their strongest weapons in struggling with the regime. Because
democratic groups and organizations received strong support from the public, especially from the middle
class, they came to have confidence in winning in democratic struggle and thereby force the regime toward
the democratic transition process.
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the Philippines in 1986, the Catholic Church that played a very significant role in the
democratization process of the Philippines supported and participated more actively in
the democratic movement in Korea.768 This external event made not only democratic
civil society but also ordinary people have stronger desires for democratization.
The democratic transition in the Philippines also made the Chun regime realize
that physical suppression o f democratic civil society could not effectively control the
democratic movement that the middle class supported and participated in. Consequently,
the regime accepted the demand of the opposition force as a second best strategy and
negotiated the democratic transition process with the opposition party. In this respect, the
successful democratic transition in the Philippines not only contributed to changing the
character of civil society, but also influenced the regime’s policy in dealing with the
democratic movement of civil society in this period.
U.S. pressure on the Chun regime and its indirect support to the democratic
movement also influenced civil society in this period. After the collapse of the Marcos
regime, the U.S. government pressured President Chun to tolerate peaceful opposition
rallies and accommodate some opposition demands.769 Secretary of the State, George P.
Shultz, was sent to express that the U.S. government supported compromise between the

767 In the ideological perspective, radical and leftist ideologies o f radical democratic organizations
began to move to the center in order to legitimate themselves and win the support of the public after the
Park Chong-Chul’s death.
7 For example, issuing public statements of church leaders, criticizing the authoritarianism of the
Chun regime, and increasing their participation in the democratic movement were more active. On June 2,
1987,1,300 Catholic priests and nurses demonstrated and demanded democratization by the democratic
way. In addition, on June 20, Clashes between demonstrators and police continued, with Buddhist monks
participating in the anti-government rally for the first time. The monks, using their fists and umbrellas,
fought police who tried to drag them away. Dong-A Daily, 24 June 1987; Washington Post, Sunday, 2 1
June 1987, A26.
769 Yun-Han Chu, Fu Hu, and Chung-In Moon, “South Korea and Taiwan: The International
Context,” 276-77.
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regime and the NKDP.770 In addition, the U.S. warned the Chun regime not to use the
military to suppress the democratic movement Knowing this, democratic civil society
became more active and aggressive in the struggle with the Chun regime.771 In this
respect external pressure and events advantageously affected the character of democratic
civil society by influencing the political opportunity structure. That is, external
environment contributed to maintaining the expanded political opportunity structure by
pressuring the Chun regime, and it helped democratic civil society to attain counterhegemony.
Along with the U.S. warning, the Chun regime could not use the military to
suppress the democratic movement because of a concern with international opinion as a
host country of the Olympic Games in 1988.772 The movement, knowing of the regime’s
difficulty in using the military to suppress it, was able to act more aggressively to attain
counter-hegemony against the regime. Therefore, democratic civil society was reinforced
by external factors, such as democratization of the Philippines, the hosting the Olympic
Games, and U.S. pressure.
Compared with the previous period, those four factors more advantageously and
consistently affected the character of civil society in this period. That is, the authoritarian
regime, unlike the 1970s and early 1980s, did not take advantage of the successful
economic development, and the successful economic development provided economic
and cultural resources that civil society and the middle class could utilize in attacking the

770 Washington Post, Friday, 6 March 1987, A25; 27 June and 5 July 1987.
771 U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Gaston Sigur between 23 and 25 June 1987 made it clear that
the U.S security guarantee was valid only as long as the South Korean government did not use the military
to put down the unrest. Juergen Kleiner, Korea: A Century o f Change, 219.
772 Many countries would have found the imposition of martial law appalling and might have
cancelled their participation in the 1988 Olympic Games. Juergen Kleiner, Korea: A Century o f Change,
218.
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illegitimacy o f the Chun regime. Moreover, the influences of successful economic
development on the political opportunity structure and external factors were favorable to
civil society as in the previous period. In addition, the successful economic development
caused other developed countries to pressure on economic and political policies of the
regime, and this pressure weakened the ruling coalition. Under this divided and
weakened regime, democratic civil society that had an active, aggressive, and united
character could struggle more effectively with the regime. Therefore, economic
development was a very significant necessary condition for changing the character of
democratic civil society in this democratization period.
Second, as in the previous period, political culture also favorably affected civil
society. The active support and participation of the middle class, influenced by
democratic civic culture, was crucial for democratic movement. In this period, this active
support and participation of the middle class were more constructive than those of the
pervious period. In addition, the influence o f political culture on the political opportunity
structure was also favorable to civil society. Despite the fact that the regime tried to
reverse the expanded political opportunity structure by suppression, as in the previous
period, the expanded political opportunity structure was not easily retracted. As
mentioned before, one important reason for this was the influence of democratic civic
culture on civil society and the middle class. Particularly in this period, external pressure
and events, such as democratization of the Philippines and the U.S. pressure and support
accelerated the spread of democratic civic culture, and provided confidence to democratic
groups and activists. Therefore, political culture constructively and significantly affected
civil society as a necessary condition.
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Third, the political opportunity structure, expanded in late 1983, also significantly
and positively affected civil society. Although the Chun regime tried to control the
democratic movement and the opposition party by retracting the expanded political
opportunity structure and replacing with repression, it did not work well because of
domestic and external restrictions. This expanded political opportunity structure had
remained in this period and provided more space for democratic civil society to struggle
actively and effectively.
Last, the external environment of this period more favorably affected civil society
than ever before. Compared with the previous period, the external environment of this
period directly and advantageously affected the character of civil society. Especially
after the collapse of the Marcos regime of the Philippines in 1986, democratic civil
society came to have confidence in the prospect for democratization and struggled more
aggressively and effectively with Chun regime despite repression. In addition, the middle
class who witnessed the democratic transition process of the Philippines became
significantly more active.
The most important factor may be that these elements affected the character of
civil society, both favorably and simultaneously. Because of this favorable and
simultaneous influence, the democratic movement could reach a peak point in this period
and successfully forced the regime toward the democratic transition process. Thus, this
unprecedented phenomenon explains why the democratic transition o f South Korea
occurred when it did. Despite the fact that those internal and external elements had
influenced civil society since the early 1970s, they had been neither consistent nor
positive until the mid-1980s because of repression and lack of readiness of democratic
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civil society. Under these circumstances, there was a limitation in changing the divided,
isolated, and inconsequential character of civil society to an active, united, assertive, and
influential one.
However, after the general election of 1985, those internal and external elements
affected democratic civil society simultaneously, and more importantly, each of those
elements advantageously affected the changing character of democratic civil society.
This change directly affected the capability of democratic civil society to struggle for
democratization, and finally it played a crucial role in accomplishing the ultimate goal,
democratic transition.
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CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that the democratic transition of South (Corea was a result of
active struggles and sacrifices of many individuals and democratic groups and
organizations of civil society for a long time. Along with the installation of the Yushin
authoritarian regime in the early 1970s, several civil society groups, such as students, the
Jaeya force, religious communities, and labor organizations, transformed to pro
democracy groups and began to work for restoration of a democratic constitution. In the
early Yushin period, these groups of civil society focused to resist against suppression
and struggled with the regime for their individual goals. In spite of their active struggles,
however, authoritarian regimes had not been directly challenged by explicitly democratic
civil society until the mid-1980s because of its inconsequential struggles.
Although democratic civil society indirectly contributed to the collapse o f the
Yushin regime by destabilizing political situation in the end of the 1970s, it did not have
the capacity to push the process to the ultimate goals of a democratic transition. Rather,
internal power struggles and conflicts within civil society and political parties induced
direct military intervention and establishment of another authoritarian regime. After the
establishment of the new authoritarian regime in 1980, democratic civil society had to
face the harshest suppression, and a divided, isolated, and inconsequential character of
civil society had remained until the mid-1980s. Because of this divided and isolated
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character, the democratic movement o f civil society could not be influential, and thus the
regime was unresponsive (other than repression) until the mid-1980s. How the divided,
isolated, and inconsequential civil society became active, united, assertive, and influential
after the general election of 198S, and began to attain counter-hegemony against the
regime, is part of the overall puzzle addressed by this dissertation. It was the active,
united, and aggressive civil society of 1986-87 that made the authoritarian regime to
accept demands for democratization.
On the other hand, the modernization thesis that has attempted to explain
democratic transition with a relationship between economic development and democracy
is partially helpful to explain the evolution process of Korean civil society. According to
the modernization thesis, economic development generates the legitimacy problem of
authoritarian regimes because public aspirations move from economic prosperity to
political development. In addition, it facilitates creation of the middle class and fosters a
democratic civic culture through education. These arguments may help to explain the
growth of Korean civil society in the mid-1980s. That is, economic development was an
important variable that explains several phenomena related to the evolutionary of Korean
civil society. For instance, successful economic development decisively contributed to
creation of the middle class who had political consciousness, and this middle class
became a foundation for the active democratic movement of civil society in the mid1980s.
Nevertheless, it is limited in explaining the long and complicated evolutionary
process of the Korean civil society that had been affected by many internal and external
factors. For instance, the successful economic development in the 1970s and early 1980s
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did not play the above positive roles for democratic transition or the growth of civil
society. Rather, it had been favorable to the authoritarian regime by providing legitimacy
until the mid-1980s. In addition, the modernization thesis is limited in explaining the
sudden vitalization of Korean civil society and the change of the public discourse in the
mid-1980s. More importantly, it has a serious limitation in explaining how civil society
attains counter-hegemony against the authoritarian regime and why democratic transition
occurs in a certain time. In this respect, the modernization thesis is inadequate to explain
the long and complicated evolutionary process of Korean civil society and democratic
transition process.
This study found that the fundamental reason for the inconsequential struggle of
civil society during the 1970s and early 1980s was an inconsistent and unfavorable
influence of internal and external elements, such as political culture, economic
development, political opportunity structure, and external environment, on civil society.
Some factors, such as traditional Confucian political culture, economic development, and
external factors, had obstructively affected the character o f democratic civil society
during the 1970s and early 1980s. In addition, the unfavorable impact of those factors
provided excuses for suppressing democratic groups and organizations and their
democratic struggles. Furthermore, favorable influence o f some factors, such as
expansion of the political opportunity structure, was not consistent because of
suppression by the regime and internal divisions within civil society.
This unfavorable and inconsistent influence of internal and external factors caused
democratic civil society to be divided and made its democratic movement
inconsequential. Moreover, democratic civil society found no support from the middle
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class for three reasons. First, the middle class had been reluctant to explicitly support
civil society because of the regime’s repression. Thus, despite the fact that they were
critical of authoritarian regimes, they did not openly express their support to democratic
civil society and it movement. Second, some radical organizations and their radical and
violent ideologies made the middle class keep a distance from civil society. Third, the
size of the middle class had been small, and thus its support to civil society could not be
influential. Under such circumstances, the democratic movement of civil society could
not be influential and was therefore easily suppressed and unable to compete with the
regime.
However, a significant change took place in the influence of internal and external
elements on the character of civil society. With the expansion of the political opportunity
structure by the regime’s decompression policy in late 1983, those internal and external
factors began to affect the character of democratic civil society, both favorably and
simultaneously. As Figure 7-1 shows, whereas most internal and external elements had
unfavorably influenced the character of civil society during the 1970s and early 1980s,
those elements o f the mid-1980s constructively affected i t This significant change in
influence of internal and external elements induced a more democratic civil society that
was more united, active, aggressive, and influential. More importantly, the middle class,
strongly influenced by evolution of political culture, successful economic development
and the expanded political opportunity structure, began to support the opposition force
more actively from the mid-1980s. This could only enhance the influence of democratic
civil society.
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Figure 7-1
The Change of Character of Democratic Civil Society
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In particular, the eruption of the middle class in the mid-1980s caused a hitherto
divided democratic civil society to unite. The politically motivated middle class strongly
criticized the division of civil society and demanded unification of civil society. In order
for democratic civil society to draw active support of the middle class, radical and
moderate organizations of civil society had to compromise and cooperate with each other.
Thus, more united and aggressive democratic civil society, actively supported by the
middle class, could play a decisive role in the Chun regime’s concession to the opposition
force in 1987. In this respect, the significant role of the middle class in the mid-1980s
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was to pressure heterogeneous democratic civil society in terms of ideologies, goals, and
strategies to unite and struggle for the ultimate goal, democratic transition.
Especially, the middle class played a decisive role not only in neutralizing radical
organizations, which had anti-democratic characters and fought for “people’s
democracy,” but also in uniting various democratic groups and organizations. Before the
middle class actively supported and participated in civil society, radical organizations that
had an anti-democratic character were active and played a leadership role in the
democratic movement because there was no force that could check their radical
ideologies and activities. However, after the mid-1980s, the middle class became openly
critical of the ideologies and strategies of radical organizations, and clearly expressed its
dissatisfaction toward radical organizations, especially their undemocratic nature. This
strong criticism and demand forced radical organizations to reconsider their ideologies
and strategies, and led them to cooperate with moderate groups and organizations. In
order for those radical organizations to maximize the support of the middle class, there
were not many options, except for cooperating with moderate groups and organizations.
That is, those radical organizations realized that they could not be supported by the
middle class who wanted liberal democracy, and had to temporarily give up their radical
ideologies and strategies. Therefore, the strong pressure of the ideologically conservative
middle class decisively contributed to marginalizing and neutralizing anti-democratic
radical organizations.
Through examining the character of civil society during the 1970s and 1980s and
its influence on the democratic movement, this study could confirm as follows. The
character of civil society had been changed gradually by the confluence of several
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factors, including political culture, economic development, the political opportunity
structure, and external environment, in spite of divisions within civil society and harsh
suppression of the regime. The first sign of the change in the character of civil society
took place in the mid-1970s. Various groups that had concentrated on struggling for their
individual goals began to realize that restoration of a democratic constitution was the
only way to achieve them. Accordingly, the authoritarian regime became the common
target of democratic groups and organzations, and thus they could theoretically cooperate
against the common enemy. Although there were internal conflicts within democratic
civil society, the level of cooperation that did take place contributed to the concentration
of resources and efforts. Especially, in the late Yushin regime, democratic groups and
organizations mobilized their members and mass to express their economic and political
dissatisfaction and therefore greatly contributed to the political crisis that brought the
collapse of the Yushin regime.
Other factors contributed to the graduate maturation of civil society in the mid1970s. First, the evolution of political culture had both positive and negative impact. In
the 1970s and early 1980s, the traditional Confucian political culture was favorable to the
authoritarian regime and hindered a change from a hierarchial to a more balanced
relationship between the state and civil society. In addition, this traditional political
culture discouraged the middle class from participating in democratic organizations and
the democratic movement. During the 1970s and early 1980s, this unfavorable influence
of political culture was strongly affected by external environment, such as the Cold War,
the U.S. defeat in the Vietnam War, and confrontation with North Korea. These
international environment and events had hindered a change of political culture and
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opening o f the political opportunity structure and obstructively affected other internal
factors.
However, this unfavorable influence of the traditional political culture in the early
authoritarian period slowly faded out, and democratic civic culture slowly spread by
socio-economic development From the mid-1980s, the changed political culture
significantly influenced not only the character of democratic civil society but also the
perception and behavior of the middle class toward the authoritarian regime. In
particular, the growing and strengthening of the middle class in the mid-1980s became a
foundation of democratic civil society. In addition, the changed political culture also
influenced the reaction of the regime to the democratic movement. Due to the spread of
democratic civic culture, the authoritarian regime realized that harsh suppression could
not be a ultimate solution for the political crisis and finally accepted a demand for
democratic transition as a second best choice. That is, unlike the 1970s and early 1980s,
the political culture had favorably affected other internal and external factors, such as
political opportunity structure and external environment. In this respect, outcomes of
evolution of political culture appeared as active support of the middle class and change of
the regime’s policy toward the opposition force in the mid-1980s. The development of
political culture was an important necessary condition for changing the character of civil
society.
Second, successful economic development during the 1970s and 1980s had
enormous influence on civil society, both favorably and unfavorably. As an unfavorable
influence, the authoritrian regime took advantage of successful economic development
until the early 1980s, turning it into a source of legitimacy and using it (in part) as
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leverage to maintain hegemony over civil society. Under this circumstance, it was very
difficult for democratic civil society to draw popular support and to struggle effectively
with the authoritarian regime. Furthermore, bad economic condition, caused by rapid
economic development, provided an excuse for direct military intervention and
maintenance of authoritarianism. As with political culture, economic development of the
1970s and early 1980s negatively reinforced other factors. For instance, successful
economic development had negatively affected civil society by providing legitimacy to
authoritarian regimes. Because of this favorable impact on the regime, authoritarian
regimes did not have to open the political opportunity structure that restricted political
activities of democratic civil society.
On the other hand, economic development began to help to change the character
of democratic civil society from the mid-1980s. Successful economic development
significantly influenced the growth and strength of the middle class and changed its
perception of the regime throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The middle class that had
supported the authoritarian regime grew to be critical of it and more actively supported
democratic civil society and its movement after the mid-1980s. This active support and
participation of the middle class became a very important motive for democratic civil
society to be active, united, and aggressive. In addition, successful economic
development significantly influenced the regime’s policy toward democratic civil society
and its movement, and consequentially advantageously influenced the character of
democratic civil society. Especially, after the mid-1980s, the outcome of successful
economic development began to appear clearly in the change of the public discourse,
political culture, and political opportunity sructure, and it contributed to the growth of
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democratic civil society. Therefore, successful economic development was a necessary
condition for changing the character of civil society.
In this respect, the modernization thesis is still powerful in explaining the
evolutionary process of civil society and its impact on democratic transition of the mid1980s. In the Korean case, economic development strongly influenced not only civil
society but also development of political culture and political opportunity structure, both
implicitly and explicitly. This implicit and explicit influence of economic development
became a foundation for the development of civil society and made its movement more
influential. Therefore, the modernization thesis is still a powerful tool for explaining the
development of Korean civil society and the democratic transition of the 1980s.
Nevertheless, as mentioned before, the modernization theory can not be a sufficient tool
for explaining the whole evolutionary process of Korean civil society. For instance, this
study found that it is limited in explaining the unfavorable influence of economic
development on civil society during the 1970s and early 1980s.
Third, the political opportunity structure had not been opened until President
Park’s death. Because of favorable influence of internal and external factors on the
regime, the regime did not have to open the political opportunity structure, and the
opposition force could not have the capacity to force it to open it. Under the closed
political opportunity structure, democratic civil society could not be active, united,
aggressive, and its democratic movement had been inconsequential. After the political
opportunity structure was accidently opened by Park’s death, the temporary expansion of
the political opportunity structure provided space for democratic groups to be active,
united, and assertive. However, democratic civil society failed to take advantage of this
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great opportunity because of internal divisions and unfavorable influence of other
elements. For example, many people, especially the middle class, still wanted political
and economic stability rather than political development in the early 1980s. In addition,
democratic groups and organizations had to face with internal power struggles and
conflicts in strategies and ideologies for democratic struggles. Under these
circumstances, the military directly intervened and emerged as a central actor in the
transitional politics. Furthermore, the new military force established a new authoritarian
regime and suppressed civil society harsher than that of the Yushin period. By the
emergence of the new authoritarian regime and harsh suppression, the temporarily
opened political opportunity structure was rapidly retracted, and democratic civil society
lost a chance for changing its character.
This closed political opportunity structure was opened by the decompression
policy in late 1983, and the emergence of the strong opposition party in 1985
significantly contributed to the growth of democratic civil society. The expanded
political opportunity structure provided space for democratic groups to be active, united,
and assertive. More importantly, the expanded political opportunity structure, affected by
successful economic development and spread of democratic civic culture, was not easily
retracted after the regime changed its policy to a repression policy. The main reason for
this was that other factors, such as economic development and poitical culture affected
the character of civil society, both favorably and simultaneously. The favorable and
simultaneous influence made democratic civil society have the capability to overcome the
suppression and to struggle more aggressively with the regime.
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In addition, the expanded political opportunity structure greatly contributed to the
appearance of a strong opposition party and establishment of a grand democratic coalition
between the democratic movement and the opposition party. The strong opposition party
not only struggled with the regime in the institutional political arena, but also supported
the democratic movement of civil society through mobilizing mass. In this respect, it
contributed to attaining counter-hegemony o f civil society against the authoritarian
regime. Therefore, the expansion of the political opportunity structure provided an
important motive and space for a democratic civil society, suppressed until the early
1980s, to revitalize and build solidarity among various social groups and organizations in
terms of ideologies, structure, and strategies. From that point forward, the democratic
movement was more influential.
In this sense, the expansion of the political opportunity structure in late 1983
became a turning point in the evolution of democratic civil society and of the
democratization effort. Furthermore, the success of the new opposition party in the
general election of 198S further expanded the political opportunity structure and provided
an opportunity for democratic civil society to build a coalition with the opposition party.
In addition, the expanded political opportunity structure strongly influenced the
perception and behavior of the middle class, and this changed middle class favorably
affected the character of civil society. Therefore, the expansion of the political
opportunity structure was an important and necessary condition for the rise of a strong
democratic civil society.
Last, external factors also affected civil society, again in both favorable and
unfavorable ways. During the 1970s and early 1980s, international environments, such
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as the Cold War and the U.S. foreign policy, acted to buttress the authoritarian regime.
The international environment undermined democratic civil society which shrank and
was inconsequential in its struggle against the repressive regime. In addition, the external
environment was used by the regime to justify repression, especially of radical groups
and organizations, and the democratic movement in general. In this respect, the external
environment undermined the potential growth of democratic civil society.
From the mid-1980s on, external factors positively affected not only the character
of civil society but also the regime’s policy toward democratic civil society. Several
external events, such as the democratization of the Philippines and U.S. pressure,
constructively affected democratic civil society and influenced the regime’s policy for
dealing with the opposition force and democratic struggles. This change of the external
environment was enhanced by other factors, such as economic development, spread of
democratic civic culture, and expansion of the political opportunity structure. Especially,
the external environment significantly contributed to reinforcing favorable influences of
internal elements on the character of civil society. This favorable influence on other
elements did not take place until the mid-1980s. Therefore, the external factor was also
an important necessary condition for the evlution of civil society in the mid-1980s.
Despite the fact that each of those internal and external factors was an important
and necessary condition for changing the character of civil society, those factors had not
affected civil society favorably and simultaneously until the mid-1980s. Most factors
unfavorably and inconsistantly had affected the character of civil society until then. As a
result, democratic civil society was not capable of struggling effectively with the
authoritarian regime. Instead, the unfavorable and inconsistent influence helped regime
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to maintain power, and it made suppression of civil society easier. However, the
influence of those internal and external factors on civil society began to be favorable and
simultaneous after the mid-1980s. This favorable and simultaneous influence decisively
contributed to changing the character of civil society. Along with the change, democratic
civil society became more active, united, and assertive, and its movement became
influential. Furthermore, this change of civil society became a foundation for attainng
counter-hegemony against the authoritarian regime. Therefore, the favorable and
simultanous influence of internal and external factors made democratic civil society
influential, and led to the successful democratic transition. In this respect, the
evolutionary process o f civil society and democratic transition of South Korea is a very
rare case. That is, it is difficult to find favorable and simultaneous influence of internal
and external factors on civil society in other countries. This makes the Korean case
unique and distinctive from other cases of democratic transition.
Additionally, this study could confirm that the character of civil society is more
important than an existence of civil society. This finding can be applied to other cases of
the Third World countries. Thus, studies on civil society and democratization in the
developing world should focus on the character of civil society. As Simone Chambers
points out, if those countries have a “bad civil society,” it is difficult for civil society to
contribute to changing the political system from an authoritarian to a democratic
system.773 Instead of a supporting role, this “bad civil society” plays an unfavorable role
for democratization. Therefore, the existence of civil society is not a sufficient condition

773 Simone Chambers, “A Critical Theory of Civil Society,” In Alternative Conceptions o f Civil
Society, 100-105.
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for democratic transition. Rather, an active, united, and assertive character o f civil
society is a more important and determinant element for bringing about democratization.
Last, this study could also find that by no means the civil society approach is
sufficient to explain the long evolutionary process of civil society that had many internal
and external intervention variables. Although the civil society approach is useful to
analyze the role of civil society in the democratic transition process, for instance, it is
limited in explaining how and why “strong” and “coercive” authoritarian regimes begin
to tolerate democratic movements. In addition, the civil society approach doesn’t have a
theoretical framework with which to analyze the structural mechanisms that would bring
the crisis of authoritarian regime. For example, in the Korean case, the civil society
approach has difficulty in explaining why the authoritarian regime forged the
decompression policy in 1983, which was a turning point of the activation of civil
society.
Another limitation of the civil society approach is the lack of capability to analyze
the changing character of civil society. The civil society approach less emphasizes
factors outside civil society and thus is limited in explaining the influence o f domestic
and international factors on the character of civil society. For instance, the civil society
approach is limited in explaining the changing character of Korean civil society that had
been affected by various internal and external factors. In order to analyze the
evolutionary process of civil society, other factors, such as political opportunity structure,
political culture, economic development, and external environment, should be utilized.
Therefore, the civil society approach is not a sufficient tool for analyzing only the
evolution process of civil society but also democratic transition.
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Through confirming several hypotheses, this study contributes to findings on the
Korean democratic transition and civil society. First, this study has tried to overcome one
of the common weaknesses of previous studies that focused a relatively short period of
democratization by dealing with the whole evolutionary process of civil society from the
emergence of an authoritarian regime to democratic transition. Second, this study has
tried to prove that particular theses, such as the modernization thesis, the political pact,
and the civil society approach, are limited in explaining the complicated democratic
transition process of South Korea. Previous studies that excessively focused on the
modernization thesis and the political pact model are incomplete in the study of Korean
democratization. That is, political elites’s role and influence of successful economic
development can not sufficiently explain the whole process of Korean democratization.
Rather, this study suggests that the character of civil society and its interactions with the
regime should be emphasized.
In addition, this study has tried to overcome another weakness of previous studies
which dismissed the evolution of Korean civil society by analyzing how the divided,
isolated, and inconsequential civil sociey of the 1970s and early 1980s changed to be
active, united, and influential in the mid-1980s. In addition, by highlighting how internal
and external elements affected the character of civil society and how the changed
character eventually led to democratization in Korea, this study helps explain why
Korean democratic transition took place in 1987.
Last, the future task for studying Korean civil society related to its character and
democratization is to focus more on the changing character of civil society and its
influence on democratic transition and consolidation. In the Korean case, the current
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delay of democratic consolidation is also closely related to the character of civil society.
After the democratic transition, democratic civil society shrank rapidly and failed to
institutionalize. Thus, the united and active civil society began to split and many groups
that were instrumental in the transition disappeared once it was over. In addition, a large
portion of the middle class showed conservative orientation once again, and sought
political and social stability. Therefore, future studies of the delaying o f the democratic
consolidation should focus on the character of civil society, the middle class, and its role.
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